Section 5: Philosophical Logic ATTITUDES AND COMMUNICATION

Werner Stelzner Stauffenbergstr. 28/582, 07747 Jena, Germany

The topic of the paper are communicative acts, which are connected with some physical manifested linguisic output given by a participant of the communicative process. These outputs of a speaker are taken as the vehicles for interpretation procedures carried out by the partners of the communicative process or by observers of this process and attitudes are explained in relation to communicative acts. As starting point of the proposed analysis we will focus on the epistemic attitude of explicit belief, which is the counterpart for explicit assertion, performed in communicative procedures. Given the fulfilment of sincerity conditions, the explicit asserted sentence is explicit believed too. In a sketchy form: x explicitly believes G in case that given x is fulfilling the sincerity condition in relation to y, then x asserts G directed to y. Of course the mentioned y can be x himself. If we exclude self-deception, we can postulate the sincerity of x related to x. Then we have that x explicitly believes G in the interval t if and only if x performed an linguistic act of internally asserting G and x would repeat this act in every case in which x is urged in t to state is he believing G or not. Every operating with linguistic expressions like the mentioned G in epistemic or communicative contexts depends on empirically given or not given abilities and intentions of the epistemic subject. For instance, to presuppose logical competence on the side of the epistemic subject is a plain empirical supposition, for which we don't have any logical foundation, because to follow the lines of logic in communicative acts isn't a logical rule, it is merely a social demand. Without such empirical suppositions we are faced with the hyperintensionality of the explicit belief attitudes and explicit communicative acts. Because of this we can almost nothing say about specific logical connections between quotational linguistic attitudes or linguistic acts. In epistemic logics one way out of this situation is often seen in the treatment of epistemic operators as presenting rational epistemic attitudes, presupposing logical omniscient epistemic subjects. In postulating such kinds of rationality on the side of epistemic subjects, the applicability of such an epistemic logic is highly limited because even theoretically we don't have fitting epistemic subjects for such a treatment.

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The intensionality of epistemic predicates can easily be established, if we treat epistemic attitudes as implicit attitudes. The bad side with the implicit epistemic attitudes is that they, similarly to the rational ones, are not effective even for the epistemic subject. May be, a speaker is even denying an implicit believed proposition, and this even sincerely. But what the implicit predicates dont share with the rational epistemic predicates are the obscure presuppositions about the rationality of fitting for such kind of epistemic logic epistemic subjects. For implicit epistemic predicates every epistemic subject is a fitting subject. For the explication of implicit epistemic predicates we can go two main streets, which both are related to each other and find their point of departure in explicit epistemic attitudes. On one side we can introduce comprehensive or hermeneutic implicit epistemic predicates. These predicates are related not only to the syntactic sentence, which figures as object of the explicit epistemic attitude, but they take into account, what this sentence expresses for the given epistemic subject, how this epistemic subject understands this sentence. Problems: in translation the translator can change the logigal structure of the translated, starting point for entailments is the translation, which may be different from the linguistic explicit belief. On the other side we can introduce formal epistemic predicates, which are related to formal-logical features in our language of analysis, of that sentence, to which the epistemic subject has a special attitude or performs some epistemic act. For internal assertion (belief) surely the construction of hermeneutic implicit predicates seems to be superior about the formal implicit epistemic variants, because the reference to formal logical features of a sentence can be entirely divergent from the actual understanding of this sentence by the epistemic subject. But: Starting point for the entailments is effective given in the logical structure given by the speaker.

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In the handout you find some formal explications about this: Handout: Hermeneutic implicit acceptance: Rih. If G1,...,Gn H and q1... qn (V(x,q1,G1,t) ... V(x,qn,Gn,t) B(x,q1,t) ... B(x,qn,t)), then Bi(x,H,t) Formal implicit acceptance: Rif. If G1,...,Gn H and B(x,G1,t) ... B(x,G n,t)), then Bi(x,H,t) Both these predicates are intensional, we have R1. If M N , then B(x,M,t) B(x,N,t) , if .

