The Association of Management and the International Association of Management, 17th Annual International Conference, San Diego, California

USA, August 6-8, 1999, Proceedings Computer Science, Vol.17, Number 2, Part B, pp. 261-265.

Interactive computing does not supersede Churchs thesis

Bertil Ekdahl
Department of Software Engineering and Computer Science, University of Karlskrona/Ronneby, S-372 25 Ronneby, Sweden. E-mail: bek@ipd.hk-r.se Abstract. Churchs thesis is the belief that every effective calculable function is recursive. The evidence for the thesis is convincing although doubts have been cast on its truth. The main objection is that the thesis connects a vague intuitive notion with an exact mathematical definition. For example Wang ([15]) asks: how could a sharp notion correspond exactly to a vague notion? Until now, nobody has been able to refute Churchs thesis. However, recently Peter Wegner asserts that he has proved that the thesis is invalidated by interactive systems, which have richer behavior than Turing machines and that interactive machines extend Turing machines. The reasons, he argues, are that Turing machines cannot accept external input while computing and that time is a nonfunctional property that is not captured by functions. He also uses Gdels completeness and incompleteness theorems to support his claim. In this paper I examine some of his arguments and show that his claim fails and that Churchs thesis is still not threatened. Keywords. Churchs thesis, Turing machine, oracle, relative computability, completeness, incompleteness. 1. Introduction Wegner ([16]) argues that interactive systems have richer behavior than algorithms and that this is surprisingly ease to prove. His argument is that Turing machines cannot model interaction machines (which extend Turing machines with interactive input/output) because interaction is not expressible by a finite initial input string. In this paper I will show that what he proposes, as a new discovery, is in fact already well known as relative computability ([3]) or relative recursiveness ([10]) and treated already in 1943 and 1952 by Kleene ([6], [7]), Kleene and Post 1954 ([8]) and Davis 1950 ([2]). Wegners main argument is that Turing machines transform finite input strings into output strings by executing sequences of state-transition instructions. They are provided with a finite initial input string, but cannot accept external input while they compute. Wegner also states that Church-Turings thesis breaks down when the notion of what is computable is broadened to include interaction. Though Churchs thesis is valid in the narrow sense that Turing machines express the behavior of algorithms, the broader assertion that algorithms precisely capture what can be computed is invalid. Wegner has some principle claims intended to support his arguments. I will analyze some of them in order to show that Wegners arguments are false, that is, contrary to his proposal, Churchs thesis is still alive and kicking. He also argues that it is shown that interaction machines cannot be described by sound and complete first-order logic (a form of Gdel incompleteness), and that incompleteness is inherently necessary to realize greater expressiveness. This claim is based on a misunderstanding of Gdels results. 2. Church-Turings thesis Wegners attack on Churchs thesis is like a challenge to the second law of thermodynamics: if the hypothesis is false, it will radically change our idea of the world. In the course of time, many people have challenged the foundations of physics claiming that they have constructed a perpetual motion machine. Still, physics is not threatened in its basis since no one has succeeded in building such a machine and thereby disproving the second law. In this paper I will show that Wegners challenge on Church-Turings thesis is as fruitless as all attempts to show the falsification of the second law of thermodynamics. While the laws of thermodynamics are about the world around (outside) us, Churchs thesis is about the minds capability or rather its incapability. In 1936, Church ([1]) proposed that every effectively calculable function (effectively decidable predicate) is general recursive. What Church had in mind was a definition of the informal idea of computability. Gdel, however, was dissatisfied with Churchs approach because the notion of effective was very vague and so was in fact even the notion of calculable. Gdel believed that the computable functions could be defined by some general kind of recursion. His proposal (similar to a proposal by Emil Post) was to analyze the notion of

