SECURE ZONE ROUTING PROTOCOL IN MANETS

Garvita Khajuria M.Tech (ECE) 2011emc01

CONTENTS

Mobile Ad Hoc Networks Routing In Mobile Ad Hoc Network Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) Security Attacks On Ad Hoc Routing Protocols Authenticated Routing For Ad Hoc Networks (ARAN) Secure Zone RoutingProtocol (SZRP) Secure Intra-zone Routing Secure Inter-zone Routing Reference Simulation Results Conclusion Future work

MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS

Comprised of mobile computing devices (nodes) Use wireless transmission for communication No established infrastructure or centralized administration Figure shows an example of mobile ad hoc network and its communication technology.

CHARACTERISITICS & DESIGN CONSTRAINTS

Wireless medium: Wireless medium has neither absolute, nor readily observable boundaries. Autonomous and infrastructureless: Each node operates in distributed mode, as an independent router and generates independent data Dynamic network topology: Nodes can move arbitrarily, resulting in route changes and possibly packet losses Limited availability of resources: Batteries have limited power supply, processing power is limited, which limits services.

MANET APPLICATIONS

Military applications. Emergency systems

Commercial uses
Collaborative and distributed computing. Wireless sensor networks.

ROUTING IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK

Proactive Protocols: maintain consistent, up-to-date routing information between every pair of nodes in the network by propagating, proactively, route updates at fixed intervals

Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR)Protocol:

Each node computes its MPRs from its set of neighbours. When ever a node broadcasts a message, only those neighbours in its MPR set rebroadcast the message. a node only lists its connections to those neighbours that have selected it as an MPR.

OPTIMIZED LINK STATE ROUTING (OLSR)PROTOCOL

Each node starts with an empty MPR set. The N is defined to be the set of onehop neighbours . N2 is the set of two-hop bidirectional neighbours. First nodes that are selected for the MPR set are those nodes in N that are the only neighbours of some node in N2. The degree of each node n in N that is not in the MPR set is calculated. Once all the nodes in N2 are covered, the process terminates. Each nodes MPR set is selected, routing path within the network can be determined.

ROUTING IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK

On-demand or Reactive Protocols: Establish a route to a destination when there is a demand for it. Once a route has been established, it is maintained by the node until destination becomes inaccessible or the route is no longer used.

Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing.

Minimizes no of required broadcasts by creating routes on a demand basis. Nodes that are not on a selected path do not maintain routing information or participate in routing table exchanges. Source node desires to send a msg to destination ,it initiates a path discovery process to locate the other node

AD HOC ON DEMAND DISTANCE VECTOR (AODV) ROUTING.

Each node maintains a broadcast ID. The broadcast ID is incremented for every RREQ the node initiates (fig (a)). Nodes record in their route tables the address of the neighbour from which the first copy of the broadcast packet is received, thereby establishing a reverse path. Once the RREQ reaches ,destination responds by a route reply (RREP) packet back to the neighbour from which it first received the RREQ (Fig. b). As the RREP packet is routed back along the reverse path, nodes along this path set up forward route entries it indicates the active forward route.

ROUTING IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORK

Hybrid Routing Protocols: Mixture of proactive & reactive protocols perform well in dynamic network conditions.

Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP):

combining best properties of both proactive and reactive When a node has a data packet, it checks if destination is within its zone or not. If within the zone, the packet is routed proactively. Reactive routing is used if the destination is outside the zone.

ZONE ROUTING PROTOCOL (ZRP)

Routing zone of S includes the nodes AI, but not K. The nodes of a zone are divided into peripheral nodes and interior nodes. (Figure) AF are interior nodes, GJ are peripheral nodes and node K is outside the routing zone. H can be reached by two paths, one with length 2 and one with length 3 hops.

ZRP ROUTING COMPONENT

Intra zone Routing Protocol (IARP)

Inter zone Routing Protocol (IERP)

Node communicate with interior nodes of it's zone and is limited by the zones radius. Pro-active, table-driven protocol. Node continuously needs to update routing information Allows for local route optimization through removal of redundant routes and the shortening of routes

Reactive approach enables communication with nodes in other zones. Node does not send a query back to the nodes the request came from, even if they are peripheral nodes Take advantage of the local routing information provided by the IARP Delay caused by the route discovery is minimized through the use of bordercasting.

SECURITY IN MOBILE AD HOC NETWORKS

Confidentiality: Information in the network is never disclosed to unauthorized entities.

Integrity: message being transferred between nodes is never altered or corrupted. Availability: The requested services (e.g. bandwidth and connectivity) are available in a timely manner. Authenticity: Network service to determine a users identity.

SECURITY ATTACKS ON AD HOC ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Information disclosure Attack

Node leaks confidential information to unauthorized nodes in the network.

Attacks using Impersonation

Attacker assumes the identity and privileges of an authorized node to make use of network resources.
Man-in-the-Middle Attack: malicious node impersonates the receiver with respect to the sender & vice versa. Sybil Attack: attacker pretends to have multiple identities. A malicious node can behaves as if it were a larger no of nodes by impersonating other nodes or by claiming false identities.

