G.R. No. L-45425 April 29, 1939 10. Maria C. Legaspi ............................................................................................... .

16
GATCHALIAN vs. CIR
11. Francisco Cabral ............................................................................................... .13
The plaintiff brought this action to recover from the defendant Collector of Internal
Revenue the sum of P1,863.44, with legal interest thereon, which they paid under protest 12. Gonzalo Javier
.14
by way of income tax. They appealed from the decision rendered in the case on October ....................................................................................................
23, 1936 by the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila, which dismissed the action
13. Maria Santiago
with the costs against them. .17
...................................................................................................
The case was submitted for decision upon the following stipulation of facts: 14. Buenaventura Guzman
.13
......................................................................................
Come now the parties to the above-mentioned case, through their respective
undersigned attorneys, and hereby agree to respectfully submit to this Honorable 15. Mariano Santos ................................................................................................. .14
Court the case upon the following statement of facts:
Total ........................................................................................................ 2.00
1. That plaintiff are all residents of the municipality of Pulilan, Bulacan, and that
defendant is the Collector of Internal Revenue of the Philippines;
3. That immediately thereafter but prior to December 15, 1934, plaintiffs
2. That prior to December 15, 1934 plaintiffs, in order to enable them to purchase purchased, in the ordinary course of business, from one of the duly authorized
one sweepstakes ticket valued at two pesos (P2), subscribed and paid therefor agents of the National Charity Sweepstakes Office one ticket bearing No. 178637
the amounts as follows: for the sum of two pesos (P2) and that the said ticket was registered in the name
of Jose Gatchalian and Company;

1. Jose Gatchalian 4. That as a result of the drawing of the sweepstakes on December 15, 1934, the
P0.18
.................................................................................................... above-mentioned ticket bearing No. 178637 won one of the third prizes in the
amount of P50,000 and that the corresponding check covering the above-
2. Gregoria Cristobal ............................................................................................... .18
mentioned prize of P50,000 was drawn by the National Charity Sweepstakes
3. Saturnina Silva .................................................................................................... .08 Office in favor of Jose Gatchalian & Company against the Philippine National
Bank, which check was cashed during the latter part of December, 1934 by Jose
4. Guillermo Tapia ................................................................................................... .13 Gatchalian & Company;

5. Jesus Legaspi 5. That on December 29, 1934, Jose Gatchalian was required by income tax
.15
...................................................................................................... examiner Alfredo David to file the corresponding income tax return covering the
6. Jose Silva prize won by Jose Gatchalian & Company and that on December 29, 1934, the
.07 said return was signed by Jose Gatchalian, a copy of which return is enclosed as
.............................................................................................................
Exhibit A and made a part hereof;
7. Tomasa Mercado ................................................................................................ .08
6. That on January 8, 1935, the defendant made an assessment against Jose
8. Julio Gatchalian Gatchalian & Company requesting the payment of the sum of P1,499.94 to the
.13
................................................................................................... deputy provincial treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan, giving to said Jose Gatchalian &
9. Emiliana Santiago Company until January 20, 1935 within which to pay the said amount of
.13 P1,499.94, a copy of which letter marked Exhibit B is enclosed and made a part
................................................................................................
hereof;
7. That on January 20, 1935, the plaintiffs, through their attorney, sent to 13. That on July 16, 1935 the said plaintiffs formally protested against the
defendant a reply, a copy of which marked Exhibit C is attached and made a part payment of the sum of P602.51, a copy of which protest is attached and marked
hereof, requesting exemption from payment of the income tax to which reply Exhibit L, but that defendant in his letter dated August 1, 1935 overruled the
there were enclosed fifteen (15) separate individual income tax returns filed protest and denied the request for refund of the plaintiffs;
separately by each one of the plaintiffs, copies of which returns are attached and
marked Exhibit D-1 to D-15, respectively, in order of their names listed in the 14. That, in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the monthly installments in
caption of this case and made parts hereof; a statement of sale signed by Jose accordance with the terms and conditions of bond filed by them, the defendant in
Gatchalian showing the amount put up by each of the plaintiffs to cover up the his letter dated July 23, 1935, copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit M,
attached and marked as Exhibit E and made a part hereof; and a copy of the ordered the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan to execute within five days
affidavit signed by Jose Gatchalian dated December 29, 1934 is attached and the warrant of distraint and levy issued against the plaintiffs on May 13, 1935;
marked Exhibit F and made part thereof;
15. That in order to avoid annoyance and embarrassment arising from the levy of
8. That the defendant in his letter dated January 28, 1935, a copy of which their property, the plaintiffs on August 28, 1936, through Jose Gatchalian,
marked Exhibit G is enclosed, denied plaintiffs' request of January 20, 1935, for Guillermo Tapia, Maria Santiago and Emiliano Santiago, paid under protest to
exemption from the payment of tax and reiterated his demand for the payment of the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan the sum of P1,260.93 representing
the sum of P1,499.94 as income tax and gave plaintiffs until February 10, 1935 the unpaid balance of the income tax and penalties demanded by defendant as
within which to pay the said tax; evidenced by income tax receipt No. 35811 which is attached and marked Exhibit
N and made a part hereof; and that on September 3, 1936, the plaintiffs formally
9. That in view of the failure of the plaintiffs to pay the amount of tax demanded protested to the defendant against the payment of said amount and requested
by the defendant, notwithstanding subsequent demand made by defendant upon the refund thereof, copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit O and made
the plaintiffs through their attorney on March 23, 1935, a copy of which marked part hereof; but that on September 4, 1936, the defendant overruled the protest
Exhibit H is enclosed, defendant on May 13, 1935 issued a warrant of distraint and denied the refund thereof; copy of which is attached and marked Exhibit P
and levy against the property of the plaintiffs, a copy of which warrant marked and made a part hereof; and
Exhibit I is enclosed and made a part hereof;
16. That plaintiffs demanded upon defendant the refund of the total sum of one
10. That to avoid embarrassment arising from the embargo of the property of the thousand eight hundred and sixty three pesos and forty-four centavos
plaintiffs, the said plaintiffs on June 15, 1935, through Gregoria Cristobal, Maria (P1,863.44) paid under protest by them but that defendant refused and still
C. Legaspi and Jesus Legaspi, paid under protest the sum of P601.51 as part of refuses to refund the said amount notwithstanding the plaintiffs' demands.
the tax and penalties to the municipal treasurer of Pulilan, Bulacan, as evidenced
by official receipt No. 7454879 which is attached and marked Exhibit J and made 17. The parties hereto reserve the right to present other and additional evidence
a part hereof, and requested defendant that plaintiffs be allowed to pay under if necessary.
protest the balance of the tax and penalties by monthly installments;
Exhibit E referred to in the stipulation is of the following tenor:
11. That plaintiff's request to pay the balance of the tax and penalties was
granted by defendant subject to the condition that plaintiffs file the usual bond To whom it may concern:
secured by two solvent persons to guarantee prompt payment of each
installments as it becomes due;
I, Jose Gatchalian, a resident of Pulilan, Bulacan, married, of age, hereby certify,
that on the 11th day of August, 1934, I sold parts of my shares on ticket No.
12. That on July 16, 1935, plaintiff filed a bond, a copy of which marked Exhibit K 178637 to the persons and for the amount indicated below and the part of may
is enclosed and made a part hereof, to guarantee the payment of the balance of share remaining is also shown to wit:
the alleged tax liability by monthly installments at the rate of P118.70 a month,
the first payment under protest to be effected on or before July 31, 1935;
Purchaser Amount Address
 1. Mariano Santos ........................................... P0.14 Pulilan, Bulacan. Exhibit Purchase Price Net
Name Expenses
No. Price Won prize
2. Buenaventura Guzman ............................... .13 - Do -
1. Jose Gatchalian
3. Maria Santiago ............................................ .17 - Do - D-1 P0.18 P4,425 P 480 3,945
..........................................
4. Gonzalo Javier .............................................. .14 - Do - 2. Gregoria Cristobal
D-2 .18 4,575 2,000 2,575
5. Francisco Cabral .......................................... .13 - Do - ......................................
3. Saturnina Silva
6. Maria C. Legaspi .......................................... .16 - Do - D-3 .08 1,875 360 1,515
.............................................
7. Emiliana Santiago ......................................... .13 - Do -
4. Guillermo Tapia
D-4 .13 3,325 360 2,965
8. Julio Gatchalian ............................................ .13 - Do - ..........................................

9. Jose Silva ...................................................... .07 - Do - 5. Jesus Legaspi by Maria

D-5 .15 3,825 720 3,105
Cristobal .........
10. Tomasa Mercado ....................................... .08 - Do -
6. Jose Silva
11. Jesus Legaspi ............................................. .15 - Do - D-6 .08 1,875 360 1,515
....................................................
12. Guillermo Tapia ........................................... .13 - Do - 7. Tomasa Mercado
D-7 .07 1,875 360 1,515
.......................................
13. Saturnina Silva ............................................ .08 - Do -
8. Julio Gatchalian by Beatriz
14. Gregoria Cristobal ....................................... .18 - Do - D-8 .13 3,150 240 2,910
Guzman .......
15. Jose Gatchalian ............................................ .18 - Do - 9. Emiliana Santiago
D-9 .13 3,325 360 2,965
......................................
2.00 Total cost of said 10. Maria C. Legaspi
D-10 .16 4,100 960 3,140
......................................
ticket; and that, therefore, the persons named above are entitled to the parts of
11. Francisco Cabral
whatever prize that might be won by said ticket. D-11 .13 3,325 360 2,965
......................................
Pulilan, Bulacan, P.I. 12. Gonzalo Javier
D-12 .14 3,325 360 2,965
..........................................
(Sgd.) JOSE GATCHALIAN
13. Maria Santiago
D-13 .17 4,350 360 3,990
..........................................
And a summary of Exhibits D-1 to D-15 is inserted in the bill of exceptions as follows:
14. Buenaventura Guzman
RECAPITULATIONS OF 15 INDIVIDUAL INCOME TAX RETURNS FOR 1934 D-14 .13 3,325 360 2,965
...........................
ALL DATED JANUARY 19, 1935 SUBMITTED TO THE COLLECTOR OF
INTERNAL REVENUE. 15. Mariano Santos
D-15 .14 3,325 360 2,965
........................................
 mixed, shall be ascertained in accordance with subsections (c) and (d) of section
<="" td=""
two of Act Numbered Two thousand eight hundred and thirty-three, as amended
style="font- by Act Numbered Twenty-nine hundred and twenty-six.
size: 14px;
text- The foregoing tax rate shall apply to the net income received by every taxable
decoration: corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
2.00 50,000 none; color: participacion), association, or insurance company in the calendar year nineteen
rgb(0, 0, 128); hundred and twenty and in each year thereafter.
font-family:
arial, There is no doubt that if the plaintiffs merely formed a community of property the latter is
verdana;"> exempt from the payment of income tax under the law. But according to the stipulation
facts the plaintiffs organized a partnership of a civil nature because each of them put up
money to buy a sweepstakes ticket for the sole purpose of dividing equally the prize
The legal questions raised in plaintiffs-appellants' five assigned errors may properly be which they may win, as they did in fact in the amount of P50,000 (article 1665, Civil
reduced to the two following: (1) Whether the plaintiffs formed a partnership, or merely a Code). The partnership was not only formed, but upon the organization thereof and the
community of property without a personality of its own; in the first case it is admitted that winning of the prize, Jose Gatchalian personally appeared in the office of the Philippines
the partnership thus formed is liable for the payment of income tax, whereas if there was Charity Sweepstakes, in his capacity as co-partner, as such collection the prize, the
merely a community of property, they are exempt from such payment; and (2) whether office issued the check for P50,000 in favor of Jose Gatchalian and company, and the
they should pay the tax collectively or whether the latter should be prorated among them said partner, in the same capacity, collected the said check. All these circumstances
and paid individually. repel the idea that the plaintiffs organized and formed a community of property only.

The Collector of Internal Revenue collected the tax under section 10 of Act No. 2833, as Having organized and constituted a partnership of a civil nature, the said entity is the one
last amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761, reading as follows: bound to pay the income tax which the defendant collected under the aforesaid section
10 (a) of Act No. 2833, as amended by section 2 of Act No. 3761. There is no merit in
SEC. 10. (a) There shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid annually upon plaintiff's contention that the tax should be prorated among them and paid individually,
the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from all sources by resulting in their exemption from the tax.
every corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
participacion), association or insurance company, organized in the Philippine In view of the foregoing, the appealed decision is affirmed, with the costs of this instance
Islands, no matter how created or organized, but not including duly registered to the plaintiffs appellants. So ordered.
general copartnership (compañias colectivas), a tax of three per centum upon
such income; and a like tax shall be levied, assessed, collected, and paid
annually upon the total net income received in the preceding calendar year from
all sources within the Philippine Islands by every corporation, joint-stock
company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en participacion), association, or
insurance company organized, authorized, or existing under the laws of any
foreign country, including interest on bonds, notes, or other interest-bearing
obligations of residents, corporate or otherwise: Provided, however, That nothing
in this section shall be construed as permitting the taxation of the income derived
from dividends or net profits on which the normal tax has been paid.

The gain derived or loss sustained from the sale or other disposition by a
corporation, joint-stock company, partnership, joint account (cuenta en
participacion), association, or insurance company, or property, real, personal, or
G.R. No. L-27933 December 24, 1968 house were demolished the defendant would suffer damage in the amount of
DIVERSIFIED CREDIT vs. ROSADO P8,000.00;

This appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Bacolod City, Negros 6. That the portion of the lot on which the house stands, would earn a monthly
Occidental (Civ. Case No. 7516 of that Court) was certified to us by the Court of Appeals rental of P50.00;
(Second Division) because the same involves no questions of fact.
7. That Felipe Rosado, husband of Luz Jayme, did not give his conformity to the
The case had its origin in the Municipal Court of Bacolod City, when the Diversified Deed of Sale, Exh. "A".
Credit Corporation filed an action to compel the spouses Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme
Rosado to vacate and restore possession of a parcel of land in the City of Bacolod (Lot 8. That on October 31, 1964, the defendant Felipe Rosado requested the plaintiff
62-B of Subdivision plan LRC-Psd-33823) that forms part of Lot No. 62 of the Bacolod in the letter, Exh. "C" for the plaintiff, for a period of six (6) months within which to
Cadastre, and is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 27083 in the name of vacate the premises.
plaintiff. After answer, claiming that the lot was defendants' conjugal property, the
Municipal Court ordered defendants to surrender and vacate the land in litigation; to pay 9. That the letter was not answered by the plaintiff and they did not accept the
P100.00 a month from the filing of the complaint up to the actual vacating of the offer, and on November 25, 1964, they filed a complaint before the Municipal
premises; to pay P500.00 attorneys' fees and costs. Upon appeal to the Court of First Court which proves that plaintiff neglected the offer;
Instance, the case was submitted on the following stipulation of facts (Rec. on App., pp.
59-60):
The Court of First Instance in its decision rejected the claim of ownership advanced by
Rosado, based upon the construction of a house on the disputed lot by the conjugal
1. That Lot No. 62-B of Bacolod Cadastre belong to the thirteen co-owners, partnership of the Rosado spouses, which allegedly converted the land into conjugal
including the wife of the defendant herein, who owns 1/13th part pro-indiviso; property under Article 158, paragraph 2 of the present Civil Code of the Philippines;
further held that defendants were in estoppel to claim title in view of the letter Exhibit C
2. That on May 11, 1964, Luz Jayme Rosado, wife of the defendant Felipe requesting for six (6) months within which to vacate the premises, and affirmed the
Rosado, signed a Deed of Sale together with the co-owners of the property to the decision of the Inferior Court. Defendant Felipe Rosado resorted to the Court of Appeals,
plaintiff as shown by Exh. "A" for the plaintiff; and his appeal (CA-G.R. No. 37398-R) is the one now before us. He assigns four alleged
errors:
3. That on the lot in question the defendant Felipe Rosado had built a house
sometime in 1957 without the whole property having been previously partitioned (a) The lower court erred in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void, since
among the thirteen (13) co-owners; upon the construction of the conjugal dwelling thereon, the conjugal partnership
of the defendant-appellant Felipe Rosado and Luz Jayme became the owner of
4. That the title of the property has already been transferred to the plaintiff upon the share of Luz Jayme in Lot No. 62-B, Bacolod Cadastre;
registration of the Deed of Sale in June, 1964, with the Office of the Register of
Deeds; (b) The trial court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to vacate Lot No. 62-
B and in not holding that Exhibit "A" is null and void because as the legal
5. That demand was made by the plaintiff upon the defendant Felipe Rosado and usufructuary of the share of Luz Jayme Rosado in Lot 62-B, Bacolod Cadastre,
his wife Luz Jayme Rosado on October 19, 1964, but until now the defendant the conjugal partnership, managed and administered by the defendant-appellant
Felipe Rosado has refused to vacate the premises or to remove his house Felipe Rosado can not be deprived of its usufructuary rights by any contract
thereon as shown by Exh. "B" for the plaintiff, on the grounds as he alleged in his between Luz Jayme and the plaintiff-appellee;
answer that he had built on the lot in question a conjugal house worth P8,000.00
which necessarily makes the lot on which it stands subject to Article 158 of the (c) The trial court erred in not holding that the defendant-appellant should be
Civil Code and on the point of view of equity that the wife of the defendant Felipe reimbursed the value of the conjugal house constructed on Lot 62-B; and
Rosado received an aliquot share of P2,400.00 only from the share and if the
 (d) The lower court erred in ordering the defendant-appellant to pay attorneys' Since the share of the wife, Luz Jayme, was at no time physically determined, it cannot
fees in the amount of five hundred (P500.00) pesos. be validly claimed that the house constructed by her husband was built on land
belonging to her, and Article 158 of the Civil Code can not apply. Certainly, on her 1/13
It can be seen that the key question is whether by the construction of a house on the lot ideal or abstract undivided share, no house could be erected. Necessarily, the claim of
owned in common by the Jaymes, and sold by them to the appellant corporation, the conversion of the wife's share from paraphernal to conjugal in character as a result of the
land in question or a 1/13th part of it became conjugal property. construction must be rejected for lack of factual or legal basis.

Appellant, husband of vendor Luz Jayme, claims the affirmative invoking the second It is the logical consequence of the foregoing ruling that the lower court did not err in
paragraph of Article 158 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, prescribing that: holding that the appellant was bound to vacate the land without reimbursement, since he
knew that the land occupied by the house did not belong exclusively to his wife, but to
ART. 158. Improvements, whether for utility or adornment, made on the separate the other owners as well, and there is no proof on record that the house occupied only
property of the spouses through advancements from the partnership or through 1/13 of the total area. The construction was not done in good faith.
the industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the conjugal partnership.
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. Costs against
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership, during the marriage on appellant Felipe Rosado.
land belonging to one of the spouses, also pertain to the partnership, but the
value of the land shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.

Rosado further contends that as the building of the house at the expense of the conjugal
partnership converted the 1/13 undivided share on his wife in Lot 62-B into property of
the community, the deed of sale of May 11, 1964 in favor of the appellee corporation was
void in so far as said 1/13 share is concerned, because his wife, Luz Jayme, had ceased
to own such share from and after the building of the house; and Rosado, as manager of
the conjugal partnership, had not participated in the sale, nor subsequently ratified the
same.

We find appellant's thesis legally untenable. For it is a basic principle in the law of co-
ownership, both under the present Civil Code as in the Code of 1889, that no individual
co-owner can claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until
the partition thereof. Prior to that time, all that the co-owner has is an ideal, or abstract,
quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-owners.
The principle is emphasized by the rulings of this Court. In Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567,
it was held that while a co-owner has the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided
interest, he has no right to sell a divided part of the real estate owned in common. "If he
is the owner of an undivided half of a tract of land, he has the right to sell and convey an
undivided half, but he has no right to divide the lot into two parts, and convey the whole
of one part by metes and bounds." The doctrine was reiterated in Mercado vs. Liwanag,
L-14429, June 20, 1962, holding that a co-owner may not convey a physical portion of
the land owned in common. And in Santos vs. Buenconsejo, L-20136, June 23, 1965, it
was ruled that a co-owner may not even adjudicate to himself any determinate portion of
land owned in common.
G.R. No. L-44426 February 25, 1982 The Court finds merit in the petition for setting aside respondent appellate court's
CARVAJAL vs. CA decision finding for respondents-plaintiffs, for the following considerations:

The Court reverses the appellate court's decision affirming in toto the judgment of the The action for ejectment and recovery of possession instituted by herein respondents in
Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, declaring plaintiffs-respondents the lawful owners the lower court is premature, for what must be settled frist is the action for partition.
of the land in question and ordering defendant (herein petitioner) to pay P30.00 monthly Unless a project of partition is effected, each heir cannot claim ownership over a definite
rentals until possession of the property is surrendered to respondents, for unless there is portion of the inheritance. Without partition, either by agreement between the parties of
partition of the estate of the deceased, either extra judicially or by court order, a co-heir by judicial proceeding, a co-heir cannot dispose of a specific portion of the estate. For
cannot validly claim title to a specific portion of the estate and send the same. Title to any where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate such heirs. 1 Upon the death of a
specific part of the estate does not automatically pass to the heirs by the mere death of person, each of his heirs becomes the undivided owner of the whole estate left wtih respect
the decedent and the effect of any disposition by a co-heir before partition shall be to the part of portion which might be adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus
limited to the portion which may be allotted to him upon the dissolution of the communal formed among the co-owners of the estate or co-heirs while it remains undivided. 2
estate. What a co-heir can validly dispose of is only his hereditary rights.
While under Article 493 of the New Civil Code, each co-owner shall have the full
Private respondents, who are husband and wife, had instituted a complaint before the ownership of his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto and he may
Court of First Instance for ejectment and recovery of possession against herein alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the
petitioner, docketed as Civil Case No. T-1163, alleging that they are the owners in fee effect of the alienation or the mortgage with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited, by
simple of a parcel of commercial land, pro-indiviso, consisting of 150.8 sq. meters, more mandate of the same article, to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division
or less, situated in Poblacion, Tayug, Pangasinan, having bought the same from Evaristo upon the termination of the co-ownership. He has no right to sell or alienate a concrete,
G. Espique by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale executed on April 15, 1964. They also specific, or determinate part of the thing in common to the exclusion of the other co-
demand that petitioner pay a monthly rental for the use of the property all P40.00 until owners because his right over the thing is represented by an abstract or Ideal portion
the property is surrendered to them. without any physical adjudication. 3 An individual co- owner cannot adjudicate to himself or
claim title to any definite portion of the land or thing owned in common until its actual partition
The property in question is a 1/5 portion of a 754 sq. qmeter land originally owned by by agreement or judicial decree. Prior to that time all that the co-owner has is an Ideal or
abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire thing owned in common by all the co-
Hermogenes Espique and his wife, both dead. After their death their five children,
owners. 4 What a co owner may dispose of is only his undivided aliquot share, which shall be
namely: Maria, Evaristo, Faustina, Estefanio and Tropinia succeeded them in the
limited to the portion that may be allotted to him upon partition. 5 Before partition, a co-heir
ownership of the whole lot. can only sell his successional rights. 6

Petitioner presently occupies two-fifths of the whole lot inherited pro-indiviso by the In the case at bar, the fact that the sale executed by Evaristo G. qqqEspique in favor of
Espique children. Petitioner alleges that he purchased the northern one-half portion of respondents and the sale executed by Estefanio Espique in favor of petitioner were
the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by respondents) from Estefanio Espique made before the partition of the property among the co-heirs does not annul or invalidate
and that the southern one-half portion of the lot he is occupying (which is also claimed by the deeds of sale and both sales are valid. However, the interests thereby acquired by
respondents) from Estefanio Espique and that the southern one-half portion is leased to petitioner and respondents are limited only to the parts that may be ultimately assigned
him by Tropinia Espique. The land subject of the controversy is the most southern to Estefanio and Evaristo, respectively, upon the partition of the estate 7 subject to
portion of the whole lot inherited by the Espique children which petitioner claims he had provisions on subrogation of the other co-heirs to the rights of the stranger-purchaser
bought from Estefanio on April 26, 1967 and which respondents claim they had bough provided in Article 1088 of the Civil Code. 8 Respondent court's ruling that the sale by
from Evaristo on April 15, 1964. Estefanio in favor of petitioner is not valid because of lack of notice to his co-heirs is
erroneous. Such notice in writing is not a requisite for the validity of the sale. Its purpose is
Both sales were made while the petition for partition filed by Evaristo Espique was still merely to apprise the co-heirs of the sale of a portion of the estate, for them to exercise their
pending before the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, docketed therein as Civil Case preferential right of subrogation under Article 1088 of the New Civil Code, that is, the right to
No. T-966. redeem the property sold within one month from the time they were notified in writing of the
sale by a co-heir. (There is nothing in the record to indicate that such right of subrogation was
in effect sought to be exercised upon the co-heirs' having learned of the sale, which is not in
issue here.)
Thus, respondents have no right to eject petitioners nor demand payment of rentals for
the use of the property in dispute. Until the partition of the estate is ordered by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan in the pending partition proceedings and the share of
each co-heir is determined by metes and bounds, neither petitioner nor respondents can
rightfully claim that what they bought is the part in dispute.

Accordingly, respondent court's judgment is set aside and judgment is hereby rendered
dismissing the complaint of respondents-plaintiffs in the court below. No pronouncement
as to costs.

--- xx END OF CHARACTERISTICS OF CO-OWNERSHIP xx ---

G.R. No. L-4656 November 18, 1912 the different and repeated demands extrajudicially made upon Matilde Ortiz to divide the
PARDELL vs. BARTOLOME aforementioned properties with the plaintiff Vicente and to deliver to the latter the one-
half thereof, together with one-half of the fruits and rents collected therefrom, the said
This is an appeal by bill of exceptions, from the judgment of October 5, 1907, whereby defendant and her husband, the self-styled administrator of the properties mentioned,
the Honorable Dionisio Chanco, judge, absolved the defendants from the complaint, and had been delaying the partition and delivery of the said properties by means of unkept
the plaintiff from a counterclaim, without special finding as to costs. promises and other excuses; and that the plaintiffs, on account of the extraordinary delay
in the delivery of one-half of said properties, or their value in cash, as the case might be,
Counsel for the spouses Ricardo y Cruz and Vicente Ortiz y Felin de Pardell, the first of had suffered losses and damages in the sum of P8,000. Said counsel for the plaintiffs
whom, absent in Spain by reason of his employment, conferred upon the second therefore asked that judgment be rendered by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de
sufficient and ample powers to appear before the courts of justice, on June 8, 1905, in Bartolome, and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs
his written complaint, alleged that the plaintiff, Vicente Ortiz, and the defendant, Matilde one-half of the total value in cash, according to appraisal, of the undivided property
Ortiz, are the duly recognized natural daughters of the spouses Miguel Ortiz and Calixta specified, which one-half amounted approximately to P3,948, or if deemed proper, to
Felin y Paula who died in Vigan, Ilocos Sur, in 1875 and 1882, respectively; that Calixta recognize the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz to be vested with the full and absolute right of
Felin, prior to her death, executed on August 17, 1876, a nuncupative will in Vigan ownership to the said undivided one-half of the properties in question, as universal
whereby she made her four children, named Manuel, Francisca, Vicenta, and Matilde, testamentary heir thereof together with the defendant Matilde Ortiz, to indemnify the
surnamed Ortiz y Felin, her sole and universal heirs of all her property; that, of the plaintiffs in the sum of P8,000, for losses and damages, and to pay the costs.
persons enumerated, Manuel died before his mother and Francisca a few years after her
death, leaving no heirs by force of law, and therefore the only existing heirs of the said Counsel for the defendants, in his answer denied the facts alleged in paragraphs 1, 4, 6,
testatrix are the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz and the defendant Matilde Ortiz; that, aside from 7, and 8 thereof, inasmuch as, upon the death of the litigating sister's brother Manuel,
some personal property and jewelry already divided among the heirs, the testatrix their mother, who was still living, was his heir by force of law, and the defendants had
possessed, at the time of the execution of her will, and left at her death the real never refused to give to the plaintiff Vicente Ortiz her share of the said properties; and
properties which, with their respective cash values, are as follows: stated that he admitted the facts alleged in paragraph 2, provided it be understood,
however, that the surname of the defendant's mother was Felin, and not Feliu, and that
Miguel Ortiz died in Spain, and not in Vigan; that he also admitted paragraph 3 of the
1. A house of strong material, with the lot on which it is built, situated complaint, with the difference that the said surname should be Felin, and likewise
P6,000.00
on Escolta Street, Vigan, and valued at paragraph 5, except the part thereof relating to the personal property and the jewelry,
since the latter had not yet been divided; that the said jewelry was in the possession of
2. A house of mixed material, with the lot on which it stands, at No.
1,500.00 the plaintiffs and consisted of: one Lozada gold chronometer watch with a chain in the
88 Washington Street, Vigan; valued at
form of a bridle curb and a watch charm consisting of the engraving of a postage stamp
3. A lot on Magallanes Street, Vigan; valued at 100.00 on a stone mounted in gold and bearing the initials M. O., a pair of cuff buttons made of
gold coins, four small gold buttons, two finger rings, another with the initials M. O., and a
4. A parcel of rice land, situated in the barrio of San Julian, Vigan; gold bracelet; and that the defendants were willing to deliver to the plaintiffs, in
60.00
valued at conformity with their petitions, one-half of the total value in cash, according to
appraisement, of the undivided real properties specified in paragraph 5, which half
5. A parcel of rice land in the pueblo of Santa Lucia; valued at 86.00 amounted to P3,948.
6. Three parcels of land in the pueblo of Candon; valued at 150.00
In a special defense said counsel alleged that the defendants had never refused to divide
Total 7,896.00 the said property and had in fact several years before solicited the partition of the same;
that, from 1886 to 1901, inclusive, there was collected from the property on Calle Escolta
the sum of 288 pesos, besides a few other small amounts derived from other sources,
That, on or about the first months of the year 1888, the defendants, without judicial which were delivered to the plaintiffs with other larger amounts, in 1891, and from the
authorization, nor friendly or extrajudicial agreement, took upon themselves the property on Calle Washington, called La Quinta, 990.95 pesos, which proceeds, added
administration and enjoyment of the said properties and collected the rents, fruits, and together, made a total of 1,278.95 pesos, saving error or omission; that, between the
products thereof, to the serious detriment of the plaintiffs' interest; that, notwithstanding years abovementioned, Escolta, and that on Calle Washington, La Quinta, 376.33, which
made a total of 1,141.71, saving error or omission; that, in 1897, the work of Vicenta Ortiz, to be vested with a full and absolute right to an undivided one-half of the
reconstruction was begun of the house on Calle Escolta, which been destroyed by an said properties; furthermore, it is prayed that the plaintiffs be awarded an indemnity of
earthquake, which work was not finished until 1903 and required an expenditure on the P8,000 for losses and damages, and the costs." Notwithstanding the opposition of the
part of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of 5,091.52 pesos; that all the collections made up to defendants, the said amendment was admitted by the court and counsel for the
August 1, 1905, including the rent from the stores, amounted to only P3,654.15, and the defendants were allowed to a period of three days within which to present a new answer.
expenses, to P6,252.32, there being, consequently, a balance of P2,598.17, which An exception was taken to this ruling.
divided between the sisters, the plaintiff and the defendant, would make the latter's share
P1,299.08; that, as shown by the papers kept by the plaintiffs, in the year 1891 the The proper proceedings were had with reference to the valuation of the properties
defendant Bartolome presented to the plaintiffs a statement in settlements of accounts, concerned in the division sought and incidental issues were raised relative to the partition
and delivered to the person duly authorized by the latter for the purpose, the sum of of some of them and their award to one or the other of the parties. Due consideration
P2,606.29, which the said settlement showed was owing his principals, from various was taken of the averments and statements of both parties who agreed between
sources; that, the defendant Bartolome having been the administrator of the undivided themselves, before the court, that any of them might at any time acquire, at the valuation
property claimed by the plaintiffs, the latter were owing the former legal remuneration of fixed by the expert judicial appraiser, any of the properties in question, there being none
the percentage allowed by law for administration; and that the defendants were willing to in existence excluded by the litigants. The court, therefore, by order of December 28,
pay the sum of P3,948, one-half of the total value of the said properties, deducting 1905, ruled that the plaintiffs were entitled to acquire, at the valuation determined by the
therefrom the amount found to be owing them by the plaintiffs, and asked that judgment said expert appraiser, the building known as La Quinta, the lot on which it stands and the
be rendered in their favor to enable them to recover from the latter that amount, together warehouses and other improvements comprised within the inclosed land, and the seeds
with the costs and expenses of the suit. lands situated in the pueblos of Vigan and Santa Lucia; and that the defendants were
likewise entitled to acquire the house on Calle Escolta, the lot on Calle Magallanes, and
The defendants, in their counter claim, repeated each and all of the allegations contained the three parcels of land situated in the pueblo of Candon.
in each of the paragraphs of section 10 of their answer; that the plaintiffs were obliged to
pay to the administrator of the said property the remuneration allowed him by law; that, After this partition had been made counsel for the defendants, by a writing of March 8,
as the revenues collected by the defendants amounted to no more than P3,654.15 and 1906, set forth: That, having petitioned for the appraisement of the properties in question
the expenditures incurred by them, to P6,252.32, it followed that the plaintiffs owed the for the purpose of their partition, it was not to be understood that he desired from the
defendants P1,299.08, that is one-half of the difference between the amount collected exception duly entered to the ruling made in the matter of the amendment to the
from and that extended on the properties, and asked that judgment be therefore complaint; that the properties retained by the defendants were valued at P9,310, and
rendered in their behalf to enable them to collect this sum from the plaintiffs, Ricardo those retained by the plaintiffs, at P2,885, one-half of which amounts each party had to
Pardell and Vicenta Ortiz, with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904, the date deliver to the other, as they were pro indivisoproperties; that, therefore, the defendants
when the accounts were rendered, together with the sums to which the defendant had to pay the plaintiffs the sum of P3,212.50, after deducting the amount which the
Bartolome was entitled for the administration of the undivided properties in question. plaintiffs were obliged to deliver to the defendants, as one-half of the price of the
properties retained by the former; that, notwithstanding that the amount of the
By a written motion of August 21, 1905, counsel for the plaintiffs requested permission to counterclaim for the expenses incurred in the reconstruction of the pro indiviso property
amend the complaint by inserting immediately after the words "or respective appraisal," should be deducted from the sum which the defendants had to pay the plaintiffs, the
fifth line of paragraph 5, the phrase "in cash in accordance with the assessed value," and former, for the purpose of bringing the matter of the partition to a close, would deliver to
likewise further to amend the same, in paragraph 6 thereof, by substituting the following the latter, immediately upon the signing of the instrument of purchase and sale, the sum
word in lieu of the petition for the remedy sought: "By reason of all the foregoing, I beg of P3,212.50, which was one-half of the value of the properties alloted to the defendants;
the court to be pleased to render the judgment by sentencing the defendants, Gaspar de such delivery, however, was not to be understood as a renouncement of the said
Bartolome and Matilde Ortiz Felin de Bartolome, to restore and deliver to the plaintiffs an counterclaim, but only as a means for the final termination of the pro indiviso status of
exact one-half of the total vale of the undivided properties described in the complaint, the property.
such value to be ascertained by the expert appraisal of two competent persons, one of
whom shall be appointed by the plaintiffs and the other by the defendants, and, in case The case having been heard, the court on October 5, 1907, rendered judgment holding
of disagreement between these two appointees such value shall be determined by a third that the revenues and the expenses were compensated by the residence enjoyed by the
expert appraiser appointed by the court, or, in a proper case, by the price offered at defendant party, that no losses or damages were either caused or suffered, nor likewise
public auction; or, in lieu thereof, it is requested that the court recognize the plaintiff, any other expense besides those aforementioned, and absolved the defendants from the
complaint and the plaintiffs from the counterclaim, with no special finding as to costs. An between the amounts which each party is entitled to claim from the other, it is imperative
exception was taken to this judgment by counsel for the defendants who moved for a to determine whether the defendant Matilde Ortiz, as coowner of the house on Calle
new trial on the grounds that the evidence presented did not warrant the judgment Escolta, was entitled, with her husband, to reside therein, without paying to her coowner,
rendered and that the latter was contrary to law. This motion was denied, exception Vicenta Ortiz, who, during the greater part of the time, lived with her husband abroad,
whereto was taken by said counsel, who filed the proper bill of exceptions, and the same one-half of the rents which the upper story would have produced, had it been rented to a
was approved and forwarded to the clerk of this court, with a transcript of the evidence. stranger.

Both of the litigating sisters assented to a partition by halves of the property left in her will Article 394 of the Civil Code prescribes:
by their mother at her death; in fact, during the course of this suit, proceedings were had,
in accordance with the agreement made, for the division between them of the said Each coowner may use the things owned in common, provided he uses them in
hereditary property of common ownership, which division was recognized and approved accordance with their object and in such manner as not to injure the interests of
in the findings of the trial court, as shown by the judgment appealed from. the community nor prevent the coowners from utilizing them according to their
rights.
The issues raised by the parties, aside from said division made during the trial, and
which have been submitted to this court for decision, concern: (1) The indemnity claimed Matilde Ortiz and her husband occupied the upper story, designed for use as a dwelling,
for losses and damages, which the plaintiffs allege amount to P8,000, in addition to the in the house of joint ownership; but the record shows no proof that, by so doing, the said
rents which should have been derived from the house on Calle Escolta, Vigan; (2) the Matilde occasioned any detriment to the interest of the community property, nor that she
payment by the plaintiffs to the defendants of the sum of P1,299.08, demanded by way prevented her sister Vicenta from utilizing the said upper story according to her rights. It
of counterclaim, together with legal interest thereon from December 7, 1904; (3) the is to be noted that the stores of the lower floor were rented and accounting of the rents
payment to the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz, of a percentage claimed to be was duly made to the plaintiffs.
due him as the administrator of the property of common ownership; (4) the division of
certain jewelry in the possession of the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz; and (5) the petition that the Each coowner of realty held pro indiviso exercises his rights over the whole property and
amendment be held to have been improperly admitted, which was made by the plaintiffs may use and enjoy the same with no other limitation than that he shall not injure the
in their written motion of August 21, 1905, against the opposition of the defendants, interests of his coowners, for the reason that, until a division be made, the respective
through which admission the latter were obliged to pay the former P910.50. lawphil.net

part of each holder can not be determined and every one of the coowners exercises,
together with his other coparticipants, joint ownership over the pro indiviso property, in
Before entering upon an explanation of the propriety or impropriety of the claims made addition to his use and enjoyment of the same.
by both parties, it is indispensable to state that the trial judge, in absolving the
defendants from the complaint, held that they had not caused losses and damages to the As the hereditary properties of the joint ownership of the two sisters, Vicenta Ortiz,
plaintiffs, and that the revenues and the expenses were compensated, in view of the fact plaintiff, and Matilde Ortiz, defendant, were situated in the Province of Ilocos Sur, and
that the defendants had been living for several years in the Calle Escolta house, which were in the care of the last named, assisted by her husband, while the plaintiff Vicenta
was pro indivisoproperty of joint ownership. with her husband was residing outside of the said province the greater part of the time
between 1885 and 1905, when she left these Islands for Spain, it is not at all strange that
By this finding absolving the defendants from the complaint, and which was acquiesced delays and difficulties should have attended the efforts made to collect the rents and
in by the plaintiffs who made no appeal therefrom, the first issue has been decided which proceeds from the property held in common and to obtain a partition of the latter,
was raised by the plaintiffs, concerning the indemnity for losses and damages, wherein especially during several years when, owing to the insurrection, the country was in a
are comprised the rents which should have been obtained from the upper story of the turmoil; and for this reason, aside from that founded on the right of coownership of the
said house during the time it was occupied by the defendants, Matilde Ortiz and her defendants, who took upon themselves the administration and care of the properties of
husband, Gaspar de Bartolome. joint tenancy for purposes of their preservation and improvement, these latter are not
obliged to pay to the plaintiff Vicenta one-half of the rents which might have been derived
Notwithstanding the acquiescence on the part of the plaintiffs, assenting to the said from the upper of the story of the said house on Calle Escolta, and, much less, because
finding whereby the defendants were absolved from the complaint, yet, as such one of the living rooms and the storeroom thereof were used for the storage of some
absolution is based on the compensation established in the judgment of the trial court, belongings and effects of common ownership between the litigants. The defendant
Matilde, therefore, in occupying with her husband the upper floor of the said house, did collected for the use of the quarters occupied by the justice of the peace, the payment of
not injure the interests of her coowner, her sister Vicenta, nor did she prevent the latter which is incumbent upon the husband of the defendant Matilde, as aforesaid, and the
from living therein, but merely exercised a legitimate right pertaining to her as coowner of balance remaining, P915.08, is the amount which the plaintiff Vicenta must pay to the
the property. defendants.

Notwithstanding the above statements relative to the joint-ownership rights which entitled The defendants claim to be entitled to the collection of legal interest on the amount of the
the defendants to live in the upper story of the said house, yet in view of the fact that the counterclaim, from December 7, 1904. This contention can not be sustained, inasmuch
record shows it to have been proved that the defendant Matilde's husband, Gaspar de as, until this suit is finally decided, it could not be known whether the plaintiffs would or
Bartolome, occupied for four years a room or a part of the lower floor of the same house would not be obliged to pay the sum whatever in reimbursement of expenses incurred by
on Calle Escolta, using it as an office for the justice of the peace, a position which he the plaintiffs in the repair work on the said house on Calle Escolta, whether or not the
held in the capital of that province, strict justice, requires that he pay his sister-in-law, the defendants, in turn, were entitled to collect any such amount, and, finally, what the net
plaintiff, one half of the monthly rent which the said quarters could have produced, had sum would be which the plaintiff's might have to pay as reimbursement for one-half of the
they been leased to another person. The amount of such monthly rental is fixed at P16 in expenditure made by the defendants. Until final disposal of the case, no such net sum
accordance with the evidence shown in the record. This conclusion as to Bartolome's can be determined, nor until then can the debtor be deemed to be in arrears. In order
liability results from the fact that, even as the husband of the defendant coowner of the that there be an obligation to pay legal interest in connection with a matter at issue
property, he had no right to occupy and use gratuitously the said part of the lower floor of between the parties, it must be declared in a judicial decision from what date the interest
the house in question, where he lived with his wife, to the detriment of the plaintiff will be due on the principal concerned in the suit. This rule has been established by the
Vicenta who did not receive one-half of the rent which those quarters could and should decisions of the supreme court of Spain, in reference to articles 1108, 1109, and 1110 of
have produced, had they been occupied by a stranger, in the same manner that rent was the Civil Code, reference on April 24, 1867, November 19, 1869, and February 22, 1901.
obtained from the rooms on the lower floor that were used as stores. Therefore, the
defendant Bartolome must pay to the plaintiff Vicenta P384, that is, one-half of P768, the With regard to the percentage, as remuneration claimed by the husband of the defendant
total amount of the rents which should have been obtained during four years from the Matilde for his administration of the property of common ownership, inasmuch as no
quarters occupied as an office by the justice of the peace of Vigan. stipulation whatever was made in the matter by and between him and his sister-in-law,
the said defendant, the claimant is not entitled to the payment of any remuneration
With respect to the second question submitted for decision to this court, relative to the whatsoever. Of his own accord and as an officious manager, he administered the
payment of the sum demanded as a counterclaim, it was admitted and proved in the said pro indiviso property, one-half of which belonged to his wife who held it in joint
present case that, as a result of a serious earthquake on August 15, 1897, the said tenancy, with his sister-in-law, and the law does not allow him any compensation as such
house on Calle Escolta was left in ruins and uninhabitable, and that, for its reconstruction voluntary administrator. He is merely entitled to a reimbursement for such actual and
or repair, the defendants had to expend the sum of P6,252.32. This expenditure, necessary expenditures as he may have made on the undivided properties and an
notwithstanding that it was impugned, during the trial, by the plaintiffs, was duly proved indemnity for the damages he may have suffered while acting in that capacity, since at all
by the evidence presented by the defendants. Evidence, unsuccessfully rebutted, was events it was his duty to care for and preserve the said property, half of which belonged
also introduced which proved that the rents produced by all the rural and urban to his wife; and in exchange for the trouble occasioned him by the administration of his
properties of common ownership amounted, up to August 1, 1905, to the sum of sister-in-law's half of the said property, he with his wife resided in the upper story of the
P3,654.15 which, being applied toward the cost of the repair work on the said house, house aforementioned, without payment of one-half of the rents said quarters might have
leaves a balance of P2,598.17, the amount actually advanced by the defendants, for the produced had they been leased to another person.
rents collected by them were not sufficient for the termination of all the work undertaken
on the said building, necessary for its complete repair and to replace it in a habitable With respect to the division of certain jewelry, petitioned for by the defendants and
condition. It is therefore lawful and just that the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz, who was willing to appellants only in their brief in this appeal, the record of the proceedings in the lower
sell to her sister Matilde for P1,500, her share in the house in question, when it was in a court does not show that the allegation made by the plaintiff Vicenta is not true, to the
ruinous state, should pay the defendants one-half of the amount expanded in the said effect that the deceased mother of the litigant sisters disposed of this jewelry during her
repair work, since the building after reconstruction was worth P9,000, according to expert lifetime, because, had she not done so, the will made by the said deceased would have
appraisal. Consequently, the counterclaim made by the defendants for the payment to been exhibited in which the said jewelry would have been mentioned, at least it would
them of the sum of P1,299.08, is a proper demand, though from this sum a reduction have been proved that the articles in question came into the possession of the plaintiff
must be made of P384, the amount of one-half of the rents which should have been Vicenta without the expressed desire and the consent of the deceased mother of the said
sisters, for the gift of this jewelry was previously assailed in the courts, without success; that no participation shall be made of jewelry aforementioned now in the possession of
therefore, and in view of its inconsiderable value, there is no reason for holding that the the plaintiff Vicenta Ortiz. The said judgment, as relates to the points appealed, is
said gift was not made. affirmed, in so far as its findings agree with those of this decision, and is reversed, in so
far as they do not. No special finding is made regarding the costs of both instances. So
As regards the collection of the sum of P910.50, which is the difference between the ordered.
assessed value of the undivided real properties and the price of the same as determined
by the judicial expert appraiser, it is shown by the record that the ruling of the trial judge --- xx END OF RIGHTS OF EACH CO-OWNERS xx ---
admitting the amendment to the original complaint, is in accord with the law and
principles of justice, for the reason that any of the coowners of a pro indiviso property,
subject to division or sale, is entitled to petition for its valuation by competent expert
appraisers. Such valuation is not prejudicial to any of the joint owners, but is beneficial to
their interests, considering that, as a general rule, the assessed value of a building or a
parcel of realty is less than the actual real value of the property, and this being appraiser
to determine, in conjunction with the one selected by the plaintiffs, the value of the
properties of joint ownership. These two experts took part in the latter proceedings of the
suit until finally, and during the course of the latter, the litigating parties agreed to an
amicable division of the pro indiviso hereditary property, in accordance with the price
fixed by the judicial expert appraiser appointed as a third party, in view of the
disagreement between and nonconformity of the appraisers chosen by the litigants.
Therefore it is improper now to claim a right to the collection of the said sum, the
difference between the assessed value and that fixed by the judicial expert appraiser, for
the reason that the increase in price, as determined by this latter appraisal, redounded to
the benefit of both parties.

In consideration of the foregoing, whereby the errors assigned to the lower court have
been duly refuted, it is our opinion that, with a partial reversal of the judgment appealed
from, in so far as it absolves the plaintiffs from the counterclaim presented by the
defendants, we should and hereby do sentence the plaintiffs to the payment of the sum
of P915.08, the balance of the sum claimed by the defendants as a balance of the one-
half of the amount which the defendants advanced for the reconstruction or repair of the
Calle Escolta house, after deducting from the total of such sum claimed by the latter the
amount of P384 which Gaspar de Bartolome, the husband of the defendant Matilde,
should have paid as one-half of the rents due for his occupation of the quarters on the
lower floor of the said house as an office for the justice of the peace court of Vigan; and
we further find: (1) That the defendants are not obliged to pay one-half of the rents which
could have been obtained from the upper story of the said house; (2) that the plaintiffs
can not be compelled to pay the legal interest from December 7, 1904, on the sum
expanded in the reconstruction of the aforementioned house, but only the interest fixed
by law, at the rate of 6 per cent per annum, from the date of the judgment to be rendered
in accordance with this decision; (3) that the husband of the defendant Matilde Ortiz is
not entitled to any remuneration for the administration of thepro indiviso property
belonging to both parties; (4) that, neither is he entitled to collect from the plaintiffs the
sum of P910.50, the difference between the assessed valuation and the price set by the
expert appraisal solicited by the plaintiffs in their amendment to the complaint; and, (5)
G.R. No. L-32047 November 1, 1930 petition was granted in open court on January 31,1928. Her amended complaint of
MELENCIO vs. DY TIAO LAY intervention of February 14,1928, contains allegations similar to those alleged in the
complaint of the original plaintiffs, and she further alleges that the defendant-appellee
On August 1,1927, the plaintiffs, Manuel, Mariano, Pura and Caridad Melencio, brought has occupied the land in question ever since November, 1920, under and by virtue of a
the present action against the defendant-appellee, Dy Tiao Lay for the recovery of the verbal contract of lease for a term from month to month. To this complaint of intervention,
possession of a parcel of land situated in the town of Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, and the defendant-appellee filed an answer reproducing the allegations contained in his
containing an area of 4,628.25 square meters. The plaintiffs further demand a monthly answer reproducing the allegations contained in his answer to the complaint of the
rental of P300 for the use and occupation of the parcel from May, 1926, until the date of original plaintiffs and setting up prescription as a further special defense.
the surrender to them of the possession thereof; and that if it is found that the said
appellee was occupying the said parcel of land by virtue of a contract of lease, such It appears from the evidence that the land in question was originally owned by one Julian
contract should be declared null and void for lack of consent, concurrence, and Melencio. He died prior to the year 1905 leaving his widow, Ruperta Garcia, and his five
ratification by the owners thereof. children, Juliana, Ramon, Ruperta, Pedro R., and Emilio Melencio. Emilio Melencio also
died before 1905, his son Jose P. Melencio, then a minor, succeeding to his interest in
In his answer, the defendant pleaded the general issue, and as special defenses, he the said parcel of land by representation. A question has been raised as to whether the
alleged in substance that he was occupying the said tract of land by virtue of a contract land was community property of the marriage of Julian Melencio and Ruperta Garcia, but
of lease executed on July 24,1905, in favor of his predecessor in interest, by Ruperta the evidence is practically undisputed that Ruperta Garcia in reality held nothing but a
Garcia, Pedro Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta Melencio under the terms widow's usufruct in the land.
specified therein, and which contract is still in force; that Liberata Macapagal, the mother
of the plaintiffs, in her capacity as judicial administratrix of the estate of Ramon Melencio, On July 24,1905, Ruperta Garcia, Pedro R. Melencio, Juliana Melencio, and Ruperta
one of the original coowners of the parcel of land in question, actually recognized and Melencio executed a contract of lease of the land in favor of one Yap Kui Chin, but
ratified the existence and validity of the contract aforesaid by virtue of the execution of a neither Jose P. Melencio nor Ramon Melencio were mentioned in the lease. The term of
public document by her on or about November 27,1920, and by collecting from the the lease was for twenty years, extendible for a like period at the option of the lessee.
assignees of the original lessee the monthly rent for the premises until April 30, 1926; The purpose of the lessee was to establish a rice mill on the land, with the necessary
and that said defendant deposits with the clerk of court the sum of P20.20 every month buildings for warehouses and for quarters for the employees, and it was further stipulated
as rent thereof and that as a counterclaim, he seeks the recovery of P272 for goods and that at the termination of the original period of the lease, or the extension therof, the
money delivered by him to the plaintiffs. lessors might purchase all the buildings and improvements on the land at a price to be
fixed by experts appointed by the parties, but that if the lessors should fail to take
The plaintiffs filed a reply to the answer alleging, among other things, that Ruperta advantage of that privilege, the lease would continue for another and further period of
Garcia was not one of the coowners of the land in question; that the person who signed twenty years. The document was duly acknowledged but was never recorded with the
the alleged contract of lease never represented themselves as being the sole and register of deeds. The original rent agreed upon was P25 per month, but by reason of the
exclusive owners of the land subject to the lease as alleged by the defendant in his construction of a street through the land, the monthly rent was reduced of P20.20.
answer; that the said contract of lease of July 24,1905, is null and void for being
executed without the intervention and consent of two coowners, Ramon Melencio and Shortly after the execution of the lease, the lessee took possession of the parcel in
Jose P. Melencio, and without the marital consent of the husbands of Juliana and question and erected the mill as well as the necessary buildings, and it appears that in
Ruperta Melencio; that the lessee has repeatedly violated the terms and conditions of the matters pertaining to the lease, he dealt with Pedro R. Melencio, who from 1905 until his
said contract; and that Liberata Macapagal, in her capacity as administratrix of the death in 1920, acted as manager of the property held in common by the heirs of Julian
property of her deceased husband, could not lawfully and legally execute a contract of Melencio and Ruperta Garcia. The original lessee, Yap Kui Chin, died in 1912, and the
lease with the conditions and terms similar to that of the one under consideration, and lease, as well as the other property, was transferred to Uy Eng Jui who again transferred
that from this it follows that she could not ratify the said lease as claimed by the it to Uy Eng Jui & Co., an unregistered partnership. Finally the lease came into the hands
defendant. of Dy Tiao Lay, the herein defendant-appellee.

On January 21,1928, Liberata Macapagal Viuda de Melencio, duly appointed and Ramon Melencio died in 1914, and his widow, Liberata Macapagal, was appointed
qualified as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband, Ramon Melencio, filed administratrix of his estate. In 1913 the land which includes the parcel in question was
a petition praying to be allowed to join the plaintiffs as party to the present case, which registered under the Torrens system. The lease was not mentioned in the certificate of
title, but it was stated that one house and three warehouses on the land were the think that the alterations are of sufficient importance to nullify the lease, especially so
property of Yap Kui Chin. since none of the coowners objected to such alterations until over twenty years after the
execution of the contract of lease. The decision of this court in the case of Enriquez vs.
In 1920 the heirs of Julian Melencio made an extrajudicial partition of parts of the A. S. Watson and Co. (22 Phil., 623), contains a full discussion of the effect of alterations
inheritance, and among other things, the land here in question fell to the share of the of leased community property, and no further discussion upon the point need here be
children of Ramon Melencio, who are the original plaintiffs in the present case. Their considered.
mother, Liberata Macapagal, as administratrix of the estate of her deceased husband,
Ramon, collected the rent for the lease at the rate of P20.20 per month until the month of The second proposition is likewise of little merit. Under the circumstances, the provision
May,1926, when she demanded of the lessee that the rent should be increased to P300 in the contract that the lessee, at any time before he erected any building on the land,
per month, and she was then informed by the defendant that a written lease existed and might rescind the lease, can hardly be regarded as a violation of article 1256 of the Civil
that according to the terms thereof, the defendant was entitled to an extension of the Code.
lease at the original rental. The plaintiffs insisted that they never had any knowledge of
the existence of such a contract of lease and maintained that in such case the lease was The third and fourth proposition are, in our opinion, determinative of the controversy. The
executed without their consent and was void. It may be noted that upon careful search, a court below based its decision principally on the case of Enriquez vs. A.S. Watson & Co.
copy of the contract of lease was found among the papers of the deceased Pedro R, (22 Phil., 623), and on the resolution of theDireccion General de los Registros dated April
Melencio. Thereafter the present action was brought to set aside the lease and to 26,1907. (Jurisprudencia Civil, vol.107, p. 222.) An examination of the Enriquez case will
recover possession of the land. Upon trial, the court below rendered judgment in favor of show that it differs materially from the present. In that case all of the coowners of a lot
the defendant declaring the lease valid and ordering the plaintiffs to pay the P272 and building executed a contract of lease of the property for the term of eighteen years in
demanded by the defendant in his counterclaim. From this judgment the plaintiffs favor of A. S. Watson & Co.; one of the owners was minor, but he was represented by
appealed. his legally appointed guardian, and the action of the latter in signing the lease on behalf
of the minor was formally approved by the Court of First Instance. In the present case
The contention of the appellants is that the aforesaid contract of lease (Exhibit C) is null only a small majority of the coowners executed the lease here in question, and according
and void for the following reasons: to the terms of the contract the lease might be given a duration of sixty years; that is
widely different from a lease granted by all of the coowners for a term of only eighteen
1. That Exhibit C calls for an alteration of the property in question and therefore years.
ought to have been signed by all the coowners as by law required in the
premises. The resolution of April 26,1907, is more in point. It relates to the inscription or registration
of a contract of lease of some pasture grounds. The majority of the coowners of the
2. That the validity and fulfillment of the said agreement of lease were made to property executed the lease for the term of twelve years but when the lessees presented
depend upon the will of the lessee exclusively. the lease for inscription in the registry of property, the registrar denied the inscription on
the ground that the term of the lease exceeded six years and that therefore the majority
3. That the said contract of lease being for a term of over six years, the same is of the coowners lacked authority to grant the lease. The Direccion General de
null and void pursuant to the provision of article 1548 of the Civil Code. los Registros held that the contract of lease for a period exceeding six years, constitutes
a real right subject to registry and that the lease in question was valid.
4. That the duration of the same is unreasonably long, thus being against public
policy. The conclusions reached by the Direccion General led to considerable criticism and have
been overruled by a decision of the Supreme Court of Spain dated June 1,1909. In that
decision the court made the following statement of the case (translation):
5. That the defendant-appellee and his predecessors in interest repeatedly
violated the provisions of the agreement.
The joint owners of 511 out of 1,000 parts of the realty denominated El
Mortero, leased out the whole property for twelve years to Doña Josefa de la
The first proposition is based on article 397 of the Civil Code which provides that "none
Rosa; whereupon the Count and Countess Trespalacios together with other
of the owners shall, without the consent of the others, make any alterations in the
coowners brought this suit to annul the lease and, in view of the fact that the land
common property even though such alterations might be advantageous to all." We do not
 was indivisible, prayed for its sale by public auction and the distribution of the property held in common have no power to lease said property for a longer
price so obtained; they alleged that they neither took part nor consented to the period than six years without the consent of all the coowners, whose propriety
lease; that the decision of the majority of part owners referred to in article 398 of rights, expressly recognized by the law, would by contracts of long duration be
the Code, implies a common deliberation on the step to be taken , for to do restricted or annulled; and as under article 1548 of the Civil Code such contracts
without it, would, even more than to do without the minority, be nothing less than cannot be entered into by the husband with respect to his wife's property, by the
plunder; and that, even if this deliberation were not absolutely necessary, the parent or guardian with respect to that of the child or ward, and by the manager
power of the majority would still be confined to decisions touching the in default of special power, since the contract of lease only produces personal
management and enjoyment of the common property, and would not include acts obligations, and cannot without the consent of all persons interested or express
of ownership, such as a lease for twelve years, which according to the Mortgage authority from the owner, be extended to include stipulations which may alter its
Law gives rise to a real right, which must be recorded, and which can be character, changing it into a contract of partial alienation of the property leased;
performed only by the owners of the property leased.
Considering that, applying this doctrine to the case before us, one of the grounds
The part owners who had executed the contract prayed in reconvention that it upon which the judgment appealed from, denying the validity of the lease made
held valid for all the owners in common, and if this could not be, then for all those by the majority of the part owners of the pasture landEl Mortero is based, must
who had signed it, and for the rest, for the period of six years; and the Audiencia be upheld; to wit, that the period of duration is twelve years and the consent of all
of Caceres having rendered judgment holding the contract null and void, and the coowners has not been obtained; hence, the third, fourth. and fifth
ordering the sale of the realty and the distribution of the price, the defendants assignments of error are without merit; firstly, because article 398 of the Civil
appealed alleging under the third and fourth assignments of error, that the Code, alleged to have been violated, refers to acts decided upon by the majority
judgment was a violation of article 398 of the Civil Code, which is absolute and of the part owners, touching the management and enjoyment of the common
sets no limit of time for the efficacy of the decisions arrived at by the majority of property, and does not contradict what we have stated in the foregoing
the part owners for the enjoyment of the common property, citing the decisions of paragraph; secondly because although the cases cited were such as arose upon
June 30th, 1897, of July 8th,1902, and of October 30th, 1907; under the fifth leases for more than six years, yet this point was not raised on appeal, and could
assignments of error the appellants contended that in including joint owners not therefore be passed upon; and thirdly, because it cannot be denied that there
among those referred to in said article, which sets certain limits to the power of is an analogy between a manager without special authority, who is forbidden by
leasing, in the course of the management of another's property, the court applied article 1548 of the Code to give a lease for a period of over six years, and the
article 1548 unduly; and by the seventh assignments of error, they maintained joint owners constituting a legal majority, who may decide to lease out the
the judgment appealed from also violated article 1727, providing that the principal indivisible property, with respect to the shares of the other coowners; and having
is not bound where his agent has acted beyond his authority; whence it may be come to the conclusion that the contract is null and void, there is no need to
inferred that if in order to hold the contract null and void, the majority of the part discuss the first two assignments of error which refer to another of the bases
owners are looked upon as managers or agents exercising limited powers, it adopted, however erroneously, by the trial court;
must at least be conceded that in so far as the act in question lies within the
scope of their powers, it is valid; the contract cannot be annulled in toto. Considering that the sixth assignment of error is without merit, inasmuch as the
joint ownership of property is not a sort of agency and cannot be governed by the
The Supreme Court held that the appeal from the decision of the Audiencia of provisions relating to the latter contract; whence, article 1727 of the Code alleged
Caceres was not well taken and expressed the following consideranda: to have been violated, can no more be applied, than, the question of the validity
or nullity of the lease being raise, upon the contract as celebrated, it would be
Considering that, although as a rule the contract of lease constitutes an act of allowable to modify aposteriori some one or other of the main conditions
management, as this court has several times held, cases may yet arise, either stipulated, like that regarding the duration of the lease, for this would amount to a
owing to the nature of the subject matter, or to the period of duration, which may novation; still less allowable would it be to authorize diverse periods for the
render it imperative to record the contract in the registry of property, in pursuance different persons unequally interested in the fulfillment.
of the Mortgage Law, where the contract of lease may give rise to a real right in
favor of the lessee, and it would then constitute such a sundering of the Taking into consideration articles 398,1548, and 1713 of the Civil Code and following the
ownership as transcends mere management; in such cases it must of necessity aforesaid decision of June 1,1909, we hold that the contract of lease here in question is
be recognized that the part owners representing the greater portion of the null and void.
It has been suggested that by reason of prescription and by acceptance of benefits under
the lease, the plaintiffs are estopped to question the authority for making the lease.To
this we may answer that the burden of proof of prescription devolved upon the defendant
and that as far as we can find, there is no proof that Ramon Melencio and his successors
ever had knowledge of the existence of the lease in question prior to 1926. We cannot by
mere suspicion conclude that they were informed of the existence of the document and
its terms; it must be remembered that under a strict interpretation of the terms of the
lease, the lessees could remain indefinitely in their tenancy unless the lessors could
purchase the mill and the buildings on the land. In such circumstances, better evidence
than that presented by the defendant in regard to the plaintiff's knowledge of the lease
must be required.

The fact that Ramon during his lifetime received his share of the products of land owned
in common with his coheirs is not sufficient proof of knowledge of the existence of the
contract of lease when it is considered that the land in question was only a small portion
of a large tract which Pedro R. Melencio was administering in connection with other
community property.

The appealed judgment as to the validity of the lease is therefore reversed, and it is
ordered that the possession of the land in controversy be delivered to the intervenor
Liberata Macapagal in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of the deceased
Ramon Melencio. It is further ordered that the defendant pay to said administratrix a
monthly rent of P50 for the occupation of the land from May 1st, 1926, until the land is
delivered to the administratrix. The sum of P272 demanded by the defendant in his
counterclaim may be deducted from the total amount of the rent due and unpaid. The
building erected on the land by the defendant and his predecessors in interest may be
removed by him, or otherwise disposed of, within six months from the promulgation of
this decision. Without costs. So ordered.
G.R. No. L-3404 April 2, 1951 (9) This contract shall remain in full force and effect during all the time that it may
TUASON vs. TUASON be necessary for the PARTY OF THE SECOND PART to fully sell the said
property in small and subdivided lots and to fully collect the purchase prices due
In 1941 the sisters Angela I. Tuason and Nieves Tuason de Barreto and their brother thereon; it being understood and agreed that said lots may be rented while there
Antonio Tuason Jr., held a parcel of land with an area of 64,928.6 sq. m. covered by are no purchasers thereof;
Certificate of Title No. 60911 in Sampaloc, Manila, in common, each owning an
undivided 1/3 portion. Nieves wanted and asked for a partition of the common property, (11) The PARTY OF THE SECOND PART (meaning Araneta Inc.) is hereby
but failing in this, she offered to sell her 1/3 portion. The share of Nieves was offered for given full power and authority to sign for and in behalf of all the said co-owners of
sale to her sister and her brother but both declined to buy it. The offer was later made to said property all contracts of sale and deeds of sale of the lots into which this
their mother but the old lady also declined to buy, saying that if the property later property might be subdivided; the powers herein vested to the PARTY OF THE
increased in value, she might be suspected of having taken advantage of her daughter. SECOND PART may, under its own responsibility and risk, delegate any of its
Finally, the share of Nieves was sold to Gregorio Araneta Inc., a domestic corporation, powers under this contract to any of its officers, employees or to third persons;
and a new Certificate of Title No. 61721 was issued in lieu of the old title No. 60911
covering the same property. The three co-owners agreed to have the whole parcel (15) No co-owner of the property subject-matter of this contract shall sell,
subdivided into small lots and then sold, the proceeds of the sale to be later divided alienate or dispose of his ownership, interest or participation therein without first
among them. This agreement is embodied in a document (Exh. 6) entitled "Memorandum giving preference to the other co-owners to purchase and acquire the same
of Agreement" consisting of ten pages, dated June 30, 1941. under the same terms and conditions as those offered by any other prospective
purchaser. Should none of the co-owners of the property subject-matter of this
Before, during and after the execution of this contract (Exh. 6), Atty. J. Antonio Araneta contract exercise the said preference to acquire or purchase the same, then such
was acting as the attorney-in-fact and lawyer of the two co-owners, Angela I. Tuason and sale to a third party shall be made subject to all the conditions, terms, and
her brother Antonio Tuason Jr. At the same time he was a member of the Board of dispositions of this contract; provided, the PARTIES OF THE FIRST PART
Director of the third co-owner, Araneta, Inc. (meaning Angela and Antonio) shall be bound by this contract as long as the
PARTY OF THE SECOND PART, namely, the GREGORIO ARANETA, INC. is
The pertinent terms of the contract (Exh. 6) may be briefly stated as follows: The three controlled by the members of the Araneta family, who are stockholders of the
co-owners agreed to improve the property by filling it and constructing roads and curbs said corporation at the time of the signing of this contract and/or their lawful heirs;
on the same and then subdivide it into small lots for sale. Araneta Inc. was to finance the
whole development and subdivision; it was prepare a schedule of prices and conditions On September 16, 1944, Angela I. Tuason revoked the powers conferred on her
of sale, subject to the subject to the approval of the two other co-owners; it was invested attorney-in-fact and lawyer, J. Antonio Araneta. Then in a letter dated October 19, 1946,
with authority to sell the lots into which the property was to be subdivided, and execute Angela notified Araneta, Inc. that because of alleged breach of the terms of the
the corresponding contracts and deeds of sale; it was also to pay the real estate taxes "Memorandum of Agreement" (Exh. 6) and abuse of powers granted to it in the
due on the property or of any portion thereof that remained unsold, the expenses of document, she had decided to rescind said contract and she asked that the property held
surveying, improvements, etc., all advertising expenses, salaries of personnel, in common be partitioned. Later, on November 20, 1946, Angela filed a complaint in the
commissions, office and legal expenses, including expenses in instituting all actions to Court of First Instance of Manila asking the court to order the partition of the property in
eject all tenants or occupants on the property; and it undertook the duty to furnish each question and that she be given 1/3 of the same including rents collected during the time
of the two co-owners, Angela and Antonio Tuason, copies of the subdivision plans and that the same including rents collected during the time that Araneta Inc., administered
the monthly sales and rents and collections made thereon. In return for all this said property.
undertaking and obligation assumed by Araneta Inc., particularly the financial burden, it
was to receive 50 per cent of the gross selling price of the lots, and any rents that may The suit was administered principally against Araneta, Inc. Plaintiff's brother, Antonio
be collected from the property, while in the process of sale, the remaining 50 per cent to Tuason Jr., one of the co-owners evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for
be divided in equal portions among the three co-owners so that each will receive 16.33 he evidently did not agree to the suit and its purpose, for he joined Araneta, Inc. as a co-
per cent of the gross receipts. defendant. After hearing and after considering the extensive evidence introduce, oral and
documentary, the trial court presided over by Judge Emilio Peña in a long and
Because of the importance of paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 of the contract (Exh. 6), for considered decision dismissed the complaint without pronouncement as to costs. The
purposes of reference we are reproducing them below:
plaintiff appealed from that decision, and because the property is valued at more than plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plans, a copy of the monthly gross collections
P50,000, the appeal came directly to this Court. from the sale of the property.

Some of the reasons advanced by appellant to have the memorandum contract (Exh. 6) The Court finds from the evidence that he defendant Gregorio Araneta,
declared null and void or rescinded are that she had been tricked into signing it; that she Incorporated has substantially complied with obligation imposed by the contract
was given to understand by Antonio Araneta acting as her attorney-in-fact and legal exhibit 6 in its paragraph 1, and that for improvements alone, it has disbursed the
adviser that said contract would be similar to another contract of subdivision of a parcel amount of P117,167.09. It has likewise paid taxes, commissions and other
into lots and the sale thereof entered into by Gregorio Araneta Inc., and the heirs of D. expenses incidental to its obligations as denied in the agreement.
Tuason, Exhibit "L", but it turned out that the two contracts widely differed from each
other, the terms of contract Exh. "L" being relatively much more favorable to the owners With respect to the charged that Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated has failed to
therein the less favorable to Araneta Inc.; that Atty. Antonio Araneta was more or less submit to plaintiff a copy of the subdivision plains, list of prices and the conditions
disqualified to act as her legal adviser as he did because he was one of the officials of governing the sale of subdivided lots, and monthly statement of collections form
Araneta Inc., and finally, that the defendant company has violated the terms of the the sale of the lots, the Court is of the opinion that it has no basis. The evidence
contract (Exh. 6) by not previously showing her the plans of the subdivision, the schedule shows that the defendant corporation submitted to the plaintiff periodically all the
of prices and conditions of the sale, in not introducing the necessary improvements into data relative to prices and conditions of the sale of the subdivided lots, together
the land and in not delivering to her her share of the proceeds of the rents and sales. with the amount corresponding to her. But without any justifiable reason, she
refused to accept them. With the indifferent attitude adopted by the plaintiff, it
We have examined Exh. "L" and compared the same with the contract (Exh. 6) and we was thought useless for Gregorio Araneta, Incorporated to continue sending her
agree with the trial court that in the main the terms of both contracts are similar and statement of accounts, checks and other things. She had shown on various
practically the same. Moreover, as correctly found by the trial court, the copies of both occasions that she did not want to have any further dealings with the said
contracts were shown to the plaintiff Angela and her husband, a broker, and both had corporation. So, if the defendant corporation proceeded with the sale of the
every opportunity to go over and compare them and decide on the advisability of or subdivided lots without the approval of the plaintiff, it was because it was under
disadvantage in entering into the contract (Exh. 6); that although Atty. Antonio Araneta the correct impression that under the contract exhibit 6 the decision of the
was an official of the Araneta Inc.; being a member of the Board of Directors of the majority co-owners is binding upon all the three.
Company at the time that Exhibit "6" was executed, he was not the party with which
Angela contracted, and that he committed no breach of trust. According to the evidence The Court feels that recission of the contract exhibit 6 is not minor violations of
Araneta, the pertinent papers, and sent to her checks covering her receive the same; the terms of the agreement, the general rule is that "recission will not be
and that as a matter of fact, at the time of the trial, Araneta Inc., had spent about permitted for a slight or casual breach of the contract, but only for such breaches
P117,000 in improvement and had received as proceeds on the sale of the lots the as are so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the object of the parties in
respectable sum of P1,265,538.48. We quote with approval that portion of the decision making the agreement" (Song Fo & Co. vs. Hawaiian-Philippine Co., 47 Phil.
appealed from on these points: 821).

The evidence in this case points to the fact that the actuations of J. Antonio As regards improvements, the evidence shows that during the Japanese occupation from
Araneta in connection with the execution of exhibit 6 by the parties, are above 1942 and up to 1946, the Araneta Inc. although willing to fill the land, was unable to
board. He committed nothing that is violative of the fiduciary relationship existing obtain the equipment and gasoline necessary for filling the low places within the parcel.
between him and the plaintiff. The act of J. Antonio Araneta in giving the plaintiff As to sales, the evidence shows that Araneta Inc. purposely stopped selling the lots
a copy of exhibit 6 before the same was executed, constitutes a full disclosure of during the Japanese occupantion, knowing that the purchase price would be paid in
the facts, for said copy contains all that appears now in exhibit 6. Japanese military notes; and Atty. Araneta claims that for this, plaintiff should be
thankfull because otherwise she would have received these notes as her share of the
Plaintiff charges the defendant Gregorio Araneta, Inc. with infringing the terms of receipts, which currency later became valueles.
the contract in that the defendant corporation has failed (1) to make the
necessary improvements on the property as required by paragraphs 1 and 3 of But the main contention of the appellant is that the contract (Exh. 6) should be declared
the contract; (2) to submit to the plaintiff from time to time schedule of prices and null and void because its terms, particularly paragraphs 9, 11 and 15 which we have
conditions under which the subdivided lots are to be sold; and to furnish the
reproduced, violate the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code, which for the purposes of authorities. As we have already said, we have viewed the case from a practical
reference we quote below: standpoint, brushing aside technicalities and disregarding any minor violations of the
contract, and in deciding the case as we do, we are fully convinced that the trial court
ART. 400. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain a party to the community. and this Tribunal are carrying out in a practical and expeditious way the intentions and
Each may, at any time, demand the partition of the thing held in common. the agreement of the parties contained in the contract (Exh. 6), namely, to dissolve the
community and co-ownership, in a manner most profitable to the said parties.
Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a specified length of
time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This period may be a new In view of the foregoing, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. There is no
agreement. pronouncement as to costs.

