Syria Case by NewYork Times

The wave of Arab unrest that began with the Tunisian revolution reached Syria on March 15, 2011, when residents of a small southern city took to the streets to protest the torture of students who had put up antigovernment graffiti. The government responded with heavy-handed force, and demonstrations quickly spread across much of the country. President Bashar al-Assad, a British-trained doctor who inherited Syrias harsh dictatorship from his father, Hafez al-Assad, at first wavered between force and hints of reform. But in April 2011, just days after lifting the countrys decades-old state of emergency, he set off the first of what became a series of withering crackdowns, sending tanks into restive cities as security forces opened fire on demonstrators. Neither the violence nor Mr. Assads offers of political reform rejected as shams by protest leaders brought an end to the unrest. Similarly, the protesters have not been able to overcome direct assault by the militarys armed forces or to seize and hold significant chunks of territory. In the summer of 2011, as the crackdown dragged on, thousands of soldiers defected and began launching attacks against the government, bringing the country to what the United Nations in December called the verge of civil war. An opposition government in exile was formed, the Syrian National Council, but the councils internal divisions have kept Western and Arab governments from recognizing it as such. The opposition remains a fractious collection of political groups, longtime exiles, grass-roots organizers and armed militants, divided along ideological, ethnic or sectarian lines. The conflict is complicated by Syrias ethnic divisions. The Assads and much of the nations elite, especially the military, belong to the Alawite sect, a minority in a mostly Sunni country. While the Assad government has the advantage of crushing firepower and units of loyal, elite troops, the insurgents should not be underestimated. They are highly motivated and, over time, demographics should tip in their favor. Alawites constitute about 12 percent of the 23 million Syrians. Sunni Muslims, the oppositions backbone, make up about 75 percent of the population. Sectarian Civil War Looms The United States and countries around the world have condemned President Assad, who many had hoped would soften his fathers iron-handed regime. Criticism has come from unlikely quarters, like Syrias neighbors, Jordan and Turkey, and the Arab League. Syria was expelled from the Arab League after it agreed to a peace plan only to step up attacks on protesters. In late 2011 and early 2012, Syria agreed to allow league observers into the country. But their presence did nothing to slow the violence. In February, the United Nations General Assembly voted overwhelmingly to approve a resolution condemning President Assads unbridled crackdown on the uprising, but China and Russia, Syrias traditional patron, have blocked all efforts for stronger Security Council action. Emboldened by faltering diplomacy and Russias pledge to keep supplying weapons, the Assad government seemed to be gaining more confidence. In March, Syrias armed forces launched bloody assaults on insurgent strongholds, driving rebels from the cities of Homs and Idlib. According to estimates from the United Nations, the conflict has left more than 10,000 dead, thousands more

displaced and as many as 40,000 people may have been detained. The Red Crescent said in May 2012 that as many as 1.5 million people needed help getting food, water or shelter. The country appeared to be unraveling in what looks like a sectarian civil war. Sunni Muslims who have fled the country described a government crackdown that is more pervasive and more sectarian than previously understood, with civilians affiliated with Mr. Assads Alawite sect shooting at their onetime neighbors as the military presses what many Sunnis see as a campaign to force them to flee their homes and villages. Locked in an Ominous Stalemate With overwhelming firepower and a willingness to kill, President Assad could hold on to power for months or even years. Insulated from all but his inner circle, Mr. Assad appears to believe that his strategy is succeeding. But analysts say sheer force alone is unlikely to eradicate what has become a diffuse and unpredictable insurgency, one able to strike out even after the government has used crushing force. Broad areas of the country are hostile territory for government troops, and attackers have managed to hit centers of power, even in the capital, Damascus. The conflict has become a war of attrition that grows more dangerous as it goes along. Tensions have spilled over borders into Lebanon, Iraq, Turkey and Jordan and raised fears that radical Islamic militants will find a new cause for recruitment. In early April, Kofi Annan, the former United Nations secretary general now acting as a special envoy, reported that the Assad government had agreed to a six-point peace plan, which laid out a framework for a cease-fire that does not involve the president leaving power. Syria agreed, but on the morning of April 12, the cease-fire deadline, fighting was said to have dropped off markedly. But only a week later, Ban-ki Moon, the current secretary general of the United Nations, said that Syria had failed to implement almost every aspect of the peace plan. Still, without a better alternative, the United Nations proposed sending 300 cease-fire observers to Syria for at least three months. In late May, international efforts to pressure Syria intensified in the wake of a massacre that left at least 108 villagers dead in central Syria, most of them women or children. Several Western countries moved to expel Syrian ambassadors from their soil, steps that followed comments by the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff warning that continued atrocities could make military intervention more likely. Protest Timeline May 29 An effort by countries including Britain, France, Germany, Australia, Spain, Italy and Canada to expel the senior Syrian officials appeared coordinated to deliver a strong diplomatic blow and underscore the extreme isolation of the Syrian government. May 28 United Nations special envoy Kofi Annan began a new round of negotiations in the capital, Damascus, and the chairman of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff warned that continued atrocities could make military intervention more likely.

