Indian Journal of Human Development, Vol. 2, No.

2, 2008

perspective

Civil Society and Exclusion: Partha Chatterjee on The Politics of the Governed
Swagato Sarkar*

Partha Chatterjee has argued that the concept of civil society neither adequately describes nor is analytically helpful in understanding the democratic life in a post-colonial society like India. Civil society is the domain of the elites, who can claim full citizenship, and a vast number of people are excluded from such a process. He proposes the concept of political society: the actual domain of policy, where the government engages with the population. On the one hand, various governmental functions and apparatus approach the population as the targets of policies. On the other hand, the people participate in the political process by manoeuvring in this domain. This space for manoeuvring is not available within the liberal space of civil society. According to Chatterjee, this should be seen as a positive aspect rather than a pathological condition, since it provides a scope for realizing the popular demands.

The concept of civil society is incorrigibly a spatial one, specifying the space of political engagements. Recently, a plethora of literature has tried to find the significance of civil society by highlighting its positive role in development and good governance. Normatively, civil society has been identified as a domain for the expansion and realization of rights and freedom (Cohen and Arato, 1992), and instrumentally, it is seen as a domain wherein distribution, exercise and control of power are (democratically) contested (Nonan-Ferrell, 2004). Taken together, civil society is an integral part of democracy and a placeholder of institutions that facilitates better (civic) co-operation, resulting in enhanced economic growth and performance (Putnam, 1994; Narayanan, 1997). The promotion of civil society is also seen as an antidote to authoritarian state interventions. Partha Chatterjee re-frames the debate by desisting from either an exclusively normative or an instrumental discussion; he discourages us to consider post-colonial politics as a pathological condition of retarded modernity (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 75). Instead, he emphasizes the political dimension. He takes the concepts like citizenship and individual will to task, and vehemently argues for considering community as a significant analytical concept. Civil society is a limited concept and an undifferentiated space. Working through this critical engagement, he splits the political space, and conceptualizes a separate domainpolitical society, which is separate and distinct from civil society, to understand the democratic urge and peoples agency in
* Doctoral candidate, University of Oxford, UK.

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postcolonial countries. In the following paragraphs, first I will provide a sketch of Chatterjees criticism of the concept of civil society, and then present a critical review of his concept of political society. CHATTERJEES CRITIQUE OF CIVIL SOCIETY Chatterjee considers civil society as the domain of the elite and their associational life, mediated through institutions located in the public sphere. This domain recognizes only the unencumbered individuals, severed of any primordial ties, and adequately sets the standard for membership and political socialization. The members are recognized by the state as citizens, empowered with certain rights. Since the primordial identities of the citizens are not invoked or referred to, they are rendered homogeneous before the state, namely, as a nation. Citizenship, then, can be framed within the ethical concepts of equality and freedom (Chatterjee, 2004). It is the will of the citizens, expressed as their generalized political aspiration and popular sovereignty, which gives legitimacy to the state and forms the basis of democracy. Chatterjee finds this concept of citizenship and the idea of democracy as restrictive and problematic. It is restrictive because only a handful of the elite in post-colonial countries can meet such criteria of citizenship. It is problematic because the concept of community, which provides meaning to most of the people in these countries, is suppressed and relegated to the pre-modern historical time. The civil society institutions become the next target of Chatterjees criticism. He argues that the institutions which we today recognize as part of civil society (in India) are a legacy of the colonial rule. The colonial rulers created such institutions to create a civil society out of the natives who would be socialized in the language of modernity and act as interlocutors and administrators of the colonial rule. These elite, then, were complicit with the colonial projects. Yet, they remained, along with the rest of the societies, as a colonial subject not a citizen proper. After Independence, these elite could claim citizenship and deliberate to steer the destiny of the new nation-state. The rest of the population remained out the purview of these insular democratic processes. As can be noticed here, Chatterjees criticism of civil society alludes to a process of exclusion. How did civil society become such a limited and exclusionary concept? Chatterjee disentangles a suppressed narrative of community in the history of the idea of civil society in the West1 to show the exclusionary process. Chatterjee argues that the state and the civil society in Western Europe are fundamentally shaped by divergences in conceptualizing (the) relation(ship) between rights and community (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 230 and passim). Such divergences are framed either as abolition of community altogether and thinking of rights as grounded solely in the self-determining individual will, and on the other, attributing to community a single determinate form (i.e. the nation), delegitimizing all other forms of community. Chatterjee claims that this subsequent historyis intricately tied with the history of capital. The individual and nation-state are embedded in the narrative of capital. The progressivist narrative constructs community as pre-modern and the pre-history of capital, and (de facto) sanctions the annihilation of community and its regulatory mechanisms by the process of primitive accumulation.