We agree with the trial court that the provisions of Art. 400 of the Civil Code are not So ordered.
applicable. The contract (Exh., 6) far from violating the legal provision that forbids a co-
owner being obliged to remain a party to the community, precisely has for its purpose --- xx END OF OBLIGATIONS OF EACH CO-OWNERS xx ---
and object the dissolution of the co-ownership and of the community by selling the parcel
held in common and dividing the proceeds of the sale among the co-owners. The
obligation imposed in the contract to preserve the co-ownership until all the lots shall
have been sold, is a mere incident to the main object of dissolving the co-owners. By
virtue of the document Exh. 6, the parties thereto practically and substantially entered
into a contract of partnership as the best and most expedient means of eventually
dissolving the co-ownership, the life of said partnership to end when the object of its
creation shall have been attained.

This aspect of the contract is very similar to and was perhaps based on the other
agreement or contract (Exh. "L") referred to by appellant where the parties thereto in
express terms entered into partnership, although this object is not expressed in so many
words in Exh. 6. We repeat that we see no violation of Art. 400 of the Civil Code in the
parties entering into the contract (Exh. 6) for the very reason that Art. 400 is not
applicable.

Looking at the case from a practical standpoint as did the trial court, we find no valid
ground for the partition insisted upon the appellant. We find from the evidence as was
done by the trial court that of the 64,928.6 sq. m. which is the total area of the parcel held
in common, only 1,600 sq. m. or 2.5 per cent of the entire area remained unsold at the
time of the trial in the year 1947, while the great bulk of 97.5 per cent had already been
sold. As well observed by the court below, the partnership is in the process of being
dissolved and is about to be dissolved, and even assuming that Art. 400 of the Civil Code
were applicable, under which the parties by agreement may agree to keep the thing
undivided for a period not exceeding 10 years, there should be no fear that the remaining
1,600 sq. m. could not be disposed of within the four years left of the ten-years period
fixed by Art. 400.

We deem it unnecessary to discuss and pass upon the other points raised in the appeal
and which counsel for appellant has extensively and ably discussed, citing numerous
G.R. No. L-51283 June 7, 1989 The Veritas Insurance Company which issued the attachment bond is ordered to pay
MARIANO vs. CA unto the defendant the full insurance coverage of P 11,000.00 to answer for the total
liability of the plaintiff thereof
The proceedings at bar concern (1) an attempt by a married man to prevent execution
against conjugal property of a judgment rendered against his wife, for obligations Esther Sanchez sought to perfect an appeal by filing a notice of appeal, an appeal bond
incurred by the latter while engaged in a business that had admittedly redounded to the and a record on appeal. 9
benefit of the family, and (2) the interference by a court with the proceedings on
execution of a co-equal or coordinate court. Both acts being proscribed by law, correction Pending approval of the record on appeal, Lourdes Mariano filed a motion for the
is called for and will hereby be effected. immediate execution of the judgment which the Court granted. 10 In virtue of the writ of
execution which afterwards issued in due course, the sheriff garnished the sum of P
The proceedings originated from a suit filed by Esther Sanchez against Lourdes Mariano 11,000.00 from Veritas Insurance Company, and levied on real and personal property
in the Court of First Instance at Caloocan City, 1 for recovery of the value of ladies' ready belonging to the conjugal partnership of Esther Sanchez and her husband, Daniel Sanchez.
made dresses allegedly purchased by and delivered to the latter. 2 Esther Sanchez then filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, praying for the
annulment of the execution pending appeal authorized by the Trial Court; but her petition was
A writ of preliminary attachment issued at Esther Sanchez' instance, upon a bond posted adjudged to be without merit and was accordingly dismissed. 11
by Veritas Insurance Company in the amount of P 11,000.00, and resulted in the seizure
of Lourdes Mariano's property worth P 15,000.00 or so. 3 Her motion for the discharge of Daniel Sanchez, Esther's husband, now made his move. He filed a complaint for
the attachment having been denied, 4 Lourdes Mariano went up to the Court of Appeals on annulment of the execution in the Court of First Instance at Quezon City in his capacity
certiorari. That Court ordered 5 the Trial Court to receive evidence on whether or not the as administrator of the conjugal partnership. 12 He alleged that the conjugal assets could
attachment had been improvidently or irregularly issued. 6 The Trial Court did so, came to the not validly be made to answer for obligations exclusively contracted by his wife, and that,
conclusion that the attachment had indeed been improperly issued, and consequently moreover, some of the personal property levied on, such as household appliances and
dissolved it. 7 utensils necessarily used in the conjugal dwelling, were exempt from execution. He also
applied for a preliminary injunction pending adjudication of the case on the merits. 13
Trial then ensued upon the issues arising from the complaint as well as Lourdes
Mariano's answer with counterclaim-which included a claim for damages resulting from The Quezon City Court issued an order setting the matter of the injunction for hearing,
wrongful attachment. Thereafter judgment was rendered in favor of defendant Lourdes and commanding the sheriff, in the meantime, to desist from proceeding with the auction
Mariano and against plaintiff Esther Sanchez containing the following dispositions, to sale of the property subject of Daniel Sanchez' claim. 14 Lourdes Mariano filed a motion to
wit: 8 dismiss the action; this, the Court denied. 15 She then instituted a special civil action of
certiorari in the Court of Appeals 16 where she initially enjoyed some measure of success: her
petition was given due course, and the Quezon City Court was restrained by the Appellate
1. On the complaint, defendant is ordered to pay unto the plaintiff for the
Court's Seventh Division 17 from further proceeding with the case. 18 Eventually, however, the
value of the dishonored check (Exhs. G-1, H and I) in the total amount of Eighth Division 19 came to the conclusion that there was no merit in her cause and dismissed
P 1,512.00. her petition. 20 It ruled that the Quezon City Court had not interfered with the execution
process of the Caloocan Court because Daniel Sanchez's action in the former court raised an
2. On the counterclaim, the plaintiff is ordered to pay unto defendant the issue-the validity of the sheriffs levy on the conjugal partnership assets of the Sanchez
following, as follows: spouses different from those adjudicated in the Caloocan Court, and Sanchez was not a
party to the case tried by the latter.
a) P 7,500.00 for loss of income of the defendant for 75 days;
From this verdict Lourdes Mariano has appealed to this Court, contending that the
b) P 16,000.00 for the value of attached goods; Appellate Court committed reversible error-

c) P 25,000.00 for moral and exemplary damages; 1) in ruling that the conjugal partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez
could not be made liable for Esther's judgment obligation arising from the
d) P 5,000.00 as attorney's fees plus costs of suit. spouses' joint business with Lourdes Mariano;
 2) in ruling that the Quezon City Court of First Instance had not interfered SEC. 17. Proceedings where property claimed by third person.-If property
with the execution process of the Caloocan Court of First Instance; and levied on be claimed by any other person than the judgment debtor or his
agent, and such person make an affidavit of his title thereto or right to the
3) when its Eighth Division decided the petition of Lourdes Mariano possession thereof, stating the grounds of such right or title, and serve
although the case had been raffled to the Seventh Division and the latter the same upon the officer making the levy, and a copy thereof upon the
had in fact given due course to the petition. judgment creditor, the officer shall not be bound to keep the property,
unless such judgment creditor or his agent, on demand of the officer,
1. There is no dispute about the fact that Esther Sanchez was engaged in indemnify the officer against such claim by a bond in a sum not greater
business not only without objection on the part of her husband, Daniel, than the value of the property levied on. In case of disagreement as to
but in truth with his consent and approval. 21 It is also established that, as such value, the same shall be determined by the court issuing the writ of
expressly acknowledged by Esther herself and never denied by Daniel, the execution.
profits from the business had been used to meet, in part at least, expenses
for the support of her family, i.e., the schooling of the children, food and other The officer is not liable for damages, for the taking or keeping of the
household expenses. 22 Under the circumstances, Lourdes Mariano action property, to any third-party claimant, unless a claim is made by the latter
against Esther Sanchez was justified, the litigation being "incidental to the ... and unless an action for damages is brought by him against the officer
business in which she is engaged 23 and consequently, the conjugal within one hundred twenty (120) days from the date of the filing of the
partnership of Daniel and Esther Sanchez was liable for the debts and bond. But nothing herein contained shall prevent such claimant or any
obligations contracted by Esther in her business since the income derived third person from vindicating his claim to the property by any proper
therefrom, having been used to defray some of the expenses for the action.
maintenance of the family and the education of the children, had redounded
to the benefit of the partnership. 24 It was therefore error for the Court of
xxx xxx xxx
Appeals to have ruled otherwise.

2. It was also error for the Court of Appeals to have held that there was The "proper action" referred to in the section "is and should be an entirely separate and
no interference by the Quezon City Court of First Instance with the distinct action from that in which execution has issued, if instituted by a stranger to the
execution process of the Caloocan Court. latter suit:" 27 and in "such separate action, the court may issue a writ of preliminary
injunction against the sheriff enjoining him from proceeding with the execution sale." 28 "Upon
the other hand, if the claim of impropriety on the part of the sheriff in the execution
The rule, one of great importance in the administration of justice, is that a Court of First proceedings is made by a party to the action, not a stranger thereto, any relief therefrom may
Instance has no power to restrain by means of injunction the execution of a judgment or be applied for with, and obtained from, only the executing court; and this is true even if a new
decree of another judge of concurrent or coordinate jurisdictions. 25 But this is precisely party has been impleaded in the suit." 29
what was done by the Quezon City Court of First Instance: it enjoined the execution of a
judgment authorized and directed by a co-equal and coordinate court, the Caloocan City In the case at bar, the husband of the judgment debtor cannot be deemed a "stranger" to
Court of First Instance. It did so on the claim of Daniel Sanchez that the property being levied
the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife. A strikingly similar situation was
on belonged to the conjugal partnership and could not be made liable for the wife's
presented in a case decided by this Court as early as 1976, Rejuso v. Estipona. 30 There,
obligations.
the sheriff tried to evict petitioner Rejuso and his family from their house and lot which had
been sold in execution of a money judgment rendered by the Court of First Instance of Davao
The question that arises is whether such a claim that property levied on in execution of a against Rejuso. What Rejuso did was to institute, together with his wife, Felisa, a separate
judgment is not property of the judgment debtor, Daniel Sanchez's wife, but of the suit in the same court against the sheriff and the judgment creditor, Estipona, for the purpose
conjugal partnership of the Sanchez Spouses is properly cognizable by a Court other of annulling the levy, execution sale, and writ of possession issued in the first action in
than that which rendered judgment adversely to the wife. respect of their residential house and lot, on the theory that that property was conjugal in
character and "hence, not subject to such proceedings considering that Felisa was not a
To be sure, Section 17, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, authorizes a "third person," i.e., party to the previous case." The action was however dismissed by the court on the ground
"any other person than the judgment debtor or his agent," to vindicate "his claim to the that it had "no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or the nature of the action and
property by any proper action." The section reads as follows: 26 of the relief sought." 31 The dismissal was had on motion of Estipona who argued that the
court had no jurisdiction to "vacate or annul and/or enjoin the enforcement of the process Instance) at Quezon City is ORDERED to dismiss Civil Case No. 20415 entitled "Daniel
issued by another branch in another case," and since Rejuso had already raised the same P. Sanchez v. Deputy Sheriff Mariano V. Cachero, et al.," with prejudice. Costs against
issues in the first case, without success, he should not be allowed to "get from another private respondents.
branch ... what he failed to get ... (from) Branch l." This Court affirmed that judgment of
dismissal, 32 holding that Rejuso's action was barred by res adjudicata; and "(a)s regards SO ORDERED.
Felisa Rejuso, who is a new party in Civil Case No. 5102" (the second action) it was ruled
that-

... her remedy, if it has not yet been barred by the statute of limitations or
become stale in some other way, is within Civil Case No. 4435 (the first
suit). Indeed, it is superfluous to start a new action on a matter which can
be more simply and conveniently litigated within a former proceeding of
which it is more logically and legally an integral part. (Ipekdjian
Merchandising Co., Inc, v. CTA, 8 SCRA 59 [1963]). Actually, the court in
which the former proceeding was pending has exclusive jurisdiction
thereof (De Leon vs. Salvador, 36 SCRA 567), the fact that the two cases
are in the same Branch of the same Court of First Instance and presided
over by the same Judge notwithstanding. After all, it is simpler and more
convenient to observe such practice, which insures also consistency in
the resolutions of related questions because they are to be determined in
most if not all instances by the same judge.

In any case, whether by intervention in the court issuing the writ, or by separate action, it
is unavailing for either Esther Sanchez or her husband, Daniel, to seek preclusion of the
enforcement of the writ of possession against their conjugal assets. For it being
established, as aforestated, that Esther had engaged in business with her husband's
consent, and the income derived therefrom had been expended, in part at least, for the
support of her family, the liability of the conjugal assets to respond for the wife's
obligations in the premises cannot be disputed.

The petitioner's appeal must therefore be sustained.

However, the petitioner's theory that the Eighth Division of the Appellate Court had
improperly taken cognizance of the case which had been raffled to the Seventh Division,
must be rejected. It is without foundation, and was evidently made without attempt to
ascertain the relevant facts and applicable rules. The case had originally been assigned
to Mr. Justice Isidro C. Borromeo for study and report while he was still a member of the
Seventh Division. The case was brought by him to the Eighth Division when he was
subsequently transferred thereto; and he had ultimately written the opinion for the
division after due deliberation with his colleagues. All of this took place in accordance
with the Rules of the Court of Appeals.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals subject of the petition is

REVERSED AND SET ASIDE, and the Regional Trial Court (formerly Court of First
G.R. No. L-24419 July 15, 1968 southeastern part of Lot No. 802 and specifically bounded on the north by De
ESTOQUE vs. PAJIMULA Guzman Street, on the east by Posadas Street, on the south by Perez Street,
and on the west by remaining portion of the same lot, which contained an area of
Direct appeal from an order of the Court of First Instance of La Union, in its Civil Case 640 square meters. And in the deed of sale executed by Crispina Perez and her
No. 1990, granting a motion to dismiss the complaint for legal redemption by a co-owner children in favor of defendant Elena Pajimula over the remaining 2/3 portion of
(retracto legal de comuneros) on account of failure to state a cause of action. Lot No. 802, said portion is identified as the western portion of Lot No. 802 which
is bounded on the north by De Guzman Street, on the east by properties of
The basic facts and issues are stated in the decision appealed from, as follows: Leonarda Estoque, on the south by the national road and on the west by Lots
Nos. 799 and 801, containing an area of 598 square meters.
Plaintiff based her complaint for legal redemption on a claim that she is a co-
owner of Lot No. 802, for having purchased 1/3 portion thereof, containing an The appellant's stand is that the deed in her favor was inoperative to convey the
area of 640 square meters as evidenced by a deed of sale, Annex "A", which southeastern third of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre notwithstanding the description in
was executed on October 28, 1951 by Crispina Perez de Aquitania, one of the the deed itself, for the reason that the vendor, being a mere co-owner, had no right to sell
co-owners, in her favor. any definite portion of the land held in common but could only transmit her undivided
share, since the specific portion corresponding to the selling co-owner is not known until
partition takes place (Lopez vs. Ilustre, 5 Phil. 567; Ramirez vs. Bautista, 14 Phil. 528).
On the other hand, the defendant, who on December 30, 1959 acquired the other
From this premise, the appellant argues that the sale in her favor, although describing a
2/3 portion of Lot No. 802 from Crispina Aquitania and her children, claimed that
definite area, should be construed as having conveyed only the undivided 1/3 interest in
the plaintiff bought the 1/3 southeastern portion, which is definitely identified and
Lot 802 owned at the time by the vendor, Crispina Perez Vda. de Aquitania. Wherefore,
segregated, hence there existed no co-ownership at the time and after said
when the next day said vendor acquired the 2/3 interest of her two other co-owners, Lot
plaintiff bought the aforesaid portion, upon which right of legal redemption can be
802 became the common property of appellant and Crispina Perez. Therefore, appellant
exercised or taken advantage of.
argues, when Crispina sold the rest of the property to appellee Pajimula spouses, the
former was selling an undivided 2/3 that appellant, as co-owner, was entitled to redeem,
From the complaint, it would appear that Lot No. 802 of the Cadastral survey of pursuant to Article 1620 of the New Civil Code.
Rosario, covered by original certificate of title No. RO-2720 (N.A.) was originally
owned by the late spouses, Rosendo Perez and Fortunata Bernal, who were
ART. 1620. A co-owner of a thing may exercise the right of redemption in case
survived by her children, namely, Crispina Perez, Lorenzo Perez and Ricardo
the shares of all the other co-owners or of any of them, are sold to a third person.
Perez. Ricardo Perez is also now dead. On October 28, 1951, Crispina P. Vda.
If the price of the alienation is grossly excessive the redemptioner shall pay only
de Aquitania sold her right and participation in Lot No. 802 consisting of 1/3
a reasonable one.
portion with an area of 640 square meters to Leonora Estoque (Annex A of the
complaint). On October 29, 1951, Lorenzo Perez, Crispina Perez and Emilia P.
Posadas, widow of her deceased husband, Ricardo Perez for herself and in Should two or more co-owners desire to exercise the right of redemption, they
behalf of her minor children, Gumersindo, Raquel, Emilio and Ricardo, Jr., may only do so in proportion to the share they may respectively have in the thing
executed a deed of extrajudicial settlement wherein Lorenzo Perez, Emilia P. owned in common.
Posadas and her minor children assigned all their right, interest and participation
in Lot No. 802 to Crispina Perez (Annex B of the complaint). On December 30, The lower court, upon motion of defendant, dismissed the complaint, holding that the
1959, Crispina Perez and her children Rosita Aquitania Belmonte, Remedios deeds of sale show that the lot acquired by plaintiff Estoque was different from that of the
Aquitania Misa, Manuel Aquitania, Sergio Aquitania and Aurora Aquitania sold to defendants Pajimula; hence they never became co-owners, and the alleged right of legal
Elena Pajimula, the remaining 2/3 western portion of Lot No. 802 with an area of redemption was not proper. Estoque appealed.
958 square meters (Annex C of the complaint).
We find no error in the order of dismissal, for the facts pleaded negate the claim that
The action of the plaintiff is premised on the claim of co-ownership. From the appellant Estoque ever became a co-owner of appellees Pajimula.
deed of sale executed in favor of the plaintiff, it can be seen that the 1/3 portion
sold to plaintiff is definitely identified as the 1/3 portion located on the
(1) The deed of sale to Estoque (Annex A of the complaint) clearly specifies the object
sold as the southeastern third portion of Lot 802 of the Rosario Cadastre, with an area of
840 square meters, more or less. Granting that the seller, Crispina Perez Vda. de
Aquitania could not have sold this particular portion of the lot owned in common by her
and her two brothers, Lorenzo and Ricardo Perez, by no means does it follow that she
intended to sell to appellant Estoque her 1/3 undivided interest in the lot forementioned.
There is nothing in the deed of sale to justify such inference. That the seller could have
validly sold her one-third undivided interest to appellant is no proof that she did choose to
sell the same. Ab posse ad actu non valet illatio.

(2) While on the date of the sale to Estoque (Annex A) said contract may have been
ineffective, for lack of power in the vendor to sell the specific portion described in the
deed, the transaction was validated and became fully effective when the next day
(October 29, 1951) the vendor, Crispina Perez, acquired the entire interest of her
remaining co-owners (Annex B) and thereby became the sole owner of Lot No. 802 of
the Rosario Cadastral survey (Llacer vs. Muñoz, 12 Phil. 328). Article 1434 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines clearly prescribes that — .

When a person who is not the owner of a thing sells or alienates and delivers it,
and later the seller or grantor acquires title thereto, such title passes by operation
of law to the buyer or grantee."

Pursuant to this rule, appellant Estoque became the actual owner of

the southeastern third of lot 802 on October 29, 1951. Wherefore, she never acquired an
undivided interest in lot 802. And when eight years later Crispina Perez sold to the
appellees Pajimula the western two-thirds of the same lot, appellant did not acquire a
right to redeem the property thus sold, since their respective portions were distinct and
separate.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the appealed order of dismissal is affirmed. Costs

against appellant Estoque. 1äwphï1.ñët

--- xxx END OF LIMITATIONS OF SUCH RIGHTS xxx ---

G.R. No. 75884 September 24, 1987 After the dissolution of the marriage with the death of
GO ONG vs. CA plaintiff's husband, the plaintiff acquired, by law, her
conjugal share, together with the hereditary rights
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the March 21, 1986 Decision * of the Court of thereon. (Margate vs. Rabacal, L-14302, April 30, 1963).
Appeals in AC-G.R. CV No. 02635, "Julita Ong etc. vs. Allied Banking Corp. et al." affirming, with modification, the January Consequently, the mortgage constituted on said property,
5, 1984 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-35230.
upon express authority of plaintiff, notwithstanding the
lack of judicial approval, is valid, with respect to her
The uncontroverted facts of this case, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows: conjugal share thereon, together with her hereditary
rights.
...: Two (2) parcels of land in Quezon City Identified as Lot No. 12, Block
407, Psd 37326 with an area of 1960.6 sq. m. and Lot No. 1, Psd 15021, On appeal by petitioner, respondent Court of Appeals affirmed, with modification, the
with an area of 3,660.8 sq. m. are covered by Transfer Certificate of Title appealed decision (Record, pp. 19-22). The dispositive portion of the appellate court's
No. 188705 in the name of "Alfredo Ong Bio Hong married to Julita Go decision reads:
Ong "(Exh. D). Alfredo Ong Bio Hong died on January 18, 1975 and
Julita Go Ong was appointed administratrix of her husband's estate in WHEREFORE, with the modification that the extrajudicial foreclosure
Civil Case No. 107089. The letters of administration was registered on proceedings instituted by defendant against plaintiff shall be held in
TCT No. 188705 on October 23, 1979. Thereafter, Julita Go Ong sold Lot abeyance to await the final result of Civil Case No. 107089 of the Court of
No. 12 to Lim Che Boon, and TCT No. 188705 was partially cancelled First Instance of Manila, 6th Judicial District Branch XXXII, entitled "IN
and TCT No. 262852 was issued in favor of Lim Che Boon covering Lot THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE ALFREDO
No. 12 (Exh. D-4). On June 8, 1981 Julita Go Ong through her attorney- ONG BIO: JULITA GO ONG, ADMINISTRATRIX". In pursuance with
in-fact Jovita K. Yeo (Exh. 1) mortgaged Lot No. 1 to the Allied Banking which the restraining order of the lower court in this case restraining the
Corporation to secure a loan of P900,000.00 obtained by JK Exports, Inc. sale of the properties levied upon is hereby ordered to continue in full
The mortgage was registered on TCT No. 188705 on the same date with force and effect coterminous with the final result of Civil Case No.
the following notation: "... mortgagee's consent necessary in case of 107089, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against
subsequent alienation or encumbrance of the property other conditions plaintiff-appellant.
set forth in Doc. No. 340, Page No. 69, Book No. XIX, of the Not. Public
of Felixberto Abad". On the loan there was due the sum of P828,000.00
and Allied Banking Corporation tried to collect it from Julita Go Ong, (Exh. SO ORDERED.
E). Hence, the complaint alleging nullity of the contract for lack of judicial
approval which the bank had allegedly promised to secure from the court. On April 8, 1986, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said decision (Ibid., pp.
In response thereto, the bank averred that it was plaintiff Julita Go Ong 24-29), but in a Resolution dated September 11, 1986, respondent court denied the
who promised to secure the court's approval, adding that Julita Go Ong motion for lack of merit (Ibid., p. 23). Hence, the instant petition (Ibid., pp. 6-17).
informed the defendant that she was processed the sum of P300,000.00
by the JK Exports, Inc. which will also take charge of the interest of the The Second Division of this Court, in a Resolution dated November 19, 1986 (Rollo, p.
loan. 30), without giving due course to the petition, resolved to require private respondent to
comment thereon and it did on February 19, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 37-42). Thereafter, in a
Concluding, the trial court ruled: Resolution dated April 6, 1987, the petition was given due course and the parties were
required to file their respective memoranda (Ibid., p. 43).
Absent (of) any evidence that the property in question is
the capital of the deceased husband brought into the Petitioner filed her Memorandum on May 13, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 45-56), while private
marriage, said property should be presumed as acquired respondent filed its Memorandum on May 20, 1987 (Ibid., pp. 62-68).
during the marriage and, therefore, conjugal property,
The sole issue in this case is —
WHETHER OR NOT THE MORTGAGE CONSTITUTED OVER THE PARCEL OF LAND to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the co-
UNDER PETITIONER'S ADMINISTRATION IS NULL AND VOID FOR WANT OF ownership (Philippine National Bank vs. Court of Appeals, 98 SCRA 207 [1980]).
JUDICIAL APPROVAL.
Consequently, in the case at bar, the trial court and the Court of Appeals cannot be
The instant petition is devoid of merit. faulted in ruling that the questioned mortgage constituted on the property under
administration, by authority of the petitioner, is valid, notwithstanding the lack of judicial
The well-settled rule that the findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great respect, approval, with respect to her conjugal share and to her hereditary rights. The fact that
carries even more weight when affirmed by the Court of Appeals as in the case at bar. what had been mortgaged was in custodia legis is immaterial, insofar as her conjugal
share and hereditary share in the property is concerned for after all, she was the
In brief, the lower court found: (1) that the property under the administration of petitioner ABSOLUTE OWNER thereof. This ownership by hers is not disputed, nor is there any
— the wife of the deceased, is a community property and not the separate property of claim that the rights of the government (with reference to taxes) nor the rights of any heir
the latter; (2) that the mortgage was constituted in the wife's personal capacity and not in or anybody else have been prejudiced for impaired. As stated by Associate Justice (later
her capacity as administratrix; and (3) that the mortgage affects the wife's share in the Chief Justice) Manuel Moran in Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 73 Phil. 618 —
community property and her inheritance in the estate of her husband.
The land in question, described in the appealed decision, originally
Petitioner, asserting that the mortgage is void for want of judicial approval, quoted belonged to Juan Melgar. The latter died and the judicial administration of
Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court and cited several cases wherein this Court his estate was commenced in 1915 and came to a close on December 2,
ruled that the regulations provided in the said section are mandatory. 1924, only. During the pendency of the said administration, that is, on
July 5, 1917, Susana Melgar, daughter of the deceased Juan Melgar,
sold the land with the right of repurchase to Pedro Cui, subject to the
While petitioner's assertion may have merit insofar as the rest of the estate of her
stipulation that during the period for the repurchase she would continue in
husband is concerned the same is not true as regards her conjugal share and her
possession of the land as lessee of the purchase. On December 12,
hereditary rights in the estate. The records show that petitioner willingly and voluntarily
1920, the partition of the estate left by the deceased Juan Melgar was
mortgaged the property in question because she was processed by JK Exports, Inc. the
made, and the land in question was adjudicated to Susana Melgar. In
sum of P300,000.00 from the proceeds of the loan; and that at the time she executed the
1921, she conveyed, in payment of professional fees, one-half of the land
real estate mortgage, there was no court order authorizing the mortgage, so she took it
in favor of the defendant-appellee Nicolas Rafols, who entered upon the
upon herself, to secure an order.
portion thus conveyed and has been in possession thereof up to the
present. On July 23, 1921, Pedro Cui brought an action to recover said
Thus, in confirming the findings of the lower court, as supported by law and the evidence, half of the land from Nicolas Rafols and the other half from the other
the Court of Appeals aptly ruled that Section 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court is not defendants, and while that case was pending, or about August 4, 1925,
applicable, since the mortgage was constituted in her personal capacity and not in her Pedro Cui donated the whole land in question to Generosa Teves, the
capacity as administratrix of the estate of her husband. herein plaintiff-appellant, after trial, the lower court rendered a decision
absolving Nicolas Rafols as to the one-half of the land conveyed to him
Nevertheless, petitioner, citing the cases of Picardal, et al. vs. Lladas (21 SCRA 1483) by Susana Melgar, and declaring the plaintiff owner of the other half by
and Fernandez, et al. vs. Maravilla (10 SCRA 589), further argues that in the settlement express acknowledgment of the other defendants. The plaintiff appealed
proceedings of the estate of the deceased spouse, the entire conjugal partnership from that part of the judgment which is favorable to Nicolas Rafols.
property of the marriage is under administration. While such may be in a sense true, that
fact alone is not sufficient to invalidate the whole mortgage, willingly and voluntarily The lower court absolved Nicolas Rafols upon the theory that Susana
entered into by the petitioner. An opposite view would result in an injustice. Under similar Melgar could not have sold anything to Pedro Cui because the land was
circumstances, this Court applied the provisions of Article 493 of the Civil Code, where then in custodia legis, that is, under judicial administration. This is error.
the heirs as co-owners shall each have the full ownership of his part and the fruits and That the land could not ordinary be levied upon while in custodia
benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or mortgage it, and legis,does not mean that one of the heirs may not sell the right, interest
even effect of the alienation or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited or participation which he has or might have in the lands under
administration. The ordinary execution of property in custodia legis is
 prohibited in order to avoid interference with the possession by the court.
But the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the
result of the pending administration, in no wise stands in the way of such
administration.

The reference to judicial approval in Sec. 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court cannot
adversely affect the substantiverights of private respondent to dispose of her Ideal [not
inchoate, for the conjugal partnership ended with her husband's death, and her
hereditary rights accrued from the moment of the death of the decedent (Art. 777, Civil
Code) share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership formed between her and the other
heirs/co-owners (See Art. 493, Civil Code, supra.). Sec. 7, Art. 89 of the Civil Code
applies in a case where judicial approval has to be sought in connection with, for
instance, the sale or mortgage of property under administration for the payment, say of a
conjugal debt, and even here, the conjugal and hereditary shares of the wife are
excluded from the requisite judicial approval for the reason already adverted to
hereinabove, provided of course no prejudice is caused others, including the
government.

Moreover, petitioner is already estopped from questioning the mortgage. An estoppel

may arise from the making of a promise even though without consideration, if it was
intended that the promise should be relied upon and in fact it was relied upon, and if a
refusal to enforce it would be virtually to sanction the perpetration of fraud or would result
in other injustice (Gonzalo Sy Trading vs. Central Bank, 70 SCRA 570).

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the instant petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993 3. to distribute the residue among the Heirs in final settlement of the
ACEBEDO vs. ABESAMIS Estate.

The lower court's jurisdiction in approving a Deed of Conditional Sale executed by To the aforesaid Motion, herein petitioner-administrator interposed an "Opposition to
respondents-heirs and ordering herein administrator-petitioner Herodotus Acebedo to Approval of Sale", to wit:
sell the remaining portions of said properties, despite the absence of its prior approval as
a probate court, is being challenged in the case at bar. 1. That he has learned that some of the heirs herein have sold some real
estate property of the Estate located at Balintawak, Quezon City, without
The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located the knowledge of the herein administrator, without the approval of this
in Quezon City and Caloocan City, with a conservative estimated value of about P30 Honorable Court and of some heirs, and at a shockingly low price;
million. Said estate allegedly has only the following unsettled claims:
2. That he is accordingly hereby registering his vehement objection to the
a. P87,937.00 representing unpaid real estate taxes due Quezon City; approval of the sale, perpetrated in a manner which can even render the
proponents of the sale liable for punishment for contempt of this
b. P20,244.00 as unpaid real estate taxes due Caloocan City; Honorable Court;

c. The unpaid salaries/allowances of former Administrator Miguel 3. The herein Administrator instead herein prays this Honorable Court to
Acebedo, and the incumbent Administrator Herodotus Acebedo; and authorize the sale of the above mentioned property of the Estate to
generate funds to pay certain liabilities of the Estate and with the
d. Inheritance taxes that may be due on the net estate. approval of this Honorable Court if warranted, to give the heirs some
advances chargeable against theirs (sic) respective shares, and, for the
purpose to authorize the herein Administrator, and the other heirs to help
The decedent was succeeded by eight heirs, two of whom are the petitioners herein, and
the Administrator personally or through a broker, to look for a buyer for
the others are the private respondents.
the highest obtainable price, subject always to the approval of this
Honorable Court. 1
Due to the prolonged pendency of the case before the respondent Court for sixteen
years, respondents-heirs filed a "Motion for Approval of Sale", on October 4, 1989. The
On October 30, 1989, herein petitioners moved to be given a period of forty-five (45)
said sale involved the properties covered by Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 155569,
days within which to look for a buyer who will be willing to buy the properties at a price
120145, 9145, and 18709, all of which are registered in Quezon City, and form part of
higher than P12,000,000.00.
the estate. The consideration for said lots was twelve (12) million pesos and by that time,
they already had a buyer. It was further stated in said Motion that respondents-heirs
have already received their proportionate share of the six (6) million pesos paid by the The case was set for hearing on December 15, 1989. However, by said date, petitioners
buyer, Yu Hwa Ping, as earnest money; that the balance of P6,000,000.00 is more than have not found any buyer offering better terms. Thus, they asked the Court, on February
enough to pay the unsettled claims against the estate. Thus, they prayed for the Court to 8, 1990, for an in extendible period of thirty days to look for a buyer.
direct the administrator, Herodotus Acebedo (referred to as petitioner-administrator
hereafter): Petitioner-administrator then filed a criminal complaint for falsification of a public
document against Yu Hwa Ping and notary public Eugenio Obon on February 26, 1990.
1. to sell the properties mentioned in the motion; He initiated this complaint upon learning that it was Yu Hwa Ping who caused the
notarization of the Deed of Conditional Sale wherein allegedly petitioner-administrator's
signature was made to appear. He also learned that after he confronted the notary public
2. with the balance of P6 million, to pay all the claims against the Estate;
of the questioned document, the latter revoked his notarial act on the same.
and
On April 2, 1990, petitioner-administrator filed the civil action to secure the declaration by
the Court of the nullity of the Deed of Conditional Sale and the Deed of Absolute Sale.
The period granted herein petitioners having lapsed without having found a buyer, WHEREFORE, the Order dated August 7, 1990, is hereby lifted,
petitioner Demosthenes Acebedo sought to nullify the Orders granting them several reconsidered and set aside, and another one is hereby issued as follows:
periods within which to look for a better buyer. Respondents filed a comment thereon.
1. Approving the conditional sale, dated September 10, 1989, executed
Having miserably failed to find a better buyer, after seven long months, petitioner- by the heirs-movants, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping, pertaining to their
administrator filed another "Opposition to Approval of Sale", dated May 10, 1990, respective shares in the properties covered by TCT Nos. 155569,
maintaining that the sale should wait for the country to recover from the effects of the 120145, 1945 and 18709 of the Register of Deeds of Quezon City;
coup d'etat attempts, otherwise, the properties should be divided among the heirs.
2. Ordering the administrator Herodotus Acebedo to sell the remaining
On June 21, 1990, petitioners filed a "Motion for Leave of Court to Mortgage and Lease portions of the said properties also in favor of Yu Hwa Ping at the same
some of the Properties of the Estate". To this Motion, respondents filed an Opposition on price as the sale executed by the herein heirs-movants;
the following grounds : that the motion is not proper because of the pending motion to
approve the sale of the same properties; that said conditional sale was initiated by 3. Ordering Yu Hwa Ping to deposit with the Court the total remaining
petitioner-administrator who had earlier signed a receipt for P500,000.00 as earnest balance of the purchase price for the said lots within TWENTY (20) DAYS
money; that the approval of the sale would mean Yu Hwa Ping's assumption of payment from notice hereof;
of the realty taxes; that the estate has no further debts and thus, the intestate
administrator may be terminated. 4. The motion to cite former administrator Miguel Acebedo in contempt of
court, resulting from his failure to submit the owner's copy of TCT Nos.
On August 17, 1990, respondent Court issued an Order, the dispositive portion of which, 155569, and 120145 is hereby denied. 3
stated, among others, to wit: 2
Yu Hwa Ping, on April 4, 1991, deposited the remaining balance of the purchase price for
b. the motion filed by the heirs-movants, dated October 4, 1989, praying the properties subject of the Deed of Conditional Sale in the amount of P6,500,000.00.
that the new administrator be directed to sell the properties covered by
TCT Nos. 155569, 120145, 9145 and 18709, in favor of Yu Hwa Ping is Petitioners herein received the questioned Order on April 11, 1991. Twenty one (21)
hereby denied; and days thereafter, they filed a Motion for Reconsideration, praying that the Court reinstate
its Order of August 17, 1990. To this, private respondents filed their Opposition. 4
c. the new administrator is hereby granted leave to mortgage some
properties of the estate at a just and reasonable amount, subject to the Instead of making a reply, petitioners herein filed a Supplemental Motion for
approval of the Court. Reconsideration. The motions for reconsideration of herein petitioners were denied by
the respondent Court on August 23, 1991.
On December 4, 1990, the respondent Judge issued an order resolving to call the parties
to a conference on December 17, 1990. The conference was held, but still the parties On September 23, 1991, herein petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration,
were unable to arrive at an agreement. So, on January 4, 1991, it was continued, hoping for the last time that they would be able to convince the Court that its Order dated
wherein the parties actually agreed that the heirs be allowed to sell their shares of the March 29, 1991 in effect approving the conditional sale is erroneous and beyond its
properties to Yu Hwa Ping for the price already agreed upon, while herein petitioners jurisdiction.
negotiate for a higher price with Yu Hwa Ping.
On October 17, 1991, the respondent Court denied the Motion for Partial
Petitioners, then, instead filed a "Supplemental Opposition" to the approval of the Deed Reconsideration for "lack of merit".
of Conditional Sale.
On November 7, 1991, private respondents filed a Motion for Execution of the Order
On March 29, 1991, the respondent Court issued the challenged Order, the dispositive dated March 29, 1991. This was pending resolution when the petitioners filed this
portion of which states, to wit: Petition for Certiorari.
The controversy in the case at bar revolves around one question: Is it within the and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, the effect of the alienation or the
jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving the mortgage, with respect to the
Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondents-heirs without prior court approval and co-owners, shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the
to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said properties? termination of the co-ownership. 12 In other words, the law does not prohibit a co-owner from
selling, alienating or mortgaging his ideal share in the property held in common. 13
We answer in the positive?
As early as 1942, this Court has recognized said right of an heir to dispose of property
In the case of Dillena vs. Court of Appeals, this Court made a pronouncement that it is
5 under administration. In the case of Teves de Jakosalem vs. Rafols, et al., 14 it was said
within the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the sale of properties of a deceased that the sale made by an heir of his share in an inheritance, subject to the result of the
person by his prospective heirs before final adjudication. Hence, it is error to say that this pending administration, in no wise, stands in the way of such administration. The Court then
matter should be threshed out in a separate action. relied on the provision of the Old Civil Code, Article 440 and Article 339 which are still in force
as Article 533 and Article 493, respectively, in the new Civil Code. The Court also cited the
words of a noted civilist, Manresa: "Upon the death of a person, each of his heirs 'becomes
The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state the undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might be
that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special adjudicated to him, a community of ownership being thus formed among the co-owners of the
proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily estate which remains undivided'."
included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in
the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which is
Conditional Sale. unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents' right to
alienate the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should be
We cannot countenance the position maintained by herein petitioners that said dismissed for lack of merit.
conditional sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval. The sale precisely was
made conditional, the condition being that the same should first be approved by the PREMISES considered, Petition is hereby DISMISSED. With Costs.
probate court.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioners herein anchor their claim on Section 7, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. 6 It is
settled that court approval is necessary for the validity of any disposition of the decedent's
estate. However, reference to judicial approval cannot adversely affect the substantive rights
of the heirs to dispose of their ideal share in the co-heirship and/or co-ownership among the
heirs. 7