May 26 More than 90 people, including at least 32 children under the age of 10, were killed in a central Syrian village, top United Nations officials said, accusing the government of perpetrating the indiscriminate shelling of civilian neighborhoods. May 15 A convoy of unarmed United Nations monitors got caught up in a violent confrontation between protesters and government forces in the embattled northwestern province of Idlib. Activist organizations put the casualty toll at around 20 killed and dozens wounded. The United Nations monitors escaped unscathed, but three of their four vehicles were damaged by some kind of explosive device, said a U.N. statement. May 14 Opposition activists said 23 soldiers and nine others were killed during clashes at dawn following heavy army shelling of Rastan, a town 110 miles north of Damascus. Also, efforts to find a viable political alternative to Bashar al-Assad faltered when the opposition group the Syrian National Council said it would boycott Arab-backed talks to unite its splintered ranks. May 10 At least 55 people were killed and some 372 injured by two powerful car bombs that exploded outside a key intelligence compound in Damascus. There was no immediate claim of responsibility, although the official media said it was the work of terrorists, while the opposition blamed the government of President Bashar al-Assad. Background to Protests The countrys last serious stirrings of public discontent had come in 1982, when increasingly violent skirmishes with the Muslim Brotherhood prompted Hafez al-Assad to move against them, sending troops to kill at least 10,000 people and smashing the old city of Hama. Hundreds of fundamentalist leaders were jailed, many never seen alive again. Syria has a liability not found in the successful uprisings in Tunisia and Egypt it is a majority Sunni nation that is ruled by a religious minority, the Alawite sect of Shiite Islam. Hafez Assad forged his power base through fear, cooption and sect loyalty. He built an alliance with an elite Sunni business community, and created multiple security services staffed primarily by Alawites. Those security forces have a great deal to lose if the government falls, experts said, because they are part of a widely despised minority, and so have the incentive of self-preservation. In July, the Obama administration, in a shift that was weeks in the making, turned against Mr. Assad but stopped short of demanding that he step down. By early August, the American ambassador was talking of a post-Assad Syria. In October, Syrian dissidents formally established the Syrian National Council in what seemed to be the most serious attempt to bring together a fragmented opposition. The groups stated goal was to overthrow President Assads government. Members said the council included representatives from the Damascus Declaration group, a pro-democracy network; the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamic political party; various Kurdish factions; the Local Coordination Committees, a group that helps organize and document protests; and other independent and tribal figures.

