CABALEN MANAGEMENT CO., INC., et al. v. JESUS P. QUIAMBAO, et al.

528 SCRA 153 (2007), SECOND DIVISION (Carpio Morales, J.) It is a well-established rule that the employer has the burden of proving a valid dismissal of an employee, for which it must be for a just or authorized cause and with due process. Jesus Quiambao, et al . were charged of tip pocketing and swapping of dining order slips with bar order slips,among others. They were dismissed from employment due to said acts. They filed a case against CabalenManagement Co., Inc. (Cabalen) for illegal dismissal but the decision of the Labor Arbiter and the NationalLabor Relations Commission was in favor of Cabalen. Quiambao, et al. elevated the case to the Court of Appeals and the CA ruled otherwise. Cabalen sought to set aside the decision of the CA which reversed theearlier rulings provided for by the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. They also questioned the Resolution givenby CA which denied their Motion for Reconsideration. The assailed CA decision held that except for respondents Vizier Inocencio and Vincent Edward Mapa whose petitions were dismissed pursuant to Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of the Rules of Court and Section4 (a) of the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC, herein Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed from theiremployment. The Supreme Court affirmed the CA decision, hence, Cabalens Motion for Reconsiderationbecame subject of this Resolution. To the Motion, Quiambao, et al. filed their Opposition. 4 ISSUES: Whether or not Quiambao, et al. were illegally dismissed HELD: It is a well-established rule that the employer has the burden of proving a valid dismissal of an employee, for which two requisites must concur: (a) the dismissal must be for any of the causes expressed in the LaborCode; and (b) the employee must be accorded due process, basic of which is the opportunity to be heard andto defend himself. To establish a just or authorized cause for dismissal, substantial evidence or "such amount of relevantevidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion" is required. Furtherrequired is that an employee sought to be dismissed must be served two written notices before thetermination of his employment. The first notice must appraise him of the particular acts or omissions upon which his dismissal is grounded; the second, to inform him of the employers decision to terminate hisemployment. While the failure of the employer to comply with these notice requirements does not make thedismissal illegal as long as a just or authorized cause has been proved, it renders the employer liable forpayment of damages because of the violation of the workers right to statutory due process.In the instant case, only photocopies of the statements of Balen and Malana form part of the records despiteCabalens reliance thereon to prove respondents purported transgressions. Jarcia Machine Shop and AutoSupply, Inc. v. NLRC held that the unsigned photocopies of daily time records (DTRs), which werepresented by the therein employer to show that its employee was neglectful of his duties, were of "doubtfulor dubious probative value."Cabalen, et al. did not even heed their own procedures on disciplinary actions. The only facts extant in therecords are that respondents were issued above-said Corrective Action Report (CARE) Forms asking themto explain their alleged infractions within 48 hours; and they subsequently received notices of dismissal afterthey submitted their written explanations. There is, however, nothing to show that before their dismissal,Quimbao, et al. were informed of their immediate supervisors decision to terminate their services, or thatthey were thereafter invited to an administrative investigation before the HRD manager or officer who istasked to conduct the investigation in the presence of the employees immediate supervisor/s and the witnesses, if necessary, as provided under Section IV of the companys Code of Conduct.No record of any administrative investigation proceeding, which under the companys rules was to be"minuted," had also been presented. Hence, only Cabalens allegation that the statements of the witnesses were taken as part of the administrative investigation is before this Court. Allegations without proof do notdeserve consideration.Finally, on the dismissal of Quiambao allegedly on the ground of business losses, it was incumbent uponCabe to len, et al. to prove it by substantial evidence. It did not, however. In fact, Quiambao presenteddocuments to disprove the validity of his retrenchment on that ground. For petitioners failure to dischargeits burden then, this Court is constrained to hold that Quiambaos dismissal was not valid.

FERNANDO G. MANAYA vs. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 168988. A LABOR RELATION CASE. FERNANDO G. MANAYA vs. ALABANG COUNTRY CLUB INCORPORATED, G.R. No. 168988 FACTS: 1. Petitioner was dismissed by the respondent because his services is no longer needed by the respondent Alabang Country Clab. 2. Petitioner filed a complaint of illegal dismissal against the respondent before the LA claiming that with his more or less nine years of service with the respondent, he had become a regular employee and that he had not committed any infraction of company policies or rules and so he, therefore, demanded his reinstatement without loss of seniority rights with full backwages and all monetary benefits due him. 3. On the otherhand, respondent claim that petitioner is not its employee because he came to work with the respondent by virtue of a legitimate