This Court had the occasion to rule that there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever
right, interest, or participation he may have in the property under administration. This is a
matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. 8

The right of an heir to dispose of the decedent's property, even if the same is under
administration, is based on the Civil Code provision 9 stating that the possession of
hereditary property is deemed transmitted to the heir without interruption and from the
moment of the death of the decedent, in case the inheritance is accepted. Where there are
however, two or more heirs, the whole estate of the decedent is, before its partition, owned in
common by such heirs. 10

The Civil Code, under the provisions on co-ownership, further qualifies this
right. 11 Although it is mandated that each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part
and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and thus may alienate, assign or mortgage it,
G.R. No. 61584 November 25, 1992 On learning of these transactions, respondents children of the late Pascual Paulmitan
PAULMITAN vs. CA filed on January 18, 1975 with the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental a
Complaint against petitioners to partition the properties plus damages.
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the decision 1 of the Court
of Appeals, dated July 14, 1982 in CA-G.R. No. 62255-R entitled "Alicio Paulmitan, et al. v. Petitioners set up the defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757 as an
Donato Sagario Paulmitan, et al." which affirmed the decision 2 of the then Court of First affirmative defense, contending that the Complaint was filed more than eleven years
Instance (now RTC) of Negros Occidental, 12th Judicial District, Branch IV, Bacolod City, in after the issuance of a transfer certificate of title to Donato Paulmitan over the land as
Civil Case No. 11770. consequence of the registration with the Register of Deeds, of Donato's affidavit
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757. As regards Lot No. 1091, petitioner
The antecedent facts are as follows: Juliana P. Fanesa claimed in her Answer to the Complaint that she acquired exclusive
ownership thereof not only by means of a deed of sale executed in her favor by her
Agatona Sagario Paulmitan, who died sometime in 1953, 3 left the two following parcels of father, petitioner Donato Paulmitan, but also by way of redemption from the Provincial
land located in the Province of Negros Occidental: (1) Lot No. 757 with an area of 1,946 Government of Negros Occidental.
square meters covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. RO-8376; and (2) Lot No.
1091 with an area of 69,080 square meters and covered by OCT No. RO-11653. From her Acting on the petitioners' affirmative defense of prescription with respect to Lot No. 757,
marriage with Ciriaco Paulmitan, who is also now deceased, Agatona begot two legitimate the trial court issued an order dated April 22, 1976 dismissing the complaint as to the
children, namely: Pascual Paulmitan, who also died in 1953, 4 apparently shortly after his said property upon finding merit in petitioners' affirmative defense. This order, which is
mother passed away, and Donato Paulmitan, who is one of the petitioners. Petitioner Juliana not the object of the present petition, has become final after respondents' failure to
P. Fanesa is Donato's daughter while the third petitioner, Rodolfo Fanes, is Juliana's appeal therefrom.
husband. Pascual Paulmitan, the other son of Agatona Sagario, is survived by the
respondents, who are his children, name: Alicio, Elena, Abelino, Adelina, Anita, Baking and
Anito, all surnamed Paulmitan. Trial proceeded with respect to Lot No. 1091. In a decision dated May 20, 1977, the trial
court decided in favor of respondents as to Lot No. 1091. According to the trial court, the
respondents, as descendants of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan were entitled to one-half
Until 1963, the estate of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan remained unsettled and the titles to
(1/2) of Lot No. 1091, pro indiviso. The sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan to his
the two lots mentioned above remained in the name of Agatona. However, on August 11,
daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not prejudice their rights. And the repurchase
1963, petitioner Donato Paulmitan executed an Affidavit of Declaration of Heirship,
by Juliana P. Fanesa of the land from the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental
extrajudicially adjudicating unto himself Lot No. 757 based on the claim that he is the
did not vest in Juliana exclusive ownership over the entire land but only gave her the
only surviving heir of Agatona Sagario. The affidavit was filed with the Register of Deeds
right to be reimbursed for the amount paid to redeem the property. The trial court ordered
of Negros Occidental on August 20, 1963, cancelled OCT No. RO-8376 in the name of
the partition of the land and directed petitioners Donato Paulmitan and Juliana P. Fanesa
Agatona Sagario and issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 35979 in Donato's
to pay private respondents certain amounts representing the latter's share in the fruits of
name.
the land. On the other hand, respondents were directed to pay P1,479.55 to Juliana P.
Fanesa as their share in the redemption price paid by Fanesa to the Provincial
As regards Lot No. 1091, Donato executed on May 28, 1974 a Deed of Sale over the Government of Negros Occidental. The dispositive portion of the trial court's decision
same in favor of petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, his daughter. 5 reads:

In the meantime, sometime in 1952, for non-payment of taxes, Lot No. 1091 was WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered on the second cause of
forfeited and sold at a public auction, with the Provincial Government of Negros action pleaded in the complain as follows:
Occidental being the buyer. A Certificate of Sale over the land was executed by the
Provincial Treasurer in favor of the Provincial Board of Negros Occidental. 6
1. The deed of sale (Exh. "F") dated May 28, 1974 is valid insofar as the
one-half undivided portion of Lot 1091 is concerned as to vest ownership
On May 29, 1974, Juliana P. Fanesa redeemed the property from the Provincial over said half portion in favor of defendant Juliana Fanesa and her
Government of Negros Occidental for the amount of P2,959.09. 7 husband Rodolfo Fanesa, while the remaining half shall belong to
plaintiffs, pro-indiviso;
 2. Lot 1091, Cadastral Survey of Pontevedra, Province of Negros Pascual, over their respective shares in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of
Occidental, now covered by TCT No. RO-11653 (N.A.), is ordered law vested in them in 1953 when their mother died intestate. At that stage, the children of
partitioned. The parties must proceed to an actual partition by property Donato and Pascual did not yet have any right over the inheritance since "[i]n every
instrument of partition, submitting the corresponding subdivision within inheritance, the relative nearest in degree excludes the more distant
sixty (60) days from finality of this decision, and should they fail to agree, ones." 11 Donato and Pascual excluded their children as to the right to inherit from Agatona
commissioners of partition may be appointed by the Court; Sagario Paulmitan, their mother.

3. Pending the physical partition, the Register of Deeds of Negros From the time of the death of Agatona Sagario Paulmitan to the subsequent passing
Occidental is ordered to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. RO-11653 away of her son Pascual in 1953, the estate remained unpartitioned. Article 1078 of the
(N.A.) covering Lot 1091, Pontevedra Cadastre, and to issue in lieu Civil Code provides: "Where there are two or more heirs, the whole estate of the
thereof a new certificate of title in the name of plaintiffs and defendants, decedent is, before its partition, owned in common by such heirs, subject to the payment
one-half portion each, pro-indiviso, as indicated in paragraph 1 above; of debts of the deceased." 12 Donato and Pascual Paulmitan were, therefore, co-owners of
the estate left by their mother as no partition was ever made.
4. Plaintiffs are ordered to pay, jointly and severally, defendant Juliana
Fanesa the amount of P1,479.55 with interest at the legal rate from May When Pascual Paulmitan died intestate in 1953, his children, the respondents,
28, 1974 until paid; succeeded him in the co-ownership of the disputed property. Pascual Paulmitan's right of
ownership over an undivided portion of the property passed on to his children, who, from
the time of Pascual's death, became co-owners with their uncle Donato over the disputed
5 Defendants Donato Sagario Paulmitan and Juliana Paulmitan Fanesa
decedent estate.
are ordered to account to plaintiffs and to pay them, jointly and severally,
the value of the produce from Lot 1091 representing plaintiffs' share in
the amount of P5,000.00 per year from 1966 up to the time of actual Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa claims ownership over Lot No. 1091 by virtue of two
partition of the property, and to pay them the sum of P2,000.00 as transactions, namely: (a) the sale made in her favor by her father Donato Paulmitan; and
attorney's fees as well as the costs of the suit. (b) her redemption of the land from the Provincial of Negros Occidental after it was
forfeited for non-payment of taxes.
xxx xxx xxx
When Donato Paulmitan sold on May 28, 1974 Lot No. 1091 to his daughter Juliana P.
Fanesa, he was only a co-owner with respondents and as such, he could only sell that
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision. Hence this petition.
portion which may be allotted to him upon termination of the co-ownership. 13 The sale did
not prejudice the rights of respondents to one half (1/2) undivided share of the land which
To determine the rights and obligations of the parties to the land in question, it is well to they inherited from their father. It did not vest ownership in the entire land with the buyer but
review, initially, the relatives who survived the decedent Agatona Sagario Paulmitan. transferred only the seller's pro-indiviso share in the property 14 and consequently made the
When Agatona died in 1953, she was survived by two (2) sons, Donato and Pascual. A buyer a co-owner of the land until it is partitioned. InBailon-Casilao v. Court of Appeals, 15 the
few months later in the same year, Pascual died, leaving seven children, the private Court, through Justice Irene R. Cortes, outlined the effects of a sale by one co-owner without
respondents. On the other had, Donato's sole offspring was petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa. the consent of all the co-owners, thus:

At the time of the relevant transactions over the properties of decedent Agatona Sagario The rights of a co-owner of a certain property are clearly specified in
Paulmitan, her son Pascual had died, survived by respondents, his children. It is, thus, Article 493 of the Civil Code, Thus:
tempting to apply the principles pertaining to the right of representation as regards
respondents. It must, however, be borne in mind that Pascual did no predecease his Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
mother, 8 thus precluding the operation of the provisions in the Civil Code on the right of representation 9 with the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
respect to his children, the respondents. When Agatona Sagario Paulmitan died intestate in assign or mortgage it and even substitute another person its enjoyment,
1952, her two (2) sons Donato and Pascual were still alive. Since it is well-settled by virtue of except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation
Article 777 of the Civil Code that "[t]he rights to the succession are transmitted from the or mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited to the portion
moment of the death of the decedent," 10 the right of ownership, not only of Donato but also of
 which may be allotted to him in the division upon the termination of the Essentially, it is the petitioners' contention that the property subject of
co-ownership. [Emphasis supplied.] dispute devolved upon him upon the failure of his co-heirs to join him in
its redemption within the period required by law. He relies on the
As early as 1923, this Court has ruled that even if a co-owner sells the provisions of Article 1515 of the old Civil Code, Article 1613 of the
whole property as his, the sale will affect only his own share but not those present Code, giving the vendee a retro the right to demand redemption
of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale [Punsalan v. Boon of the entire property.
Liat, 44 Phil. 320 (1923)]. This is because under the aforementioned
codal provision, the sale or other disposition affects only his undivided There is no merit in this petition.
share and the transferee gets only what would correspond to his grantor
in the partition of the thing owned in common [Ramirez v. Bautista, 14 The right of repurchase may be exercised by co-owner with respect to his
Phil. 528 (1909)]. Consequently, by virtue of the sales made by Rosalia share alone (CIVIL CODE, art. 1612, CIVIL CODE (1889), art. (1514.).
and Gaudencio Bailon which are valid with respect to their proportionate While the records show that petitioner redeemed the property in its
shares, and the subsequent transfers which culminated in the sale to entirety, shouldering the expenses therefor, that did not make him the
private respondent Celestino Afable, the said Afable thereby became a owner of all of it. In other words, it did not put to end the existing state of
co-owner of the disputed parcel of land as correctly held by the lower co-ownership (Supra, Art. 489). There is no doubt that redemption of
court since the sales produced the effect of substituting the buyers in the property entails a necessary expense. Under the Civil Code:
enjoyment thereof [Mainit v. Bandoy, 14 Phil. 730 (1910)].
Art. 488. Each co-owner shall have a right to compel the other co-owners
From the foregoing, it may be deduced that since a co-owner is entitled to contribute to the expenses of preservation of the thing or right owned
to sell his undivided share, a sale of the entire property by one co-owner in common and to the taxes. Any one of the latter may exempt himself
without the consent of the other co-owners is not null and void. However, from this obligation by renouncing so much of his undivided interest as
only the rights of the co-owner-seller are transferred, thereby making the may be equivalent to his share of the expenses and taxes. No such
buyer a co-owner of the property. waiver shall be made if it is prejudicial to the co-ownership.

Applying this principle to the case at bar, the sale by petitioner Donato Paulmitan of the The result is that the property remains to be in a condition of co-
land to his daughter, petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa, did not give to the latter ownership ownership. While a vendee a retro, under Article 1613 of the Code, "may
over the entire land but merely transferred to her the one half (1/2) undivided share of not be compelled to consent to a partial redemption," the redemption by
her father, thus making her the co-owner of the land in question with the respondents, one co-heir or co-owner of the property in its totality does not vest in him
her first cousins. ownership over it. Failure on the part of all the co-owners to redeem it
entitles the vendee a retro to retain the property and consolidate title
Petitioner Juliana P. Fanesa also claims ownership of the entire property by virtue of the thereto in his name (Supra, art. 1607). But the provision does not give to
fact that when the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental bought the land after it the redeeming co-owner the right to the entire property. It does not
was forfeited for non-payment of taxes, she redeemed it. provide for a mode of terminating a co-ownership.

The contention is without merit. Although petitioner Fanesa did not acquire ownership over the entire lot by virtue of the
redemption she made, nevertheless, she did acquire the right to reimbursed for half of
The redemption of the land made by Fanesa did not terminate the co-ownership nor give the redemption price she paid to the Provincial Government of Negros Occidental on
her title to the entire land subject of the co-ownership. Speaking on the same issue behalf of her co-owners. Until reimbursed, Fanesa hold a lien upon the subject property
raised by petitioners, the Court, in Adille v. Court of Appeals, 16 resolved the same with the for the amount due her. 17
following pronouncements:
Finally, petitioners dispute the order of the trial court, which the Court of Appeals
The petition raises a purely legal issue: May a co-owner acquire affirmed, for them to pay private respondents P5,000.00 per year from 1966 until the
exclusive ownership over the property held in common? partition of the estate which represents the share of private respondents in the fruits of
the land. According to petitioners, the land is being leased for P2,000.00 per year only.
This assigned error, however raises a factual question. The settled rule is that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review. As a general rule, findings of fact
made by the trial court and the Court of Appeals are final and conclusive and cannot be
reviewed on appeal. 18

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the decision of the Court of Appeals
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-33187 March 31, 1980 meters and covered by transfer certificate of title No. 14570 issued in the name of
PAMPLONA vs. MORETO Flaviano Moreto, married to Monica Maniega, although the lot was acquired during their
marriage. As a result of the sale, the said certificate of title was cancelled and a new
This is a petition for certiorari by way of appeal from the decision of the Court of transfer certificate of title No. T-5671 was issued in the name of Geminiano Pamplona
Appeals 1 in CA-G.R. No. 35962-R, entitled "Vivencio Moreto, et al., Plaintiff-Appellees vs. married to Apolonia Onte (Exh. "A").
Cornelio Pamplona, et al., Defendants-Appellants," affirming the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, Branch I at Biñan. After the execution of the above-mentioned deed of sale (Exh. "1"), the spouses
Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte constructed their house on the eastern part of
The facts, as stated in the decision appealed from, show that: lot 1496 as Flaviano Moreto, at the time of the sale, pointed to it as the land which he
sold to Geminiano Pamplona. Shortly thereafter, Rafael Pamplona, son of the spouses
Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega were husband and wife. During their marriage, Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonia Onte, also built his house within lot 1496 about one
they acquired adjacent lots Nos. 1495, 4545, and 1496 of the Calamba Friar Land meter from its boundary with the adjoining lot. The vendor Flaviano Moreto and the
Estate, situated in Calamba, Laguna, containing 781-544 and 1,021 square meters vendee Geminiano Pamplona thought all the time that the portion of 781 square meters
respectively and covered by certificates of title issued in the name of "Flaviano Moreto, which was the subject matter of their sale transaction was No. 1495 and so lot No. 1495
married to Monica Maniega." appears to be the subject matter in the deed of sale (Exh. "1") although the fact is that
the said portion sold thought of by the parties to be lot No. 1495 is a part of lot No. 1496.
The spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega begot during their marriage six (6)
children, namely, Ursulo, Marta, La Paz, Alipio, Pablo, and Leandro, all surnamed From 1956 to 1960, the spouses Geminiano Pamplona and Apolonio Onte enlarged their
Moreto. house and they even constructed a piggery corral at the back of their said house about
one and one-half meters from the eastern boundary of lot 1496.
Ursulo Moreto died intestate on May 24, 1959 leaving as his heirs herein plaintiffs
Vivencio, Marcelo, Rosario, Victor, Paulina, Marta and Eligio, all surnamed Moreto. On August 12, 1956, Flaviano Moreto died intestate. In 1961, the plaintiffs demanded on
the defendants to vacate the premises where they had their house and piggery on the
Marta Moreto died also intestate on April 30, 1938 leaving as her heir plaintiff Victoria ground that Flaviano Moreto had no right to sell the lot which he sold to Geminiano
Tuiza. Pamplona as the same belongs to the conjugal partnership of Flaviano and his deceased
wife and the latter was already dead when the sale was executed without the consent of
the plaintiffs who are the heirs of Monica. The spouses Geminiano Pamplona and
La Paz Moreto died intestate on July 17, 1954 leaving the following heirs, namely, herein
Apolonia Onte refused to vacate the premises occupied by them and hence, this suit was
plaintiffs Pablo, Severina, Lazaro, and Lorenzo, all surnamed Mendoza.
instituted by the heirs of Monica Maniega seeking for the declaration of the nullity of the
deed of sale of July 30, 1952 above-mentioned as regards one-half of the property
Alipio Moreto died intestate on June 30, 1943 leaving as his heir herein plaintiff Josefina subject matter of said deed; to declare the plaintiffs as the rightful owners of the other
Moreto. half of said lot; to allow the plaintiffs to redeem the one-half portion thereof sold to the
defendants. "After payment of the other half of the purchase price"; to order the
Pablo Moreto died intestate on April 25, 1942 leaving no issue and as his heirs his defendants to vacate the portions occupied by them; to order the defendants to pay
brother plaintiff Leandro Moreto and the other plaintiffs herein. actual and moral damages and attorney's fees to the plaintiffs; to order the defendants to
pay plaintiffs P120.00 a year from August 1958 until they have vacated the premises
On May 6, 1946, Monica Maniega died intestate in Calamba, Laguna. occupied by them for the use and occupancy of the same.

On July 30, 1952, or more than six (6) years after the death of his wife Monica Maniega, The defendants claim that the sale made by Flaviano Moreto in their favor is valid as the
Flaviano Moreto, without the consent of the heirs of his said deceased wife Monica, and lot sold is registered in the name of Flaviano Moreto and they are purchasers believing in
before any liquidation of the conjugal partnership of Monica and Flaviano could be good faith that the vendor was the sole owner of the lot sold.
effected, executed in favor of Geminiano Pamplona, married to defendant Apolonia Onte,
the deed of absolute sale (Exh. "1") covering lot No. 1495 for P900.00. The deed of sale
(Exh. "1") contained a description of lot No. 1495 as having an area of 781 square
After a relocation of lots 1495, 1496 and 4545 made by agreement of the parties, it was The fundamental and crucial issue in the case at bar is whether under the facts and
found out that there was mutual error between Flaviano Moreto and the defendants in circumstances duly established by the evidence, petitioners are entitled to the full
the execution of the deed of sale because while the said deed recited that the lot sold is ownership of the property in litigation, or only one-half of the same.
lot No. 1495, the real intention of the parties is that it was a portion consisting of 781
square meters of lot No. 1496 which was the subject matter of their sale transaction. There is no question that when the petitioners purchased the property on July 30, 1952
from Flaviano Moreto for the price of P900.00, his wife Monica Maniega had already
After trial, the lower court rendered judgment, the dispositive part thereof being as been dead six years before, Monica having died on May 6, 1946. Hence, the conjugal
follows: partnership of the spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega had already been
dissolved. (Article 175, (1) New Civil Code; Article 1417, Old Civil Code). The records
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered for the plaintiffs declaring show that the conjugal estate had not been inventoried, liquidated, settled and divided by
the deed of absolute sale dated July 30, 1952 pertaining to the eastern the heirs thereto in accordance with law. The necessary proceedings for the liquidation of
portion of Lot 1496 covering an area of 781 square meters null and void the conjugal partnership were not instituted by the heirs either in the testate or intestate
as regards the 390.5 square meters of which plaintiffs are hereby proceedings of the deceased spouse pursuant to Act 3176 amending Section 685 of Act
declared the rightful owners and entitled to its possession. 190. Neither was there an extra-judicial partition between the surviving spouse and the
heirs of the deceased spouse nor was an ordinary action for partition brought for the
The sale is ordered valid with respect to the eastern one-half (1/2) of purpose. Accordingly, the estate became the property of a community between the
1781 square meters of Lot 1496 measuring 390.5 square meters of which surviving husband, Flaviano Moreto, and his children with the deceased Monica Maniega
defendants are declared lawful owners and entitled to its possession. in the concept of a co-ownership.

After proper survey segregating the eastern one-half portion with an area The community property of the marriage, at the dissolution of this bond
of 390.5 square meters of Lot 1496, the defendants shall be entitled to a by the death of one of the spouses, ceases to belong to the legal
certificate of title covering said portion and Transfer Certificate of Title No. partnership and becomes the property of a community, by operation of
9843 of the office of the Register of Deeds of Laguna shall be cancelled law, between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased spouse,
accordingly and new titles issued to the plaintiffs and to the defendants or the exclusive property of the widower or the widow, it he or she be the
covering their respective portions. heir of the deceased spouse. Every co-owner shall have full ownership of
his part and in the fruits and benefits derived therefrom, and he therefore
may alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 5671 of the office of the Register of
in its enjoyment, unless personal rights are in question. (Marigsa vs.
Deeds of Laguna covering Lot No. 1495 and registered in the name of
Macabuntoc, 17 Phil. 107)
Cornelio Pamplona, married to Apolonia Onte, is by virtue of this decision
ordered cancelled. The defendants are ordered to surrender to the office
of the Register of Deeds of Laguna the owner's duplicate of Transfer In Borja vs. Addision, 44 Phil. 895, 906, the Supreme Court said that "(t)here is no
Certificate of Title No. 5671 within thirty (30) days after this decision shall reason in law why the heirs of the deceased wife may not form a partnership with the
have become final for cancellation in accordance with this decision. surviving husband for the management and control of the community property of the
marriage and conceivably such a partnership, or rather community of property, between
the heirs and the surviving husband might be formed without a written agreement."
Let copy of this decision be furnished the Register of Deeds for the
In Prades vs. Tecson, 49 Phil. 230, the Supreme Court held that "(a)lthough, when the
province of Laguna for his information and guidance.
wife dies, the surviving husband, as administrator of the community property, has
authority to sell the property with•ut the concurrence of the children of the marriage,
With costs against the defendants. 2 nevertheless this power can be waived in favor of the children, with the result of bringing
about a conventional ownership in common between the father and children as to such
The defendants-appellants, not being satisfied with said judgment, appealed to the Court property; and any one purchasing with knowledge of the changed status of the property
of Appeals, which affirmed the judgment, hence they now come to this Court. will acquire only the undivided interest of those members of the family who join in the act
of conveyance.
It is also not disputed that immediately after the execution of the sale in 1952, the Petitioners point to the fact that spouses Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega owned
vendees constructed their house on the eastern part of Lot 1496 which the vendor three parcels of land denominated as Lot 1495 having an area of 781 sq. meters, Lot
pointed out to them as the area sold, and two weeks thereafter, Rafael who is a son of 1496 with an area of 1,021 sq. meters, and Lot 4545 with an area of 544 sq. meters. The
the vendees, also built his house within Lot 1496. Subsequently, a cemented piggery three lots have a total area of 2,346 sq. meters. These three parcels of lots are
coral was constructed by the vendees at the back of their house about one and one-half contiguous with one another as each is bounded on one side by the other, thus: Lot 4545
meters from the eastern boundary of Lot 1496. Both vendor and vendees believed all the is bounded on the northeast by Lot 1495 and on the southeast by Lot 1496. Lot 1495 is
time that the area of 781 sq. meters subject of the sale was Lot No. 1495 which bounded on the west by Lot 4545. Lot 1496 is bounded on the west by Lot 4545. It is
according to its title (T.C.T. No. 14570) contains an area of 781 sq. meters so that the therefore, clear that the three lots constitute one big land. They are not separate
deed of sale between the parties Identified and described the land sold as Lot 1495. But properties located in different places but they abut each other. This is not disputed by
actually, as verified later by a surveyor upon agreement of the parties during the private respondents. Hence, at the time of the sale, the co-ownership constituted or
proceedings of the case below, the area sold was within Lot 1496. covered these three lots adjacent to each other. And since Flaviano Moreto was entitled
to one-half pro-indiviso of the entire land area or 1,173 sq. meters as his share, he had a
Again, there is no dispute that the houses of the spouses Cornelio Pamplona and perfect legal and lawful right to dispose of 781 sq. meters of his share to the Pamplona
Apolonia Onte as well as that of their son Rafael Pamplona, including the concrete spouses. Indeed, there was still a remainder of some 392 sq. meters belonging to him at
piggery coral adjacent thereto, stood on the land from 1952 up to the filing of the the time of the sale.
complaint by the private respondents on July 25, 1961, or a period of over nine (9) years.
And during said period, the private respondents who are the heirs of Monica Maniega as We reject respondent Court's ruling that the sale was valid as to one-half and invalid as
well as of Flaviano Moreto who also died intestate on August 12, 1956, lived as to the other half for the very simple reason that Flaviano Moreto, the vendor, had the
neighbors to the petitioner-vendees, yet lifted no finger to question the occupation, legal right to more than 781 sq. meters of the communal estate, a title which he could
possession and ownership of the land purchased by the Pamplonas, so that We are dispose, alienate in favor of the vendees-petitioners. The title may be pro-indiviso or
persuaded and convinced to rule that private respondents are in estoppel by laches to inchoate but the moment the co-owner as vendor pointed out its location and even
claim half of the property, in dispute as null and void. Estoppel by laches is a rule of indicated the boundaries over which the fences were to be erectd without objection,
equity which bars a claimant from presenting his claim when, by reason of abandonment protest or complaint by the other co-owners, on the contrary they acquiesced and
and negligence, he allowed a long time to elapse without presenting the same. tolerated such alienation, occupation and possession, We rule that a factual partition or
(International Banking Corporation vs. Yared, 59 Phil. 92) termination of the co-ownership, although partial, was created, and barred not only the
vendor, Flaviano Moreto, but also his heirs, the private respondents herein from
We have ruled that at the time of the sale in 1952, the conjugal partnership was already asserting as against the vendees-petitioners any right or title in derogation of the deed of
dissolved six years before and therefore, the estate became a co-ownership between sale executed by said vendor Flaiano Moreto.
Flaviano Moreto, the surviving husband, and the heirs of his deceased wife, Monica
Maniega. Article 493 of the New Civil Code is applicable and it provides a follows: Equity commands that the private respondents, the successors of both the deceased
spouses, Flaviano Moreto and Monica Maniega be not allowed to impugn the sale
Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of executed by Flaviano Moreto who indisputably received the consideration of P900.00
the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, and which he, including his children, benefitted from the same. Moreover, as the heirs of
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its both Monica Maniega and Flaviano Moreto, private respondents are duty-bound to
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involve. But the effect of the comply with the provisions of Articles 1458 and 1495, Civil Code, which is the obligation
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited of the vendor of the property of delivering and transfering the ownership of the whole
to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon the property sold, which is transmitted on his death to his heirs, the herein private
termination of the co-ownership. respondents. The articles cited provide, thus:

We agree with the petitioner that there was a partial partition of the co-ownership when Art. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates
at the time of the sale Flaviano Moreto pointed out the area and location of the 781 sq. himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing,
meters sold by him to the petitioners-vendees on which the latter built their house and and the other part to pay therefore a price certain in money or its
also that whereon Rafael, the son of petitioners likewise erected his house and an equivalent.
adjacent coral for piggery.
 A contract of sale may be absolute or conditionial.

Art. 1495. The vendor is bound to transfer the ownership of and deliver,
as well as warrant the thing which is the object of the sale.

Under Article 776, New Civil Code, the inheritance which private respondents received
from their deceased parents and/or predecessors-in-interest included all the property
rights and obligations which were not extinguished by their parents' death. And under
Art. 1311, paragraph 1, New Civil Code, the contract of sale executed by the deceased
Flaviano Moreto took effect between the parties, their assigns and heirs, who are the
private respondents herein. Accordingly, to the private respondents is transmitted the
obligation to deliver in full ownership the whole area of 781 sq. meters to the petitioners
(which was the original obligation of their predecessor Flaviano Moreto) and not only
one-half thereof. Private respondents must comply with said obligation.

The records reveal that the area of 781 sq. meters sold to and occupied by petitioners for
more than 9 years already as of the filing of the complaint in 1961 had been re-surveyed
by private land surveyor Daniel Aranas. Petitioners are entitled to a segregation of the
area from Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-9843 covering Lot 1496 and they are also
entitled to the issuance of a new Transfer Certificate of Title in their name based on the
relocation survey.

WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED with modification in the sense that the sale made and executed by Flaviano
Moreto in favor of the petitioners-vendees is hereby declared legal and valid in its
entirely.

Petitioners are hereby declared owners in full ownership of the 781 sq. meters at the
eastern portion of Lot 1496 now occupied by said petitioners and whereon their houses
and piggery coral stand.

The Register of Deeds of Laguna is hereby ordered to segregate the area of 781 sq.
meters from Certificate of Title No. 9843 and to issue a new Transfer Certificate of Title
to the petitioners covering the segregated area of 781 sq. meters.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-25014 October 17, 1973 Condition No. 2 of Exhibit A reads as follows:
VDA. DE CASTRO vs. ATIENZA
"2. Na sa pamamagitan nito ay pinawawalang kabuluhan namin ang
The Court rejects petitioners' appeal as without merit and affirms the judgment of the nasabing kasulatan at nagkasundo kami na ang bawat isa sa amin ni
appellate court. Petitioners' predecessor-in-interest as co-owner of an undivided one-half Arsenio de Castro at Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro ay isauli kay
interest in the fishpond could validly lease his interest to a third party, respondent GREGORIO ATIENZA ang tig P2,500.00 o kabuuang halagang
Atienza, independently of his co-owner (although said co-owner had also leased his P5,000.00 na paunang naibigay nito alinsunod sa nasabing kasulatan; na
other undivided one-half interest to the same third party) and could likewise by mutual ang nasabing tig P2,500.00 ay isasauli ng bawat isa sa amin sa o bago
agreement independently cancel his lease agreement with said third party. Said dumating ang Dec. 30, 1956."
predecessor-in-interest (and petitioners who have substituted him as his heirs) therefore
stands liable on his express undertaking to refund the advance rental paid to him by the Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro refused to sign Exhibit A. Defendant did not
lessee on the cancelled lease and cannot invoke the non-cancellation of the co-owner's pay the P2,500.00 which under the above-quoted paragraph of Exhibit A,
lease to elude such liability. he should have paid on December 30, 1956. Demand for payment was
made by plaintiff's counsel on January 7, 1957 but to no avail, hence the
The Court of Appeals, in its decision affirming in toto the judgment of the Manila court of present action.
first instance ordering therein defendant-appellant Arsenio de Castro, Sr. (now deceased
and substituted by above-named petitioners as his heirs) "to return to the plaintiff On the conflicting contentions between the parties as to who between them would attend
(respondent) Gregorio Atienza the sum P2,500.00 with legal interest from the date of the to securing the signature of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro (widow of Tomas de Castro)
filing of complaint until fully paid plus the sum of P250.00 as attorney's fees and the to the agreement of cancellation of the lease with respondent Atienza, the appellate court
costs of the suit", found the following facts to undisputed: found that "the testimony of the defendant (Arsenio de Castro, Sr.) ... supports the
contention of the plaintiff (Atienza) "that it was the defendant Arsenio who was interested
On January 24, 1956 the brothers Tomas de Castro and Arsenio de and undertook to do so, citing Arsenio's own declaration that "I agreed to sign this
Castro, Sr. leased to plaintiff a fishpond containing an area of 26 document (referring to the cancellation) because of my desire to cancel our original
hectares situated in Polo, Bulacan and forming part of a bigger parcel of agreement" and that his purpose in obtaining the cancellation of said lease agreement
land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 196450 of the registry of with plaintiff Atienza was "(B)ecause I had the intention of having said fishpond leased to
the property of Bulacan. The lessors are co-owners in equal shares of the other persons and I cannot lease it to third parties unless I can secure the signature of
leased property. Felisa Vda. de Castro."

According to the contract of lease (Exh. 1) the term of the lease was for The appellate court thus held in effect that as Arsenio "was the one interested in
five years from January 24, 1956 at a rental of P5,000 a year, the first cancelling the lease (Exh. 1), it stands to reason that he most probably undertook to
year's rental to be paid on February 1, 1956, the second on February 1, obtain the signature of Mrs. Castro [widow and successor-in-interest of his brother
1957 and the rental for the last three years on February 1, 1958. The first Tomas]" and that he could not invoke his own failure to obtain such signature to elude
year's rental was paid on time. his own undertaking and liability to refund respondent (plaintiff) his share of the rental
paid in advance by respondent on the cancelled lease in the sum of P2,500.00.
In the meantime, Tomas de Castro died.
The appellate court furthermore correctly held that the consent or concurrence of Felisa
In the month of November, 1956, plaintiff as lessee and defendant Vda. de Castro (as co-owner in succession of Tomas) was not an essential condition to
Arsenio de Castro, Sr. as one of the lessors, agreed to set aside and the validity and effectivity of the agreement of cancellation of the lease (Exhibit A) as
annul the contract of lease and for this purpose an agreement (Exh. A) between Arsenio and respondent-lessee, contrary to petitioners' claim, holding that
was signed by them, Exhibit A as signed by plaintiff and defendant shows "(S)ince there is no specific provision in Exhibit A supporting defendant's claim, we are
that Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro, widow of Tomas de Castro, was not prepared to supply such condition unless the same can be deduced from other
intended to be made a party thereof in her capacity as representative of evidence or unless the terms of Exhibit A cannot be performed by plaintiff and defendant
the heirs of Tomas Castro. without Mrs. Castro being bound as a party thereto."
The issue is simply reduced to whether Arsenio as co-owner of the fishpond owned pro-
indiviso by him with his brother Tomas (succeeded by Felisa Vda. de Castro) could
validly lease his half-interest to a third party (respondent Atienza) independently of his
co-owner, and in case his co-owner also leased his other half interest to the same third
party, whether Arsenio could cancel his own lease agreement with said third party?