In the U.S.: Different Views on Intervention The Obama administration has made a point of working through the Arab League and the United Nations rather than giving the appearance that the United States is trying to intervene in Syria. This is partly to avoid giving Iran any excuse to get involved on behalf of its regional ally, analysts say. However, some politicians favor more direct intervention. On Feb. 19, two senior American senators spoke out strongly in favor of arming the Syrian opposition forces. The senators, John McCain of Arizona and Lindsey Graham of South Carolina, both Republicans, laid out a series of diplomatic, humanitarian and military aid proposals that would put the United States squarely behind the effort to topple President Assad. Mr. McCain and Mr. Graham, both of whom are on the Senate Armed Services Committee, said that rebel fighters deserved to be armed and that helping them take on the Syrian government would aid Washingtons effort to weaken Iran. The next day, two Iranian warships docked in the Syrian port of Tartous as a senior Iranian lawmaker denounced the possibility that the Americans might arm the Syrian opposition. Irans semi-official Fars News Agency called the ships a serious warning to the United States. The presence of Iran and Russias flotillas along the Syrian coast has a clear message against the United States possible adventurism, said Hossein Ebrahimi, a vice chairman of the Iranian Parliaments national security and foreign policy commission, Fars reported. Syria relies on Iran for financial and military support, and the governments in Damascus and Tehran have sectarian ties as well: Iran has strongly backed the Syrian Shiite minority and the offshoot Alawite sect that makes up Syrias ruling class. Arms Anchor the Relationship With Russia As the violence has worsened throughout Syria, amateur video has shown government troops rolling through the besieged city of Homs in vintage Soviet battle tanks. Seemingly undeterred by an international outcry, Moscow has worked frantically to preserve its relationship with the increasingly isolated government of Mr. Assad, even as the Syrian leader turns his guns on his own citizens, and the death toll mounts. Russia has praised Mr. Assads call for a constitutional referendum, a step that the United States and other governments have dismissed as meaningless. On Feb. 16, Russia was one of just a dozen countries, among them China, Iran and North Korea, to vote against a General Assembly resolution urging Mr. Assad to step down. And many analysts say that without Russias backing, including a steady supply of weapons, food, medical supplies and other aid, the Assad government will crumble within a matter of months if not sooner. While Moscow has a number of reasons to guard its relations with Damascus, the most concrete, many analysts say, is the longstanding arms sales to Syria. Arms exports have long anchored the relationship between Moscow and Damascus, including sales over the years of MIG fighter jets, attack helicopters and high-tech air defense systems.

While the ouster and death of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi in Libya and the imposition of sanctions on Iran have sharply curtailed other formerly lucrative arms markets for Russia, Syria has increased its weapons purchases. Regional political events have also played a part. The Arab Spring and the American-led wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have dissipated Russias once-powerful influence in the region, transforming the relationship into one of critical importance to Prime Minister Vladimir V. Putin, who is running for president and wants to expand Russias role as a global powerbroker. Conflict in Syria Poses Risk of a Wider Strife For decades, Syria was the linchpin of the old security order in the Middle East. It allowed the Russians and Iranians to extend their influence even as successive Assad governments provided predictability for Washington and a stable border for Israel, despite support for Hezbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Palestinian territories. But the burgeoning civil war in Syria has upset that paradigm, placing the Russians and Americans and their respective allies on opposite sides. It is a conflict that has sharply escalated sectarian tensions between Shiites and Sunnis and between Iran and Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf nations. And it has left Israel hopeful that an enemy will fall, but deeply concerned about who might take control of his arsenal. Washington is keenly aware of the larger forces at play and of the dangers of another military intervention