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Chatterjee argues against such a theoretical position and rejects the proposition of co-presence of several times (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 7), for example, modern, premodern, etc. Instead he draws attention to the inherent tension between various concepts, on the one hand, and the real encounters with modernity, which produce these formations, on the other (ibid., pp. 7-8). Hence, the argument cannot be reduced to traditional versus modern (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 279). For Chatterjee, capital cannot subsume community, and there is a necessary contradiction between capital and community (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 237) and capital and community are antithetical (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 280). He considers Robert Putnams study on social capital, as one which highlights such a contradiction. According to Putnam, the government in certain parts of northern Italy works better because the civic institutions are robust and have the active participation of citizens. Such political socialization binds citizens in a mutual obligation and reciprocal social actions. The organizational features like trust, reciprocity and network of civic engagement can be called social capital, which unlike capital, is a public good. Putnam forwards examples from non-Western countries such as Indonesia, Nigeria and Mexico. In each of these cases, local people have relied on their communal relationship to arrange credit, as the conventional capitalist credit system would not be able to operate under the given circumstances. Hence, (t)hese institutions are much more than merely economic; they are mechanisms that strengthen the solidarity of the community.the concept of community is being invoked here to supply what does not properly belong to the concept of capital (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 280 and passim). He finds Putnams formulation of social capital as an attempt to do what capital has always failed to do, namely, ground the social institutions of modern capitalist economy in community. However, Chatterjee does not attempt to recover or advocate the search of an autonomous community. He tries to show how community remains as a residual category which includes police and corporation (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 233). The public surveillance, which the civil society organizes, blurs the line of separation between the private and public, and such separation can only be contextual. Chatterjee reads this lack of objective separation as the instance through which the suppressed narrative of community raises its irrepressible head (ibid., p. 233). He draws attention to Hegels invocation of the term universal family to refer to the requirement of intervention at the household level to compel parents to send their children to school, to have them vaccinated and so forth (Hegel, 1967, p. 277, additions to para 239). This allows the appropriation of the Hegelian framework by the dominant strand which claims that this role of the universal family can be properly played by the only legitimate community in modern societythe nation (Chatterjee, 1993, p. 234 and passim). As an inevitable consequence the contingent contractual domain of civil society must, after all, be unified at the higher, universal level of the absolute idea of Right, embodied in the state as the political community. Such legitimized intervention by the nationstate, according to Chatterjee, is the basis for the governmentalization of the state, and is particularly significant for understanding the politics of the societies wherein most of the population does not include citizens.

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CHATTERJEE ON THE POLITICS OF THE GOVERNED Chatterjees advocacy for the identification of a different political space beyond civil society rests on three moves. Firstly, he focuses attention on the sphere of governmental intervention wherein, he claims, a different kind of political engagement between the legal-bureaucratic apparatus and the people, who are excluded from civil society, can be witnessed. The post-colonial Indian state inherited the legal-bureaucratic apparatus, which was able to reach as the target of many of its activities virtually all of the population that inhabits its territory, the domain of civil social institutions, as conceived above is still restricted to a fairly small section of citizens (Chatterjee, 2001, p. 172). According to Chatterjee, this is a new paradigm wherein there is a clear shift from the abstract theoretical domain of citizenship to the actual domain of policy. Following Foucault, he claims that the domain of policy is predicated upon a conception of the society as one constituted by population, not citizens or elementary units of homogenous families (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 279; 2001, p. 173). The regime secures legitimacy not by the participation of citizens in the matters of state, but by claiming to provide for the well-being of the population (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 279). Thus, Chatterjees second move is to shift the focus from the normative category of citizens to the descriptive and empirical category of population. The concept of population is predicated upon an enumerable, descriptive, empirical mass of people, and does not rely on a normative theory or abstraction. The population is assumed to contain, large elements of naturalness and primordiality; the internal principles of the constitution of particular population groups is not expected to be rationally explicable since they are not the products of rational contractual association, but are, as it were, pre-rational (Chatterjee, 2001, p. 173 and passim). The concept of population offers the governmental functions and apparatus an access to a set of rationally manipulable instruments for reaching [a] large section of the inhabitants of a country as the targets of policy. Such interventions in the society-as-population, if we may call it, and the interaction between these governmental apparatus and the population groups inaugurate a new site for strategic manoeuvring, resistance and appropriation. Chatterjee calls this site the political society. The strategic manoeuvre and mobilization that take place in this domain neither always conform, nor are consistent, with the principles of association in civil society. Yet, Chatterjee identifies an urge for democracy in this mobilization in political society, as it channels the demands on the developmental state. Chatterjee makes the third move by translating the subject of development into a political subject, by assigning an identity to it and finding a normative ground for it. Chatterjee is interested in exploring how people use the space opened by the intervention of governmental functions. As we have seen, such interventions perceive the society as population and then categorize the latter into empirical groups which become the target for policies. However, such categorization also infuses a new identity within the group, and many a time, the constituents of the group emerge as distinct political entities. These new groups have a territorial boundary, clearly defined

