Downsizing in Kosovo Risking Security in the Western Balkans

By Rosen Dimov Kosovo, the disputed youngest state on the map of Europe, has recently been said to undergo multiple reductions. Alike a contagious trend, downsizing started in the interim UN mission known as UNMIK and extended to the presence of international community in Kosovo. While, for example, the specialized NATO troops of KFOR are gradually withdrawing as well as EULEX, the tailor-made EU mission in charge of the rule of law, is willing to leave huger discretion to local authorities [1], topics about the newborn country are now getting tabled on the international stage with a surprising and increasing ease. Whether it is due to prima facie normalisation of the situation due to favourable status quo, overlooking Kosovo bears a risk for the security in the Western Balkans, even though most of the regional states are firmly headed towards their Euroatlantic integration. Less uncertainty exists on both sides of the most committed opponent to independent Kosovo and the seceded state. Serbia, yet, formally keeps the passionate rhetorics about Kosovo, underlining that the advisory ruling of the International Court of Justice (dated July 2010) on the compliance of the independence of the state with international law shall not bring it a step further to recognising the province as a separate country [2]. However, in practice, the successor of Former Yugoslavia has to come in terms with the reality and unwillingly enter into a dialogue with the authorities therein. The whole story about Kosovo is complemented by a new chapter, where tranquility is seemingly becoming common. Is it indeed? Closing eyes in order to make an advancement for the whole area of the Western Balkans does not necessarily imply a single note of reconciliation and established understanding among countries in the region [3]. Furthermore, pretending that Kosovo is experiencing unthreatened internal peace and harmony with the neighbours, especially Serbia, poses a peril to security in the whole area. Consequently, this oblivion may blow the Euroatlantic chances of these Western Balkan countries, despite the exceedingly hesitant, nearly unwilling moves of Serbia towards NATO [4]. To start with, downsizing the worries about the legality of Kosovo's independence does not make a thorough change in the relations with border countries. Far before the UN Court pronounced about conformity with international law, Albania (albeit suspicion about second thoughts) was the first to pass a hand to a an equal partner in diplomacy [5]. Macedonia and Montenegro also managed to provoke the anger of Serbia because of opening diplomatic relations with the seceded state. Still, the northern frontier of Kosovo remains unstable and contradicted. At first, Serbia insisted on re-mapping the border, splitting the territory into a Serb dominated and Prishtina-controlled parts [6]. At present, there is a de facto separation because
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authorities of the state of Kosovo, along with their international partners, cannot fully exercise sovereignty over the whole area. Security in the newly invented municipality of Northern Kosovska Mitrovica and the Serbian enclaves is at stake due to parallel Serbian authorities disabling Kosovar institutions to exert their power locally. Taking into consideration the steadiness of the relations of Kosovo and its neighbours Macedonia, Montenegro and Albania, Serbia can only make a move due to the boost of the International Court of Justice to Kosovo. This shift on behalf of the newborn country's fiercest adversary is detrimental to the stability in the region. Serbia can only take advantage of the backup by Russia and China as well as their satellites in order to reduce the likelihood of survival of Kosovo by itself [7]. Hence, a multiplicity of measures can be applied (political as well as economic, primarily) so that Kosovo suffers to the largest degree possible. It goes without saying that in a weakened Kosovo, especially in times of financial crisis, the downsizing of international presence in the country shall not lead to any good. Tension arising will throw Kosovo into a crucial challenge to this emerging democracy, where institutions of the independent state are still being built. Meanwhile, in view of the bitter past when efforts and resources were generously poured by the same international partners in Bosnia and Herzigovina, Kosovo is considered to be a landmark for their success in the region [8]. While it is a lost battle until constitutional changes take place in the three-fold federation, Kosovo has still promising prospects to keep territorial integrity and develop a fully fledged institutional skeleton. Moreover, Kosovo, if it still goes on the right track, can serve as a positive role model for a multi-ethnic state in transition, whose lessons learnt are to be multiplied in the region. Compact masses of Albanians also live in Macedonia and Montenegro (although in much different proportions), so an impulse in Kosovo can directly reflect the others in a domino effect. While the archaic ideal about Great Albania may be not feasible today, people in pieces of former Yugoslavia can co-exist together in a peaceful way [9]. Therefore, until the final status of Kosovo remains unresolved, the fashionable processes of downsizing in Kosovo shall also be downsized themselves. Now that the provoking neighbour is being teased by the UN court, international support is more than necessary in Kosovo. Fragile institutions of the weak democracy have to resist the pressure arising contingent upon the actions of Serbia and circle. Withdrawal or failure of the international presence in Kosovo can discredit the Western partners and diverge the states in the Western Balkans from their Euro-atlantic trajectory. The plan B for their orbit is too Eastern and reminding of the Communist past. In a post-2008 perspective, Kosovo is the key to stability in the whole Western Balkans region. The importance of the state cannot be simplified or disputed by employing the paradigm of downsizing. Ensuring security within Kosovo as well as across its borders with the

neighbour countries, the whole region and consequently NATO and the European Union can enjoy increasing stability and prosperity in the vicinity. List of references (enumerated in order of appearance) [1] European Security and Defence Assembly article, retrieved from http://www.assemblyweu.org/en/presse/cp/2010/13b_2010.php [2] International Crisis Group report, retrieved from http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/europe/balkans/kosovo/206-kosovo-and-serbia-after-theicj-opinion.aspx [3] Miroslav Polzer, Silvo Devetak, Ludvik Toplak, Felix Unger, Maria Eder, Religion and European Integration: Religion as a Factor of Stability and Development in South Eastern Europe, Verlag und Datenbank fr Geisteswissenschaften, 2007, page 138 [4] NATO progress report on relations with Serbia, retrieved from http://www.nato.int/issues/nato-serbia/index.html [5] Analys of Albanian aspirations in Kosovo, retrieved from http://www.economist.com/node/8558447?story_id=8558447 [6] Briefing of the UN Security Council, retrieved from http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9928.doc.htm [7] Legal research findings on Russia and China`s attitute towards Kosovo, retrieved from http://www.germanlawjournal.com/index.php?pageID=11&artID=1276 [8] Marshall Cavendish, World and Its People, Edition on Western Balkans, 2009, page 1642 [9] Dejan Jovic, Yugoslavia: a state that withered away, Purdue University Press, 2009, page 71