computability in order to reach the essentially features behind it. Such an analysis was done by Turing ([13]) who proposed a model of an abstract computer in a way satisfactory to Gdel. Post ([9]) saw this as a fundamental discovery in the limitation of the mathematicizing power of Homo Sapiens has been made. Gdel ([4], p.73) strengthened this limitation: [Turings model] do not establish any bounds for the power of human reason but rather for the potentiality of pure formalism in mathematics. Because of Turings and Churchs equivalent characterizing of the computable functions the thesis is now referred to as Church-Turings thesis (CT). Thus, CT is a proposition about limitations in the human cognitive capacity, namely about which functions that can constructively be so well defined that they can be computed in an effective way. That is, once the description is reached, there is a procedure that can be followed without any trace of ingenuity. No matter how hard we try, we will not be able, in an effective way to make a precise description of a non-recursive function. Gdels formulation above implies that he considered CT a limitation of the mind, not in any specific formal system. Turings formulation of computability is not relativized to a certain language but a definition of an epistemological phenomenon that is independent of formalism. If the thesis is true it is not provable because in order to prove it we have to compare a vague intuitive term, effective computability, with a formal notion, recursive functions, Turing machines or some other equivalent formulation. To do this we have to formalize the notion of effective computability, i.e., give an adequate axiomatization of the intuitive notion of computability in which CT would be a theorem. Then we would face the problem whether the introduced formalization is equivalent to the intuitive notion. The solution to the problem would require a claim corresponding to Churchs thesis and so on ending up with an infinite regression. Thus, there will always be beliefs about the mind, which we are not able to deduce from any theory but which seems reasonable from overwhelming evidence. This is a more basic question than Gdels incompleteness theorems, saying what cannot be proved in a formal system. On the other hand, if CT is false it is provable because then there is a counter example, i.e., there exists a function, such that it can be calculated in detail by a human being but not by a Turing machine. Thus we can make a complete description of it, possible to follow without ingenuity and such that the description is transferable to other people but we are not able to put this description in the elementary form of a Turing machine.

So, what Wegner in fact claims when he asserts that CT is not valid for interactive machines (IM) is that he can prove that there is something effectively computable in the intuitive sense that cannot be computed by a Turing machine but is solvable by an IM. This claim is peculiar since it suggests that we cannot, in any way, give such a description that we are able to calculate it by paper and pencil. No one can set up a procedure for how to solve it and despite that an IM, in some magical way, knows how to solve it. To emphasize my point, I will take the well-known busy beaver problem (After Tibor Rado, Bell System Technical Journal, May 1962) as an example. The busy beaver function is well defined but can be shown to grow faster than any recursive function. So, the busy beaver function is easily understood, easily shown to be monotonic and it is also easy to give some characteristics about how fast it grows. Despite that, it is completely impossible to give a precise description of how to compute it: no Turing machine can solve it because we are not able to give a precise description of how to solve the function. That is such a divine procedure that Wegner is referring to. He does not show it and he does not even show such a function and much less such a description. 3. Interactive computing Wegner regards Turing machines as closed systems in the meaning that they cannot interact with its environment contrary to interactive machines, which are open systems due to their ability to interact directly with an external environment by read and write actions. Wegner states (principle claim P2) that interaction machines cannot be modeled by Turing machines. He argues that IMs cannot be modeled by TMs because they require an infinite input tape whose input is not under the control of the IM and whose acceptance condition cannot be specified by a final state. To establish P2 it is sufficient to show that IMs express mapping between infinite as well as finite strings. This claim is hard to understand since every computation must have finite input. Imagine a tape with an infinite set of 1s on it. No machine would be able to compute such a string. For an existing IM the question arises: How it is possible to write the infinitely many 1s on the tape? As an example of a system that is not Turing computable, Wegner states an airline reservation system. So, let us take a similar, but much simpler system as our starting example. We assume that we have a Turing machine that adds two numbers, that is, the Turing machine program is a realization of the recursive function add ( x, y ) = x + y . Suppose further that every time the machine has computed two numbers it enters a wait-state meaning that the machine is waiting for two new numbers to be fed on the tape. In Wegners parlance this is not a Turing machine so let us