The appellate court correctly resolved the issue thus: "Our view of the contract of lease
Exhibit 1 is that each of the Castro brothers, leased his undivided one-half interest in the
fishpond they owned in common to the plaintiff. Could one of them have validly leased
his interest without the other co-owner leasing his own? The answer to this is given by
appellant in his own brief (p. 14) when he said that it would result in a partnership
between the lessee and the owner of the other undivided half. If the lease could be
entered into partially by one of the co-owners, insofar as his interest is concerned, then
the lease, Exhibit 1, can also be cancelled partially as between plaintiff and defendant.
Therefore, we conclude that the consent of Mrs. Felisa Cruz Vda. de Castro is not
essential for the cancellation of the lease of defendant's one-half undivided share in the
fishpond to plaintiff."

The appellate court's judgment is fully supported by the Civil Code provisions on the
rights and prerogatives of co-owners, and specifically by Article 493 which expressly
provides that

Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of
the fruits and benefitspertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate,
assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment, except when personal rights are involved. But the effect of the
alienation or the mortgage, with respect to the co-owners, shall be limited
to the portion which may be alloted to him in the division upon the
termination of the co-ownership. *

ACCORDINGLY, the appealed judgment is hereby affirmed with costs against

petitioners.
G.R. No. 137152 January 29, 2001 Respondents filed a "Motion for Preliminary Hearing" claiming that the defenses alleged
CITY OF MANDALUYONG vs. AGUILAR in their Answer are valid grounds for dismissal of the complaint for lack of jurisdiction
over the person of the defendants and lack of cause of action. Respondents prayed that
This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court of the Orders dated the affirmative defenses be set for preliminary hearing and that the complaint be
September 17, 1998 and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, dismissed.4 Petitioner replied.
Pasig City1 dismissing the petitioner's Amended Complaint in SCA No. 1427 for
expropriation of two (2) parcels of land in Mandaluyong City. 1âw phi1.nêt On November 5, 1997, petitioner filed an Amended Complaint and named as an
additional defendant Virginia N. Aguilar and, at the same time, substituted Eusebio
The antecedent facts are as follows: Aguilar with his heirs. Petitioner also excluded from expropriation TCT No. 59870 and
thereby reduced the area sought to be expropriated from three (3) parcels of land to two
On August 4, 1997, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City (2) parcels totalling 1,636 square meters under TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767.5
a complaint for expropriation entitled "City of Mandaluyong, plaintiff v. Antonio N.,
Francisco N, Thelma N, Eusebio N, Rodolfo N., all surnamed Aguilar, The Amended Complaint was admitted by the trial court on December 18, 1997.
defendants." Petitioner sought to expropriate three (3) adjoining parcels of land with an Respondents, who, with the exception of Virginia Aguilar and the Heirs of Eusebio
aggregate area of 1,847 square meters registered under Transfer Certificates of Title Aguilar had yet to be served with summons and copies of the Amended Complaint, filed
Nos. 59780, 63766 and 63767 in the names of the defendants, herein respondents, a "Manifestation and Motion" adopting their "Answer with Counterclaim" and "Motion for
located at 9 de Febrero Street, Barangay Mauwag, City of Mandaluyong; on a portion of Preliminary Hearing" as their answer to the Amended Complaint.6
the 3 lots, respondents constructed residential houses several decades ago which they
had since leased out to tenants until the present; on the vacant portion of the lots, other The motion was granted. At the hearing of February 25, 1998, respondents presented
families constructed residential structures which they likewise occupied; in 1983, the lots Antonio Aguilar who testified and identified several documentary evidence. Petitioner did
were classified by Resolution No. 125 of the Board of the Housing and Urban not present any evidence. Thereafter, both parties filed their respective memoranda.7
Development Coordinating Council as an Area for Priority Development for urban land
reform under Proclamation Nos. 1967 and 2284 of then President Marcos; as a result of On September 17, 1998, the trial court issued an order dismissing the Amended
this classification, the tenants and occupants of the lots offered to purchase the land from Complaint after declaring respondents as "small property owners" whose land is exempt
respondents, but the latter refused to sell; on November 7, 1996, the Sangguniang from expropriation under Republic Act No. 7279. The court also found that the
Panlungsod of petitioner, upon petition of the Kapitbisig, an association of tenants and expropriation was not for a public purpose for petitioner's failure to present any evidence
occupants of the subject land, adopted Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996 authorizing that the intended beneficiaries of the expropriation are landless and homeless residents
Mayor Benjamin Abalos of the City of Mandaluyong to initiate action for the expropriation of Mandaluyong. The court thus disposed of as follows:
of the subject lots and construction of a medium-rise condominium for qualified
occupants of the land; on January 10, 1996, Mayor Abalos sent a letter to respondents "WHEREFORE, the Amended Complaint is hereby ordered dismissed without
offering to purchase the said property at P3,000.00 per square meter; respondents did pronouncement as to cost.
not answer the letter. Petitioner thus prayed for the expropriation of the said lots and the
fixing of just compensation at the fair market value of P3,000.00 per square meter.2
SO ORDERED."8
In their answer, respondents, except Eusebio N. Aguilar who died in 1995, denied having
Petitioner moved for reconsideration. On December 29, 1998, the court denied the
received a copy of Mayor Abalos' offer to purchase their lots. They alleged that the
motion. Hence this petition.
expropriation of their land is arbitrary and capricious, and is not for a public purpose; the
subject lots are their only real property and are too small for expropriation, while
petitioner has several properties inventoried for socialized housing; the fair market value Petitioner claims that the trial court erred
of P3,000.00 per square meter is arbitrary because the zonal valuation set by the Bureau
of Internal Revenue is P7,000.00 per square meter. As counterclaim, respondents "IN UPHOLDING RESPONDENT'S CONTENTION THAT THEY QUALIFY AS
prayed for damages of P21 million.3 SMALL PROPERTY OWNERS AND ARE THUS EXEMPT FROM
EXPROPRIATION."9
Petitioner mainly claims that the size of the lots in litigation does not exempt the same (a) Those owned by the Government or any of its subdivisions,
from expropriation in view of the fact that the said lots have been declared to be within instrumentalities, or agencies, including government-owned or controlled
the Area for Priority Development (APD) No. 5 of Mandaluyong by virtue of Proclamation corporations and their subsidiaries;
No. 1967, as amended by Proclamation No. 2284 in relation to Presidential Decree No.
1517.10 This declaration allegedly authorizes petitioner to expropriate the property, ipso (b) Alienable lands of the public domain;
facto, regardless of the area of the land.
(c) Unregistered or abandoned and idle lands;
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1517, the Urban Land Reform Act, was issued by then
President Marcos in 1978. The decree adopted as a State policy the liberation of human (d) Those within the declared Areas for Priority Development, Zonal
communities from blight, congestion and hazard, and promotion of their development Improvement Program sites, and Slum Improvement and Resettlement
and modernization, the optimum use of land as a national resource for public Program sites which have not yet been acquired;
welfare.11 Pursuant to this law, Proclamation No. 1893 was issued in 1979 declaring the
entire Metro Manila as Urban Land Reform Zone for purposes of urban land reform. This
(e) Bagong Lipunan Improvement of Sites and Services or BLISS Sites
was amended in 1980 by Proclamation No. 1967 and in 1983 by Proclamation No. 2284
which have not yet been acquired;
which identified and specified 245 sites in Metro Manila as Areas for Priority
Development and Urban Land Reform Zones.
(f) Privately-owned lands.
In 1992, the Congress of the Philippines passed Republic Act No. 7279, the "Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992." The law lays down as a policy that the state, in Where on-site development is found more practicable and advantageous to the
cooperation with the private sector, undertake a comprehensive and continuing Urban beneficiaries, the priorities mentioned in this section shall not apply. The local
Development and Housing Program; uplift the conditions of the underprivileged and government units shall give budgetary priority to on-site development of
homeless citizens in urban, areas and resettlement areas by making available to them government lands."
decent housing at affordable cost, basic services and employment opportunities and
provide for the rational use and development of urban land to bring about, among others, Lands for socialized housing are to be acquired in the following order: (1) government
equitable utilization of residential lands; encourage more effective people's participation lands; (2) alienable lands of the public domain; (3) unregistered or abandoned or idle
in the urban development process and improve the capability of local government units in lands; (4) lands within the declared Areas for Priority Development (APD), Zonal
undertaking urban development and housing programs and projects.12 Towards this end, Improvement Program (ZIP) sites, Slum Improvement and Resettlement (SIR) sites
all city and municipal governments are mandated to conduct an inventory of all lands which have not yet been acquired; (5) BLISS sites which have not yet been acquired;
and improvements within their respective localities, and in coordination with the National and (6) privately-owned lands.
Housing Authority, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board, the National Mapping
Resource Information Authority, and the Land Management Bureau,identify lands for There is no dispute that the two lots in litigation are privately-owned and therefore last in
socialized housing and resettlement areas for the immediate and future needs of the the order of priority acquisition. However, the law also provides that lands within the
underprivileged and homeless in the urban areas, acquire the lands, and dispose of declared APD's which have not yet been acquired by the government are fourth in the
said lands to the beneficiaries of the program.13 order of priority. According to petitioner, since the subject lots lie within the declared
APD, this fact mandates that the lots be given priority in acquisition.14
The acquisition of lands for socialized housing is governed by several provisions in the
law. Section 9 of R.A. 7279 provides: Section 9, however, is not a single provision that can be read separate from the other
provisions of the law. It must be read together with Section 10 of R.A. 7279 which also
"Sec. 9. Priorities in the Acquisition of Land. — Lands for socialized housing shall provides:
be acquired in the following order:
"Section 10. Modes of Land Acquisition. — The modes of acquiring lands for
purposes of this Act shall include, among others, community mortgage, land
swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land banking, donation to the
Government, joint-venture agreement, negotiated purchase, and
 expropriation: Provided, however, That expropriation shall be resorted to only banking, donation to the government, or joint venture agreement under Section 9 of the
when other modes of acquisition have been exhausted: Provided, law.
further, That where expropriation is resorted to, parcels of land owned by
small property owners shall be exempted for purposes of this Section 9 also exempts from expropriation parcels of land owned by small property
Act: Provided, finally, That abandoned property, as herein defined, shall be owners.18 Petitioner argues that the exercise of the power of eminent domain is not
reverted and escheated to the State in a proceeding analogous to the procedure anymore conditioned on the size of the land sought to be expropriated.19 By the
laid down in Rule 91 of the Rules of Court.15 expanded notion of public use, present jurisprudence has established the concept that
expropriation is not anymore confined to the vast tracts of land and landed estates, but
For the purposes of socialized housing, government-owned and foreclosed also covers small parcels of land.20 That only a few could actually benefit from the
properties shall be acquired by the local government units, or by the National expropriation of the property does not diminish its public use character.21 It simply is not
Housing Authority primarily through negotiated purchase:Provided, That qualified possible to provide, in one instance, land and shelter for all who need them.22
beneficiaries who are actual occupants of the land shall be given the right of first
refusal." While we adhere to the expanded notion of public use, the passage of R.A. No. 7279, the
"Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992" introduced a limitation on the size of the
Lands for socialized housing under R.A. 7279 are to be acquired in several modes. land sought to be expropriated for socialized housing. The law expressly exempted
Among these modes are the following: (1) community mortgage; (2) land swapping, (3) "small property owners" from expropriation of their land for urban land reform. R.A. No.
land assembly or consolidation; (4) land banking; (5) donation to the government; (6) 7279 originated as Senate Bill No. 234 authored by Senator Joey Lina23 and House Bill
joint venture agreement; (7) negotiated purchase; and (8) expropriation. The mode of No. 34310. Senate Bill No. 234 then provided that one of those lands not covered by the
expropriation is subject to two conditions: (a) it shall be resorted to only when the other urban land reform and housing program was "land actually used by small property
modes of acquisition have been exhausted; (b) parcels of land owned by small property owners within the just and equitable retention limit as provided under this Act."24 "Small
owners are exempt from such acquisition. property owners" were defined in Senate Bill No. 234 as:

Section 9 of R.A. 7279 speaks of priorities in the acquisition of lands. It enumerates the "4. Small Property Owners — are those whose rights are protected under Section
type of lands to be acquired and the heirarchy in their acquisition. Section 10 deals with 9, Article XIII of the Constitution of the Philippines, who own small parcels of land
the modes of land acquisition or the process of acquiring lands for socialized housing. within the fair and just retention limit provided under this Act and which are
These are two different things. They mean that the type of lands that may be adequate to meet the reasonable needs of the small property owner's family and
acquired in the order of priority in Section 9 are to be acquired only in the modes their means of livelihood.25
authorized under Section 10. The acquisition of the lands in the priority list must be
made subject to the modes and conditions set forth in the next provision. In other words, The exemption from expropriation of lands of small-property owners was never
land that lies within the APD, such as in the instant case, may be acquired only in the questioned on the Senate floor.26This exemption, although with a modified definition, was
modes under, and subject to the conditions of, Section 10. actually retained in the consolidation of Senate Bill No. 234 and House Bill No. 34310
which became R.A. No. 7279.27
Petitioner claims that it had faithfully observed the different modes of land acquisition for
socialized housing under R.A. 7279 and adhered to the priorities in the acquisition for The question now is whether respondents qualify as "small property owners" as defined
socialized housing under said law.16 It, however, did not state with particularity whether in Section 3 (q) of R.A. 7279. Section 3 (q) provides:
it exhausted the other modes of acquisition in Section 9 of the law before it decided to
expropriate the subject lots. The law states "expropriation shall be resorted to when other "Section 3 x x x (q). "Small property owners" refers to those whose only real
modes of acquisition have been exhausted." Petitioner alleged only one mode of property consists of residential lands not exceeding three hundred square meters
acquisition, i.e., by negotiated purchase. Petitioner, through the City Mayor, tried to (300 sq.m.) in highly urbanized cities and eight hundred square meters (800
purchase the lots from respondents but the latter refused to sell.17 As to the other modes sq.m.) in other urban areas."
of acquisition, no mention has been made. Not even Resolution No. 516, Series of 1996
of the Sangguniang Panlungsod authorizing the Mayor of Mandaluyong to effect the
"Small-property owners" are defined by two elements: (1) those owners of real property
expropriation of the subject property states whether the city government tried to acquire
whose property consists of residential lands with an area of not more than 300 square
the same by community mortgage, land swapping, land assembly or consolidation, land
meters in highly urbanized cities and 800 square meters in other urban areas; and (2) quota or proportionate share in the entire land or thing.38 Article 493 of the Civil Code
that they do not own real property other than the same. however provides that:

The case at bar involves two (2) residential lots in Mandaluyong City, a highly urbanized "Art. 493. Each co-owner shall have the full ownership of his part and of the fruits
city. The lot under TCT No. 63766 is 687 square meters in area and the second under and benefits pertaining thereto, and he may therefore alienate, assign or
TCT No. 63767 is 949 square meters, both totalling 1,636 square meters in area. TCT mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its enjoyment, except when
No. 63766 was issued in the names of herein five (5) respondents, viz: personal rights are involved. But the effect of the alienation or the mortgage, with
respect to the co-owners shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to
"FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO him in the division upon termination of the co-ownership.39
N. AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N.
AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig; all of legal age, Filipinos."28 Before partition in a co-ownership, every co-owner has the absolute ownership of his
undivided interest in the common property. The co-owner is free to alienate, assign or
TCT No. 63767 was issued in the names of the five (5) respondents plus Virginia Aguilar, mortgage his interest, except as to purely personal rights.40 He may also validly lease his
thus: undivided interest to a third party independently of the other co-owners.41The effect of
any such transfer is limited to the portion which may be awarded to him upon the
"FRANCISCO N. AGUILAR, widower; THELMA N. AGUILAR, single; EUSEBIO partition of the property.42
N. AGUILAR, JR., widower; RODOLFO N. AGUILAR, single and ANTONIO N.
AGUILAR, married to Teresita Puig; and VIRGINIA N. AGUILAR, single, all of Article 493 therefore gives the owner of an undivided interest in the property the right to
legal age, Filipinos."29 freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest.43 The co-owner, however, has no right to
sell or alienate a concrete specific or determinate part of the thing owned in common,
Respondent Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other registered owners are all because his right over the thing is represented by a quota or ideal portion without any
siblings who inherited the subject property by intestate succession from their physical adjudication.44 If the co-owner sells a concrete portion, this, nonetheless, does
parents.30 Their father died in 1945 and their mother in 1976.31 Both TCT's were issued in not render the sale void. Such a sale affects only his own share, subject to the results of
the siblings' names on September 2, 1987.31 In 1986, however, the siblings agreed to the partition but not those of the other co-owners who did not consent to the sale.45
extrajudicially partition the lots among themselves, but no action was taken by them to
this end. It was only eleven (11) years later, on November 28, 1997 that a survey of the In the instant case, the titles to the subject lots were issued in respondents' names as co-
two lots was made33 and on February 10, 1998, a consolidation subdivision plan was owners in 1987—ten (10) years before the expropriation case was filed in 1997. As co-
approved by the Lands Management Service of the Department of Environment and owners, all that the respondents had was an ideal or abstract quota or proportionate
Natural Resources.34 The co-owners signed a Partition Agreement on February 24, share in the lots. This, however, did not mean that they could not separately exercise any
199835 and on May 21, 1998, TCT Nos. 63766 and 63767 were cancelled and new titles rights over the lots. Each respondent had the full ownership of his undivided interest in
issued in the names of the individual owners pursuant to the Partition Agreement. the property. He could freely sell or dispose of his interest independently of the other co-
owners. And this interest could have even been attached by his creditors.46 The partition
Petitioner argues that the consolidation of the subject lots and their partition was made in 1998, six (6) months after the filing of the expropriation case, terminated the co-
more than six (6) months after the complaint for expropriation was filed on August 4, ownership by converting into certain and definite parts the respective undivided shares of
1997, hence, the partition was made in bad faith, for the purpose of circumventing the the co-owners.47 The subject property is not a thing essentially indivisible. The rights of
provisions of R.A. 7279.36 the co-owners to have the property partitioned and their share in the same delivered to
them cannot be questioned for "[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-
ownership."48 The partition was merely a necessary incident of the co-ownership;49 and
At the time of filing of the complaint for expropriation, the lots subject of this case were
absent any evidence to the contrary, this partition is presumed to have been done in
owned in common by respondents; Under a co-ownership, the ownership of an undivided
good faith.
thing or right belongs to different persons.37During the existence of the co-ownership, no
individual can claim title to any definite portion of the community property until the
partition thereof; and prior to the partition, all that the co-owner has is an ideal or abstract Upon partition, four (4) co-owners, namely, Francisco, Thelma, Rodolfo and Antonio
Aguilar each had a share of 300 square meters under TCT Nos. 13849, 13852, 13850,
13851.50 Eusebio Aguilar's share was 347 square meters under TCT No. 1385351 while municipality of Las Piñas69 and the municipality of San Juan del Monte70 as having no
Virginia Aguilar's was 89 square meters under TCT No. 13854.52 real property registered for taxation in their individual names.
1âw phi 1.nêt

It is noted that Virginia Aguilar, although granted 89 square meters only of the subject Finally, this court notes that the subject lots are now in the possession of respondents.
lots, is, at the same time, the sole registered owner of TCT No. 59780, one of the three Antonio Aguilar testified that he and the other co-owners filed ejectment cases against
(3) titles initially sought to be expropriated in the original complaint. TCT No. 59780, with the occupants of the land before the Metropolitan Trial Court, Mandaluyong, Branches 59
a land area of 211 square meters, was dropped in the amended complaint. Eusebio and 60. Orders of eviction were issued and executed on September 17, 1997 which
Aguilar was granted 347 square meters, which is 47 square meters more than the resulted in the eviction of the tenants and other occupants from the land in question.71
maximum of 300 square meters set by R.A. 7279 for small property owners. In TCT No.
13853, Eusebio's title, however, appears the following annotation: IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the orders dated September 17. 1998
and December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 168, Pasig City in SCA No.
"... subject to x x x, and to the prov. of Sec. 4 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court with 1427 are AFFIRMED.
respect to the inheritance left by the deceased Eusebio N. Aguilar."53
SO ORDERED.
Eusebio died on March 23, 1995,54 and, according to Antonio's testimony, the former was
survived by five (5) children.55 Where there are several co-owners, and some of them --- xx END OF EXTINGUISHMENT OF ENCUMBRANCES xx ---
die, the heirs of those who die, with respect to that part belonging to the deceased,
become also co-owners of the property together with those who survive.56After Eusebio
died, his five heirs became co-owners of his 347 square-meter portion. Dividing the 347
square meters among the five entitled each heir to 69.4 square meters of the land
subject of litigation.

Consequently, the share of each co-owner did not exceed the 300 square meter limit set
in R.A. 7279. The second question, however, is whether the subject property is the only
real property of respondents for them to comply with the second requisite for small
property owners.

Antonio Aguilar testified that he and most of the original co-owners do not reside on the
subject property but in their ancestral home in Paco, Manila.57 Respondents therefore
appear to own real property other than the lots in litigation. Nonetheless, the records do
not show that the ancestral home in Paco, Manila and the land on which it stands are
owned by respondents or anyone of them. Petitioner did not present any title or proof of
this fact despite Antonio Aguilar's testimony.

On the other hand, respondents claim that the subject lots are their only real
property58 and that they, particularly two of the five heirs of Eusebio Aguilar, are merely
renting their houses and therefore do not own any other real property in Metro
Manila.59 To prove this, they submitted certifications from the offices of the City and
Municipal Assessors in Metro Manila attesting to the fact that they have no registered
real property declared for taxation purposes in the respective cities. Respondents were
certified by the City Assessor of Manila;60 Quezon City;61Makati City;62 Pasay
City;63 Paranaque;64 Caloocan City;65 Pasig City;66 Muntinlupa;67 Marikina;68 and the then
G.R. No. L-29727 December 14, 1988 The Oliverases stated in their complaint that possession of the disputed properties was
OLIVERAS vs. LOPEZ delivered to them with the knowledge and consent of the defendants; that they had been
paying the real estate taxes thereon; that prior to the sale, said properties were offered to
This case exemplifies the Filipino custom of keeping inherited property in a prolonged the other co-owners for sale but they refused to buy them; that on February 18, 1953, the
juridical condition of co-owner ship. transactions were duly annotated and entered in the Memorandum of encumbrances of
OCT No. 15262 as adverse claims; and that their desire to segregate the portions of Lot
Lorenzo Lopez owned Lot 4685 of the Cadastral survey of Villasis, Pangasinan with an 4685 sold to them was frustrated by defendants' adamant refusal to lend them the
area of 69,687 square meters as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 15262. 1 In owner's duplicate of OCT No. 15262 and to execute a deed of partition of the whole lot.
December, 1931, Lorenzo Lopez died, 2 leaving said property to his wife, Tomasa Ramos
and six (6) children. From that time on, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez did not initiate any moves In claiming moral damages in the amount of P2,000.00 plaintiffs alleged that defendants
to legally partition the property. also refused to allow them to survey and segregate the portions bought by them.
Plaintiffs prayed that the court order the defendants to partition Lot 4685 and to allow
More than twenty-one years later, or on February 11, 1953, Tomasa Ramos and her them to survey and segregate the portions they had purchased. They also demanded
eldest son, Candido Lopez, executed a deed of absolute sale of the "eastern undivided payment of P800.00 as attorney's fees and cost of the suit.
four thousand two hundred and fifty seven-square meters (4,257) more or less, of the
undivided portion of (their) interests, rights and participation" over Lot 4685, in favor of In their answer, the defendants alleged that no sale ever transpired as the alleged
the spouses Melecio Oliveras and Aniceta Minor, in consideration of the amount of one vendors could not have sold specific portions of the property; that plaintiffs' possession
thousand pesos (P1,000). 3 and occupation of specific portions of the properties being illegal, they could not ripen
into ownership; and that they were not under any obligation to lend their copy of the
On the same day, Tomasa and Candido executed another deed of absolute sale of the certificate of title or to accede to plaintiffs' request for the partition or settlement of the
"undivided" four thousand two hundred and fifty-seven (4,257) square meters of the property. As special and affirmative defenses, the defendants contended that the deeds
"eastern part" of Lot 4685 in favor of the spouses Pedro Oliveras and Teodora Gaspar, of sale were null and void and hence, unenforceable against them; that the complaint did
also in consideration of P1,000. 4 Each of the said documents bear the thumbmark of not state a cause of action and that the cause or causes of action if any, had prescribed.
Tomasa and the signature of Candido.
Defendants averred in their counterclaim that despite repeated demands, plaintiffs
In his affidavit also executed on February 11, 1953, Candido stated that a month prior to refused and failed to vacate the premises; that the properties occupied by the plaintiffs
the execution of the deed of sale in favor of Melecio Oliveras, he offered his: "undivided yielded an average net produce in palay and peanuts in the amount of P1,600.00
portion" of Lot 4685 to his "adjacent owners" but none of them was "in a position to annually, and that the complaint was filed to harass them. They prayed for the dismissal
purchase" said property. 5 of the complaint and the payment of P1,600.00 per year from 1953 until plaintiffs shall
have vacated the premises and P1,000.00 for attorney's fees.
Since the execution of the two deeds of absolute sale, the vendees, brothers Melecio
and Pedro, had been paying the real property taxes for their respectively purchased Plaintiffs filed an answer to defendants' counterclaim, denying all the allegations therein
properties. 6 They also had been in possession of their purchased properties which, being and stating that defendants never demanded that plaintiffs vacate the portions of Lot
planted to palay and peanuts, were segregated from the rest of Lot 4685 by dikes. 7 4685 they had bought.

More than thirteen years later or on November 21, 1966, the counsel of the Oliveras The lower court explored the possibility of an amicable settlement between the parties
brothers wrote the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez reminding them of the Oliverases' demands to without success. Hence, it set the case for trial and thereafter, it rendered a
partition the property so that they could acquire their respective titles thereto without decision 11 declaring valid the deeds of absolute sale 12 and ordering the defendants to allow
resorting to court action, and that, should they fail to respond, he would be forced to file a the segregation of the sold portions of Lot 4685 by a licensed surveyor in order that the
case in court. 8 Apparently, the Lopezes did not answer said letter since on December 15, plaintiffs could obtain their respective certificates of title over their portions of said lot.
1966, the Oliveras brothers and their wives filed a complaint for partition and damages 9 in
the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan.10 In resolving the case, the lower court passed upon the issue of whether the two deeds of
absolute sale were what they purported to be or merely mortgage documents. It
considered as indicia of plaintiffs' absolute dominion over the portions sold to them their In the instant case, the heirs of Lorenzo Lopez maintained the co-ownership for more
actual possession thereof without any opposition from the defendants until the filing of than twenty years. We hold that when Candido and his mother (who died before the filing
the complaint, their payment of taxes thereon and their having benefited from the of the complaint for partition) sold definite portions of Lot 4685, they validly exercised
produce of the land. The court ruled that the defendants' testimonial evidence that the dominion over them because, by operation of law, the co-ownership had ceased. The
deeds in question were merely mortgage documents cannot overcome the evidentiary filing of the complaint for partition by the Oliverases who, as vendees, are legally
value of the public instruments presented by the plaintiffs. considered as subrogated to the rights of Candido over portions of Lot 4685 in their
possession, 16 merely served to put a stamp of formality on Candido's otherwise
On the issue of whether the two deeds of absolute sale were null and void considering accomplished act of terminating the co-ownership.
that the land subject thereof had not yet been partitioned, the court observed that the
total area of 8,514 square meters sold to plaintiffs by Candido was less than his share The action for partition has not prescribed. Although the complaint was filed thirteen
should Lot 4685 with an area of 69,687 square meters be divided among the six children years from the execution of the deeds of sale and hence, as contended by the
of Lorenzo Lopez and their mother. In this connection, the lower court also found that defendants-appellants, prescription might have barred its filing under the general
during his lifetime, and before Candido got married, Lorenzo Lopez had divided Lot 4685 provision of Article 1144 (a) of the Civil Code, Article 494 specifically mandates that each
among his children who then took possession of their respective shares. * co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned in common insofar as
his share is concerned. Hence, considering the validity of the conveyances of portions of
The defendants appealed said decision to this Court contending that the lower court Lot 4685 in their favor and as subrogees of Candido Lopez, the Oliverases' action for
erred in declaring the two deeds of absolute sale as valid, in ordering the segregation of partition was timely and properly filed. 17
the sold portions of Lot 4685 to enable the plaintiffs to obtain their respective certificates
of title, and in not considering their defense of prescription. We cannot write finis to this decision without commenting on the compliance with the
resolution of September 1, 1986 of counsel for defendants-appellants. In said resolution,
The extrinsic validity of the two deeds of absolute sale is not in issue in this case in view the court required the parties to move in the premises "considering the length of time that
of the finding of the trial court that the defendants admittedly do not question their due this case has remained pending in this Court and to determine whether or not there
execution. 13 What should pre-occupy the Court is the intrinsic validity of said deeds insofar might be supervening events which may render the case moot and academic. 18 In his
as they pertain to sales of designated portions of an undivided, co-owned property. manifestation and motion dated August 12, 1987, said counsel informed the Court that he
had contacted the defendants-appellants whom he advised "to move in the premises which is
the land in question and to maintain the status quo with respect to their actual possession
In a long line of decisions, this Court has held that before the partition of a land or thing
thereon" and that he had left a copy of said resolution with the defendants-appellants" for
held in common, no individual co-owner can claim title to any definite portion thereof. All
their guidance in the compliance of their obligations (sic) as specified in said
that the co-owner has is an Ideal or abstract quota or proportionate share in the entire resolution." 19
land or thing. 14
Obviously, said counsel interpreted literally the Court's directive "to move in the
However, the duration of the juridical condition of co-ownership is not limitless. Under premises." For the enlightenment of said counsel and all others of similar perception, a
Article 494 and 1083 of the Civil Code, co-ownership of an estate should not exceed the "move in the premises" resolution is not a license to occupy or enter the premises
period of twenty (20) years. And, under the former article, any agreement to keep a thing subject of litigation especially in cases involving real property. A "move in the premises"
or property undivided should be for a ten-year period only. Where the parties stipulate a resolution simply means what is stated therein: the parties are obliged to inform the
definite period of in division which exceeds the maximum allowed by law, said stipulation Court of developments pertinent to the case which may be of help to the Court in its
shall be void only as to the period beyond such maximum. 15 immediate disposition.

Although the Civil Code is silent as to the effect of the in division of a property for more WHEREFORE, the decision of the lower court insofar as it declares the validity of the two
than twenty years, it would be contrary to public policy to sanction co-ownership beyond deeds of sale and directs the partition of Lot 4685, is AFFIRMED. The lower court is
the period set by the law. Otherwise, the 20-year limitation expressly mandated by the hereby ordered to facilitate with dispatch the preparation of a project of partition which it
Civil Code would be rendered meaningless. should thereafter approve. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.--- xxx END OF PARTITION OF CO-OWNERSHIP xxx ---

G.R. No. L-46296 September 24, 1991 2) Heirs of Juanita Delima, namely: Bibiano Bacus, Olimpio Bacus and
DELIMA vs. CA Purificacion Bacus (on-fourth);

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals reversing 3) Heirs of Eulalio Delima, namely Epitacio, Pagano, Fidel, Virgilio and
the trial court's judgment which declared as null and void the certificate of title in the Galileo Jr., all surnamed Delima (one-fourth); and
name of respondents' predecessor and which ordered the partition of the disputed lot
among the parties as co-owners. 4) The Heirs of Galileo Delima, namely Flaviana Vda. de Delima, Lily D.
Arias, Helen Niadas and Dionisio, Antonio, Eotu Irenea, and Fely, all
The antecedent facts of the case as found both by the respondent appellate court and by surnamed Delima (one-fourth).
the trial court are as follows:
Transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009 is declared null and void and the
During his lifetime, Lino Delima acquired Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar Register of Deeds of Cebu is ordered to cancel the same and issue in
Lands Estate in Cebu by sale on installments from the government. Lino Delima later lieu thereof another title with the above heirs as pro-indiviso owners.
died in 1921 leaving as his only heirs three brothers and a sister namely: Eulalio Delima,
Juanita Delima, Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima. After his death, TCT No. 2744 of the After the payment of taxes paid by Galileo Delima since 1958, the heirs
property in question was issued on August 3, 1953 in the name of the Legal Heirs of Lino of Galileo Delima are ordered to turn a over to the other heirs their
Delima, deceased, represented by Galileo Delima. respective shares of the fruits of the lot in question computed at P170.00
per year up to the present time with legal (interest).
On September 22, 1953, Galileo Delima, now substituted by respondents, executed an
affidavit of "Extra-judicial Declaration of Heirs." Based on this affidavit, TCT No. 2744 Within sixty (60) days from receipt of this decision the parties are ordered
was cancelled and TCT No. 3009 was issued on February 4,1954 in the name of Galileo to petition the lot in question and the defendants are directed to
Delima alone to the exclusion of the other heirs. immediately turn over possession of the shares here awarded to the
respective heirs.
Galileo Delima declared the lot in his name for taxation purposes and paid the taxes
thereon from 1954 to 1965. Defendants are condemned to pay the costs of the suit.

On February 29, 1968, petitioners, who are the surviving heirs of Eulalio and Juanita The counterclaim is dismissed.
Delima, filed with the Court of First Instance of Cebu (now Regional Trial Court) an action
for reconveyance and/or partition of property and for the annulment of TCT No. 3009 with SO ORDERED. (pp. 54-55, Rollo)
damages against their uncles Galileo Delima and Vicente Delima,. Vicente Delima was
joined as party defendant by the petitioners for his refusal to join the latter in their action.
Not satisfied with the decision, respondents appealed to the Court of Appeals. On May
19, 1977, respondent appellate court reversed the trial court's decision and upheld the
On January 16, 1970, the trial court rendered a decision in favor of petitioners, the claim of Galileo Delima that all the other brothers and sister of Lino Delima, namely
dispositive portion of which states: Eulalio, Juanita and Vicente, had already relinquished and waived their rights to the
property in his favor, considering that he (Galileo Delima) alone paid the remaining
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the following are balance of the purchase price of the lot and the realty taxes thereon (p. 26, Rollo).
the declared owners of Lot No. 7758 of the Talisay-Minglanilla Friar
Lands Estate presently covered by transfer Certificate of Title No. 3009, Hence, this petition was filed with the petitioners alleging that the Court of Appeals erred:
each sharing a pro-indiviso share of one-fourth;
1) In not holding that the right of a co-heir to demand partition of
1) Vicente Delima (one-fourth) inheritance is imprescriptible. If it does, the defenses of prescription and
laches have already been waived.
 2) In disregarding the evidence of the petitioners.(p.13, Rollo) one of the co-owners has adversely possessed the property as exclusive owner for a
period sufficient to vest ownership by prescription.
The issue to be resolved in the instant case is whether or not petitioners' action for
partition is already barred by the statutory period provided by law which shall enable It is settled that possession by a co-owner or co-heir is that of a trustee. In order that
Galileo Delima to perfect his claim of ownership by acquisitive prescription to the such possession is considered adverse to the cestui que trust amounting to a repudiation
exclusion of petitioners from their shares in the disputed property. Article 494 of the Civil of the co-ownership, the following elements must concur: 1) that the trustee has
Code expressly provides: performed unequivocal acts amounting to an ouster of the cestui que trust; 2) that such
positive acts of repudiation had been made known to the cestui que trust; and 3) that the
Art. 494. No co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership. evidence thereon should be clear and conclusive (Valdez v. Olorga, No. L-22571, May
Each co-owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing owned 25, 1973, 51 SCRA 71; Pangan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-39299, October 18, 1988, 166
in common, insofar as his share is concerned. SCRA 375).