SECURITY ATTACKS ON AD HOC ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Attacks using Modification

Attack disrupts routing function by having attacker illegally modifying content of the msg.
Misrouting Attack: Non-legitimate node redirects routing message and sends data packet to the wrong destination Byzantine attack: Intermediate node collectively carries out attacks such as, routing packets on non-optimal paths and selectively dropping packets. Denial of service (DoS) attack: Attacker attempts to prevent legitimate and authorized users of services offered by the network from accessing those services.

SECURITY ATTACKS ON AD HOC ROUTING PROTOCOLS

Attacks using Fabrication

Intruder generates false routing messages in order to disturb network operation .

Resource Consumption Attack: malicious node deliberately tries to consume the resources (e.g. battery power, bandwidth, etc.) of other nodes. Black Hole Attack: malicious node falsely advertises good path to the destination node during the path finding process

REQUIREMENTS FOR A SECURE ROUTING PROTOCOL

Routing messages cannot be altered in transit. Fabricated routing messages cannot be injected into the network Routing loops cannot be formed through malicious action Routes cannot be redirected from the shortest path by malicious action Unauthorized nodes should be excluded from route computation and discovery Network topology must not be exposed by the routing messages to authorized nodes.

AUTHENTICATED ROUTING FOR AD HOC NETWORKS (ARAN)

On-demand protocol designed to provide secure communications Each node in ARAN receives a certificate after securely authenticating its identity to a trusted certificate server Certificate contains the nodes IP address, its public key, as well as the time of issuing & expiration. Existence of a secure path to the destination.

Node A receives a certificate as T A: certA = [IPA, KA+, t, e] KT

AUTHENTICATED ROUTING FOR AD HOC NETWORKS (ARAN)

All the fields are concatenated and signed with source node Is private key I broadcasts a RDP for a destination D as: I brdcst: [RDP, IPD, certI, NI, t] KI After RDP, D sends REP packet back along the reverse path to I. REP packet is sent as: D J: [REP, IPI, certD, NI, t] KD I on receiving the REP packet, verifies the destinations signature KD. When no traffic on existing route,then that route is deactivated. Nodes use ERR message to report links in active routes broken due to node movement

SECURE ZONE ROUTING PROTOCOL (SZRP)

Combines best features of both proactive and reactive approaches & adds its own security mechanisms. Selecting ZRP as the basis for SZRP are

Based on concept of routing zones, more feasible to apply the security mechanisms within a restricted area. Separate nodes in terms of interior and exterior, certain information etc. can be hidden to the exterior nodes Incase of a failure, it can be restricted to a zone.

Address all security concerns like packet integrity & data confidentiality

SECURE ZONE ROUTING PROTOCOL (SZRP)

Each node has two pairs of private/public keys, one pair for signing and verifying and the other for encrypting and decrypting. For Node X

Signing keys are SKX Verifying VKX Encrypting Keys are EKX Decrypting keys DKX SKX and DKX are private keys whereas VKX and EKX are public keys

SZRP assumes the presence of trusted certification servers called authorities (CAs) Communicating nodes which we call the common nodes (CNs). Each CN before taking part in communication need to be certified by some CA and are granted public keys.

CERTIFICATION PROCESS

Each

node requests a certificate from its nearest CA..

A

common node X receives a certificate from its nearest CA as follows: CA X: certX = [IPX, VKX, EKX, t, e] | signCA where, signCA = [IPX, VKX, EKX, t, e] SKCA
Contains

the IP address of

X Two public keys VKX and EKX of X, one for verifying the signature signed by X and other for encrypting a packet to be send to X

Timestamp t of when the certificate was created

T

time e at which the certificate expire

SZRP

SIARP computes the route to all intrazone nodes in SIARP routing table.

Node A computes the route to B, T, E, F and Y and stores in its SIARP routing table (proactive route computation) If node A has a packet destined for node Y, the packet is forwarded to Y using SIARP. If node A wants to transmit a packet to Z, then interzone routing is performed using SIERP

SECURE INTRA-ZONE ROUTING

Steps taken by SIARP (at node A) to route a data packet from A to Y.

A looks for the route to Y in its SIARP routing table and finds it to be A-F-Y. A sends SKREQ packet to Y requesting KAY between A and Y. A Y : [SKREQ, IPY, certA] | signA

where, signA = [SKREQ, IPY, certA] SKA SKREQ packet contains a packet type identifier SKREQ IP address of Y As certificate, all appended by the signature signA of A signed using SKA.

SECURE INTRA-ZONE ROUTING

Y on receiving this request, verifies using VKA

creates the session key KAY, encrypts it using EKA and sends it to A as SKREP packet along the reverse route Y-F-A.

Y A : [SKREP, IPA, certY, {KAY}EKA] | signY where, signY = [SKREP, IPA, certY, {KAY}EKA] SKY

packet type identifier SKREP IP address of A certificate of Y session key encrypted using EKA decrypts it using DKA extracts the session key KAY. Once A gets KAY, it can encrypt the data packet and send it to Y . Further communication between A and Y takes place similarly, using this session key.