job contract and that its true employer is the First Staffing Network Corporation with which respondent alabang country clab has a memorandum agreement so it prayed for the dismissal of the complaint because the petitioner has no cause of action against it. 4. The LA ruled that the dismissal of the petitioner was no valid cause and that he is a regular employee of the respondent and order its reinstatement. 5. Respondent appealed to the NLRC who dismiss the case because it is filed beyond the statutory period of appealsso the decision of the LA had become final and executory and denied all the motion for reconsideration of the respondent. 6. Respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals who grant the petition and order the NLRC to give due course to respondents appeal of the Labor Arbiters Decision and denied all the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. 7. Petitioner filed a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether or not, the CA commited an error when it give due course of the respondents appeal before the NLRC even if it is filed beyond the 10 days reglamentary period. According to the Supreme Court, The controlling date of the receipt of the decision is on December 11 2,000, when it was received by the lawyer of the respondent, and so the appeal was filed beyond the reglamentary period when they filed it on December 26 of the same year. For negligence not to be binding on the client, the same must constitute gross negligence as to amount to a deprivation of property without due process. Wherefore, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 9 May 2005 and its Resolution dated 21 July 2005 is REVERSED. The Decision of the Labor Arbiter dated 20 November 2000 is reinstated. Let the records of the above-entitled case be remanded to the Labor Arbiter for immediate execution of the Decision. No costs.

Metro Transit Organization vs Piglas NFWU-KMU et al., (2008) G.R. 175460 Facts: Petitioner MTO is a government owned and controlled corporation which entered into a Management andOperations Agreement (MOA) with the Light Rail Transit Authority (LRTA) for the operation of the Light RailTransit (LRT) Baclaran-Monumento Line.Petitioner Jose L. Cortez, Jr. was sued in his official capacity as thenUndersecretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications and Chairman of the Board of Directors of petitioner MTO.Respondents filed with the LaborArbiter Complaints against petitioners and the LRTAfor the following: (1)illegal dismissal; (2) unfair labor practice for union busting; (3) moral and exemplary damages; and (4)attorney's fees.On 13September 2004, the LaborArbiter rendered judgment in favor of respondents. Petitioners appealedto the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).In a Resolution dated 19 May 2006, the NLRC dismissedpetitioners' appeal for nonperfection since it failed to post the required bond. Without filing a Motion forReconsideration of the afore-quoted NLRC Resolution, petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari with the Courtof Appeals assailing the same. On 24August 2006, the Court of Appeals issued a Resolution dismissing thePetition. Issue: WON petitioner can directly file the extraordinary remedy of certiorari without filing first a motion forreconsideration with the NLRC. Held: Petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration against the assailed Resolution of the NLRCrendered its petition for certiorari before the appellate court as fatally defective. It must be primarily established that petitioners contravened the procedural rule for the extraordinaryremedy of certiorari. The rule is, for the writ to issue, it must be shown that there is no appeal, nor any plain,speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law.The settled rule is that a motion for reconsideration is a condition sinequa non for the filing of a petition forcertiorari. Its purpose is to grant an opportunity for the court to correct any actual or perceived errorattributed to it by the re examination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. The rationale of therule rests upon the presumption that the court or administrative body which issued the assailed order orresolution may amend the same, if given the chance to correct its mistake or error.We have held that the "plain," "speedy," and "adequate remedy" referred to inSection 1, Rule 65 of theRules of Court is a motion for reconsideration of thequestioned Order or Resolution.As we consistently heldin numerous cases, a motion for reconsideration is indispensable for it affords the NLRC an opportunity torectify errors or mistakes it might have committed before resort to the courts can be had. In the case at bar, petitioners directly went to the Court of Appeals on certiorari without filing a motion forreconsideration with the NLRC. The motion for reconsideration would have aptly furnished a plain, speedy,and adequate remedy. As a rule, the Court of Appeals, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction, will not takecognizance of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, unless the lower court has been given the opportunityto correct the error imputed to it. The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that petitioners' failure to file a motion for reconsideration against the assailed Resolution of the NLRC rendered its petition for certioraribefore the appellate court as fatally defective.We agree in the Court of Appeals' finding that petitioners' case does not fall under any of the recognizedexceptions to the filing of a motion for reconsideration, to wit: (1) when the issue raised is purely of law; (2)when public interest is involved; (3) in case of urgency; or when the questions raised are the same as thosethat have already been squarely argued and exhaustively passed upon by the lower court.As the Court of Appeals reasoned, the issue before the NLRC is both factual and legal at the same time, involving as it doesthe requirements of the property bond for the perfection of the appeal, as well as the finding that petitionersfailed to perfect the same. Evidently, the burden is on petitioners seeking exception to the rule to showsufficient justification for dispensing with the requirement.Certiorari cannot be resorted to as a shield from the adverse consequences of petitioners' own omission of the filing of the required motion for reconsideration.Nonetheless, even if we are to disregard the petitioners' procedural faux pas with the Court of Appeals, andproceed to review the propriety of the 19 May 2006 NLRC Resolution, we still arrive at the conclusion thatthe NLRC did not err in denying petitioners' appeal for its failure to file a bond in accordance with the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC.