Bundesministerium des Innern

Annual Report of the Office for Protection of the Constitution

1999

IV. Activities of Intelligence Services of Countries in the Near/Middle East

Also, the services of several Near/Middle East countries continue to pursue intelligence activities in, and against, Germany. Their intelligence interest covers the classical areas of espionage - politics, the military, industry, science and technology - and, to a particular extent, infiltration of, and spying on, organizations or persons in Germany which/who are in opposition to the government of their respective country of origin. In order to achieve these ends, they are also prepared to use force which may even include acts of (state-sponsored) terrorism. Also, they are interested in the subject of proliferation.

1.
Priority aim: spying on regime opponents

Iranian Intelligence Services

As before, the priority aim of the Iranian Intelligence Service VEVAK (Ministry for Intelligence and Security) is to combat Iranian dissidents living in Germany. In departure from the violent approach taken until the mid-1990s - inter alia, attempts on the lives of leading opposition politicians in Western foreign countries, including Germany 175) - VEVAK activities were, as in the previous years, focused on the political neutralization of opposition groups and their anti-regime activities. The "Peoples Mujahiddin of Iran" (MEK) and its political arm which is active worldwide, the "Nationaler Widerstandsrat Iran" (NWRI - "National Resistance Council of Iran"), continued to be the focus of the intelligence interest of the Iranian intelligence service. In its fight against the Iranian opposition-in-exile, VEVAK makes use of so-called "culture associations". These are cover organizations founded as directed by VEVAK and acting in accordance with Irans interests and wishes. In addition, the Iranian service initiates anti-MEK publications which in part are published by former MEK activists and have the aim of persuading the readers of these publications to turn their backs upon this organization. For spying on the MEK, the Iranian intelligence service also recruits supporters of that organization and other Iranian nationals. Recruitment mostly takes place during visits by exiled Iranians to Iran. When in that country, they will be approached by VEVAK and, in instances, under threat of massive harassment against themselves or their relatives in Iran, are compelled to co-operate with the intelligence service. On 24 November, the trial began in the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal against a 36-year old Iranian national living in Germany for a number of years and arrested in Berlin in July. He was under strong suspicion to have spied, as a supposed MEK

"Culture Associations" and anti-MEK publications

Severe harassment as a lever

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supporter, on leading functionaries and activities of that organization in Germany on behalf of the Iranian intelligence service*).

2.

Syrian Intelligence Services

Also the Syrian intelligence services continued their intelligence collection activities in Germany.
Residencies control the source and informant network

For the development and control of the source and informant network set up to this end, they run undercover bases established at the official and quasi-official missions (legal residencies). The latter include the Syrian Embassy. The main tasks of the Syrian intelligence service officers operating from these missions under diplomatic cover are intelligence collection, and spying on and monitoring of compatriots living in Germany who are critical of the political system in their home country. The primary observation sites of Syrian secret services include the Islamic Centres and mosques whose frequenters are considered to be among the political opponents. With the help of sources and informants, the services attempt to gather information on the living conditions, contacts and political aims of these persons so as to induce them, by using the information thus obtained, to abandon their dissident stance. A case in point concerns a 43-year old Syrian who, after his asylum application had been turned down in August 1995, as a walkin volunteered co-operation with the Syrian intelligence service. Since then, he had maintained intensive intelligence contacts with the resident of the civilian Syrian intelligence service who held the cover post of attach in the Consular Division of the Syrian Embassy. In this context, he procured, and delivered to his handler, personal data on a large number of ethnic Syrians and Lebanese living in Germany. For this purpose, he increasingly made use of clandestine methods and means. This intelligence contact ended in May 1999 when he was arrested. In early October, he was sentenced by the Hamburg OLG (Higher Regional Court of Appeal) to two years' imprisonment (suspended on probation) on the charge of intelligence activity on behalf of Syria. At the instigation of the Foreign Office, the agent controller of the Syrian Embassy left the Federal Republic of Germany on 24 July.

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On 19 January 2000, the Berlin Higher Regional Court of Appeal sentenced the accused to 18 months imprisonment (suspended on probation) and to a fine of 5,000 DM.

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3.
Residency staff members and alleged asylum seekers spy on dissidents

Iraqi Intelligence Services

Spying on, and infiltration of, Iraqi dissidents living abroad continue to be the priority intelligence targets of the Iraqi intelligence service in Germany. Its primary interest is in obtaining information on the whereabouts, in other countries, of specific critics of the regime, officers having fled the country or other persons cleared for access to classified information. In addition to undercover intelligence-service staffers at the Iraqi Embassy in Bonn, it increasingly uses agents who, posing as asylum seekers, attempt to obtain information on the German asylum procedure and to infiltrate Iraqi dissident groups. For facilitation of entry, the Iraqi intelligence services make use of professional clandestine immigration rings which, against payment, smuggle the agents concerned from a neighbouring country to Germany. As regards the direction and control of agents who have already been active for some time - so-called asset sources - the Iraqi services increasingly channel their contacts with them either directly through the services headquarters in Baghdad or through a residency in a neighbouring country of the German area of operations.

V.

Activities of Far East Intelligence Services

Intelligence services from a number of Far East countries also continue to pursue intelligence activities in Germany. In this regard, the Peoples Republics of China and of North Korea are the primary countries involved.

1.
Intelligence services are to contribute to the achievement of Chinas envisaged great-power position

Chinese Intelligence Services

The intensive espionage activities of the intelligence services of the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) continue to be based on the objective of drawing level with leading industrial nations economically and in terms of armaments technology.. In the political area, too, the PRC, as an emerging great power, wants to obtain all essential information. To this end, with major staffing and funding inputs, it has, for a number of years, been operating six intelligence and security services, of which primarily the "Ministry for State Security" (civilian intelligence service - MSS) and the "Main Directorate Intelligence of the General Staff of the Peoples Liberation Army" (military intelligence service - MID) are responsible for foreign-intelligence tasks.

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