A on receiving the SKREP packet, verifies using VKY

SECURE INTER-ZONE ROUTING

Steps are taken by SIERP to route the data packet from A to Z SIERP at A begins the secure route discovery process to Z by bordercasting a SRD packet with the help of MBRP. A bordercast : [SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] | signA where, signA = [SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] SKA

packet type identifier SRD IP address of Z As certificate, the zone radius nonce NA created by A current time t.

SECURE INTER-ZONE ROUTING

When T, E or Y receives the SRD, it checks the (IPA, NA, t) to verify that it has not already processed this SRD.
Receiving node uses As public key, to validate the signature When T receives SRD it sets up a reverse path back to A by recording the neighbour B .. Since none of the nodes T, E and Y has the route to Z , all rebordercasts the SRD to their peripheral nodes like T rebordercasts the SRD to K.

Tbordercast : [[SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] | signA ] | signT, certT

where, signT =[[SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] signA]]SKT

SECURE INTER-ZONE ROUTING

Ts peripheral node K checks the (IPA, NA, t) validates Ts signature and sets up the reverse path to T .
K removes Ts certificate and signature. It checks in its SIARP routing table whether it has a valid path to Z

Kbordercast : [[SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] | signA ] | signK, certK where, signK =[[SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] | signA]]SKK

When SDR reaches J, it validates the packet, sets up the reverse path to D, removes Ds certificate and signature, signs the contents of the message originally bordercast by A, appends this signature and its certificate and forwards the SRD to Z.

JZ : [[SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] | signA ] | signJ, certJ where, signH =[[SRD, IPZ, certA, , NA, t] | signA]]SKJ

SECURE INTER-ZONE ROUTING

SRD arrives at Z, Z on getting this SRD packet verifies it using both VKJ and VKA, confirms its authenticity and extracts EKA.

Z creates a secure route reply (SRR) packet ,The first node that receives the SRR sent by Z is H.

ZH : [SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ where, signZ = [SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA]SKZ

Since, J is the next hop node to the source A after H:

HJ : [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] | signH, certH Where, signH = [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] SKH

J removes Hs signature and certificate and unicast to L

.JL : [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] | signJ, certJ Where, signJ = [[SRR, IPA, certZ, NA, t, {KAZ}EKA] | signZ] SKJ

Each node checks the nonce and signature of the previous hop Eventually the source A receives the SRR.

SECURE INTER-ZONE ROUTING

On getting the SRR

A verifies Zs signature to conform its authenticity Extracts the session key KAZ A encrypt the data packet using KAZ and send it to Z along the same route.

ROUTE MAINTENANCE
Required in SIERP for inter zone routing. SIERP keeps track of routes whether they are active or not. A node generates an ERR message in either of the following cases:

if data is received on an inactive route, or link of an active route is broken due to node mobility

For a route between A and destination X, a node M generates the ERR message for its neighbour N as follows: MN : [ERR, IPA, IPX, certM, NM, t] | signM Where, signM =[ERR, IPA, IPX, certM, NM, t] SKM ERR messages are signed so malicious nodes cannot generate ERR messages for other nodes.

SECURITY ASPECTS
SZRP

ZRP

No hop count information is present in the SRD or SRR packets. Accept those packets that have been signed with a certified key issued by a CA. This prevents man-in the-middle attack and sybil attack. Does not prevent fabrication of routing messages, but it does offer a deterrent by ensuring non-repudiation

Compromised node may leak confidential information to unauthorized Attacker assumes the identity and privileges of an authorized node. Sybil attack is common Intruder generates false routing messages, such as routing updates and route error messages.

REFERENCE SIMULATION RESULTS

PACKET DELIVERY FRACTION

Packet delivery fraction obtained using SZRP is above 96%

SZRP is highly effective in discovering and maintaining routes for delivery of data packets, even with relatively high node mobility.

AVERAGE ROUTING LOAD IN BYTES

Byte routing load of SZRP is higher compared to that of ZRP.

Nearly 40% for 20 nodes as compared to 22% for ZRP with identical topology

AVERAGE ROUTE ACQUISITION LATENCY

Average route acquisition latency for SZRP is approximately 1.7 times as that of ZRP.

PERCENTAGE OF PACKETS DROPPED THAT PASSED THROUGH MALICIOUS NODES

SZRP, a much larger fraction of packets that passed through malicious nodes were dropped, as compared to that of ZRP.

In the presence of 30% malicious nodes with no node mobility, only 26% of packets were dropped when using ZRP, as compared to almost 47% when using SZRP.

CONCLUSION

SZRP is a simple protocol that supports nodes with moderate resources and does not require significant additional work from the nodes within the group. The reference simulation results showed that SZRP is as efficient as ZRP in discovering and maintaining routes. It has a more robust security system and is resistance to various security attacks.

FUTURE WORKS
The SZRP protocol considers that, the certification authorities (CAs) are safe within the network and are free from any kind of attacks caused either by external advisory or internal compromised nodes. A possible extension of the work may include employing additional feature to SZRP so that it can handle a scenario where the trusted certification authorities are compromised or attacked.

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R.K nami ,szrp efficient over zrp/july2010

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