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in time and space (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 58 and passim). Consistent with his critique of civil society and the prominence of community, Chatterjee tries to demonstrate how these groups become a communityand thus a collective, and also finds a normative ground for the latters demands. According to him, since the livelihood and existence of many of the members of such groups are predicated upon a (collective) violation of (property) laws, they appear as illegal entities before the state. They are not recognized as proper civic bodies, pursing legitimate objectives. Thus, to be recognized by the governmental functions, they must find ways of investing their collective identity with a moral content (ibid., p. 57 and passim) and thereby give to the empirical form of a population group the moral attributes of a community [emphasis in original]. Yet this community is about the shared interests of the members of association... they describe the community in [] terms of a shared kinshipthe most common metaphor is that of a family. Chatterjee never spells out what he means by the moral content of an identity, but it seems that these new groups appropriate the proposition of the governments obligation to look after the poor and underprivileged population groups (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 60). The objective of their mobilization is to secure the benefits of governmental program[me]s (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66), which they claim as a matter of rights and use their association as the principal collective instrument to pursue that claim (ibid., p. 59). This, according to Chatterjee, is a clear break with the erstwhile patron-client exchanges, and an indication of their political assertion. Chatterjee explains that the mobilization which takes place on the terrain of political society is necessarily temporary and contextual, and depends entirely on the ability of particular population groups to mobilize support to influence the implementation of government policy in their favour (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 60, emphasis added; note: implementation, not policy formulation). Such strategic politics must operate within the constellation of the (mainstream) political formations (i.e., parties, but also nongovernmental organizations?). The success of such strategic manoeuvring depends on applying the right pressure at the right places in the governmental machinery (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66). However, they do not always have access to such right places, and therefore, (t)o produce a viable and persuasive politics of the governed, there has to be considerable act of mediation (ibid., p. 64). Hence, there is a real need for finding trustworthy mediators who can represent them. A CRITICAL APPRAISAL Chatterjee critically engages with the concept of civil society to show its limits and the exclusion that it entails. Thereafter, he splits the political field into civil society and political society, with the point of division being the modality of realization of rights. It is not that political society replaces civil society altogether, but he identifies and conceptualizes a separate domain and privileges the former over the latter. The problem with Chatterjees approach is that he does not leave his explication of political society at the level of description or fully flesh out the logics of Indian populism. Instead, in his attempt to appreciate the Indian politics, he offers a positive