in an Arab country. For Russia, the fall of Mr. Assad, an ally and arms customer, would further diminish its influence in the region. If Mr. Assad goes, any new government will note Russias support for him, including a steady supply of weapons. Arabs across the region, who are demanding their rights and freedoms, may resent it, too. For the United States, the conflict is a bundle of risks and contradictions that has made Washingtons stance frustrating those who favor a more robust intervention far more cautious than it was in Libya. For Washington, Europe and the Sunnis of Saudi Arabia and the gulf, the impact on Iran is as important as the fate of Mr. Assad. Syria is one of Irans closest allies. It was nearly alone in supporting Iran, not Iraq, in their war in the 1980s. Syria has been Irans main conduit to supply aid and weapons to Hezbollah, Hamas and Islamic Jihad. The United States and Europe with tenuous Russian and Chinese support have isolated Iran economically and diplomatically to try to forestall Tehran from being able to build a nuclear weapon. The conflict in Syria complicates that delicate diplomacy, but a new Syrian government could be a greater blow to Iranian influence than any sanction the West has mustered so far. It could also revive democratic protests in Iran. But the administration is ruling out direct military intervention in this conflict. After a decade of wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, and a limited intervention in Libya that was harshly criticized by Republicans,

President Obama wants no new military adventure in an election year. Nor does the Pentagon, especially given Syrias integrated air defense system, supplied by Russia. Not least, American officials point out the murky nature and incoherence of the armed opposition to Mr. Assad and note that the Free Syrian Army, formed by exiled Syrian Army officers, defectors and militias, does not control significant territory in Syria where arms could be supplied. Aggravating Regional Sectarian Tensions The insurrection in Syria, led by the countrys Sunni majority in opposition to a government dominated by Alawites, an offshoot of Shiism, is increasingly unpredictable and dangerous because it is aggravating sectarian tensions beyond its borders in a region already shaken by religious and ethnic divisions. For many in the region, the fight in Syria is less about liberating a people under dictatorship than it is about power and self-interest. Syria is drawing in sectarian forces from its neighbors, and threatening to spill its conflict into a wider conflagration. There have already been sparks in neighboring Lebanon, where Sunnis and Alawites have skirmished. And in Iraq, where Shiites are a majority, the events across the border have put the nation on edge while hardening a sectarian schism. Iraqs Shiites are now lined up on the side of a Baathist dictatorship in Syria, less than a decade after the American invasion of Iraq toppled the rule of Saddam Hussein and his own Baath Party, which for decades had repressed and brutalized the Shiites. The paradox, of Shiites supporting a Baathist dictator next door, has laid bare a tenet of the old power structure that for so long helped preserve the Middle Easts strongmen. Minorities often remained loyal and pliant and in exchange were given room to carve out communities, even if they were more broadly discriminated against. As dictators have fallen in neighboring countries, religious and ethnic identities and alliances have only hardened, while notions of citizenship remain slow to take hold. Syrias minorities have the example of Iraq in considering their own future, should the Assad government fall: Assyrian Christians, Yazidis and others were brutally persecuted by insurgents. In Egypt, where a similar paradigm was toppled with the long-serving dictator Hosni Mubarak, Christians have experienced more sectarian violence, increasing political marginalization and a growing link between Islamic identity and citizenship. New Constitution Approved As Troops Pursue Rebels On Feb. 27, the Syrian government announced that nearly 90 percent of voters in a referendum had approved a new Constitution. But Western leaders labeled the referendum a farce. In a bulletin across the bottom of the screen on state television, the ministry said 89 percent of the voters, or nearly 7.5 million of the 8.4 million people who cast ballots, had voted in favor of the Constitution an offer of reform that critics dismissed as too little, too late. The new Constitutions most important changes include ending the political monopoly of the Baath Party and introducing presidential term limits.