call it an Alan machine. We assume further that the system is equipped with a monkey (with very limited intelligence) and that this monkey writes two numbers on the tape every time a computation is finished. As I understand it, this is an interactive computing, just like an airline reservation system, even if scaled down. In a modern style the program can look like the following: While ( forever ) input ( x, y ) print ( x + y ) endwhile What Wegner is saying is that our monkey system can do more than a Turing machine, i.e., that it is richer than a normal computation since it is an open system, which can request input from its environment. Let us analyze the process in more detail. When the monkey writes the numbers on the tape, this is a completely describable process and can equally well be done by another Turing machine. The process of feeding numbers to the tape can go on in infinity but every computation is finite. When the Alan machine has finished a computation it is asking for two new numbers. Which numbers the monkey is going to write on the tape is not a recursive process. However, this does not supersede CT because the thesis is about the observable albeit vague notion of calculability. It is not a parapsychological thesis about how to figure out numbers you (or the monkey) are thinking of. So, the input of numbers can be regarded as a question to an oracle. An oracle answers questions known in advance but the answers are not possible to reckon in advance. For example in an airline reservation system everything that the computer does is specified by an algorithm but of course the algorithm does not include the name of the passengers and the destination. The analogy with the program for addition above is While (forever) input (passengers name, destination) print (ticket) endwhile The monkey is now replaced with people who do not write names and destinations casually but this circumstance does not alter the resemblance to the monkey system. Like this, the airline reservation system above follows a completely specified description how to proceed when names and destinations are put on the tape. Specifically, every computation is finite even if the loop is intended to go on forever. Wegner does not seem to separate infinite computations with infinite many executions of finite computations.

I believe that it is Wegners opinion of time that has led him to his conclusion. He argues that functions cannot express time (in O3) and that time is a nonfunctional property. The reason is that functions are too strong an abstraction that sacrifices the ability to model time and this leads him to the conclusion that interactive behavior includes nonfunctional behavior and consequently cannot be described in a Turing machine program. If we think about functions as belonging to a language we will not arrive at the same standpoint as Wegner. We will separate the function and its description and think of a function as belonging to a model. Descriptions are finite and time independent while interpretations may be infinite, time dependent and dynamic. A computation is an interpretation process and as such a reality. Let us take the recursive functions as an example. All recursive functions can be described in, for instance, Peano arithmetic1 (PA). A Turing machine program, as well as a computer program, is a coding in PA and when the TM is executing its program it deduces a theorem in PA. The computation in PA of a function is a time dependent process, which is an action in reality (time). A real time system displays dynamic and time dependent behavior and can also display infinity while the programs in the system are time independent and finite. As an example think about a TM printing out all natural numbers one at a time. The interpretation process brings non-describable properties to the description otherwise the description would be of no value. Thus, what Wegner calls nonfunctional behavior is always present in every execution (interpretation), interactive or not. This forms no limit on TMs but, in fact, is the qualification for using TMs. 4. Oracle computable functions As a support for his claim that Turing machines are not the most powerful computing mechanism, Wegner refers to Turing who in 1939 ([14]) showed that machines with oracle are more powerful than ordinary Turing machines. In ancient time the Greeks believed that there exist people that were able to communicate with the gods. The Greeks called them oracles due to their ability to answer questions not answerable by man. It was especially important to ask an oracle before a battle. The belief was of course, as it is today, that the gods know more than human beings and that it was advisable to ask them when important decisions had to be made. The idea is that restrictions valid for human beings are not applicable to oracles. But in the idea of an oracle is also the necessity of stopping the ongoing activity and ask the oracle for help to get an outside divine answer to a question. This was also the very idea of Turing: stop the computation by the machine, ask the oracle and
1

See for example [11].