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evaluation of political society and rehabilitates it as an innovative and promising political development. Chatterjee argues that it is through manoeuvring in political society that certain groups participate in political process, which is otherwise not possible within the liberal space of the associations of civil society transacting business with the constitutional state (Chatterjee, 1998, p. 282). He claims that the working of political society opens up the possibility to effectively work against the [existing] distribution of power in society as a whole (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66). This possibility, according to him, is realized in the case of distribution of property rights. The practices in political society are located in relation to the legal-political forms of the modern state (ibid., p. 74, and passim). As the new political entities wrangle over property and benefits, they also strike at the foundation of property relations. Property, Chatterjee reminds us, is the conceptual name of regulations by law of relations between individuals in civil society. But as these social relations are yet to be mo(u)lded into proper forms of civil society, the state must maintain a fiction that in the constitution of its sovereignty, all citizens belong to civil society and are, by virtue of that legally constructed fact, equal subjects of the law. This fictional element must be addressed in the actual administrative processes. And when the non-citizens assert their agency through manoeuvring in political society, they force the state to adopt a dual strategy: on the one hand, para-legal arrangements that modify, re-arrange or supplement on the contingent terrain of political society the formal structures of property that must, on the other hand, continue to be affirmed and protected within the legally constructed domain of civil society. However, the reconstitution of property relationships that Chatterjee finds does not radically alter those relationships; such a reconstitution is generally compensatory in nature, which otherwise preserves or facilitates to preserve the existing property relationships. Chatterjees political agenda avoids articulating any demand for redistribution of property, and that is evident in his depiction of negotiation over illegal squatting or encroachment of property as a positive political process. He is satisfied to observe that the governmental functions and non-governmental agencies are forced to recognize the demands of the members of political society in a different way. These agencies do not recognize these members or groups as part of civil society and consequently, cannot negotiate with them according to the formal and strict procedures and law of the land. Hence, there is a proliferation of layered mediations and para-legal arrangements to resolve various contentious issues, and to meet the demands of these groups. The governmental bodies and political representatives deliberate and negotiate to identify the valid claims (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 69). However, such negotiations must be hidden and not formally recorded, as (i)t is entirely possible that the negotiations on the ground did not respect the principles of bureaucratic rationality or even the provisions of law (ibid. p. 73 and passim). Chatterjee appreciates this para-legal arrangement and the actions in political society as an act of actual expansion of the freedoms of the people (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 66). He briefly refers to Amartya Sens capability approach, which embod[ies] a set of substantive freedoms rather than utilities or income or primary goods (ibid., p. 68) to support his claim. Nonetheless, the limit of this politics is captured in the context of the recent phase of capitalist transformation in India. In an article published in 2008, Chatterjee

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engages with the political economy of this transformation and tries to make his earlier observations compatible with the new context. Here, the central problematic is the sole ascendancy of private industrial-corporate capital in India to the position of hegemonic domination which is accomplished with the connivance [in my words] of the urban middle classesthe sphere that seeks to be congruent with the normative models of bourgeois civil society (Chatterjee, 2008a, p. 57)and the parallel decline of the agrarian bourgeoisie (ibid., p. 56). Such ascendancy of industrial-corporate capital is rendered possible through primitive accumulation, namely, the dissociation of the labourer from the means of labour [i.e. production] (ibid., p. 54) and the attendant transfer of those means of production to the capitalists. Chatterjee thinks that political society again becomes a significant field of contestation and interventions in this new context: the need to reverse the effects of the primitive accumulation necessitate that the governmental agencies engage with political society to distribute the benefits, following the modality described above. Thereby, he tries to rehabilitate political society precisely when its limits are very much exposed. In response to this article, Amita Baviskar and Nandini Sundar, Mary E. John and Satish Deshpande, and Mihir Shah (2008) have all criticized Chatterjee for misconstruing the present capitalist transformation in India and the location and status of the peasantry in that process. Baviskar and Sundar (2008) explain that it is the capitalist imperative for accumulation that brings primitive or primary accumulation to the fore, which requires the transfer of property from one to another, achieved in contemporary India through an application of force. Such an application of force makes civil society not a domain of hegemony, but of domination (ibid., p. 89], implying that the division and distinction of civil and political societies along the axes of civility and legality is misleading. All the authors argue that in order to understand contemporary subaltern resistances (in my words), one needs to analyse the political economy of rural societies, take into consideration the historical differentiation of the peasantry, the grip of finance and mercantile capital over rural production and exchange processes, and pay attention to various forms of welfarism in practice since the colonial times. Political activity cannot be restricted to a contest over reversing the effects of the primitive accumulation (i.e. negotiating the amount of compensation or provisions of other welfare benefits, or identifying the beneficiaries). Through such negotiations, politics in political society would simply allow the (corporate-) capitalist transformation to take place, albeit at a cost, and thereby such politics would not threaten the dominant: it will be easier for the dominant to meet those demands. In order to appreciate the contemporary subaltern politics, these critics suggest that one needs to study the cases of resistance (John and Deshpande, 2008, p. 86), to see the success in getting the NREGA (National Rural Employment Guarantee Act), the Forest Act and the Right to Information Act as an outcome of peoples own degree of organization and their increased ability to speak in terms of the very law that is used to dispossess them (Baviskar and Sundar, 2008, p. 88) and the look out for spaces, which the ruling classes are compelled to open up in an attempt to legitimize their positions of power so as to (utilize) [those spaces] with a renewed creativity by those fighting for a more equal, less exploitative social order (Shah, 2008, p. 81).