Those changes come with enormous caveats, however. The president would be limited to two terms of seven years each, but the clock would start only when Mr. Assads current term expires in 2014. That would allow him to serve two more terms and potentially to remain in office until he is 62, a total of 28 years. His father, Hafez al-Assad, ruled for 30 years until his death in 2000 at age 69. The document also includes provisions that appear to be intended to prevent the political opposition from entering politics or winning the presidency. It requires candidates to have lived in Syria for 10 successive years and to have a Syrian-born wife, and it prohibits parties that are based on religion or ethnicity, which would bar groups like the Muslim Brotherhood or representatives of the Kurdish minority from participating. Before the Revolt: Syrias Foreign Policy Under the administration of President George W. Bush, Syria was once again vilified as a dangerous pariah. It was linked to the 2005 killing of a former Lebanese prime minister, Rafik Hariri. In 2007, Israeli jets destroyed buildings in Syria that intelligence officials said might have been the first stage in a nuclear weapons program. And the United States and its Arab allies mounted a vigorous campaign to isolate Damascus, which they accused of sowing chaos and violence throughout the middle east through its support for militant groups like Hezbollah and Hamas. President Obama came into office pledging to engage with Syria, arguing that the Bush administrations efforts to isolate Syria had done nothing to wean it from Iran or encourage Middle East peace efforts. So far, however, the engagement has been limited. American diplomats have visited Damascus, but have reiterated the same priorities as the Bush administration: protesting Syrias military support to Hezbollah and Hamas, and its strong ties with Iran. Secret State Department cables obtained by WikiLeaks and made available to several news organizations show that arms transactions involving Syria and Hezbollah continue to greatly concern the Obama administration. Hezbollahs arsenal now includes up to 50,000 rockets and missiles, including some 40 to 50 Fateh-110 missiles capable of reaching Tel Aviv and most of Israel, and 10 Scud-D missiles. Syrias determined support of Hizballahs military build-up, particularly the steady supply of longerrange rockets and the introduction of guided missiles could change the military balance and produce a scenario significantly more destructive than the July-August 2006 war, said a November 2009 cable from the American charg daffaires in Damascus. According to cables, Syrian leaders appeared to believe that the weapons shipments increased their political leverage with the Israelis. But they made Lebanon even more of a tinderbox and increased the prospect that a future conflict might include Syria. The Hariri Case Also looming is potential new trouble in Lebanon, where a United Nations-backed international tribunal is expected to indict members of Hezbollah in the death of Mr. Hariri. Hezbollah and its allies including high-ranking Syrian officials have warned that an indictment could set off civil conflict.

The United States withdrew its ambassador in 2005 after Mr. Hariri was killed in a car bombing in Beirut along with 22 others. Syria was widely accused of having orchestrated the killing, though it has vehemently denied involvement. The Bush administration imposed economic sanctions on Syria, as part of a broader effort to isolate the government of Mr. Assad. The current chill is a significant change from the situation a few years ago, when Mr. Assad showed signs of wanting warmer relations with the West than his father, Hafez al-Assad, had ever pursued. President Nicolas Sarkozy of France led the way with a visit in September 2008. King Abdullah of Saudi Arabia, who was said to be furious at Mr. Assad, welcomed him warmly in the Saudi capital, Riyadh, in March 2009. And Prime Minster Ehud Olmert of Israel hinted at a revival of talks on the Golan Heights a prospect that faded when Mr. Olmert was succeeded by the more conservative Benjamin Netanyahu. Turkish Opposition to Assad Once one of Syrias closest allies, Turkey is hosting an armed opposition group waging an insurgency against the government of President Assad, providing shelter to the commander and dozens of members of the group, the Free Syrian Army, and allowing them to orchestrate attacks across the border from inside a camp guarded by the Turkish military. Turkish support for the insurgents comes amid a broader campaign to undermine Mr. Assads government. Turkey is expected to impose sanctions on Syria, and it has deepened its support for the Syrian National Council. But its harboring of leaders in the Free Syrian Army, a militia composed of defectors from the Syrian armed forces, may be its most striking challenge so far to Damascus. On Oct. 26, 2011, the Free Syrian Army, living in a heavily guarded refugee camp in Turkey, claimed responsibility for killing nine Syrian soldiers, including one uniformed officer, in an attack in restive central Syria. The group is too small to pose any real challenge to Mr. Assads government but support from Turkey underlines how combustible, and resilient, Syrias uprising has proven. The country sits at the intersection of influences in the region with Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, Saudi Arabia and Israel and Turkeys involvement will be closely watched by Syrias friends and foes. Turkish officials say that their government has not provided weapons or military support to the insurgent group, nor has the group directly requested such assistance.