continue the computation. Turing gave his original definition of an oracle for the case of unsolvable problems, which is very natural when you consider the meaning of an oracle. It was after having proved that the halting problem, the set K = { x : x ( x ) } , is undecidable that Turing considered the question of what can be decided by a Turing machine that had an oracle for K. Davis ([3]) uses the notion relatively computable functions. He writes (p.20): Thus far we have dealt only with closed computation. However, it is easy to imagine a machine that halts a computation at various times and requests additional information. This is exactly an IM. In the idea of an oracle machine is also the allowance of the number of questions and the subjects of later questions to depend on the answers to earlier questions. With an oracle the natural question arises: Which noncomputable functions will now become computable? In the ordinary theory of recursive functions it is the partial functions that are the basic objects. If instead a fixed set A is chosen and partial functions are replaced by partial A-computable functions, a relativized theory is obtained. All results in the ordinary theory of recursive function theory remain valid if changed to such a relativization. Following Davis ([3]) we will see how such a relative theory of computation is defined in terms of Turing machines. Turing machine programs consist of a set of quadruples each of one of the following types: (1) q i S j S k q l (2) q i S j R q l (3) q i S j L q l (4) q i S j q k q l where q stands for a state, S for a symbol, R for move right and L for move left. A Turing machine, such as Wegner refers to, consists only of quadruples of type 1,2 and 3. Such machines deal only with closed computations. However, it is easy to imagine a machine that halts its computation at various times and requests additional information. Davis calls this kind of computability relative computability. For this reason the fourth quadruple is used. This provides a Turing machine with the ability to communicate with an external environment. When the machine reaches the quadruple q i S j q k q l , it stops the computation and put a question to an oracle. When an oracle behave recursively we have not gained anything but when the oracle answers noncomputable questions it extends the notion of computability. But relative computability does not by any means invalidate CT. An oracle does not

need to follow CT but on the other hand, CT is not about oracles. 5. Limits of logic Wegner states that expressing interactive systems by logic are not merely hard to realize but unachievable in their pure form. He claims ( P29): Logic is too weak to model interactive computation. Wegner constantly use the term model in a way that is not the normal usage. Logic is used to describe a model. For example the axiom system of Peano arithmetic is a description of the natural numbers which is the model. Axioms are descriptions, not models. Wegner takes Gdels completeness and incompleteness theorems as support for his claim and he regards incompleteness as a positive attribute of interactive systems [.] rather than as a negative obstacle to formalization. However, his use of the incompleteness theorem as opposite to the completeness theorem indicates a confusion. Wegner explains the meaning of sound and complete in the following way (D17): A logic is sound if all provable formulae are tautologies, complete if all tautologies are provable. This is a formulation of Gdels completeness theorem. Formulas true in all models (of appropriate type, which henceforth is tacitly understood) are normally called valid while Wegner calls them tautologies, which is normally reserved for propositions true in all valuations. Wegners account of completeness is somewhat confusing. To give some examples. On the one hand he writes: Soundness and completeness capture only properties true in all modeled worlds and have little to say about properties of specific modeled worlds. On the other hand: Soundness and completeness together ensure that a representation correctly captures all behavior in the world being modeled. In the same spirit as the latest quotation is Soundness and completeness together imply that W is reducible to R. In Wegners usage W is the model and R the theory of W. These statements seem contradictory since little to say about properties of specific modeled worlds and captures all behavior in the world being modeled cannot both be true. Besides, it is a trivial fact as I am going to explain, that W is not reducible to R, except in very special cases. Wegner regards the completeness theorem as a limitation while logicians regard it as a confirmation that our formal system is suited to our need. Further Wegner compares Gdels completeness theorem with his incompleteness theorem and claims that (O33) incomplete systems expresses richer behavior than complete systems. He also argues that Gdels incompleteness result [] is a particular case [] of incompleteness results that brings out the fundamental limitations of completeness. This statement is remarkable since Wegner here claims that Gdels