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Responding to his critics, Chatterjee clarifies that he does not see the policies to reverse the effects of the primitive accumulation being based on a need of capital argument (Chatterjee, 2008b, p. 91 and passim), rather his argument in his 2008a article was not a transition argument at all. It [reversing the effects of the primitive accumulation] is a process that [...] is integral to the global reproduction of capital in its most advanced phase. The impulse for such ameliorative measures comes from the moral passionas Chatterjee (2008b, p. 92 and passim) explains:
it is mistaken to claim that the dominant and propertied classes any longer set the standards of morality for society; rather, in a democratic age, the moral passion of entitlement and outrage is on the side of those who have little

And in agreement with the critics, he underlines the political dimension of such an engagement:
Since the intentions emerge from the arena of politics, it goes without saying that they are shaped by the struggles between rival groups and classes in that arena.

The character of the politics which emerges in this fielda field created by governmentalityis populist, and populism is the only morally legitimate form of democratic politics today. Thus, it seems that Chatterjee stands by his earlier claim that the politics of the governed is shifting the historical horizon of political modernity in most of the world (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 75). It is through such political engagements that people are substantial[ly] redefin[ing] property and law within the actually existing modern state (ibid., p. 75) and are devising new ways in which they can choose how they should be governed... people are learning, and forcing their governors to learn, how they would prefer to be governed[which itself is a] good justification for democracy (ibid., pp. 77-78). The political leverage in political society is linked with the inherent majoritarian bias of electoral democracy (Chatterjee, 2008b, p. 90 and passim). And it is in this context that new marginalized groups comprising low-caste and tribals, excluded from political society, have emerged: [p]olitical society and electoral democracy have not given these groups the means to make effective claims on governmentality. In this sense, these marginalised groups represent an outside beyond. This third space is a new category in Chatterjees writing, which John and Deshpande (2008, p. 85) call the liminal zone. The presence of this third space makes it quite clear that the attempt to completely map political spaces is difficult, and the criteria drawn up to differentiate these spaces always leave out another space. But it seems that the two important issues at stake in this debate are: (i) the centrality of governmentality in post-colonial political processes, and (ii) whether it is possible to work out the logics and limits of Indian populism from it. Chatterjee reiterates the centrality of governmentality2 as he says (2008b, p. 93, emphasis added):
they [members of political society] are not necessarily turning into republican citizens, but they are nonetheless acquiring a stake, strategically and morally, in the processes of governmental power. And governmental power, we know, is no longer restricted to the branches of the state but extends to a host of non-state and even non-governmental agencies.