Nevertheless, an agreement to keep the thing undivided for a certain We have held that when a co-owner of the property in question executed a deed of
period of time, not exceeding ten years, shall be valid. This term may be partition and on the strength thereof obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of
extended by a new agreement. their predecessor and the issuance of a new one wherein he appears as the new owner
of the property, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership of the other co-
A donor or testator may prohibit partition for a period which shall not owners over their shares, the statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the
exceed twenty years. action instituted by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership
and of their rights thereunder (Castillo v. Court of Appeals, No. L-18046, March 31, 1964,
10 SCRA 549). Since an action for reconveyance of land based on implied or
Neither shall there be any partition when it is prohibited by law.
constructive trust prescribes after ten (10) years, it is from the date of the issuance of
such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the statute of
No prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner or co-heir against his co- limitations is counted (Jaramil v. Court of Appeals, No. L-31858, August 31, 1977, 78
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the SCRA 420).
co-ownership.
Evidence shows that TCT No. 2744 in the name of the legal heirs of Lino Delima,
As a rule, possession by a co-owner will not be presumed to be adverse to the others, represented by Galileo Delima, was cancelled by virtue of an affidavit executed by
but will be held to benefit all. It is understood that the co-owner or co-heir who is in Galileo Delima and that on February 4, 1954, Galileo Delima obtained the issuance of a
possession of an inheritance pro-indiviso for himself and in representation of his co- new title in Ms name numbered TCT No. 3009 to the exclusion of his co-heirs. The
owners or co-heirs, if, as such owner, he administers or takes care of the rest thereof issuance of this new title constituted an open and clear repudiation of the trust or co-
with the obligation of delivering it to his co-owners or co-heirs, is under the same ownership, and the lapse of ten (10) years of adverse possession by Galileo Delima from
situation as a depository, a lessee or a trustee (Bargayo v. Camumot, 40 Phil, 857; February 4, 1954 was sufficient to vest title in him by prescription. As the certificate of
Segura v. Segura, No. L-29320, September 19, 1988, 165 SCRA 368). Thus, an action title was notice to the whole world of his exclusive title to the land, such rejection was
to compel partition may be filed at any time by any of the co-owners against the actual binding on the other heirs and started as against them the period of prescription. Hence,
possessor. In other words, no prescription shall run in favor of a co-owner against his co- when petitioners filed their action for reconveyance and/or to compel partition on
owners or co-heirs so long as he expressly or impliedly recognizes the co-ownership (Del February 29, 1968, such action was already barred by prescription. Whatever claims the
Blanco v. Intermediate Appellate Court, No. 72694, December 1, 1987, 156 SCRA 55). other co-heirs could have validly asserted before can no longer be invoked by them at
this time.
However, from the moment one of the co-owners claims that he is the absolute and
exclusive owner of the properties and denies the others any share therein, the question ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of
involved is no longer one of partition but of ownership (De Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23; Appeals dated May 19, 1977 is AFFIRMED.
Bargayo v. Camumot, supra; De los Santos v. Santa Teresa, 44 Phil. 811). In such case,
the imprescriptibility of the action for partition can no longer be invoked or applied when
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-57062 January 24, 1992 163 together with Lots Nos. 669, 1346 and 154 were owned by their common father,
MARIATEGUI vs. CA Lupo Mariategui, and that, with the adjudication of Lot No. 163 to their co-heirs, they
(children of the third marriage) were deprived of their respective shares in the lots.
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision * of the Court of Appeals dated Plaintiffs pray for partition of the estate of their deceased father and annulment of the
December 24, 1980 in CA-G.R. No. 61841, entitled "Jacinto Mariategui, et al. v. Maria deed of extrajudicial partition dated December 2, 1967 (Petition, Rollo, p. 10). Cresencia
del Rosario Mariategui, et al.," reversing the judgment of the then Court of First Instance Mariategui Abas, Flaviana Mariategui Cabrera and Isabel Santos were impleaded in the
of Rizal, Branch VIII ** at Pasig, Metro Manila. complaint as unwilling defendants as they would not like to join the suit as plaintiffs
although they acknowledged the status and rights of the plaintiffs and agreed to the
The undisputed facts are as follows: partition of the parcels of land as well as the accounting of their fruits (Ibid., Rollo, p. 8;
Record on Appeal, p. 4).
Lupo Mariategui died without a will on June 26, 1953 (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp.
116; 8). During his lifetime, Lupo Mariategui contracted three (3) marriages. With his first The defendants (now petitioners) filed an answer with counterclaim (Amended Record on
wife, Eusebia Montellano, who died on November 8, 1904, he begot four (4) children, Appeal, p. 13). Thereafter, they filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause
namely: Baldomera, Maria del Rosario, Urbana and Ireneo. Baldomera died and was of action and prescription. They specifically contended that the complaint was one for
survived by her children named Antero, Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and recognition of natural children. On August 14, 1974, the motion to dismiss was denied by
Federico, all surnamed Espina. Ireneo also died and left a son named Ruperto. With his the trial court, in an order the dispositive portion of which reads:
second wife, Flaviana Montellano, he begot a daughter named Cresenciana who was
born on May 8, 1910 (Rollo, Annex "A", p. 36). It is therefore the opinion of the Court that Articles 278 and 285 of the
Civil Code cited by counsel for the defendants are of erroneous
Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco (Lupo's third wife) got married sometime in 1930. application to this case. The motion to dismiss is therefore denied for lack
They had three children, namely: Jacinto, born on July 3, 1929, Julian, born on February of merit.
16, 1931 and Paulina, born on April 19, 1938. Felipa Velasco Mariategui died in 1941
(Rollo, Ibid). SO ORDERED. (Ibid, p. 37).

At the time of his death, Lupo Mariategui left certain properties which he acquired when However, on February 16, 1977, the complaint as well as petitioners' counterclaim were
he was still unmarried (Brief for respondents, Rollo, pp. 116; 4). These properties are dismissed by the trial court, in its decision stating thus:
described in the complaint as Lots Nos. 163, 66, 1346 and 156 of the Muntinglupa Estate
(Rollo, Annex "A", p. 39). The plaintiffs' right to inherit depends upon the acknowledgment or
recognition of their continuous enjoyment and possession of status of
On December 2, 1967, Lupo's descendants by his first and second marriages, namely, children of their supposed father. The evidence fails to sustain either
Maria del Rosario, Urbana, Ruperto, Cresencia, all surnamed Mariategui and Antero, premise, and it is clear that this action cannot be sustained. (Ibid, Rollo,
Rufina, Catalino, Maria, Gerardo, Virginia and Federico, all surnamed Espina, executed pp. 67-68)
a deed of extrajudicial partition whereby they adjudicated unto themselves Lot No. 163 of
the Muntinglupa Estate. Thereafter, Lot No. 163 was the subject of a voluntary The plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals on the ground that the trial court
registration proceedings filed by the adjudicatees under Act No. 496, and the land committed an error ". . . in not finding that the parents of the appellants, Lupo Mariategui
registration court issued a decree ordering the registration of the lot. Thus, on April 1, and Felipa Velasco (were) lawfully married, and in holding (that) they (appellants) are not
1971, OCT No. 8828 was issued in the name of the above-mentioned heirs. legitimate children of their said parents, thereby divesting them of their inheritance . . . "
Subsequently, the registered owners caused the subdivision of the said lot into Lots Nos. (Rollo, pp. 14-15).
163-A to 163-H, for which separate transfer certificates of title were issued to the
respective parties (Rollo, ibid). On December 24, 1980, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision declaring all the
children and descendants of Lupo Mariategui, including appellants Jacinto, Julian and
On April 23, 1973, Lupo's children by his third marriage with Felipa Velasco (Jacinto, Paulina (children of the third marriage) as entitled to equal shares in the estate of Lupo
Julian and Paulina) filed with the lower court an amended complaint claiming that Lot No. Mariategui; directing the adjudicatees in the extrajudicial partition of real properties who
eventually acquired transfer certificates of title thereto, to execute deeds of With respect to the legal basis of private respondents' demand for partition of the estate
reconveyance in favor, and for the shares, of Jacinto, Julian and Paulina provided rights of Lupo Mariategui, the Court of Appeals aptly held that the private respondents are
of innocent third persons are not prejudiced otherwise the said adjudicatees shall legitimate children of the deceased.
reimburse the said heirs the fair market value of their shares; and directing all the parties
to submit to the lower court a project of partition in the net estate of Lupo Mariategui after Lupo Mariategui and Felipa Velasco were alleged to have been lawfully married in or
payment of taxes, other government charges and outstanding legal obligations. about 1930. This fact is based on the declaration communicated by Lupo Mariategui to
Jacinto who testified that "when (his) father was still living, he was able to mention to
The defendants-appellees filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision but it was (him) that he and (his) mother were able to get married before a Justice of the Peace of
denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition which was given due course by the court on Taguig, Rizal." The spouses deported themselves as husband and wife, and were known
December 7, 1981. in the community to be such. Although no marriage certificate was introduced to this
effect, no evidence was likewise offered to controvert these facts. Moreover, the mere
The petitioners submit to the Court the following issues: (a) whether or not prescription fact that no record of the marriage exists does not invalidate the marriage, provided all
barred private respondents' right to demand the partition of the estate of Lupo requisites for its validity are present (People vs. Borromeo, 133 SCRA 106 [1984]).
Mariategui, and (b) whether or not the private respondents, who belatedly filed the action
for recognition, were able to prove their successional rights over said estate. The Under these circumstances, a marriage may be presumed to have taken place between
resolution of these issues hinges, however, on the resolution of the preliminary Lupo and Felipa. The laws presume that a man and a woman, deporting themselves as
matter, i.e., the nature of the complaint filed by the private respondents. husband and wife, have entered into a lawful contract of marriage; that a child born in
lawful wedlock, there being no divorce, absolute or from bed and board is legitimate; and
The complaint alleged, among other things, that "plaintiffs are the children of the that things have happened according to the ordinary course of nature and the ordinary
deceased spouses Lupo Mariategui . . . and Felipa Velasco"; that "during his lifetime, habits of life (Section 5 (z), (bb), (cc), Rule 131, Rules of Court; Corpus v. Corpus, 85
Lupo Mariategui had repeatedly acknowledged and confirmed plaintiffs as his children SCRA 567 [1978]; Saurnaba v. Workmen's Compensation, 85 SCRA 502 [1978];
and the latter, in turn, have continuously enjoyed such status since their birth"; and "on Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]; Reyes v. Court of Appeals,
the basis of their relationship to the deceased Lupo Mariategui and in accordance with 135 SCRA 439 [1985]).
the law on intestate succession, plaintiffs are entitled to inherit shares in the foregoing
estate (Record on Appeal, pp. 5 & 6). It prayed, among others, that plaintiffs be declared Courts look upon the presumption of marriage with great favor as it is founded on the
as children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and adjudication in favor of plaintiffs their lawful following rationale:
shares in the estate of the decedent (Ibid, p. 10).
The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of
A perusal of the entire allegations of the complaint, however, shows that the action is marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a
principally one of partition. The allegation with respect to the status of the private new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is
respondents was raised only collaterally to assert their rights in the estate of the deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans
deceased. Hence, the Court of Appeals correctly adopted the settled rule that the nature toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent
of an action filed in court is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint constituting matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counterpresumption or
the cause of action (Republic vs. Estenzo, 158 SCRA 282 [1988]). evidence special to that case, to be in fact married. The reason is that
such is the common order of society and if the parties were not what they
It has been held that, if the relief demanded is not the proper one which may be granted thus hold themselves out as being, they would be living in the constant
under the law, it does not characterize or determine the nature of plaintiffs' action, and violation of decency and of
the relief to which plaintiff is entitled based on the facts alleged by him in his complaint, law . . . (Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 56 [1922] quoted in
although it is not the relief demanded, is what determines the nature of the action (1 Alavado vs. City Government of Tacloban, 139 SCRA 230 [1985]).
Moran, p. 127, 1979 ed., citing Baguioro vs. Barrios, et al., 77 Phil. 120).
So much so that once a man and a woman have lived as husband and wife and such
relationship is not denied nor contradicted, the presumption of their being married must
be admitted as a fact (Alavado v. City Gov't. of Tacloban, supra).
The Civil Code provides for the manner under which legitimate filiation may be proven. owners (Mariano vs. De Vega, 148 SCRA 342 [1987]). Furthermore, an action to
However, considering the effectivity of the Family Code of the Philippines, the case at demand partition is imprescriptible and cannot be barred by laches (Del Banco vs. IAC,
bar must be decided under a new if not entirely dissimilar set of rules because the parties 156 SCRA 55 [1987]). On the other hand, an action for partition may be seen to be at
have been overtaken by events, to use the popular phrase (Uyguangco vs. Court of once an action for declaration of co-ownership and for segregation and conveyance of a
Appeals, G.R. No. 76873, October 26, 1989). Thus, under Title VI of the Family Code, determinate portion of the property involved (Roque vs. IAC, 165 SCRA 118 [1988]).
there are only two classes of children — legitimate and illegitimate. The fine distinctions
among various types of illegitimate children have been eliminated (Castro vs. Court of Petitioners contend that they have repudiated the co-ownership when they executed the
Appeals, 173 SCRA 656 [1989]). extrajudicial partition excluding the private respondents and registered the properties in
their own names (Petition, p. 16; Rollo, p. 20). However, no valid repudiation was made
Article 172 of the said Code provides that the filiation of legitimate children may be by petitioners to the prejudice of private respondents. Assuming petitioners' registration
established by the record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment or by of the subject lot in 1971 was an act of repudiation of the co-ownership, prescription had
the open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. not yet set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present action for partition
(Ceniza vs. C.A., 181 SCRA 552 [1990]).
Evidence on record proves the legitimate filiation of the private respondents. Jacinto's
birth certificate is a record of birth referred to in the said article. Again, no evidence which In their complaint, private respondents averred that in spite of their demands, petitioners,
tends to disprove facts contained therein was adduced before the lower court. In the except the unwilling defendants in the lower court, failed and refused to acknowledge
case of the two other private respondents, Julian and Paulina, they may not have and convey their lawful shares in the estate of their father (Record on Appeal, p. 6). This
presented in evidence any of the documents required by Article 172 but they allegation, though denied by the petitioners in their answer (Ibid, p. 14), was never
continuously enjoyed the status of children of Lupo Mariategui in the same manner as successfully refuted by them. Put differently, in spite of petitioners' undisputed
their brother Jacinto. knowledge of their relationship to private respondents who are therefore their co-heirs,
petitioners fraudulently withheld private respondent's share in the estate of Lupo
While the trial court found Jacinto's testimonies to be inconsequential and lacking in Mariategui. According to respondent Jacinto, since 1962, he had been inquiring from
substance as to certain dates and names of relatives with whom their family resided, petitioner Maria del Rosario about their (respondents) share in the property left by their
these are but minor details. The nagging fact is that for a considerable length of time and deceased father and had been assured by the latter (Maria del Rosario) not to worry
despite the death of Felipa in 1941, the private respondents and Lupo lived together until because they will get some shares. As a matter of fact, sometime in 1969, Jacinto
Lupo's death in 1953. It should be noted that even the trial court mentioned in its constructed a house where he now resides on Lot No. 163 without any complaint from
decision the admission made in the affidavit of Cresenciana Mariategui Abas, one of the petitioners.
petitioners herein, that " . . . Jacinto, Julian and Paulina Mariategui ay pawang mga
kapatid ko sa Petitioners' registration of the properties in their names in 1971 did not operate as a valid
ama . . ." (Exh. M, Record on Appeal, pp. 65-66). repudiation of the co-ownership. In Adille vs. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 455, 461-462
[1988]), the Court held:
In view of the foregoing, there can be no other conclusion than that private respondents
are legitimate children and heirs of Lupo Mariategui and therefore, the time limitation Prescription, as a mode of terminating a relation of co-ownership, must
prescribed in Article 285 for filing an action for recognition is inapplicable to this case. have been preceded by repudiation (of the co-ownership). The act of
Corollarily, prescription does not run against private respondents with respect to the filing repudiation, in turn, is subject to certain conditions: (1) a co-owner
of the action for partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription is invoked, repudiates the co-ownership; (2) such an act of repudiation is clearly
have not expressly or impliedly repudiated the co-ownership. In other words, prescription made known to the other co-owners; (3) the evidence thereon is clear
of an action for partition does not lie except when the co-ownership is properly and conclusive; and (4) he has been in possession through open,
repudiated by the co-owner (Del Banco vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 156 SCRA 55 continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession of the property for the
[1987] citing Jardin vs. Hollasco, 117 SCRA 532 [1982]). period required by law.

Otherwise stated, a co-owner cannot acquire by prescription the share of the other co- xxx xxx xxx
owners absent a clear repudiation of co-ownership duly communicated to the other co-
 It is true that registration under the Torrens system is constructive notice
of title, but it has likewise been our holding that the Torrens title does not
furnish shield for fraud. It is therefore no argument to say that the act of
registration is equivalent to notice of repudiation, assuming there was
one, notwithstanding the long-standing rule that registration operates as
a universal notice of title.

Inasmuch as petitioners registered the properties in their names in fraud of their co-heirs
prescription can only be deemed to have commenced from the time private respondents
discovered the petitioners' act of defraudation (Adille vs. Court of Appeals, supra).
Hence, prescription definitely may not be invoked by petitioners because private
respondents commenced the instant action barely two months after learning that
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 24, 1980 is Affirmed.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 109910 April 5, 1995 from the lots and for moral and exemplary damages, attorney's fees, expenses of the
SALVADOR vs. CA litigation, and costs of the suit.

Assailed in this petition is the legal determination made by the Court of Appeals on the The two cases were consolidated and jointly heard by Branch 5 of the Court of First
issues of which portion of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 formed part of the conjugal Instance of Cagayan de Oro City.
assets of the spouses Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo, and of whether or not the rights
of Pastor's co-heirs in the estate of Maria Yabo were extinguished through prescription or By evidence, Pastor, Makibalo sought to prove the following allegations:
laches.
He was married to Maria Yabo who died on 17 March 1962. 4 In August 1949, Jose and
Alipio Yabo was the owner of Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. 6180 situated in Barrio Bulua, Victoriano, both surnamed Yabo, sold their respective shares in the disputed lots to one
Cagayan de Oro City, containing an area of 1,267 and 3,816 square meters, Pedro Ebarat, and in 1952 the latter sold both shares to Pastor Makibalo. 5 Ebarat formalized
respectively. Title thereto devolved upon his nine children, namely, Victoriano, Procopio, this conveyance by executing an Affidavit of Waiver and Quitclaim dated 30 May 1969 in
Lope, Jose, Pelagia, Baseliza, Francisca, Maria, and Gaudencia, upon his death favor of Pastor. 6
sometime before or during the second world war.
On 16 January 1951, the heirs of the late Lope Yabo sold Lope's shares in the litigated
On 28 April 1976, Pastor Makibalo, who is the husband of Maria Yabo, one of Alipio's properties to one Dominador Canomon, 7 who, in turn, sold the same to Pastor. 8 Canomon
children, filed with the then Court of First Instance of Misamis Oriental a complaint, afterwards executed an Affidavit of Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of the latter. 9
docketed as Civil Case No. 5000, against the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo for
"Quieting of Title, Annulment of Documents, and Damages." In the complaint, he alleged Pastor Makibalo likewise purchased the shares of Baseliza in the two lots in 1942, of
that he owned a total of eight shares of the subject lots, having purchased the shares of Procopio in 1957, of Francisca in 1958, and of Pelagia in 1967. The only share he did not
seven of Alipio's children and inherited the share of his wife, Maria, and that except for buy was that of Gaudencia. After every purchase, he took possession of the portions
the portion corresponding to Gaudencia's share which he did not buy, he occupied, bought and harvested the products thereof. 10
cultivated, and possessed continuously, openly, peacefully, and exclusively the two
parcels of land. He then prayed that he be declared the absolute owner of 8/9 of the lots In 1966, Pastor sold back to Alberto a portion of Lot No. 6180 which was formerly the
in question. 1 share of Alberto's father, Procopio. 11

On 8 October 1976, the grandchildren and great-grandchildren of the late Alipio In December 1968, Pastor mortgaged the two lots to the spouses Eulogio and Remedios
Yabo 2 lodged with the same court a complaint for partition and quieting of title with Salvador. 12 On 26 September 1978, he executed a document denominated as a
damages, 3 docketed as Civil Case No. 5174, against Pastor Makibalo, Enecia Cristal, and "Confirmation and Quitclaim" whereby he waived all his rights, interests, and participation in
the spouses Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. They alleged that Lot No. 6080 and Lot No. the lots in favor of the Salvador spouses. 13
6180 are the common property of the heirs of Alipio Yabo, namely, the plaintiffs, defendant
Enecia Cristal, Maria Yabo and Jose Yabo, whose share had been sold to Alberto Yabo; that
On the other hand, by their evidence, l4 the spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo tried to prove that they had
after Alipio's death, the spouses Pastor and Maria Makibalo, Enecia Cristal and Jose Yabo repurchased from Pastor Makibalo the share of Procopio, which was previously sold to Pastor, and had bought the shares of
became the de facto administrators of the said properties; and that much to their surprise, Jose and Maria. 15
they discovered that the Salvador spouses, who were strangers to the family, have been
harvesting coconuts from the lots, which act as a cloud on the plaintiffs' title over the lots. Filoteo Yabo denied having sold the share of his father, Lope Yabo, in the contested lots
and disowned his signature and those of his mother, brothers, and sisters appearing at
The plaintiffs then prayed that (a) they, as well as defendant Pastor Makibalo, in the back of Exhibit "C". 16
representation of his wife, and Enecia Cristal, in representation of Gaudencia, be
declared as the owners of the lots; (b) the Salvador spouses be declared as having no Ignacio Yabo testified that his father, Victoriano Yabo, did not know how to write and sign
rights thereto except as possible assignees of their co-defendants, Pastor Makibalo and his name. He further declared that he had no knowledge that his father affixed his
Enecia Cristal; (c) the lots be partitioned according to law among the aforementioned co- thumbmark in the document marked as Exhibit "A" purporting to alienate his father's
owners; and (d) the defendants be made to pay for the value of the fruits they harvested share in the disputed lots. l7
On 15 January 1983, the trial court rendered its decision 18 holding as follows: claim of Filoteo Yabo that the signatures appearing in Exh. C are not his
and those of his brothers and sisters are of no avail, for if they were not
Assuming that the thumbmark on the typewritten name "Jose Yabo" in the ones who affixed those signatures and so they did not sell the shares
Exh. 3 was that of Jose Yabo, Alberto Yabo and Elpia R. Yabo of their father Lope Yabo, why did they not then take possession of said
purchased the share of Jose Yabo in bad faith because they knew before shares — they remained silent from 1951 to September 16, 1976 a
and up to the execution of Exh. 3 on October 24, 1972 that Jose Yabo period of 25 years. They are now [e]stopped by laches.
was no longer the owner of that area because from the documents she
borrowed from Mrs. Salvador they came to know that Jose Yabo had sold And as regards the shares of Baseliza, Francisca and Pelagia, there is
his shares to Pedro Ebarat, and they have seen that Pastor Makibalo has no evidence presented to effectively rebut the testimony of Pastor
been in possession of those shares together with the seven others Makibalo that he acquired the shares of Baseliza Yabo in 1942 by
exclusively as owner, he having mortgaged them to Mrs. Salvador. changing it with a buffalo; that he bought the shares of Francisca Yabo in
1958 and that he bought the shares of Pelagia Yabo in 1967; Pastor
As Jose Yabo was no longer the owner of the one-ninth (1/9) shares Makibalo had been in possession of these shares from the time he
which he sold to Alberto Yabo and Elpia Yabo under Exh. 3, the sale is acquired them, continuously, adversely, openly, and peacefully, as owner
null and void, and Alberto and Elpia acquired nothing because Jose Yabo up to the time he sold his rights and interest therein to the spouses
had no more title, right or interest to dispose of. Eulogio and Remedies Salvador. The heirs of Baseliza, Francisca and
Pelagia have not taken any step to protect their rights over those shares
... for over 40 years in the case of Baseliza's share, for about 20 years in
the case of Francisca's share, and for more than 10 years in the case of
Pelagia's share. Laches, likewise has rendered their rights stale.
Pastor Makibalo had been in possession of Jose Yabo's share since
1949 after purchasing it from Ebarat, and has been in possession thereof
up to September 26, 1978 when he sold it to the spouses Eulogio On March 10, 1966 Pastor Makibalo sold back to Alberto Yabo the share
Salvador and Remedios Salvador, who are now in possession of the of Procopio Yabo in Lot 6180 (Exh. 1 and 2), but there is nothing to show
same. that. Pastor Makibalo also sold back Procopio's share in Lot 6080.

Exh. A, evidencing the sale of Victoriano Yabo's share to Pedro Ebarat So then, by purchase, Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo acquired the
was identified by the latter who testified that he sold it to Pastor Makibalo shares of Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Procopio and Francisca, or
in 1951. Exh. A is an ancient document — 1949 when the document six (6) shares from Lots 6080 and 6180. These belonged to the conjugal
came to existence up to now is more than 30 years, and the document partnership of Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo. Maria Yabo had also a
had been in the possession of Pastor Makibalo, then Remedios Salvador share from Lots 6080 and 6180, and Pastor Makibalo acquired the
who had interest in its preservation. shares of Pelagia Yabo in both Lots 6080 and 6180. All in all; Pastor
Makibalo acquired eight shares in both Lot 6080 and 6180.
As regards the shares of Lope Yabo, the same had been sold by his
surviving spouse Juana Legaspi, and his children Filoteo, Andresa, While Maria Yabo died on March 17, 1962, and so one-fourth (1/4) of the
Jovita, Bonifacio, and Rundino for P105.00 on January 16, 1951 to shares of Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, and Francisca, or one-fourth
Dominador Conomon (Exh. C and C-1), who in turn sold it to Pastor of five-ninth (5/9) of both lots and one-fourth (1/4) of Lot 6080 should go
Makibalo in 1952, executing a formal Deed of Waiver and Quitclaim on to the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo by virtue of the
May 30, 1969 provisions of Article 1001 of the New Civil Code, the latter have lost their
(Exh. D). rights thereto by laches for their inaction for a very long period and their
rights have become stale. On the other hand, Pastor Makibalo who had
been in possession of the whole of the eight shares in both Lots 6080
Exh. C is an ancient document, being more than 30 years old and has
and 6180, enjoying the fruits thereof exclusively, uninterruptedly, publicly,
been in the possession of Pastor Makibalo and then the spouses Eulogio
peacefully, and continuously from the death of Maria Yabo up to the filing
and Remedios Salvador — who had an interest in its preservation. The
of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 on October 8, 1976, or a period of
 14 years, had acquired title to the whole of the eight shares in Lot 6080 and to her conjugal share in the portions acquired from her brothers and sisters; and (c)
and seven shares in Lot 6180 (the share of Procopio in Lot 6180 had Procopio never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to Pastor Makibalo. More specifically it stated:
been sold back to Alberto Yabo).
Exh. E is the document found by the lower court to be a falsification. This
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered finding appellants do not dispute and have not raised an error.
finding Pastor Makibalo, now Eulogio Salvador and Remedios Salvador
the owner of eight (8) shares, equivalent to eight-ninth (8/9) of Lot No. ...
6080, and of seven (7) shares, equivalent to seven-ninth (7/9) of Lot No.
6180, and therefore, ordering the partition of Lot 6080 so that the one- While acknowledging. that upon the death of Maria Yabo on March 17,
ninth (1/9) alloted to Gaudencia Yabo will go to her heirs or their assigns, 1962, one-half (1/2) of the share of Maria Yabo in Lots 6080 and 6180
and the remaining eight-ninth (8/9) will go to the spouses Eulogio and one-half (1/2) of Maria Yabo's conjugal share in the portions bought
Salvador and Remedios Salvador, as successor of Pastor Makibalo, and from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and Francisca should go to
the partition of Lot 6180 so that the seven-ninth (7/9) portion which the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria in accordance with Article
formerly belonged to Baseliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Maria, Francisca, 1001 of the Civil Code, the lower court rule that said children have lost
and Pelagia will go to the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador, the their rights by laches "for their inaction for a very long period and their
one-ninth (1/9) which formerly belonged to Procopio, will go to Alberto rights have become stale" (Decision, p. 16; Record, Vol. 2, p. 158).
Yabo, and the remaining one-ninth (1/9) which formerly belonged to
Gaudencia, will go to Gaudencia's heirs or their assigns. Appellants in their second assignment of error aver that this is an error.

Doc. No. 720, recorded on page 28 of Notarial Register No. VII, and We agree that the lower court erred.
acknowledged before Notary Public Isidro S. Baculio (Exh. E)
[purportedly executed by Maria Yabo and Pastor Makibalo] is hereby
While between March 17, 1962 when Maria Yabo died and October 8,
declared null and void, and so the Office of the City Fiscal is directed to
1976, when Civil Case No. 5174 for partition was filed, was a period of
cause an investigation of this matter to find out the person or persons
more than fourteen (14) years, that alone to our mind would not suffice to
responsible for the falsification of the said document, and if the evidence
establish laches or prescription. Upon the death of Maria Yabo, appellee
warrants, to file the corresponding criminal action in court. The Office of
Pastor Makibalo and appellants and the other children of the brothers
the City Assessor of Cagayan de Oro City is, likewise, directed to cause
and sisters of Maria, by operation of law become co-owners of the one-
the cancellation of Tax Declarations Nos. 33553, marked as Exh. H-3,
ninth (1/9) share of Maria as heir of her father Alipio and the conjugal
33557, marked as Exh. H-2, both in the name of Alberto Yabo, for having
share of Maria in the portions acquired from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose,
been issued on the basis of a falsified document. Let copies of this
Lope, Pelagia and Francisca. Time alone is not a decisive factor.
decision be furnished the Offices of the City Fiscal and City Assessor,
Appellee Pastor Makibalo, it must be remembered, is the husband of
both of Cagayan de Oro City.
Maria and, therefore, an uncle in-law of appellants. In our culture, a
demand by an heir or heirs for partition immediately upon the death of a
No pronouncement as to damages, attorney's fees and costs. relative is more often taken not as a legitimate assertion of a right but of
something else, like greed. It must also be noted that the spouses, the
SO ORDERED. 19 appellee Pastor Makibalo and his deceased wife Maria, were childless
and, therefore, appellants and the other children of the brothers and
The defendants in Civil Case No. 5000 and the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. 5174 appealed sisters of Maria must have felt that at any rate the property would go to
from the decision to the Court of Appeals on 19 August 1983. 20 them in the course of time. This probably explains why appellants started
asserting their right over the property only after appellee Pastor Makibalo
In its decision of 3 February 1993, 21 the Court of Appeals held that (a) Maria Yabo did not sold the same to the spouses Eulogio and Remedios Salvador. Besides,
sell her share to Alberto and Elpia Yabo; (b) prescription and laches have not run against the Lots 6080 and 6180 have a combined area only of 5,083 square meters
private respondents with respect to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and before the development of Northern Mindanao, and even in 1962
when Maria Yabo died, were not that valuable. This is shown by the fact point, since the latter merely bought back what was previously sold, his
that each heir sold his other share only for P110.00. father's share in Lot 6180. 22

As we have said not time alone. In the early case of Cortes v. Oliva, 33 The respondent court then concluded and held as follows:
Phil. 480, it was held that"(o)rdinarily, possession by one joint owner will
not be presumed to be adverse to the others, but will, as a rule, be held In summary, appellee Pastor Makibalo and his assigns, the spouses
to be for the benefit of all. Much stronger evidence is required to show an Eulogio and Remedios Salvador, are entitled only to one-half (½) of the
adverse holding by one of several joint owners than by a stranger; and in one-ninth (1/9) share of Maria and three-fourths (3/4) of the six-ninth (6/9)
such cases, to sustain a plea of prescription, it must always clearly shares acquired from Basiliza, Victoriano, Jose, Lope, Pelagia and
appear that one who was originally a joint owner has repudiated the Francisca. Accordingly, the partition should be done as follows:
claims of his co-owners, and that his co-owners were apprised or should
have been apprised of his claim of adverse and exclusive ownership (1) 1/9 of Lots 6080 end 6180 should be given to the heirs
before the alleged prescription began to run (at page 484). This ruling on of Gaudencia Yabo or their successors and assigns;
prescription should apply with equal force to laches.
(2) 1/9 of Lot 6180 should go to Alberto Yabo and his wife
The third assignment of error challenges the finding of the lower court Elpia Yabo;
that "there is nothing to show that Pastor Makibalo also sold back
Procopio's share in Lot 6080" (Decision, p. 16; Records, Vol. 2,p. 158).
(3) 1/9 of Lot 6080 should be given to the heirs of
Procopio Yabo and their successors end assigns,
Exhibits 1 and 2 cover only Procopio's share in Lot 6180. In other words, including Alberto Yabo;
Exhibits 1 and. 2 conveyed back to Alberto Yabo only his father,
Procopio's share in Lot 6180.
(4) The 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in Lots 6080 and 6180
should be partitioned: One-half (1/2) for the surviving
There is indeed no evidence that Pastor Makibalo also sold back to spouse Pastor Makibalo (now the spouses Eulogio
Alberto, his father Procopio's share in Lot 6080. Salvador and Remedios Salvador) and the other half for
the children of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo in
But from the evidence it appears that Procopio Yabo never sold his share equal shares.
in Lot 6080 to Pastor Makibalo. So there was no need to convey back
Procopio's share in Lot 6080. (5) The remaining 6/9, one-half (1/2) of which is conjugal
between Maria Yabo and appellee Pastor Makibalo
This fact is evident from the Affidavit of Confirmation of Sale (Exh. M) should be partitioned three-fourths (3/4) for Pastor
dated April 22, 1970, executed by Alberto Yabo, which is the very Makibalo (now the spouses Eulogio Salvador and
document relied upon by the lower court (Decision, p. 11; Record, Vol. 2, Remedios Salvador) and one-fourth (1/4) for the children
p. 153) in finding that "Alberto Yabo admitted that the share of his father of the brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo in equal shares.
Procopio Yabo was previously bought by Pastor Makibalo." A look at
Exh. M, particularly par. 3 thereof, reveals that AlbertoYabo merely (6) Jose Yabo if he is still alive should participate in the
acknowledged or confirmed the sale of his father's share to Pastor partition as heir of Maria otherwise he shall be
Makibalo in Lot 6180. In effect, it at the same time proves that Lot 6080 represented by his children.
was never sold by Procopio to appellee Pastor Makibalo; otherwise, it
would have been included in the said Affidavit of Confirmation of Sale.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, subject to the modification in the
The Deed of Absolute Sale (Exh. 2) subsequently executed by Pastor
partition, as indicated above, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED,
Makibalo in favor of Alberto Yabo on April 23, 1970, further proves this
without pronouncement as to costs. The lower court is directed if
necessary to fully effect the partition, to conduct further hearings and
 determine whether Jose Yabo is still alive and who are the children of the of the action cannot, however, be invoked when one of the co-owners has possessed the
brothers and sisters of Maria Yabo. 23 property as exclusive owner and for a period sufficient to acquire it by prescription. 30

Unable to obtain a reconsideration of the said-decision, Remedios Salvador, together What needs to be addressed first is whether or not Pastor Makibalo has acquired by
with her daughter, Ma. Gracia Salvador, as one of the successors-in-interest of Eulogio prescription the shares of his other co-heirs or co-owners. Prescription as a mode of
M. Salvador who died during the pendency of the appeal, 24 elevated the case to this Court acquiring ownership requires a continuous, open, peaceful, public, and adverse
contending that the respondent court erred in ruling that: (1) the shares of Pelagia Yabo possession for a period of time fixed by law.
should be included in the partition; (2) prescription and laches have not run against the
private respondents in relation to the 1/9 share of Maria Yabo in the estate of her father and This Court has held that the possession of a co-owner is like that of a trustee and shall
to her ½ conjugal share in those acquired by purchase; (3) Procopio Yabo never sold to not be regarded as adverse to the other co-owners but in fact as beneficial to all of
Pastor Makibalo his share in Lot No. 6080; and(4) Jose Yabo should be allowed to participate them. 31 Acts which may be considered adverse to strangers may not be considered adverse
as heir of Maria even as he had openly rejected this option by refusing to participate in both insofar as co-owners are concerned. A mere silent possession by a co-owner, his receipt of
civil cases. 25 rents, fruits or profits from the property, the erection of buildings and fences and the planting
of trees thereon, and the payment of land taxes, cannot serve as proof of exclusive
Article 160 of the Civil Code provides that all property of the marriage is presumed to ownership, if it is not borne out by clear and convincing evidence that he exercised acts of
belong to the conjugal partnership, unless it be proved that it pertains .exclusively to the possession which unequivocably constituted an ouster or deprivation of the rights of the other
husband or to the wife. Since the shares of Jose, Victoriano, Lope, Baseliza, Procopio, co-owners. 32
and Francisca in Lot No. 6180 and Lot No. 6080 had been purchased by Pastor during
his marriage with Maria, and there is no proof that these were acquired with his exclusive Thus, in order that a co-owner's possession may be deemed adverse to the cestui que
money, the same are deemed conjugal properties. Not forming part of the conjugal trust or the other co-owners, the following elements must concur: (1) that he has
partnership are: (1) the 1/9 share inherited by Maria which remained as her exclusive performed unequivocal acts of repudiation amounting to an ouster of the cestui que
property pursuant to Article 146 (2) of the Civil Code; (2) the 1/9 share of Gaudencia trust or the other co-owners; (2) that such positive acts of repudiation have been made
which was not sold to Pastor; and (3) the 1/9 share of Pelagia which was acquired by known to the cestui que trust or the other co-owners; and (3) that the evidence thereon
Pastor in 1967 or five years after the death of his wife and which was therefore his must be clear and convincing. 33
exclusive property.
In Pangan vs. Court of Appeals, 34 this Court had occasion to lay down specific acts which
There is, thus; merit in the petitioners' first assigned error. The Court of .Appeals should are considered as acts of repudiation:
have excluded from the conjugal partnership the share of Pelagia which Pastor had
acquired after his wife's death. Filing by a trustee of an action in court against the trustor to quiet title to
property, or for recovery of ownership thereof, held in possession by the
Upon Maria's death in 1962, the conjugal partnership of gains was dissolved. 26 Half of former, may constitute an act of repudiation of the trust reposed on him
the conjugal properties, together with Maria's l/9 hereditary share in the disputed lots, by the latter.
constituted Maria's estate and should thus go to her surviving heirs. 27 Under Article 1001 of
the Civil Code, her heirs are her spouse, Pastor Makibalo, who shall be entitled to-one-half The issuance of the certificate of title would constitute an open and clear
(1/2) of her estate, her brother, Jose, and the children of her other brothers and sisters, who repudiation of any trust, and the lapse of more than 20 years, open and
shall inherit the other half. There having been no actual partition of the estate yet, the said
adverse possession as owner would certainly suffice to vest title by
heirs became co-owners thereof by operation of law. 28
prescription.
We now determine whether prescription and laches can be applied against the co-heirs
An action for the reconveyance of land based on implied or constructive
of Pastor Makibalo.
trust prescribes within 10 years. And it is from the date of the issuance of
such title that the effective assertion of adverse title for purposes of the
It has been said that Article 494 of the Civil Code which provides that each co-owner statute of limitation is counted.
may demand at any time the partition of the common property implies that an action to
demand partition is imprescriptible or cannot be barred by laches. 29 The imprescriptibility
 The prescriptive period may only be counted from the time petitioners In the instant case, a conflict in the findings of facts of the lower courts exists. The trial
repudiated the trust relation in 1955 upon the filing of the complaint for court found that Pastor was the owner of Procopio's share in Lot No. 6080, as there was
recovery of possession against private respondents so that the nothing to show that he sold it back to Alberto Yabo. The respondent court on the other
counterclaim of the private respondents contained in their amended hand, held that Procopio Yabo never sold his share in Lot No. 6080 to pastor, thus, there
answer wherein they asserted absolute ownership of the disputed realty was no need to convey it back to Procopio's son, Alberto.
by reason of the continuous and adverse possession of the same is well
within the l0-year prescriptive period. At this juncture, it is worthy to quote pertinent portions of the testimony of Pastor
Makibalo:
There is clear repudiation of a trust when one who is an apparent
administrator of property causes the cancellation of the title thereto in the COURT: (To the witness.)
name of the apparent beneficiaries and gets a new certificate of title in
his own name. Q Where is AlbertoYabo living?