(first) incompleteness result in a way invalidates his completeness theorem. This claim must be based on a misunderstanding of the completeness and incompleteness results. So, I will briefly explain the relation between the two theorems. Hilbert and Ackermann ([5]) were the first who raised the question of completeness for first order logic. In 1928 they wrote: Whether the axiom system is complete in the sense that from it all logical formulas [logische Formeln] that are correct [richtig] for each domain of individuals can be derived is still an unsolvable question. It is only known purely empirical that this axiom system suffices for all applications. It was this question Gdel answered positively in his doctoral dissertation 1929. In 1930 he published a revised dissertation, Die Vollstndigkeit der Axiome des logischen Funktionenkalkls, i.e. Completeness of the axioms of functional calculus. Nowadays the term predicate calculus is more common than functional calculus. Gdel showed that the formal system used is complete in the sense that it captures all the valid sentences: all valid sentences are provable in the formal system used and no other formal system could do better. Gdels formulation of completeness was F is either 0 -satisfiable or refutable where F is a formula. In modern form, the theorem can be stated as follows: For any set T of sentences and any formula , T = iff T , where = means logical entailment (semantic consequence) and is the provability relation. Normally any set T of sentences is not interesting but only those which have a model. However, the theorems in a theory do not say everything about a model. For example, let N be the normal model of arithmetic and PA as before the axiom system of Peano arithmetic. Now, if PA then N = by the completeness theorem but if N = the theorem is of no help. From the view of the completeness theorem there may be sentences true in N but unprovable in PA. It is here that Gdels first incompleteness theorem is applicable. Simply it states that in every theory, extending PA2 there is a sentence, in the language of the theory, which is neither provable nor refutable. It means that the theory is not complete: A theory T in a given language L is complete if for every sentence of L, either T or T .
2

This form of completeness is related to theories and has nothing to do with models. However, if a complete theory has a model it roughly means that it is possible to list all the true statements which is not the case when the theory is incomplete. As seen, Gdels (first) incompleteness theorem has nothing to do with his completeness theorem. One is about axiom completeness, the other about theory completeness. Unfortunately, the term completeness is used in two completely different ways. The obvious examples of complete theories are theories of given models: Th ( M ) = : M = . The completeness theorem tells us that these are the only consistent, complete theories. Sometimes incompleteness easily follows from the completeness theorem. Following Tarski ([12]), let A be an axiom system for the R (the real numbers) where the primitive terms are real number, is less than, is greater than and sum. Now, all axioms in A retain their validity if R is replaced by Z (integers) or Q (the rational numbers). The sentence xy ( x = y + y ) , is true in Q but not in Z while in Z the negated sentence is true. The completeness theorem is now telling us that the sentence is neither provable no refutable in A, i.e., the mathematical theory based on A is incomplete. Wegners principle claim (P30) states that sound and complete models have an enumerable number of true statements. This claim reveals a complete confusion. It refers to the completeness theorem but models are neither sound nor complete (in this sense). It is, as I have explained above, the axiom system, the deductive apparatus, the formal system or whatever we like to call it, that is sound and complete. Nor is it always true that the true statements in a model are enumerable. This follows from Tarskis theorem ([11]) that says that the set of true formulas of arithmetic is non-arithmetic. A consequence of Tarskis theorem is that Wegners assertion that completeness captures all behavior in the world being modeled is simply not true. Kleene ([6]) has formulated it as follows: It is impossible to confine the intuitive mathematics of elementary propositions about integers to the extent that all true theorems will follow from explicitly stated axioms by explicitly stated rules of inference, simply because the complexity of the predicates soon exceeds the limited form representing the concept of provability in a stated formal system.

The theorem is valid for weaker system than PA.

Wegners claim (O33) that incomplete systems express richer behavior than complete systems is based on the following argument: Complete = = no emergent behavior = formalizable Incomplete = = emergent behavior = unformalizable It is obvious that he compares concepts that are not comparable. Again, incomplete theories are deductively complete, i.e., Gdels completeness theorem is valid even for incomplete theories. To be witty, incomplete theories3 are always complete. Even if Wegner with complete should refer to theories it would not make the statement meaningful. In no theory, not even in an incomplete theory, is emergent behavior possible. It would amount to suddenly having a new theorem in the theory, not deducible from the axiom. Such seems magical. Gdels completeness theorem is not the only interesting theorem about completeness. For example, consider the following theorem of 1 -completeness: Let ( x1 ,..., x n ) be a 1 -formula and a1 ,..., a n natural numbers, then N = ( a1 ,..., a n ) PA ( a1 ,..., a n ) . Roughly, 1 -formulas defines the recursive enumerable predicates. Since those predicates are partial computable this completeness directly concerns Turing machines. It means that for recursive enumerable (r.e.) predicates the situation is very satisfactory. If T is a theory then it is of course complete in the sense of Gdels completeness theorem. T is also 1 -complete and that part of T, which consists of the r.e. predicates, is complete. That is, if R is a r.e. predicate and represents R in T then either T or T . Thus, for the predicates interesting for computability we can express it informally as there is no incompleteness at all. Wegner claims that interactive models may have multiple pragmatic modes of use (interfaces), while logics have a single pragmatic interpretation determined by the syntax. First, logic has no interpretation at all but a formal language may have an interpretation. Normally we are not interested only in a formal language. The purpose of a language is to make it possible to speak about the model and in order to do so we have to axiomatize some properties in the model. This axiomatization is what is normally called a theory.
3