where is ih or

While conclusive implicit belief is closed under the logical entailment relation, R2. If M N , then Bi(x,M,t) Bi(x,N,t) it isn't closed under the Gdel rule. We dont have: If M , then Bi(x,M,t) . What we have is the following: R3. If M , then pBi(x,p,t) Bi(x,M,t) If x conclusive implicit is believing some sentence, so x is conclusive implicit believing any tautology. Some (often unmentioned but important) problems are connected with basing the introduced implicit belief and implicit assertion on classical entailment theory. Have a look at the Handout and see some sound in this treatment formulas, which in one or the other intuitive point of view undoubtedly come out to be paradoxically: T1. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x, p,t) Bi(x,q,t) T2. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x, p,t) Bi(x,p,t) T3. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x,q q,t) T4. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x,p p,t)
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T5. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x, p,t) Bi(x,q,t) Bi(x, q,t) T6. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x, p,t) (Bi(x,q,t) Bi(x, q,t)) Bi(x,q,t) Bi(x, q,t) T7. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x,q,t) Bi(x, p q q,t) T8. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x,p q,t) T9. Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x,q,t) Bi(x,p q,t) T10. Bi(x,p q,t) Bi(x,p,t) Bi(x,q,t) T11. Bi(x,p Bi(x,~p,t) Bi(x,q,t) q,t) If explaining implicit beliefs and assertions, we should not forget that there are alternatives to classical entailment theory and that, e.g., the avoiding of the Gettier-Paradox has not so much to be connected with attacks on the Standard Theory of Knowledge, but should be connected with a divergence from the irrelevant classical entailment theory as basis for implicit epistemic attitudes. A way to do this is to choose relevant entailment theories as basis for explaining implicit belief or implicit assertion. Promising candidates for this (with different intuitive aims connected) are Tautological entailment, conceptualistic systems as the logical entailment relation systems of Sinowjew or Parry/Dunns analytic implication and systems based on fulfillment condition semantics. With Tautological Entailments as basic system for implicit belief we get rid of T1, T3, T5, T6, T10, T11. With Strong logical entailment of Sinowjew or first degree analytical implication as basic system for implicit belief we get rid of T1, T3, and T8. With Fulfillment condition semantics as basic system for implicit belief we get rid of T1, T3, T4, T5, T7, T8, T9. More generally: With tautological entailment we get rid of such classically sound formulas, which take the reason for ther soundness from the classical valuation prinples that a proposition and ist negation cannot be true at the same valuation and that they cannot be both false at the same valuation. The conceptualistic oriented systems of Sinowjew and Parry get rid of such classically sound entailment relations, where in the conclusion uccur variables, which dont occur in the premisses. Fulfillment condition semantics rule out such classically sound entailment relations, where in the conclusion uccur such constituents of fulfillment conditions, which dont occur in the premisses. If we combine Tautological entailment with fulfillment condition semantics we get a mixed system in which with the exclusion of T2 none of the above mentioned paradoxes is sound, because we than combine the intuitive main principles of tautological
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entailment that we cannot exclude that a sentence and ist negation both or none of them is given the value true and the relevance principe of fulfillment condition semantics that every partial fulfillement of the conclusion has to be a partial fulfillment of the premisses. T2 would be excluded if we add to to the so far mentioned conclusion relevance a condition for premiss relevance: every partial fulfillment of the premiss has to be a partiqal fulfillment of the conclusion. A unified semantic treatment of all these we can give in a 16-valued semantic, hwere as quadrupels of classical values, epistemic/pragmatic explication: The connected with a sentence H Quadruple <v1, v2, mentioned relevant systems we treat intuitively as: Epistemic values: v1=t : H is assigned the value true v1=f : H is not assigned the value true v2=t : H is not assigned the value true v2=f : H is assigned the value true Pragmatic values: v3=t : the fulfillment of H is pragmatically free v3=f : the fulfillment of H is not pragmatically free v4=t : the fulfillment of H is pragmatically free v4=f : the fulfillment of H is not pragmatically free So in fact the value quadruples are reports about situations, which can be ascribed with a little help by the predicates A ("is assigned the value t") and F ("is free for fulfillment"): w(H)=1: w(H)=2: w(H)=3: w(H)=4: w(H)=5: . . . w(H)=16: A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) or formerly shorter: A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) tttt tttf ttft ttff tftt ffff relevance conditions the values are taken which get an v3, v4> of values in the

For generating the truth-tables the following principles are used (where R stands for A or F respectively):
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(1) (2A) (3) (5) (6C) (6P)

R(p) R(q) R(p q) A(p q) A(p) A(q) (2F) F(p q) F(p) F(q) R( (p q)) R( p q) (4) R( (p q)) R( p q) R( p) R(p) Conclusion relevance: w(<v1,v2,v3,v4> <v5,v6,v7,v8>) = <v1 v5, v2 v6, v3 v7, v4 v8> Premise relevance: w(<v1,v2,v3,v4> <v5,v6,v7,v8>) = <v1 v5, v2 v6, v7 v3, v8 v4>

Using these principles we get by purely classical logic an aequat 16-valued semantics for the mentioned mixed system.