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Although there are scopes to delve further for fathoming the process and degree of expansion of governmental power and its capacity to shape and contain the Indian populism, yet Chatterjee does not undertake that task. In fact, throughout his writings, governmentality has been handled in terms of its instrumentality, which gives rise to the allegation that he has equate[d] intensions with outcomes (John and Deshpande, 2008, p. 84). Mediating on the logics and limits on Indian populism is beyond the purview of this article, but I would like to foreground an interesting theoretical question, which has come out from Chatterjees defence of political society, particularly in the context of capitalist transformation, and Shahs remark that [g] overnmentality [in India] is [] in a crisis (2008, p. 80). The question is: Do the practices of governmentality (i.e. positive policy interventions) manage to dispel or absorb capitalist antagonisms? As argued in this article, the imperatives of capitalist accumulation require the separation of labour from the means of production (exploitation) and transfer of property from one to another (among other processes, via primitive/primary accumulation). The antagonisms which emerge because of such separation are unavoidable, and the provision of compensation would not always be sufficient to dispel or absorb that antagonism. This separation induced by capitalism is fundamental in nature, creating polar opposite (and broad) identities of owners of means of production, and owners of labour power and the dispossessed people. These identities are different from those infused by governmental policies in the way as Chatterjee explains, i.e. empirical groups gain an identity from the category that the government assigns. The forms and content of political articulations of these latter groups are already located within, and thereby subsumed by the governmental discourse. But, in the case of capitalist antagonism, political articulations resist subsumption within capitalist and governmental discourses. What the concept of political society warns us is that a certain section of the society is marginalized and that their demands do not become part of mainstream political articulations in civil society; rather different sorts of demands are allowed to be raised and those are dealt in a piecemeal way. In fact, Chatterjee reminds us, that governmentality always operates on a heterogeneous social field, on multiple population groups, and with multiple strategies (Chatterjee, 2004, p. 60 and passim). And we have seen that the politics in political society is necessarily temporary and contextual. Thus, any political intervention that wants to overcome this fragmentary and temporary politics would necessarily require an engagement in hegemonic politics, a process of constructing a broader political movement beyond the fragmentary ones [for example, the way Ernesto Laclau and Chantal Mouffe (1985) theorize hegemonic strategy]. A detailed discussion on this is beyond the scope of this article.] The exclusions within and from civil society cannot be positively ameliorated or rehabilitated in another domain, namely political society, but a sustained political struggle is required to re-constitute and restructure civil society as the very sphere of realization of rights to counter such exclusions and exclusionary practices. The tasks that need to be undertaken, working through Chatterjees writing, are: (i) developing an analytical framework which helps us understand the specificity and complexity of power relationships in India and the changes within it, (ii) explicating

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the logics of Indian populism, and (iii) exploring its limits, which would inform us about the new exclusions, and the possibility of re-organizing the political space. NOTES
1. Here, Chatterjee criticizes Charles Taylors essay on civil society (see Taylor, 2005). Chatterjee demonstrates that both Locke and Montesquieu had defended the sovereignty of the subjective will (from the state) by appealing and grounding it to a notion of community. The centrality of governmentality was already indicated by Sudipta Kaviraj (1997, p. 54), though he called it the terrain of governance, which according to him, refers to the process of actual policy decisions within the apparatuses of the state and this ensure[s] that actual political configurations do not become symmetrical to class divisions in society.

2.

REFERENCES
Baviskar, Amita and Nandini Sundar (2008). Democracy versus Economic Transformation?, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 46, November 15, pp. 87-89. Chatterjee, Partha (2008a). Democracy and Economic Transformation in India, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 16, April 19-25, pp. 53-62. (2008b). Classes, Capital and Indian Democracy, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 46, November, pp. 89-93. (2004). The Politics of the Governed, Columbia University Press, New York. (2001). On Civil and Political Society in Post-colonial Democracies, in Sudipta Kaviraj and Sunil Khilnani (eds), Civil Society: History and Possibilities, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, England. (1998). Community in the East, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 33, No. 6, February 7. (1993). The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Post-colonial Histories, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Cohen, J. and A. Arato (1992). Political Theory and Civil Society, MIT Press, Cambridge. Hegel, G.W.F. (1967). Philosophy of Right, Oxford University Press, Oxford. Kaviraj, Sudipta (1997). A Critique of Passive Revolution, in Partha Chatterjee (ed.), State and Politics in India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi. Laclau, Ernesto and Chantal Mouffe (1985). Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics, Verso, London. John, Mary and Satish Deshpande (2008). Theorizing the Present: Problems and Possibilities, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 46, November 15, pp. 83-86. Narayanan, D. (1997). Designing Community-based Development, http://www-wds.worldbank. org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2001/07/06/000094946_0106220400478 5/additional/585559324_20040284043342.pdf, accessed on 16 October 2008. Nonan-Ferrell, C. (2004). The State, Civil Society and Revolutions: Building Political Legitimacy in Twentieth Century Latin America, Latin American Research Review, Vol. 39, No. 3, pp. 294-304. Putnam, R. (1994). Making Democracy Work: Civic Traditions in Modern Italy, Princeton University Press, Princeton. Shah, Mihir (2008). Structures of Power in Indian Society: A Response, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 43, No. 46, November 15, pp. 78-83. Taylor, Charles (2005). Invoking Civil Society, in Robert E. Goodwin and Philip Petit (eds) Contemporary Political Philosophy: An Anthology, Blackwell, Oxford.

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