Even if there exist theories with only one model up to isomorphism, many theories have models that are not isomorphic to the standard model. This is the case also for arithmetic. 6. Conclusion As I have shown, Wegner has not succeeded in his purpose to show the limitations of TMs. It seems as he has been led to his conclusion by claims that have a very weak scientific support. First, he does not seem to separate infinite computations with infinite many executions of finite computations. As I have shown, every description has to be finite otherwise the computation will never stop. This implies that descriptions are finite and time independent and that time is not describable. It is then trivial that functions cannot express time and that time is, as Wegner expresses it, a nonfunctional property. So, even this argument fails to show that IMs change the basis of computability. Secondly, Wegners confusion of Gdels completeness and incompleteness theorems leads him into a false path. Like those who claim that they have built a perpetuum mobile Wegner has failed in showing that Church-Turings thesis is not valid for interactive machines. His claim that IMs extend TMs is based on a number of misunderstandings of which I have pointed out some. Interactive machines are, at least since 1943, part of the theory of computability.

First order. For second order logic there is no complete deductive system.

References [1] Alonzo Church, An unsolvable problem of elementary number theory, American journal of mathematics, vol. 58, pp. 345-363, 1936. [2] Martin Davis, On the Theory of Recursive Unsolvability, doctoral dissertation, Princeton University, 1950. [3] Martin Davis, Computability and Unsolvability, Dover edition 1982, New York, Dover Publications, Inc., 1958. [4] Martin Davis, (ed.), The Undecidable, New York, Raven Press, 1965. [5] David Hilbert, and Wilhelm Ackermann, Grundzge der theoretischen Logik, Berlin, SpringerVerlag, 1928. [6] Stephen C. Kleene, Recursive Predicates and Quantifiers, Transactions of the American Mathematical Society, vol. 53, pp. 41-73, 1943. [7] Stephen C. Kleene, Introduction to Metamathematics, Tenth impression 1991, Amsterdam, New York, North-Holland Publishing Company, 1952. [8] Stephen C. Kleene, and Emil L. Post, The Upper Semi-lattice of Degrees of Recursive Unsolvability, Annals of Mathematics, ser. 2, vol. 59, pp. 379-407, 1954. [9] Emil L. Post, Finite combinatory processes formulation, I, The journal of symbolic logic, vol. 1, pp. 103-105, 1936.

[16] Peter Wegner, 1998, Interactive foundations of computing, Theoretical Computer Science 192, pp. 315-351, 1998.

[10] Hartley Rogers Jr., Theory of Recursive Functions and Effective Computability, second printing, Cambridge, Massachusetts London, England, MIT Press paperback edition, 1988. [11] Raymond Smullyan, Gdels Incompleteness Theorems, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992. [12] Alfred Tarski, Introduction to Logic and to the Methodology of Deductive Sciences, Jan Tarski (ed.), Oxford Logic Guides, New York, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1994. [13] Alan M. Turing, On the computable numbers, with application to the Entscheidungsproblem, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, ser. 2, vol. 42, pp. 230-265, 1936-7; corrections, Ibid, vol. 43 pp. 544-546, 1937. [14] Alan M. Turing, Systems of Logic Based on Ordinals, Proceedings of the London Mathematical Society, ser. 2, vol. 45, pp.162-228, 1939. [15] Hao Wang, From Mathematics to Philosophy, London, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1974.