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In the handout there is a table in which the values for negationare composed : H
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F( A(H) H) A( F(H) F( H) A(H) H) F(H) H) A( F( A(H) H) F(H) F( H) A( A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F( A(H) H) A( F(H) F( H) A(H) H) F(H) H) A( F( A(H) H) F(H) F( H) A(

A( H) H) H) H) A( F( F( A( H) H) F( H) H) A( F( A( H) H) H) F( H) A( F( A( H) H) F( H) F( H) A( A( H) H) H) H) A( F( F( A( H) H) F( H) H) A( F( A( H) H) H) F( H) A( F( A( H) H) F( H) F( H) A( A( H) A( H) H) H) F( F( A( H) A( H) F( H) H) F( A( H) A( H) H) F( H) F( A( H) A( H) F( H) F( H) A( H) A( H) H) H) F( F( A( H) A( H) F( H) H) F( A( H) A( H) H) F( H) F( A( H) A( H) F( H) F( H)

~H

13 15 14 16 5 7 6 8 9 11 10 12 1 3 2 4

So far for composing epistemic values we have no principle, which leads from a positive predication to a single negatice predication or to the negation of a predication or vica versa. Adding such principles, we come to weaker relevance systems: From this overall system we come back to the special relevance systems by adding the following principles PC0, PC1, and PC2 : Classical assignment condition: PC0. A(H) A( H) If this condition holds, situations 5 to 12 are excluded because there we have that A(H)A( H). The remaining situations build the space for classical fulfillment condition semantics. The remaining situations, standing now for possible values, we can rename leaving out 5 to 12 so we receive the truth value table for negation in classical fulfillment condition semantics as given above: H
1 2 3 4 13 14 15 16 A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F( A(H) H) A( F(H) F( H) A(H) H) F(H) H) A( F( A(H) H) F(H) F( H) A( 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 5 7 6 8 1 3 2 4

A( H) H) H) H) A( F( F( A( H) H) F( H) H) A( F( A( H) H) H) F( H) A( F( A( H) H) F( H) F( H) A( A( H) A( H) H) H) F( F( A( H) A( H) F( H) H) F( A( H) A( H) H) F( H) F( A( H) A( H) F( H) F( H)

~H

13 15 14 16 1 3 2 4

Conceptualist pragmatic condition: PC1. F(p) F( p) p is conceptualistic free, iff p is conceptualistic free.
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If this condition holds, situations 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15 are excluded because there we don't have F(H)F( H). The remaining situations build the space for tautological first degree analytic implication and the systems of logical entailment in the sense of Sinowjew. The remaining situations, standing now for possible values, we can rename leaving out 2, 3, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 15 so we receive the truth value table for negation in tautological conceptualistic systems as given above: H
1 4 5 8 9 12 13 16 A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F( A(H) H) F(H) F( H) A( A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F( A(H) H) F(H) F( H) A(

1 2
3 4

7 8
3 4

5 6
7 8

5 6
1 2

~H A( H) H) H) H) A( F( F( A( H) H) F( H) F( H) A( A( H) H) H) H) A( F( F( A( H) H) F( H) F( H) A( A( H) A( H) H) H) F( F( A( H) A( H) F( H) F( H) A( H) A( H) H) H) F( F( A( H) A( H) F( H) F( H)

13 16 5 8 9 12 1 4

Semantics for the classical systems of Sinowjew and first degree analytic implication we receive, if imposing both conditions PC0 and PC1. Then the remaining possible situations are those, characterized by the values 1, 4, 13, 16 out of the given 16 values. The remaining situations, standing now for possible values, we can rename the values 1, 4, 13, 16 so we receive the truth value table for negation in original (classical) conceptualistic systems as given above: H
1 4 13 16 A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) F( H) A( F( F( 3 A( H) H) H) H) A( 4 A( H) H) F( H) F( H) F( F( 1 A( H) A( H) H) H) 2 A( H) A( H) F( H) F( H)

~H

1 2
3 4

13 16 1 4

A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F( A(H) H) F(H) F( H) A(

Classical and Tautological pragmatic condition: PC2. pF(p)

One could take this as saying that classical and tautological thinking takes for granted that in every situation everything is pragmatically free. Or in the conceptualist direction treated, it could be said, these logics presuppose that there are no tabous, all is free. And now you could start to blame these logics for for there silly pragmatics. On the other hand, and more adequate, you can take this as saying, the classical thinking says nothing specific about pragmatic values. If imposing condition PC2 on the space of situations given in the 16-valued semantics as possible situations remain only those indicated be the values 1, 5, 9, 13, which are characteristic for tautological entailments:

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H
1 5 9 13 A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F( A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F(