It is only when the defendants, alleged co-owners of the property in A It is there in their house at Bulua.
question, executed a deed of partition and on the strength thereof
obtained the cancellation of the title in the name of their predecessor and
ATTY. JARAULA: (Continuing.)
the issuance of a new one wherein they appear as the new owners of a
definite area each, thereby in effect denying or repudiating the ownership
of one of the plaintiffs over his alleged share in the entire lot, that the Q In whose land?
statute of limitations started to run for the purposes of the action instituted
by the latter seeking a declaration of the existence of the co-ownership A Alipio Yabo's land.
and of their rights thereunder.
Q What relation has that land to the two (2) parcels of
The records do not show that Pastor Makibalo adjudicated to himself the whole estate of land under litigation?
his wife by means of an affidavit filed with the Office of the Register of Deeds as allowed
under Section 1 Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, or that he caused the issuance of a A I bought already.
certificate of title in his name or the cancellation of the tax declaration in Alipio's name
and the issuance of a new one in his own name. The only act which may be deemed as Q So, will you please tell the Honorable Court, why
a repudiation by Pastor of the co-ownership over the lots is his filing on 28 April 1976 of Alberto Yabo is staying on that land when you said you
an action to quiet title (Civil Case No. 5000). The period of prescription started to run only have bought that land already.
from this repudiation. However, this was tolled when his co-heirs, the private
respondents herein, instituted on 8 October 1976 an action for partition (Civil Case No. A So, I sold back a portion to them because they
5174) of the lots. Hence, the adverse possession by Pastor being for only about six requested me.
months would not vest in him exclusive ownership of his wife's estate, and absent
acquisitive prescription of ownership, laches and prescription of the action for partition COURT: (To the witness.)
will not lie in favor of Pastor. 35
Q When was that when you said that Alberto Yabo
The issue presented by the petitioners in their third assigned error involves a question of
requested a portion?
fact. This Court is not ordinarily a trier of facts, its jurisdiction being limited to errors of
law. Thus; the findings of facts of the Court of Appeals are as a rule deemed conclusive.
However, when the findings of facts of the appellate court vary with those of the trial A In 1967.
court, this Court has to review the evidence in order to arrive at the correct findings. 36
COURT:
Q Did you give that portion which they requested? COURT:

A Their share being inherited from their father Procopio All right.
was the portion they requested.
ATTY. JARAULA (Continuing.)
COURT
Q Now, for how much did you buy. the shares of each of
Q Yes. Did you grant that? the brothers and sisters of your wife?

A Yes. A One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos.

Q That is the area you sold to Alberto Yabo, pursuant to Q When you sold back to Alberto Yabo, the portion
his request? corresponding to the share of his father Procopio in the
Poblacion, how much did he pay you?
A Because that was the land they inherited from their
father that was what they requested. A The same.

Q All right. So that, the area now being occupied by Q By the same, you are referring by the same amount of
Alberto Yabo? One Hundred Ten (P110.00) Pesos?

A Yes. That land in the Centro. A Yes, Sir. The same amount. 37

Q This is now identified as Lot No. 6180? The petitioners contend that the sales or conveyances made by Alipio's heirs were for
their consolidated shares in the two lots. If this was so, and the receipt which Procopio
A Yes, Your Honor. signed when he sold his consolidated share to Pastor was turned over to Alberto, the
inevitable conclusion is that Alberto redeemed his father's share in both lots, not only in
ATTY. JARAULA: (Continuing.) Lot: No. 6180. This conclusion is further buttressed by the above-quoted testimony of
Pastor that he bought the shares (consolidated) of each of Alipio's heirs for P110.00 and
that when he sold back to Alberto the former share of Procopio, Alberto paid him the
Q Where did you sign a document ceding that portion
same amount of P110.00.
requested by Alberto Yabo?
However, since the share of Procopio in the two litigated parcels of land was purchased
A We did not make any receipt in favor of AlbertoYabo
by Pastor during his marriage with Maria, the same became conjugal property, and half
because they got only the receipt of that of his father.
of it formed part of Maria's estate upon her death in 1962. Accordingly, Pastor's resale in
favor of Alberto could only be valid with respect to Pastor's one-half (1/2) conjugal share
COURT: (To the witness.) and one-fourth (1/4) hereditary share as heir of Maria. 38 The remaining one-fourth (1/4)
should go to Pastor's co-heirs, the private respondents herein.
Q You mean to say, that the receipt which Procopio
signed when he sold his share for [sic] the document Now on the fourth assigned error.
which Alberto got?
Section 1, Rule 69 of the Rules of Court requires that all persons interested in the land
A Yes. sought to be partitioned must be joined as defendants in the complaints. All co-owners
and persons having an interest in the property are considered indispensable parties and Phil., 109, 116), "a second action would be but a repetition of the first and
an action for partition will not lie without the joinder of said persons. 39 It has been held would involve both parties, plaintiffs and defendant, in much additional
that the absence of an indispensable party in a case renders ineffective all the proceedings expense and would cause much delay, in that way defeating the purpose
subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the judgment. 40 of the section, which is expressly stated to be "that the actual merits of
the controversy may speedily be determined without regard to
It must be recalled that in Civil Case No. 5174 the private respondents sought the technicalities and in the most expeditious and inexpensive manner." (See
partition of the two lots based on the co-ownership which arose from the right of also Diaz vs. De la Rama, 73 Phil., 104)
succession to Alipio's estate. Since Jose Yabo confirmed, through his thumbmark in the
verification of the complaint, that he had already parted with his share in Alipio's estate, To avoid further delay in the disposition of this case, we declare Civil Case No. 5174 as
he in effect admitted that he had ceased to be a co-owner of the two lots which thus duly amended. Consequently, Jose Yabo may participate in the partition of the
comprised his father's estate. Thus, his non-joinder as a party-plaintiff in the complaint estate of Maria Yabo. The fourth assigned error must then be rejected.
would appear to be proper. He does not, as well, appear to be an indispensable party in
Civil Case No. 5000. In view of the foregoing disquisitions, the appealed judgment should be modified as
follows: (a) the former 1/9 share of Pelagia Yabo in Lots No. 6180 and 6080 which she
As it turned out, however, the evidence and the issues which cropped up rendered sold to Pastor should be treated as the latter's exclusive property which should now
imperative the determination of the conjugal assets of Pastor Makibalo and Maria Yabo pertain to the petitioners, his successors-in-interest; and (b) the former 1/9 share of
and the partition of the latter's estate among her heirs. Her estate consists of one-half(½) Procopio Yabo in both lots should be divided as follows: 3/4 (respondent Pastor's 1/2
of the conjugal properties, which should then be divided pursuant to Article 1001 of the conjugal share and 1/4 representing his share therein as Maria's heir) for the spouses
Civil Code since the marriage produced no child; thus: one-half (½) to Pastor, and the Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and 1/4 (representing the share therein of Maria's collateral
other half to her brother Jose, and to her nephews and nieces. relatives as Maria's heirs) for the private respondents, including Alberto and Jose Yabo.
The partition of the two lots in controversy should therefore be made in this wise:
Insofar as the partition of Maria Yabo's estate is concerned, Jose is an indispensable
party. Strictly, the rule on indispensable parties may bar a partition of Maria's estate. (1) 1/9 share of Gaudencia Yabo should be allotted to her heirs or
Considering, however, that such estate or its partition are but incidents in Civil Case No. successors-in-interest;
5000 and Civil Case No. 5174, and the parties have not offered any objection to the
propriety of the determination and partition of her estate, then in the light of Section 11 of (2) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Pelagia Yabo — to the petitioners as
Rule 3 41 and Sections 1 and 5, Rule 10 42 of the Rules of Court, and following the rulings of successors-in-interest of Pastor Makibalo;
this Court in the 1910 case of Alonso vs. Villamor 43 and the 1947 case of Cuyugan vs.
Dizon, 44 an amendment of the complaint in Civil Case No. 5174 to implead Jose Yabo as
(3) 1/9 hereditary share of Maria Yabo to be divided as follows:
party plaintiff would be in order.

In Alonso, it was held that under Section 110 of the Code of Civil Procedure — whose (a) 1/2 for the petitioners (as successors-in-interest of
Pastor Makibalo), and
first paragraph is substantially the same as the aforesaid Section 1 of Rule 10 — and
Section 503 thereof, this Court "has full power, apart from that power and authority which
is inherent, to amend the process, pleadings, proceedings, and decision in this case by (b) 1/2 for the private respondents, including Jose Yabo
substituting, as party plaintiff, the real party in interest." Our ruling in Cuyugan states: or his heirs;

We, however, do not believe that the case should be dismissed for (4) 1/9 share formerly belonging to Procopio Yabo to be divided thus:
plaintiff's failure to join her husband. (Sec. 11, Rule 2, Rules of Court).
Nor should the case be remanded to the court below and a new trial (a) 3/4 for Spouses Alberto and Elpia Yabo, and
ordered on this account. The complaint may and should be amended
here, to cure the defect of party plaintiffs, after final decision is rendered. (b) 1/4 for the other private respondents, including Jose
Section 11, Rule 2, and Section 2, Rule 17, explicitly authorize such Yabo or his heirs;
procedure. As this Court had occasion to say in Quison vs. Salud, (12
 (5) 5/9 shares which became the conjugal properties of Pastor Makibalo
and Maria Yabo to be divided thus:

(a) 3/4 for the petitioners (as successors-in-interest of

Pastor Makibalo), and

(b) ¼ for the private respondents, including Jose Yabo or

his heirs.

In sum, Lots Nos. 6180 anid 6080 should be partitioned as follows:

1/9 or 4/36 — to Guadencia Yabo's heirs or successors-in-interest;

3/4 of 1/9 or 3/36 — to the spouses Alberto and Elpina Yabo;

8/36 — to the private respondents, including Jose Yabu or his heirs;

21/36 — to the petitioners as successors-in-interest of Pastor Makibalo.

WHEREFORE, the challenged decision of the Court of Appeals of 8 February 1993 in

CA-G.R. CV No. 12839 is AFFIRMED, subject to the modifications indicated above.
Upon the finality of this decision, let this case be forthwith remanded to the court a
quo for further proceedings on the partition of Lots Nos. 6180 and 6080 in conformity
with this decision.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184109 February 1, 2012 Respondents agree that Doroteo’s five children each inherited 114 sq. m. of Lot No. 552.
MERCADO vs. ESPINOCILLA However, Macario’s share increased when he received Dionisia’s share. Macario’s
increased share was then sold to his son Roger, respondents’ husband and father.
The Case Respondents claim that they rightfully possess the land they occupy by virtue of
acquisitive prescription and that there is no basis for petitioner’s claim of encroachment.12
Petitioner Celerino E. Mercado appeals the Decision1 dated April 28, 2008 and
Resolution2 dated July 22, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 87480. The Trial Court’s Decision
The CA dismissed petitioner’s complaint3 for recovery of possession, quieting of title,
partial declaration of nullity of deeds and documents, and damages, on the ground of On May 15, 2006, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of petitioner and held that
prescription. he is entitled to 171 sq. m. The RTC found that petitioner inherited 142.5 sq. m. from his
mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. The RTC computed that
The Antecedent Facts Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel and Macario each inherited 142.5 sq. m. of Lot No. 552. Each
inherited 114 sq. m. from Doroteo and 28.5 sq. m. from Dionisia. The RTC further ruled
Doroteo Espinocilla owned a parcel of land, Lot No. 552, with an area of 570 sq. m., that Macario was not entitled to 228 sq. m. Thus, respondents must return 39 sq. m. to
located at Magsaysay Avenue, Zone 5, Bulan, Sorsogon. After he died, his five children, petitioner who occupies only 132 sq. m.13
Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel, Macario, and Dionisia divided Lot No. 552 equally among
themselves. Later, Dionisia died without issue ahead of her four siblings, and Macario There being no public document to prove Dionisia’s donation, the RTC also held that
took possession of Dionisia’s share. In an affidavit of transfer of real property4 dated Macario’s 1948 affidavit is void and is an invalid repudiation of the shares of his sisters
November 1, 1948, Macario claimed that Dionisia had donated her share to him in May Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel in Dionisia’s share. Accordingly, Macario cannot acquire
1945. said shares by prescription. The RTC further held that the oral partition of Lot No. 552 by
Doroteo’s heirs did not include Dionisia’s share and that partition should have been the
Thereafter, on August 9, 1977, Macario and his daughters Betty Gullaba and Saida main action. Thus, the RTC ordered partition and deferred the transfer of possession of
Gabelo sold5 225 sq. m. to his son Roger Espinocilla, husband of respondent Belen the 39 sq. m. pending partition.14 The dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
Espinocilla and father of respondent Ferdinand Espinocilla. On March 8, 1985, Roger
Espinocilla sold6 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. Per actual survey of Lot No. 552, WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the court issues the following ORDER,
respondent Belen Espinocilla occupies 109 sq. m., Caridad Atienza occupies 120 sq. m., thus -
Caroline Yu occupies 209 sq. m., and petitioner, Salvacion's son, occupies 132 sq. m.7
a) Partially declaring the nullity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Property dated
The Case For Petitioner August 9, 1977 x x x executed by Macario Espinocilla, Betty E. Gullaba and
Saida E. Gabelo in favor of Roger Espinocilla, insofar as it affects the portion or
Petitioner sued the respondents to recover two portions: an area of 28.58 sq. m. which he the share belonging to Salvacion Espinocilla, mother of [petitioner,] relative to the
bought from Aspren and another 28.5 sq. m. which allegedly belonged to him but was property left by Dionisia Espinocilla, including [Tax Declaration] No. 13667 and
occupied by Macario’s house.9 His claim has since been modified to an alleged other documents of the same nature and character which emanated from the
encroachment of only 39 sq. m. that he claims must be returned to him. He avers that he said sale;
is entitled to own and possess 171 sq. m. of Lot No. 552, having inherited 142.5 sq. m.
from his mother Salvacion and bought 28.5 sq. m. from his aunt Aspren. According to b) To leave as is the Deeds of Absolute Sale of May 11, 1983 and March 8,
him, his mother’s inheritance is 142.5 sq. m., that is, 114 sq. m. from Doroteo plus 28.5 1985, it having been determined that they did not involve the portion belonging to
sq. m. from Dionisia. Since the area he occupies is only 132 sq. m.,10 he claims that [petitioner] x x x.
respondents encroach on his share by 39 sq. m.11
c) To effect an effective and real partition among the heirs for purposes of
The Case For Respondents determining the exact location of the share (114 sq. m.) of the late Dionisia
Espinocilla together with the 28.5 sq. m. belonging to [petitioner’s] mother
Salvacion, as well as, the exact location of the 39 sq. m. portion belonging to the
 [petitioner] being encroached by the [respondents], with the assistance of the ordinary or extraordinary. Ordinary acquisitive prescription requires possession in good
Commissioner (Engr. Fundano) appointed by this court. faith and with just title for 10 years. In extraordinary prescription, ownership and other
real rights over immovable property are acquired through uninterrupted adverse
d) To hold in abeyance the transfer of possession of the 39 sq. m. portion to the possession for 30 years without need of title or of good faith.20
[petitioner] pending the completion of the real partition above-mentioned.15
Here, petitioner himself admits the adverse nature of respondents’ possession with his
The CA Decision assertion that Macario’s fraudulent acquisition of Dionisia’s share created a constructive
trust. In a constructive trust, there is neither a promise nor any fiduciary relation to speak
On appeal, the CA reversed the RTC decision and dismissed petitioner’s complaint on of and the so-called trustee (Macario) neither accepts any trust nor intends holding the
the ground that extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in favor of property for the beneficiary (Salvacion, Aspren, Isabel). The relation of trustee and cestui
respondents. The CA found that Doroteo’s four remaining children made an oral partition que trust does not in fact exist, and the holding of a constructive trust is for the trustee
of Lot No. 552 after Dionisia’s death in 1945 and occupied specific portions. The oral himself, and therefore, at all times adverse.21 Prescription may supervene even if the
partition terminated the co-ownership of Lot No. 552 in 1945. Said partition also included trustee does not repudiate the relationship.22
Dionisia’s share because the lot was divided into four parts only. And since petitioner’s
complaint was filed only on July 13, 2000, the CA concluded that prescription has set Then, too, respondents’ uninterrupted adverse possession for 55 years of 109 sq. m. of
in.16 The CA disposed the appeal as follows: Lot No. 552 was established. Macario occupied Dionisia’s share in 1945 although his
claim that Dionisia donated it to him in 1945 was only made in a 1948 affidavit. We also
WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed May 15, 2006 Decision of the agree with the CA that Macario’s possession of Dionisia’s share was public and adverse
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bulan, Sorsogon is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. since his other co-owners, his three other sisters, also occupied portions of Lot No. 552.
The Complaint of the [petitioner] is hereby DISMISSED. No costs.17 Indeed, the 1977 sale made by Macario and his two daughters in favor of his son Roger
confirms the adverse nature of Macario’s possession because said sale of 225 sq.
m.23 was an act of ownership over Macario’s original share and Dionisia’s share. In 1985,
The Instant Petition
Roger also exercised an act of ownership when he sold 114 sq. m. to Caridad Atienza. It
was only in the year 2000, upon receipt of the summons to answer petitioner’s complaint,
The core issue to be resolved is whether petitioner’s action to recover the subject portion that respondents’ peaceful possession of the remaining portion (109 sq. m.) was
is barred by prescription. interrupted. By then, however, extraordinary acquisitive prescription has already set in in
favor of respondents. That the RTC found Macario’s 1948 affidavit void is of no moment.
Petitioner confirms oral partition of Lot No. 552 by Doroteo's heirs, but claims that his Extraordinary prescription is unconcerned with Macario’s title or good faith. Accordingly,
share increased from 114 sq. m. to 171 sq. m. and that respondents encroached on his the RTC erred in ruling that Macario cannot acquire by prescription the shares of
share by 39 sq. m. Since an oral partition is valid, the corresponding survey ordered by Salvacion, Aspren, and Isabel, in Dionisia’s 114-sq. m. share from Lot No. 552.
the RTC to identify the 39 sq. m. that must be returned to him could be made.18 Petitioner
also alleges that Macario committed fraud in acquiring his share; hence, any evidence Moreover, the CA correctly dismissed petitioner’s complaint as an action for
adduced by him to justify such acquisition is inadmissible. Petitioner concludes that if a reconveyance based on an implied or constructive trust prescribes in 10 years from the
person obtains legal title to property by fraud or concealment, courts of equity will time the right of action accrues.24 This is the other kind of prescription under the Civil
impress upon the title a so-called constructive trust in favor of the defrauded party.19 Code, called extinctive prescription, where rights and actions are lost by the lapse of
time.25 Petitioner’s action for recovery of possession having been filed 55 years after
The Court’s Ruling Macario occupied Dionisia’s share, it is also barred by extinctive prescription. The CA
while condemning Macario’s fraudulent act of depriving his three sisters of their shares in
We affirm the CA ruling dismissing petitioner’s complaint on the ground of prescription. 1âwphi1
Dionisia’s share, equally emphasized the fact that Macario’s sisters wasted their
opportunity to question his acts.
Prescription, as a mode of acquiring ownership and other real rights over immovable
property, is concerned with lapse of time in the manner and under conditions laid down WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition for review on certiorari for lack of merit
by law, namely, that the possession should be in the concept of an owner, public, and AFFIRM the assailed Decision dated April 28, 2008 and Resolution dated July 22,
peaceful, uninterrupted, and adverse. Acquisitive prescription of real rights may be 2008 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 87480.
G.R. No. L-27952 February 15, 1982 Cuenta de Ahorros en el Philippine Trust
RAMIREZ vs. RAMIREZ
Co.............................................................................................. 2,350.73
The main issue in this appeal is the manner of partitioning the testate estate of Jose
Eugenio Ramirez among the principal beneficiaries, namely: his widow Marcelle TOTAL..............................................................
Demoron de Ramirez; his two grandnephews Roberto and Jorge Ramirez; and his P512,976.97
companion Wanda de Wrobleski.
MENOS:
The task is not trouble-free because the widow Marcelle is a French who lives in Paris,
while the companion Wanda is an Austrian who lives in Spain. Moreover, the testator Deuda al Banco de las Islas Filipinas, garan-
provided for substitutions.
tizada con prenda de las acciones de La Carlota ......... P 5,000,00
Jose Eugenio Ramirez, a Filipino national, died in Spain on December 11, 1964, with
only his widow as compulsory heir. His will was admitted to probate by the Court of First
VALOR LIQUIDO........................................... P507,976.97
Instance of Manila, Branch X, on July 27, 1965. Maria Luisa Palacios was appointed
administratrix of the estate. In due time she submitted an inventory of the estate as
follows: The testamentary dispositions are as follows:

INVENTARIO A.—En nuda propiedad, a D. Roberto y D. Jorge Ramirez, ambas

menores de edad, residentes en Manila, I.F., calle 'Alright, No. 1818,
Malate, hijos de su sobrino D. Jose Ma. Ramirez, con sustitucion vulgar a
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de un te
favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con sustitucion
vulgar reciprocal entre ambos.
rreno, con sus mejoras y edificaciones, situadoen
El precedente legado en nuda propiedad de la participacion indivisa de la
la Escolta, Manila............................................................. P500,000.00 finca Santa Cruz Building, lo ordena el testador a favor de los legatarios
nombrados, en atencion a que dicha propiedad fue creacion del querido
Una sexta parte (1/6) proindiviso de dos padre del otorgante y por ser aquellos continuadores del apellido
Ramirez,
parcelas de terreno situadas en Antipolo, Rizal................... 658.34
B.—Y en usufructo a saber: —
Cuatrocientos noventa y uno (491) acciones
a. En cuanto a una tercera parte, a favor de la esposa del testador, Da.
de la 'Central Azucarera de la Carlota a P17.00 Marcelle Ramirez, domiciliada en IE PECO, calle del General Gallieni No.
33, Seine Francia, con sustitucion vulgar u fideicomisaria a favor de Da.
por accion ................................................................................8,347.00 Wanda de Wrobleski, de Palma de Mallorca, Son Rapina Avenida de los
Reyes 13,
Diez mil ochocientos seize (10,806) acciones
b.—Y en cuanto a las dos terceras partes restantes, a favor de la
de la 'Central Luzon Milling Co.', disuelta y en nombrada Da. Wanda de Nrobleski con sustitucion vulgar v
fideicomisaria a saber:—
liquidacion a P0.15 por accion ..............................................1,620.90
 En cuanto a la mitad de dichas dos terceras partes, a favor de D. Juan because the testament provides for a usufruct in her favor of one-third of the estate. The
Pablo Jankowski, de Son Rapina Palma de Mallorca; y encuanto a la court a quo erred for Marcelle who is entitled to one-half of the estate "en pleno dominio"
mitad restante, a favor de su sobrino, D. Horace V. Ramirez, San Luis as her legitime and which is more than what she is given under the will is not entitled to
Building, Florida St. Ermita, Manila, I.F. have any additional share in the estate. To give Marcelle more than her legitime will run
counter to the testator's intention for as stated above his dispositions even impaired her
A pesar de las sustituciones fideiconiisarias precedentemente ordinadas, legitime and tended to favor Wanda.
las usufiructuarias nombradas conjuntamente con los nudo propietarios,
podran en cualquier memento vender a tercero los bienes objeto 2. The substitutions.
delegado, sin intervencion alguna de los titulares fideicomisaarios.
It may be useful to recall that "Substitution is the appoint- judgment of another heir so
On June 23, 1966, the administratrix submitted a project of partition as follows: the that he may enter into the inheritance in default of the heir originally instituted." (Art. 857,
property of the deceased is to be divided into two parts. One part shall go to the widow Civil Code. And that there are several kinds of substitutions, namely: simple or common,
'en pleno dominio" in satisfaction of her legitime; the other part or "free portion" shall go brief or compendious, reciprocal, and fideicommissary (Art. 858, Civil Code.) According
to Jorge and Roberto Ramirez "en nuda propriedad." Furthermore, one third (1/3) of the to Tolentino, "Although the Code enumerates four classes, there are really only two
free portion is charged with the widow's usufruct and the remaining two-thirds (2/3) with a principal classes of substitutions: the simple and the fideicommissary. The others are
usufruct in favor of Wanda. merely variations of these two." (111 Civil Code, p. 185 [1973].)

Jorge and Roberto opposed the project of partition on the grounds: (a) that the provisions The simple or vulgar is that provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code which reads:
for vulgar substitution in favor of Wanda de Wrobleski with respect to the widow's
usufruct and in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horacio V. Ramirez, with respect to ART. 859. The testator may designate one or more persons to substitute
Wanda's usufruct are invalid because the first heirs Marcelle and Wanda) survived the the heir or heirs instituted in case such heir or heirs should die before
testator; (b) that the provisions for fideicommissary substitutions are also invalid because him, or should not wish, or should be incapacitated to accept the
the first heirs are not related to the second heirs or substitutes within the first degree, as inheritance.
provided in Article 863 of the Civil Code; (c) that the grant of a usufruct over real property
in the Philippines in favor of Wanda Wrobleski, who is an alien, violates Section 5, Article A simple substitution, without a statement of the cases to which it refers,
III of the Philippine Constitution; and that (d) the proposed partition of the testator's shall comprise the three mentioned in the preceding paragraph, unless
interest in the Santa Cruz (Escolta) Building between the widow Marcelle and the the testator has otherwise provided.
appellants, violates the testator's express win to give this property to them Nonetheless,
the lower court approved the project of partition in its order dated May 3, 1967. It is this
The fideicommissary substitution is described in the Civil Code as follows:
order which Jorge and Roberto have appealed to this Court.
ART. 863. A fideicommissary substitution by virtue of which the fiduciary
1. The widow's legitime.
or first heir instituted is entrusted with the obligation to preserve and to
transmit to a second heir the whole or part of inheritance, shall be valid
The appellant's do not question the legality of giving Marcelle one-half of the estate in full and shall take effect, provided such substitution does not go beyond one
ownership. They admit that the testator's dispositions impaired his widow's legitime. degree from the heir originally instituted, and provided further that the
Indeed, under Art. 900 of the Civil Code "If the only survivor is the widow or widower, she fiduciary or first heir and the second heir are living at time of the death of
or he shall be entitled to one-half of the hereditary estate." And since Marcelle alone the testator.
survived the deceased, she is entitled to one-half of his estate over which he could
impose no burden, encumbrance, condition or substitution of any kind whatsoever. (Art.
It will be noted that the testator provided for a vulgar substitution in respect of the
904, par. 2, Civil Code.)
legacies of Roberto and Jorge Ramirez, the appellants, thus: con sustitucion vulgar a
favor de sus respectivos descendientes, y, en su defecto, con substitution vulgar
It is the one-third usufruct over the free portion which the appellants question and reciprocal entre ambos.
justifiably so. It appears that the court a quo approved the usufruct in favor of Marcelle
The appellants do not question the legality of the substitution so provided. The appellants admits "that the testator contradicts the establishment of a fideicommissary substitution
question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria a favor de Da. Wanda de Wrobleski" in when he permits the properties subject of the usufruct to be sold upon mutual agreement
connection with the one-third usufruct over the estate given to the widow Marcelle of the usufructuaries and the naked owners." (Brief, p. 26.)
However, this question has become moot because as We have ruled above, the widow
is not entitled to any usufruct. 3. The usufruct of Wanda.

The appellants also question the sustitucion vulgar y fideicomisaria in connection with The appellants claim that the usufruct over real properties of the estate in favor of Wanda
Wanda's usufruct over two thirds of the estate in favor of Juan Pablo Jankowski and is void because it violates the constitutional prohibition against the acquisition of lands by
Horace v. Ramirez. aliens.

They allege that the substitution in its vulgar aspect as void because Wanda survived the The 1935 Constitution which is controlling provides as follows:
testator or stated differently because she did not predecease the testator. But dying
before the testator is not the only case for vulgar substitution for it also includes refusal SEC. 5. Save in cases of hereditary succession, no private agricultural
or incapacity to accept the inheritance as provided in Art. 859 of the Civil Code, supra. land shall be transferred or assigned except to individuals, corporations,
Hence, the vulgar substitution is valid. or associations qualified to acquire or hold lands of the public domain in
the Philippines. (Art. XIII.)
As regards the substitution in its fideicommissary aspect, the appellants are correct in
their claim that it is void for the following reasons: The court a quo upheld the validity of the usufruct given to Wanda on the ground that the
Constitution covers not only succession by operation of law but also testamentary
(a) The substitutes (Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez) are not related to succession. We are of the opinion that the Constitutional provision which enables aliens
Wanda, the heir originally instituted. Art. 863 of the Civil Code validates a to acquire private lands does not extend to testamentary succession for otherwise the
fideicommissary substitution "provided such substitution does not go beyond one degree prohibition will be for naught and meaningless. Any alien would be able to circumvent the
from the heir originally instituted." prohibition by paying money to a Philippine landowner in exchange for a devise of a
piece of land.
What is meant by "one degree" from the first heir is explained by Tolentino as follows:
This opinion notwithstanding, We uphold the usufruct in favor of Wanda because a
Scaevola Maura, and Traviesas construe "degree" as designation, usufruct, albeit a real right, does not vest title to the land in the usufructuary and it is the
substitution, or transmission. The Supreme Court of Spain has decidedly vesting of title to land in favor of aliens which is proscribed by the Constitution.
adopted this construction. From this point of view, there can be only one
tranmission or substitution, and the substitute need not be related to the IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the estate of Jose Eugenio Ramirez is hereby ordered
first heir. Manresa, Morell and Sanchez Roman, however, construe the distributed as follows:
word "degree" as generation, and the present Code has obviously
followed this interpretation. by providing that the substitution shall not go One-half (1/2) thereof to his widow as her legitime;
beyond one degree "from the heir originally instituted." The Code thus
clearly indicates that the second heir must be related to and be one
One-half (1/2) thereof which is the free portion to Roberto and Jorge Ramirez in naked
generation from the first heir.
ownership and the usufruct to Wanda de Wrobleski with a simple substitution in favor of
Juan Pablo Jankowski and Horace V. Ramirez.
From this, it follows that the fideicommissary can only be either a child or
a parent of the first heir. These are the only relatives who are one
The distribution herein ordered supersedes that of the court a quo. No special
generation or degree from the fiduciary (Op. cit., pp. 193-194.)
pronouncement as to costs.
(b) There is no absolute duty imposed on Wanda to transmit the usufruct to the
SO ORDERED.
substitutes as required by Arts. 865 and 867 of the Civil Code. In fact, the appellee
G.R. No. L-45142 April 26, 1991 Private respondents alleged in their answer that in or about April, 1951, the late Marcos
VDA. DE ESPINA vs. ABAYA Espina and his widow, Simprosa, together with their children made a temporary verbal
division and assignment of shares among their children. After the death of Marcos, the
This is a petition for certiorari with prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary temporary division was finalized by the heirs. Thereafter the heirs took immediate
injunction seeking the nullification of the orders issued by the respondent Judge Otilio possession of their respective shares on April 20, 1952. Private respondents took actual
Abaya, in his capacity as the presiding judge of the Court of First Instance of Surigao del physical possession of their respective shares including the portions ceded to them by
Sur, Branch II, Lianga, Surigao del Sur in Civil Case No. L-108, entitled "Simprosa Vda. Simprosa upon their payment of P50.00 each per quarter starting April, 1952 until the
de Espina, et. al. v. Sofia Espina, et. al." dated May 9, 1975 dismissing the complaint for latter's death pursuant to their contract of procession The assignment of shares was as
partition; July 25, 1975 denying the motion for reconsideration; August 13, 1975 denying follows:
the second motion for reconsideration and March 15, 1976 denying plaintiffs' notice of
appeal. (a) To the surviving spouses, (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina, herein plaintiffs,
one-half (1/2) of the parcel of land adjudicated to each of said plaintiffs-heirs and
The antecedent facts are as follows: defendants;

Marcos Espina died on February 14, 1953 and was survived by his spouses, Simprosa (b) To each of the following compulsory heirs, to wit:
Vda. de Espina and their children namely, Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudiosa,
Necifora, Sora and Jose, all surnamed Espina. Decedent's estate comprises of four (4) 1. To Recaredo (sic) Espina, one-half (1/2) portion which contains an area of one
parcels of land located at the Municipality of Barobo Province of Surigao del Sur. and three-fourths (1 3/4) hectares and which forms part of Parcel 4 whose
description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel IV has been
On August 23, 1973 an action for partition of the aforementioned parcels of land was in the possession of both Recaredo Espina and plaintiff Simprosa Vda. de Espina
filed by petitioners Simprosa and her children Recaredo, Timoteo, Celia, Gaudencia and from April 20, 1952 until the present time;
Necifora.
2. To Timoteo Espina, one half (1/2) portion which contains an area of not less
The complaint alleges that parcel No. 1 is the exclusive property of the deceased, hence than one-half (1/2) hectare and which forms part of Parcel 3 whose description is
the same is owned in common by petitioners and private respondents in eight (8) equal given in paragraph III of the complaint, the said Parcel III was originally assigned
parts, while the other three (3) parcels of land being conjugal properties, are also owned by Marcos Espina who thereupon obtained an Original Certificate of Title in her
in common, one-half (1/2) belongs to the widow Simprosa and the other half is owned by (sic) name but was finally adjudicated to said Timoteo Espina in April, 1952, the
her and her children in eight (8) equal parts. other half (1/2) portion of which parcel III was the share of the surviving spouses
(sic), Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III has been in the possession of
It also alleges that parcel No. 1 has been subdivided into two lots. Lot No. 994 PL8-44 is said Timoteo Espina and Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 5570 in the name of one of the heirs, Sofia present time as their share;
Espina, who acquired the title as a trustee for the beneficiaries or heirs of Marcos
Espina, while lot No. 1329 PCS-44 is covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 3732 3. To Cecilia (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina, one-half (1/2)
issued in the name of one of the heirs, Jose Espina as trustee for the heirs of Marcos portion, share and share alike which contains two (2) hectares and which forms
Espina. Said parcel of land is in the possession of petitioners and private respondents part of Parcel II whose description is given in paragraph III of the complaint, the
who have their respective houses thereon. other half (1/2) of said Parcel III (sic) is the share of the surviving spouses (sic)
Simprosa Vda. de Espina, and said Parcel III (sic) has been in the possession of
Simprosa presently occupies parcel No. 2 while parcel No. 3 is occupied by Timoteo, said Cecilia. (sic) Espina, Gaudiosa Espina and Necifora Espina and Simprosa
although the same is actually titled in the name of Sofia. Parcel No. 4 is occupied by Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the present time;
Recaredo.
4. To Sofia Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the parcel of land included in the
Petitioners have several times demanded the partition of the aforementioned properties, deception of Parcel 1 in paragraph III of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of said
but notwithstanding such demands private respondents refused to accede. parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de Espina
 and having been ceded by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said Sofia Espina for xxx xxx xxx
a valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00 beginning April,
1952 until her death, and said Sofia Espina has been regularly paying to said On May 9, 1975 the trial court granted the motion and thereafter dismissed the
Simprosa Vda. de Espina quarterly from April, 1952 the said amount of P50.00 complaint. On May 23, 1975 petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration on the following
until the present time, and by virtue of said agreement, Sofia Espina obtained grounds, to wit:
Original Certificate of Title in her name of said parcel of land which is included in
the description of said parcel 1, as her exclusive property; 1. THAT THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL HAS NO LEGAL BASIS IN FACT AND IN
LAW.
5. To Jose Espina, one-half (1/2) portion of the other parcel of land included in
the description of Parcel 1 in paragraph 1 of the complaint, the other half (1/2) of 2. THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS IS NOT APPLICABLE IN THE CASE
said parcel being the share of the surviving spouses (sic) Simprosa Vda. de AT BAR. (Rollo, p. 50)
Espina and having been coded (sic) by said Simprosa Vda. de Espina to said
Jose Espina for a valuable consideration payable quarterly at the rate of P50.00
However, petitioners' motion was denied in an order dated July 23, 1975. On August 11,
beginning April, 1952 until her death, and said Jose Espina has been regularly
1975 petitioners filed another motion for reconsideration stressing that they were denied
quarterly paying to said Simprosa Vda. de Espina from April, 1952 until the
due process when their motion was not heard. Again said motion was denied on August
present time, the said amount of P50.00, and by virtue of said agreement, Jose
13, 1975.
Espina obtained Original Certificate of Title in his name of said parcel of land
which is included in the description of said Parcel 1 as his exclusive property.
(Rollo, pp. 27-28) Thereafter, petitioners filed their notice of appeal on September 11, 1975 and a motion
for extension of time to file their Record on Appeal on September 18, 1975.
On February 13, 1974 private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the complaint
alleging the following grounds, to wit: On March 15, 1976, the respondent judge disapproved petitioners' Record on Appeal
and appeal bond on the ground that the notice of appeal was filed out of time. Hence,
this petition. The petitioners raised four (,41) assignment of errors:
I
1. Whether or not an action for partition among co-heirs prescribes.
THAT THE FACTS ALLEGED IN THE COMPLAINT FAIL TO CONFER UPON
THE COURT COMPLETE AND LAWFUL JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE
FOR NON-COMPLIANCE WITH THE CONDITION SINE QUA NON 2. Whether or not an oral partition among co-heirs is valid.
CONCERNING SUIT BETWEEN MEMBERS OF THE SAME FAMILY.
3. Whether or not a hearing on a motion for reconsideration is indispensable the
xxx xxx xxx lack of which is a deal of due process.