1
2

3
4

A( H) H) H) H) 13 A( F( F( A( H) H) H) H) A( F( F( 5 A( H) A( H) H) H) 9 F( F( 3 F( F( 1 A( H) A( H) H) H) 1 4
2

~H

And if imposing both conditions PC0 (classical assignment condition) and PC2 (classical pragmatic condition), we the remaining relevant situations are indicated by the values 1 and 13, arriving this way at the classical propositional logic: H
1 13 A(H) A( H) F(H) H) F( A(H) H) A( F(H) H) F(

1
2

2
1

A( H) H) H) H) A( F( F( A( H) A( H) H) H) F( F(

~H

13 1

All the mentioned here logical relations (classical or releveant ones) hold entirely independently from any logical abilities of the epistemic subject and these relations say nothing about such abilities and dont presuppose such abilities. So these are in fact logical relations, coming with our logic and the given definitions. For the philosophical evaluation of the whole enterprise to catch the logic (or a logic) of epistemic attitudes or communicative acts by means of implicit attitudes or acts, we shall have in mind the fact that referring to implicit attitudes or acts, we don't in an effective manner refer to the starting points of the travel, the explicit epistemic attitudes or communicative acts. From the implicit attitudes or acts there is no effective way back to the linguistic epistemic attitudes or communicative acts performed by the epistemic subject. And because of this, there is no connection to the problem of ascribing logical intelligence to the epistemic entities holding sets of implicit beliefs, structured in a special logical way: All the logical derivations concerning implicit attitudes or acts are not carried out by the epistemic subject in his language, but are sound inside the language of analysis, used by us or other observers of the given epistemic and communicative contexts. Especially these implict attitudes say nothing about the accessibility of assertions or other communicative acts. Even if we have an explicit assertion as starting point for the derivation of an implicit belief and the asserting epistemic subject would fulfil a sincerity condition, we cannot conclude that he will in relevant situations explicitely assert what he is implicitely believing,
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because may be he is not able to see that from his explicite assertions follows this implicitely believed proposition. Based on the explicit assertions of a speaker to give a prediction about what new explicit or potential asserrtion is possibly to access in question-answer-sequences, one has to use hypothetical suppositions about the ability and willingness or disposition to perform communicative acts according to logical rules, to fulfil sound (may be extremely simple) logical obligations. What we are speaking about here is a step by step performance of communicative acts to fulfil logical obligations coming from formerly performed explicit communicative acts. For the hypotheses about the accessibility of logically derivable conclusions from explicitly asserted sentences aside with logical principles a pragmatical principle of simplicity should play an important role. The minimal logical condition should be that rules for this step by step performance of communicative acts should be closed under logical entailment: P1. The rules for the explicit derivation shall lead from true premisses to true conclusions. The second condition should ensure paraconsistence of the derivation and there should be no conclusions following from arbitrary premisses: P2. The explicit or implicit assertion of a logical contradiction doesnt lead to the absolut inconsistency of the set of accesible explicit assertions. For explaining a pragmatic simplicity condition we dont have clear bounderies. We will go along the following lines: Lets confine the set of possibly occurring logical connectives in the rules which govern the transition from one explicit assertion to another accessible in a one sep procedure explicit assertion. As examples lets look at the following two alternative principles: P31. In the underived derivation rules only one of the connectives , , or two of , should occur. P32. In the underived derivation rules only one of the connectives , , and not more than two of , should occur. Have a look at the handout: With Principles P1, P2 and P31 exists only one deduction system, which is consistent and complete in respect to these principles: (1) N M N (2) M N, M N (3) M M M (4) M M N
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(5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (DR)

N M N M, N M N M N M M N N M M M M If M N and N K are underived deduction rules, then M K is a derived deduction rule

With principles P1, P2 and P32 we have at least two different deduction systems, each of them being consistent and complete in respect to these principles: One of them is a subsystem of Sinowjews strong logical entailment, the other is a subsystem of tautological entailment. In this sense in the case of principle P32 a pragmatic simplicity condition leads to systems, which fulfill special relevance conditions. These two systems are given in the handout: System 32a: (1) M N, M N (2) M N, N M M M (3) M (4) M M M (5) M M M (6) M M M (7) M M M M (8) M M (9) M M M (10) M M M (11) M M M N (12) M N, M (13) M N, N M (14) M, N M N (15) M N M (16) M N N M (17) (M N) (18) (M N) N (19) (M N) M (20) (M N) N M (21) M (22) M M System 32b: (1) N M N (3) M M M (5) M M N (8) M, N M N (11) (M N) M (13) (M N) M (15) M (M N) (17) M M (2) M M (4) M M N M N M N M (12) (M N) (14) (M N) (16) N (M (18) M M N M (7) M M (10) M N N N N)

(6) (9)

M N

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