II 4. Whether or not the second motion for reconsideration is pro forma Rollo, p. 10)

THAT THE CAUSE OF ACTION IS BARRED BY . . . . STATUTE OF Petitioners maintain that the present action is not for reconveyance but one for partition.
LIMITATIONS. Hence, the rule insisted by the private respondents on prescriptibility of an action for
reconcile conveyance of real property based on an implied trust is not applicable in the
case at bar. In addition, petitioners, argue that private respondents cannot set up the
xxx xxx xxx
defense of prescription or laches because their possession of the property no matter how
long cannot ripen into ownership. (Memorandum for Petitioners, p. 7)
III
However, the private respondents stress that 'any supposed right of the petitioners to
THAT THE PLAINTIFFS HAS NO LEGAL CAPACITY TO SUE, (Motion to demand a new division or partition of said estate of Marcos Espina has long been barred
Dismiss Complaint, pp. 1-5; Rollo, pp. 34-38)
by the Statute of Limitations and has long prescribed." (Memorandum for Private possessed the property as exclusive owners and their possession for a period of twenty
Respondents, p. 5) one (21) years is sufficient to acquire it by prescription. Hence, from the moment these
co-heirs claim that they are the absolute and exclusive owners of the properties and
The petitioners claim that the alleged oral partition is invalid and strictly under the deny the others any share therein, the question involved is no longer one of partition but
coverage of the statute of Frauds on two grounds, to wit: of ownership.

Firstly, parcel No. 1 being an exclusive property of the deceased should have been Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. "An agreement
1âw phi 1

divided into eight (8) equal parts. Therefore, Simprosa . could only cede her share of the of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the
land which is 1/8 portion thereof and cannot validly cede the shares of her then minor property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of
children without being duly appointed as guardian. Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of
property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which
Secondly, under Article 1358 of the New Civil Code, Simprosa could not have ceded her belong to the co-owners." (Tolentino, Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil
right and that of her other children except by a public document. (Memorandum of Code of the Philippines, Vol. II, 1983 Edition, 182-183 citing Hernandez v. Andal, et. al.,
Petitioners, pp. 8-9) G.R. No. L275, March 29, 1957)

On the other hand, private respondents insist that the oral partition is valid and binding Time and again, the Court stresses that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in
and does not fall under the coverage of the Statute of Frauds. oral argument is a matter which rests upon the sound discretion of the Court. Its refusal
does not constitute a denial of due process in the absence of a showing of abuse of
discretion. (see Philippine Manufacturing Co. v. Ang Bisig ng PMC et. al., 118 Phil. 431,
Petitioners claim that they were denied due process when the motion for reconsideration
434)
was denied without any hearing.
The absence of a formal hearing on the petitioners' motion for reconsideration is
However, private respondents maintain that the hearing of a motion for reconsideration in
thoroughly explained in the order of the respondent judge dated August 13, 1975, which
oral argument is a matter which rest upon the sound discretion of the Court.
is hereunder quoted as follows:
Finally, petitioners stress that the second motion for reconsideration is not pro forma,
When the court issued its order of June 5, 1975 requiring counsel for defendants
thus, it suspends the running of the period of appeal. Hence, the notice of appeal was
to answer plaintiffs' motion for reconsideration, the court opted to resolve
timely filed.
plaintiffs' motion based on the pleadings of the parties, without further oral
arguments. The court considered the arguments of the parties stated in their
On this point, private respondent maintain that the order of respondent judge dated pleadings as already sufficient to apprise the court of the issues involved in said
March 1 5, 1976 disapproving petitioners' Record on Appeal and appeal bond may not motion.
properly be a subject of a petition for certiorari. (Memorandum of Private Respondents,
p. 13)
Plaintiffs' allegation that the Clerk of Court failed to calendar their motion for
reconsideration for oral argument has not deprived the plaintiffs of any
We find the petition devoid of merit. substantial right or his right to due process.

We already ruled in Lebrilla, et al. v. Intermediate Appellate Court (G.R. No. 72623, SO ORDERED. (Memorandum of Private Respondents, pp. 1213)
December 18, 1989, 180 SCRA 188; 192) that an action for partition is imprescriptible.
However, an action for partition among co-heirs ceases to be such, and becomes one for
A cursory reading of the aforequoted order will show that there was indeed no formal
title where the defendants allege exclusive ownership.
hearing on the motion for reconsideration. There is no question however, that the motion
is grounded on the lack of basis in fact and in law of the order of dismissal and the
In the case at bar, the imprescriptibility of the action for partition cannot be invoked existence or lack of it is determined by a reference to the facts alleged in the challenged
because two of the co-heirs, namely private respondents Sora and Jose Espina pleading. The issue raised in the motion was fully discussed therein and in the opposition
thereto. Under such circumstances, oral argument on the motion is reduced to an All premises considered, the Court is convinced that the acts of respondent judge, in
unnecessary ceremony and should be overlooked (see Ethel Case, et al. v. Jugo, 77 dismissing the action for partition and in subsequently denying the motions for
Phil. 517, 522). reconsideration of the petitioners, does not amount to grave abuse of discretion.

We adhere to the findings of the trial court that the second motion for reconsideration ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DISMISSED.
dated August 11, 1975 ispro forma, to it
SO ORDERED.
The grounds stated in said motion being in reiteration of the same grounds
alleged in his first motion, the same is pro-forma. (Order dated March 15, 1976,
p. 2, Rollo, p. 74)

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the second motion for reconsideration has not stated new grounds
considering that the alleged failure of the Clerk of Court to set plaintiffs' motion
for reconsideration, although seemingly a different ground than those alleged in
their first motion for reconsideration, is only incidental to the issues raised in their
first motion for reconsideration, as it only refers to the right of plaintiffs' counsel to
argue his motion in court just to amplify the same grounds already deed by the
court. (Ibid, p. 3, Rollo, p. 75)

Therefore, it is very evident that the second motion for reconsideration being pro-
forma did not suspend the running of the period of appeal. Thus, the lower court
committed no error when it held that the notice of appeal was filed after the lapse of thirty
five (35) days, which is clearly beyond the period of thirty (30) days allowed by the rules.

Finally, it has been a basic rule that certiorari is not a substitute for appeal which had
been lost. (see Edra v. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R. No. 75041, November 13,
1989, 179 SCRA 344) A special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court will not
be a substitute or cure for failure to file a timely petition for review oncertiorari (appeal)
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. (Escudero v. Dulay, G.R. No. 60578, February 23,
1988, 158 SCRA 69, 77)

The application of the abovecited rule should be relaxed where it is shown that it will
result in a manifest failure or miscarriage of justice. (Ibid, p. 77) However, as emphasized
earlier, the case at bar is totally devoid of merit, thus, the strict application of the said file
will not in any way override sub-substantial justice.

Therefore, the delay of five (5) days in filing a notice of appeal and a motion for extension
to file a record on appeal cannot be excused on the basis of equity.
G.R. No. 180269 February 20, 2013 in possession, plus attorney’s fees of P5,000.00, litigation expenses and costs. On
CASILANG vs. CASILANG-DIZON March 23, 1998, the MTC issued a writ of execution; and on August 28, 1998, a Writ of
Demolition6was issued.
Before us is a petition for review of the Decision1 dated July 19, 2007 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619, which reversed and set aside the On June 2, 1998, the petitioners, counting 7 of the 8 children of Liborio and
Decision2 dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Francisca,7 filed with the RTC of Dagupan City a Complaint,8 docketed as Civil Case No.
Branch 41, in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D. 98-02371-D for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and Peaceful Possession with
Damages" against the respondents. On June 10, 1998, the petitioners moved for the
Antecedent Facts issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order, which the RTC
however denied on June 23, 1998.
The late spouses Liborio Casilang (Liborio) and Francisca Zacarias (Francisca) had eight
(8) children, namely: Felicidad Casilang (Felicidad), Ireneo Casilang (Ireneo), Marcelina Among the documents sought to be annulled was the 1997 Deed of Extrajudicial
Casilang (Marcelina), Jacinta Casilang (Jacinta), Bonifacio Casilang (Bonifacio), Leonora Partition executed by Ireneo’s children over Lot No. 4618, as well as TD No. 555, and by
Casilang (Leonora), Jose Casilang (Jose) and Flora Casilang (Flora). Liborio died necessary implication its derivatives, TD No. 15177 (for the lot) and TD No. 15176 (for
intestate on October 11, 1982 at the age of 83, followed not long after by his wife the house), both of which were issued in 1998 in the name of Rosario Casilang-Dizon.9
Francisca on December 25, 1982. Their son Bonifacio also died in 1986, survived by his
child Bernabe Casilang (Bernabe), while son Ireneo died on June 11, 1992, survived by The petitioners alleged in their complaint that all eight (8) children of Liborio entered into
his four (4) children, namely: Mario Casilang (Mario), Angelo Casilang (Angelo), Rosario a verbal partition of his estate, pursuant to which Jose was allotted Lot No. 4618 as his
Casilang-Dizon (Rosario) and Rodolfo Casilang (Rodolfo), herein respondents. share; that Ireneo never claimed ownership of Lot No. 4618, nor took possession of it,
because his share was the southwestern 1/5 portion of Lot No. 4676, containing an area
The estate of Liborio, which left no debts, consisted of three (3) parcels of land located of 1,308 sq m,10 of which he took exclusive possession during his lifetime; that Jose has
in Barangay Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan, namely: (1) Lot No. 4676, with an area of always resided in Lot No. 4618 since childhood, where he built his family’s semi-concrete
4,164 square meters; (2) Lot No. 4704, containing 1,164 sq m; and (3) Lot No. 4618, with house just a few steps away from his parents’ old bamboo hut; that he took in and cared
897 sq m. for his aged parents in his house until their deaths in 1982; that one of his children has
also built a house on the lot.11 Jose, said to be the most educated of the Casilang
On May 26, 1997, respondent Rosario filed with the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of siblings, worked as an insurance agent.12 The complete disposition of the intestate estate
Calasiao, Pangasinan a complaint for unlawful detainer, docketed as Civil Case No. 847, of Liborio per the parties’ verbal partition appears as follows:
to evict her uncle, petitioner Jose from Lot No. 4618. Rosario claimed that Lot No. 4618
was owned by her father Ireneo, as evidenced by Tax Declaration (TD) No. 555 issued in 1. Lot No. 4676, with 4,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 534 in Liborio’s
1994 under her father’s name. On April 3, 1997, the respondents executed a Deed of name,13 was verbally partitioned among Marcelina (236 sq m), Leonora (1,965 sq
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim3 whereby they adjudicated Lot No. 4618 to m), Flora (655 sq m), and Ireneo, represented by his children, the herein
themselves. In the same instrument, respondents Mario, Angelo and Rodolfo renounced respondents-defendants (1,308 sq m), as shown in a Deed of Extrajudicial
their respective shares in Lot No. 4618 in favor of Rosario. Partition with Quitclaim dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the
Casilang siblings and their representatives.
In his Answer, Jose raised the defense that he was the "lawful, absolute, exclusive
owner and in actual possession" of the said lot, and that he acquired the same "through 2. Lot No. 4704, with 1,164 sq m, declared under TD No. 276 in Liborio’s
intestate succession from his late father."4For some reason, however, he and his lawyer, name,14 was divided among Jacinta and Bonifacio, who died in 1986 and is now
who was from the Public Attorney’s Office, failed to appear at the scheduled pre-trial represented by his son Bernabe; and
conference, and Jose was declared in default; thus, the adverse judgment against him.5
3. Lot No. 4618, containing 897 sq m, declared since 1994 under TD No. 555 in
On February 18, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment finding Rosario to be the owner of Ireneo’s name,15 is now the subject of the controversy below. Jose insists that he
Lot No. 4618, and ordering Jose to remove his house, vacate Lot No. 4618, and pay succeeded to it per verbal partition, and that he and his family have always
Rosario P500.00 in monthly rentals from the filing of the complaint until she was placed
 occupied the same peacefully, adversely and exclusively even while their parents f) The RTC Clerk of Court and Ex-officio Provincial Sheriff would just be doing
were alive.16 her job if she and her deputies would implement the writ of execution/demolition
issued by the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan since it is its ministerial duty to do
For her part, Rosario alleged in her answer with counterclaim,17 which she filed on so;
September 15, 1998, that:
g) The Appellees have no cause of action; not having shown in their complaint
a) She is the actual and lawful owner of Lot No. 4618 with an area of 897 square the basis, the reason and the very core of their claim as to why the questioned
meters, having acquired the same by way of a Deed of Extra judicial Partition document should be nullified.18 (Citation omitted)
with Quitclaim dated 3 April 1997 which was duly executed among herein
Appellant ROSARIO and her brothers, namely, MARIO, ANGELO and In their reply19 to Rosario’s aforesaid answer, the petitioners asserted that the MTC
RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG; committed a grave error in failing to consider a material fact-that Jose had long been in
prior possession under a claim of title which he obtained by partition.
b) Her ownership over subject property could be traced back to her late father
IR[E]NEO which the latter inherited by way of intestate succession from his At the pre-trial conference in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the parties entered into the
deceased father LIBORIO sometime in 1992; that the residential house following stipulations:
described in herein Appellee JOSE’s complaint is an illegal structure built by him
in 1997 without her (ROSARIO’s) knowledge and consent; that in fact, an 1. That the late LIBORIO is the father of FELICIDAD, MARCELINA, JUANITA,
ejectment suit was filed against Appellee JOSE with the Municipal Trial Court in LEONORA, FLORA and IRENEO, all surnamed CASILANG;
Calasiao, Pangasinan in Civil Case No. 847;
2. That the late LIBORIO died in 1982; That the late LIBORIO and his family
c) The subject lot is never a portion of Appellee JOSE’s share from the intestate resided on Lot [No.] 4618 up to his death in 1982; That the house of the late
of his deceased father, LIBORIO; that on the contrary, the lot is his deceased LIBORIO is located on Lot [No.] 4618;
brother IR[E]NEO’s share from the late LIBORIO’s intestate estate; that in fact,
the property has long been declared in the name of the late IRENEO as shown 3. That Plaintiff JOSE used to reside on the lot in question because there was a
by Tax Declaration No. 555 long before his children ROSARIO DIZON, MARIO, case for ejectment filed against him;
ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG, executed the Deed of
Partition dated 18 February 1998; that Appellee JOSE had actually consumed his
4. That the house which was demolished is the family house of the late LIBORIO
shares which he inherited from his late father, and after a series of sales and
and FRANCISCA ZACARIAS with the qualification that it was given to the
dispositions of the same made by him, he now wants to take Appellants’
defendants;
property;
5. That the action involves members of the same family; and
d) Appellee JOSE is never the rightful owner of the lot in question and has not
shown any convincing proof of his supposed ownership; that the improvements
introduced by him, specifically the structures he cited are the subject of a Writ of 6. That no earnest efforts were made prior to the institution of the case in court.20
Demolition dated 28 August 1998 pursuant to the Order dated 17 August 1998 of
the MTC of Calasiao, Pangasinan; Ruling of the RTC

e) No protestation or objection was ever made by Appellee JOSE in Civil Case After a full trial on the merits, the RTC in its Decision21 dated April 21, 2003 decreed as
No. 847 (Unlawful Detainercase) where he was the defendant; that the truth was follows:
that his possession of the subject property was upon the tolerance and
benevolence of his late brother IRENEO during the latter’s lifetime and that WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the
Appellant ROSARIO; plaintiffs and against the defendants as follows:
 1. Declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 The RTC found baseless the claim of Rosario that Lot No. 4618 was an inheritance of
null and void; her father Ireneo considering that a tax declaration is not conclusive proof of ownership.
The RTC even noted that the tax declaration of Ireneo started only in 1994, although he
2. Declaring plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. as the lawful owner and possessor of had been dead since 1992. "Such being the case, the heirs of Ir[e]neo Casilang has [sic]
the subject Lot No. 4618 and as such, entitled to the peaceful possession of the no basis in adjudicating unto themselves Lot No. 4618 and partitioning the same by
same; executing the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim."27

3. Ordering the defendants to pay to plaintiff Jose Z. Casilang Sr. attorney’s fees Appeal to the CA
in the amount ofP20,000.00 and litigation expenses in the amount of P5,000.00,
and to pay the costs of suit. Undeterred, Rosario appealed to the CA averring that: (1) the lower court erred in
declaring the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim dated April 3, 1997 as null and
SO ORDERED.22 void; and (2) the lower court erred in declaring Jose as the lawful owner and possessor
of the subject Lot No. 4618.28
The RTC affirmed Jose’s ownership and possession of Lot No. 4618 by virtue of the oral
partition of the estate of Liborio by all the siblings. In the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition In the now assailed decision, the CA reversed the RTC by relying mainly on the factual
with Quitclaim23 dated January 8, 1998, subsequently executed by all the eight (8) findings and conclusions of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847, viz:
Casilang siblings and their legal representatives―with Ireneo represented by his four (4)
children, and Bonifacio by his son Bernabe―petitioners Jose, Felicidad, Jacinta and Per the records, the above described property was subject of Civil Case No. 847 decided
Bernabe, acknowledged that they had “already received their respective shares of by the MTC of Calasiao, First Judicial Region, Province of Pangasinan which rendered a
inheritance in advance,"24 and therefore, renounced their claims over Lot No. 4676 in judgment, supra, in favor of Appellant ROSARIO ordering herein Appellee JOSE and all
favor of co-heirs Marcelina, Leonora, Flora and Ireneo, as follows: persons claiming rights under him to vacate the land of Appellant ROSARIO. It was
found by the MTC that the latter is the owner of the subject parcel of land located at
We hereby RENOUNCED, WAIVED AND QUITCLAIM, all our rights, interests and Talibaew, Calasiao, Pangasinan; that the former owner of the land is the late IRENEO
participations over the WHOLE parcel of land [Lot No. 4676], left by the late, LIBORIO (who died on 11 June 1992), father of Appellant ROSARIO; that Extra Judicial Partition
CASILANG, in favor of our coheirs, namely: MARCELINA Z. CASILANG-PARAYNO, with Quitclaim was executed by and among the heirs of the late IRENEO; that MAURO
LEONORA Z. CASILANG-SARMIENTO, FLORA Z. CASILANG, MARIO A. CASILANG, [sic], ANGELO and RODOLFO, all surnamed CASILANG waived and quitclaimed their
ANGELO A. CASILANG, ROSARIO A. CASILANGDIZON AND RODOLFO A. respective shares over the subject property in favor of Appellant ROSARIO; that
CASILANG.25 Appellee JOSE was allowed by the late IRENEO during his lifetime to occupy a portion of
the land without a contract of lease and no rentals being paid by the former; that
Thus, Jose expressly renounced his share in Lot No. 4676, which has an area of 4,164 Appellant ROSARIO allowed Appellee JOSE to continue occupying the land after the
sq m, because he had already received in advance his share in his father’s estate, Lot Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim was executed.29
No. 4618 with 897 sq m:
Moreover, noting that the decision in Civil Case No. 847 in favor of Rosario was issued
To the mind of the court, Jose Casilang could have not [sic] renounced and waived his on February 18, 1998 while the petitioners’ complaint in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D was
rights and interests over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not his, while filed on June 2, 1998, the CA concluded that the latter case was a mere afterthought:
the other lot, Lot [No.] 470[4], was divided between sister Jacinta Casilang and brother
Bonifacio Casilang[,] Sr., who was represented by his son. In the same [way] as testified If the latter has really a strong and valid reason to question the validity of the Deed of
to by plaintiffs Felicidad Casilang and Jacinta Casilang, they signed the Deed of Extra Judicial Partition with Quitclaim, supra, he could have done it soon after the said
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim wherein they waived and renounced their rights and Deed was executed on 3 April 1997. However, curiously enough, it was only when the
interests over Lot [No.] 4676 because they have already received their share, which is MTC ordered his eviction from the subject property that he decided to file the instant
Lot [No.] 470[4].26 case against the Appellants.30

Petition for Review in the Supreme Court

Now in this petition for review on certiorari, petitioners maintain that: his ownership over Lot No. 4618 under a partition agreement with his co-heirs, and
seeks to invalidate Ireneo’s "claim" over Lot No. 4618 and to declare TD No. 555 void,
IN UPHOLDING THE LEGALITY [OF] THE DEED OF EXTRAJUDICIAL PARTITION and consequently, to annul the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Quitclaim executed by
AND QUITCLAIM DATED APRIL 3, 1997, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS Ireneo’s heirs.
GROSSLY VIOLATED THE SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT OF JOSE Z. CASILANG, SR. AS
DIRECT COMPULSORY HEIR.31 It is imperative to review the CA’s factual conclusions since they are entirely
contrary to those of the RTC, they have no citation of specific supporting
Our Ruling and Discussions evidence, and are premised on the supposed absence of evidence, particularly on
the parties’ verbal partition, but are directly contradicted by the evidence on
There is merit in the petition. record.

Inferior courts are empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the It must be noted that the factual findings of the MTC, which the CA adopted without
defendant in an ejectment suit, but only to resolve the issue of possession; its question, were obtained through Summary Procedure and were based solely on the
determination is not conclusive on the issue of ownership. complaint and affidavits of Rosario, after Jose had been declared in default. But since a
full trial was had in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D, the CA should have pointed out the
specific errors and weaknesses in the RTC’s factual conclusions before it could rule that
It is well to be reminded of the settled distinction between a summary action of ejectment
Jose was unable to present "any evidentiary support" to establish his title, and that his
and a plenary action for recovery of possession and/or ownership of the land. What really
continued possession of Lot No. 4618 was by mere tolerance of Rosario. At most,
distinguishes an action for unlawful detainer from a possessory action (accion publiciana)
however, the CA only opined that it was conjectural for the RTC to conclude, that Jose
and from a reinvindicatory action (accion reinvindicatoria) is that the first is limited to the
had already received his inheritance when he renounced his share in Lot No. 4676. It
question of possession de facto. Unlawful detainer suits (accion interdictal) together with
then ruled that the RTC erred in not considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No.
forcible entry are the two forms of ejectment suit that may be filed to recover possession
847-that Jose’s possession over subject property was by mere tolerance. Said the
of real property. Aside from the summary action of ejectment, accion publiciana or the
appellate court:
plenary action to recover the right of possession and accion reinvindicatoria or the action
to recover ownership which also includes recovery of possession, make up the three
kinds of actions to judicially recover possession.32 Given the claim of the Appellee that Lot [No.] 4618 was orally given/assigned to him by
his deceased father LIBORIO, or that his claim was corroborated by his sisters (his co-
plaintiffs-Appellees), or that their claim is indubitably tied up with the Deed of
Under Section 3 of Rule 70 of the Rules of Court, the Summary Procedure governs the
Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim over Lot No. 4676, still We cannot fully agree with
two forms of ejectment suit, the purpose being to provide an expeditious means of
the pronouncement of the court a quo that Appellee JOSE could not have renounced and
protecting actual possession or right to possession of the property. They are not
waived his rights and interest over Lot [No.] 4676 if he believes that Lot [No.] 4618 is not
processes to determine the actual title to an estate. If at all, inferior courts are
his. Wanting any evidentiary support, We find this stance as conjectural being
empowered to rule on the question of ownership raised by the defendant in such suits,
unsubstantiated by law or convincing evidence. At the most and taking the factual or
only to resolve the issue of possession and its determination on the ownership issue is
legal circumstances as shown by the records, We hold that the court a quo erred in not
not conclusive.33 As thus provided in Section 16 of Rule 70:
considering the findings of the MTC in Civil Case No. 847 ruling that herein Appellee
JOSE’s possession over subject property was by mere tolerance. Based as it is on mere
Sec. 16. Resolving defense of ownership.―When the defendant raises the defense of tolerance, Appellee JOSE’s possession therefore could not, in any way, ripen into
ownership in his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without ownership.35 (Citations omitted)
deciding the issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to
determine the issue of possession.
By relying solely on the MTC’s findings, the CA completely ignored the testimonial,
documentary and circumstantial evidence of the petitioners, obtained by the RTC after a
It is apropos, then, to note that in contrast to Civil Case No. 847, which is an ejectment full trial on the merits. More importantly, the CA did not point to any evidence of Rosario
case, Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is for "Annulment of Documents, Ownership and that Ireneo had inherited Lot No. 4618 from Liborio. All it did was adopt the findings of
Peaceful Possession;" it is an accion reinvindicatoria, or action to recover ownership, the MTC.
which necessarily includes recovery of possession34 as an incident thereof. Jose asserts
The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and unless the case falls under any of the well- 1. In his testimony, Jose claimed that his parents’ bamboo house in Lot No. 4618
defined exceptions, the Supreme Court will not delve once more into the findings of facts. disintegrated from wear and tear; so he took them in to his semi-concrete house
In Sps. Sta. Maria v. CA,36 this Court stated: in the same lot, which was just a few steps away, and he cared for them until
they died; shortly before Liborio’s death, and in the presence of all his siblings,
Settled is the rule that the jurisdiction of this Court in cases brought before it from the his father Liborio assigned Lot No. 4618 to him as his inheritance; his house was
Court of Appeals via Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited to reviewing errors of law. demolished in 1998 as a result of the ejectment case filed against him; but his
Findings of fact of the latter are conclusive, except in the following instances: (1) when family continued to live thereat after reconstructing the house; Ireneo and his
the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises, or conjectures; (2) when the family did not live in Lot No. 4618; although Jose’s job as an insurance agent
inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd, or impossible; (3) when there is grave took him around Pangasinan, he always came home to his family in his house in
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) Lot No. 4618, which he used as his permanent address; only Lot No. 4676 was
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of included in the Deed of Extrajudicial Partition dated January 8, 1998 because Lot
Appeals went beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the No. 4618 had already been distributed to Jose, and Lot No. 4704 had already
admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to been assigned to Jacinta and Bonifacio as their share in their father’s estate.38
those of the trial court; (8) when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific
evidence on which they are based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as 2. Jose’s testimony was corroborated by petitioners
in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondent; and (10) Felicidad,39 Jacinta,40 Leonora,41 and Flora,42 who all confirmed that their brother
when the findings of fact are premised on the supposed absence of evidence and Jose has always resided in Lot No. 4618 from his childhood up to the present,
contradicted by the evidence on record.37 (Citation omitted) that he took their aged parents into his house after their bamboo house was
destroyed, and he attended to their needs until they died in 1982. The sisters
In the instant case, the factual findings of the CA and the RTC are starkly contrasting. were also one in saying that their father Liborio verbally willed Lot No. 4618 to
Moreover, we find that the CA decision falls under exceptions (7), (8) and (10) above, Jose as his share in his estate, and that their actual partition affirmed their
which warrants another review of its factual findings. father’s dispositions. Jacinta claimed that she and Bonifacio have since taken
possession of Lot No. 4704 pursuant to their partition, and have also declared
The evidence supporting Rosario’s claim of sole ownership of Lot No. 4618 is the Deed their respective portions for tax purposes.43 Flora corroborated Jacinta on their
of Extrajudicial Partition with Quitclaim, which she executed with her brothers Mario, taking possession of Lot No. 4704, as well as that Jose built his house on Lot No.
Angelo and Rodolfo. There is no question that by itself, the said document would have 4618 next to his parents and they came to live with him in their old age. Flora
fully conveyed to Rosario whatever rights her brothers might have in Lot No. 4618. But affirmed that Exhibit "F" correctly reflects their verbal partition of Lot No. 4676,
what needs to be established first is whether or not Ireneo did in fact own Lot No. 4618 and that she was fully in accord with it. She added that Felicidad and Marcelina
through succession, as Rosario claims. And here now lies the very crux of the had since constructed their own houses on the portions of Lot No. 4676 assigned
controversy. to them.44 Felicidad mentioned that in their partition, Ireneo was given a portion of
Lot No. 4676, while Lot No. 4704 was divided between Jacinta and Bonifacio,
and Jose alone got Lot No. 4618. Leonora confirmed that they were all present
A review of the parties’ evidence shows that they entered into an oral partition,
when their father made his above dispositions of his estate.
giving Lot No. 4618 to Jose as his share, whereas Rosario presented no proof
whatsoever that her father inherited Lot No. 4618 from his father Liborio.
3. Benjamin Lorenzo, a long-time neighbor of the Casilangs testified that Jose’s
house stands on Lot No. 4618 and Ireneo did not live with his family on the said
Rosario’s only proof of Ireneo’s ownership is TD No. 555, issued in his name, but she did
lot but was a tenant in another farm some distance away.45
not bother to explain why it was dated 1994, although Ireneo died on June 11, 1992.
Liborio’s ownership of Lot No. 4618 is admitted by all the parties, but it must be asked
whether in his lifetime Liborio did in fact transmit it to Ireneo, and if not, whether it was 4. For her part, Rosario merely asserted that her father Ireneo succeeded to Lot
conveyed to him by Liborio’s heirs. It is imperative for Rosario to have presented proof of No. 4618 from Liborio, as shown in TD No. 555 (Exhibit "1"); that she and her
this transfer to Ireneo, in such a form as would have vested ownership in him. We find, brothers extra-judicially settled Ireneo’s estate, and that they each waived their
instead, a preponderance of contrary evidence. shares in her favor; and, that she has been paying taxes on Lot No. 4618.
Rosario admitted, however, that Jose has lived in the lot since he was a child,
and he has reconstructed his house thereon after its court-ordered
demolition.46 But Rosario on cross-examination backtracked by claiming that it years, but obviously, by then Liborio’s house had long been gone. Again,
was her father Ireneo and grandfather Liborio who built the old house in Lot No. confusedly, Rosario denied that she knew of her father’s share in Lot No. 4676.
4618, where Ireneo resided until his death; he even planted various fruit trees.
Yet, there is no mention whatsoever to this effect by any of the witnesses. From the testimonies of the parties, we are convinced that the conclusion of the RTC is
Rosario also contradicted herself when she denied that Jose lived there because well-supported that there was indeed a verbal partition among the heirs of Liborio,
his job as insurance agent took him away often and yet admitted that Jose’s pursuant to which each of his eight children received his or her share of his estate, and
house stands there, which he reconstructed after it was ordered demolished by that Jose’s share was Lot No. 4618.
the MTC. Inexplicably, Rosario disclaimed knowledge of Ireneo’s share in Lot No.
4676, although she was a signatory, along with her brothers and all the The parties’ verbal partition is valid, and has been ratified by their taking
petitioners, in the deed of partition of the said lot, whereby she got 1,308 sq m. possession of their respective shares.
Rosario also admitted that taxes were paid on the lot only beginning in 1997, not
before.47
The validity of an oral partition is well-settled in our jurisdiction. In Vda. de Espina v.
Abaya,53 this Court declared that an oral partition is valid:
5. Benjamin Dizon, husband of Rosario, testified that Rosario was losing appetite
and sleep because of the case filed by Jose; that Ireneo died in another farm;
Anent the issue of oral partition, We sustain the validity of said partition. "An agreement
that Ireneo had a house in Lot No. 4618 but Jose took over the house after he
of partition may be made orally or in writing. An oral agreement for the partition of the
died in 1992.48 Respondent Angelo, brother of Rosario, claimed that when he
property owned in common is valid and enforceable upon the parties. The Statute of
was 13 or 14 years old, he heard his grandfather tell his father Ireneo that he
Frauds has no operation in this kind of agreements, for partition is not a conveyance of
would inherit Lot No. 4618. On cross-examination, Angelo insisted that his father
property but simply a segregation and designation of the part of the property which
had always lived with his family in his grandfather’s house in Lot No. 4618, that
belong to the co-owners."54
Jose did not live there but was given another lot, although he could not say which
lot it was; he admitted that his grandmother lived with Jose when she died, and
Ireneo’s share was in Lot No. 4676.49 In Maestrado v. CA,55 the Supreme Court upheld the partition after it found that it
conformed to the alleged oral partition of the heirs, and that the oral partition was
confirmed by the notarized quitclaims executed by the heirs subsequently.56 In Maglucot-
6. On rebuttal, Jose recounted that after his four children were married, Ireneo
Aw v. Maglucot,57 the Supreme Court elaborated on the validity of parol partition:
lived as a tenant in another farm; that during a period of illness he lived in Manila
for some time, and later resided in Cagayan with his two married sons; and lastly
on his return, worked as a tenant of the Maningding family for about 10 years in On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity
Calasiao, staying in a hut one kilometer away. Jose also claimed that Ireneo had have enforce [sic] oral partition when it has been completely or partly performed.
asked Liborio for a portion of Lot No. 4676, a lot which is bigger than Lot No.
4618 by several hundreds of square meters.50 Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable
at law, equity will [in] proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been
7. On sur-rebuttal, Rosario claimed that her grandparents, father and mother consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by
lived in Lot No. 4618 when she was a child until she married and left in 1976; that the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol
her uncle Jose asked permission from Liborio to be allowed to stay there with his partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held or stated in a
family. She admitted that Jose built his house in 1985, three years after Liborio number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession,
died, but as if to correct herself, she also claimed that Jose built his house in Lot exercised acts of ownership, or otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that
No. 4676, and notin Lot No. 4618. (Contrarily, her aunt Leonora testified that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance with the
Jose built his house in Lot No. 4618 while their parents were alive.)51 Moreover, if possession in severalty.
such was the case, Rosario did not explain why she filed Civil Case No. 847, if
she thought her uncle built his house in Lot No. 4676, and not in Lot No. In numerous cases it has been held or stated that parol partition may be sustained on the
4618.52 Rosario also claimed that Ireneo always came home in the evenings to ground of estoppel of the parties to assert the rights of a tenant in common as to parts of
his father Liborio’s house from the Maningding farm, which he tenanted for 10 land divided by parol partition as to which possession in severalty was taken and acts of
individual ownership were exercised. And a court of equity will recognize the agreement
and decree it to be valid and effectual for the purpose of concluding the right of the WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July
parties as between each other to hold their respective parts in severalty. 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 79619 is hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, and the Decision dated April 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of
A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have Dagupan City, Branch 41 in Civil Case No. 98-02371-D is REINSTATED.
acquiesced in and ratified the partition by taking possession in severalty, exercising acts
of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the partition. SO ORDERED.

A number of cases have specifically applied the doctrine of part performance, or have --- xxx END OF ACTION FOR PARTITION xxx ---
stated that a part performance is necessary, to take a parol partition out of the operation
of the statute of frauds. It has been held that where there was a partition in fact between
tenants in common, and a part performance, a court of equity would have regard to and
enforce such partition agreed to by the parties.58

Jose’s possession of Lot No. 4618 under a claim of ownership is well borne out by the
records. It is also consistent with the claimed verbal partition with his siblings, and fully
corroborated by his sisters Felicidad, Jacinta, Leonora, and Flora, who further testified
that they each had taken possession of their own shares and built their houses thereon.

A possessor of real estate property is presumed to have title thereto unless the adverse
claimant establishes a better right.59 Moreover, under Article 541 of the Civil Code, one
who possesses in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title, and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. Similarly, Article
433 of the Civil Code provides that actual possession under a claim of ownership raises
a disputable presumption of ownership. Thus, actual possession and exercise of
dominion over definite portions of the property in accordance with an alleged partition are
considered strong proof of an oral partition60 which the Court will not hesitate to uphold.

Tax declarations and tax receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership.

It is settled that tax declarations and tax receipts alone are not conclusive evidence of
ownership. They are merely indicia of a claim of ownership,61 but when coupled with
proof of actual possession of the property, they can be the basis of claim of ownership
through prescription.62 In the absence of actual, public and adverse possession, the
declaration of the land for tax purposes does not prove ownership.63 We have seen that
there is no proof that Liborio, or the Casilang siblings conveyed Lot No. 4618 to Ireneo.
There is also no proof that Ireneo himself declared Lot No. 4618 for tax purposes, and
even if he or his heirs did, this is not enough basis to claim ownership over the subject
property. The Court notes that TO No. 555 was issued only in 1994, two years after
Ireneo's death. Rosario even admitted that she began paying taxes only in 1997.64 More
impmiantly, Ireneo never claimed Lot No. 4618 nor took possession of it in the concept of
owner.