IEC 61508 IEC 61511 Presentation

Document last revised 20 May 2005

G.M. International s.r.l

Via San Fiorano, 70 20058 Villasanta (Milano) ITALY www.gmintsrl.com info@gmintsrl.com

Standard Definitions
Title: Standard for Functional Safety of Electrical / Electronic / Programmable Electronic Safety-Related System IEC 61511 has been developed as a Process Sector of IEC 61508 Title: Safety Instrumented Systems for the Process Industry

Standard History
The IEC 61508 was conceived to define and harmonize a method to reduce risks of human and/or valuable harms in all environments. The IEC 61508 integrates and extends American Standard ISA-S84.01 (1996) and German DIN 19250 (1994).

Standard Requirements

Other related standards

DIN 19250 (1994)
Title: Fundamental Safety aspects to be considered for measuring and control equipment Deals with Quantitative Risk Analysis used for Part 5 of IEC 61508, classification in AK classes 1-8 similar to SIL levels

ISA-S84.01 (1996)
Title: Application of Safety Instrumented Systems (SIS) for the process industry Defines Safety Lifecycles assuming Risk analysis and SIL been carried out.

Fundamental Concepts
Risk Reduction and Risk Reduction Factor (RRF) Safety Integrity Level (SIL) Independence Levels and consequences Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) Reliability Availability Failure Rate () Proof Test Interval between two proof tests (T[Proof]) Failure In Time (FIT) Mean Time To Failure (MTTF) Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) Mean Time To Repair (MTTR) Safe Failure Fraction (SFF) Safety Lifecycle Safety Instrumented System (SIS)

Fundamental Concepts

Risk Reduction
As Low As Reasonably Practicable or Tollerable Risk
(ALARP ZONE)

Fundamental Concepts

Risk Reduction

Fundamental Concepts

Safety Integrity Level (SIL)

SIL levels (Safety Integrity Level) RRF (Risk Reduction Factor) PFD avg (Average Probability of Failure on Demand)

SIL Table for Demand and Continuous mode of Operation

Fundamental Concepts

Independence Levels
Assessement Independence Level as a function of consequences

Fundamental Concepts

PFDavg / RRF
Correlation between Probability of Failure on Demand and Risk Reduction Factor

Fundamental Concepts

Reliability
Reliability is a function of operating time. All reliability functions start from reliability one and decrease to reliability zero. The device must be successful for an entire time interval. The statement: Reliability = 0.76 for a time of 100.000 hs makes perfect sense.

R(t) = P(T>t)

Fundamental Concepts

Reliability
Reliability is the probability that a device will perform its intended function when required to do so, if operated within its specified design limits.
The device intended function must be known. When the device is required to function must be judged. Satisfactory performance must be determined. The specified design limits must be known.

Mathematically reliability is the probability that a device will be successful in the time interval from zero to t in term of a random variable T.

Fundamental Concepts

Availability
Availability is the probability that a device is successful at time t. No time interval is involved. A device is available if its operating. The measure of success is MTTF (Mean Time To Failure)

Fundamental Concepts

MTTF
MTTF is an indication of the average successful operating time of a device (system) before a failure in any mode. MTBF (Mean Time Between Failures) MTBF = MTTF + MTTR MTTF = MTBF - MTTR MTTR (Mean Time To Repair) Since (MTBF >> MTTR) MTBF is very near to MTTF in value.

Fundamental Concepts

MTBF and Failure Rate

Relation between MTBF and Failure Rate
Failure per unit time Quantity Exposed 1 MTBF

= ----------------------------- = ------------

1 Quantity Exposed MTBF = ------ = ----------------------------

Failure per unit time

Fundamental Concepts

MTBF - Example
Instantaneous failure rate is commonly used as measure of reliability. Eg. 300 Isolators have been operating for 10 years. 3 failures have occurred. The average failure rate of the isolators is: Failure per unit time 3 = ------------------------------- = ----------------- = Quantity Exposed 300*10*8760 = 0.000000038 per hour = = 38 FIT (Failure per billion hours) = = 38 probabilities of failure in one billion hours. MTBF = 1 / = 303 years (for constant failure rate)

Fundamental Concepts

Failure Rate Categories

tot = safe + dangerous s = sd + su d = dd + du tot = sd + su + dd + du

Where:
sd su dd du = Safe detected = Safe undetected = Dangerous detected = Dangerous undetected

Fundamental Concepts

FIT
Failure In Time is the number of failures per one billion devices hours.

1 FIT = 1 Failure in 109 hours = = 10-9 Failures per hour

Fundamental Concepts

SFF (Safe Failure Fraction)

SFF summarizes the fraction of failures, which lead to a safe state and the fraction of failure which will be detected by diagnostic measure and lead to a defined safety action

Fundamental Concepts

Type A SFF Chart

Type A components are described as simple devices with well-known failure modes and a solid history of operation

Fundamental Concepts

Type B SFF Chart

Type B: Complex component (using micro controllers or programmable logic); according 7.4.3.1.3 of IEC 61508-2

Fundamental Concepts

HSE Study
Results of system failure cause study done by English Health and Safety Executive (HSE)

Fundamental Concepts

Safety Lifecycle Origin

Fundamental Concepts

Safety Lifecycle 1/5

Fundamental Concepts

Safety Lifecycle 2/5

First portion of the overall safety lifecycle ANALYSIS (End user / Consultant)

Fundamental Concepts

Safety Lifecycle 3/5

Realisation activities in the overall safety lifecycle

Fundamental Concepts

Safety Lifecycle 4/5

Safety lifecycle for the E/E/PES (Electrical / Electronic / Programmable Electronic) Safety - Related System (IEC 61508, Part 2)

Fundamental Concepts

Safety Lifecycle 5/5

Last portion of the overall safety lifecycle OPERATION (End User / Contractor)

Fundamental Concepts

SIS
SIS (Safety Instrumented System) according to IEC 61508 and IEC 61511

IEC 61511
Safety Instrumented Systems for Process Industry
IEC 61511 has been developed as a Process Sector implementation of the IEC 61508. The Safety Lifecycle forms the central framework which links together most of the concepts in this standard, and evaluates process risks and SIS performance requirements (availability and risk reduction). Layers of protection are designed and analysed. A SIS, if needed, is optimally designed to meet particular process risk.

IEC 61511

Process sector system standard

IEC 61511

IEC 61511 Parts

The Standard is divided into three Parts Part 1: Framework, Definitions, Systems, Hardware and Software Requirements Part 2: Guidelines in the application of IEC 61511-1 Part 3: Guidelines in the application of hazard and risk analysis

IEC 61511

IEC 61511 Part 3

Guidelines in the application of hazard and risk analysis

FMEDA
Failure Modes and Effects Diagnostic Analysis (FMEDA) Is one of the steps taken to achieve functional safety assessement of a device per IEC 61508 and is considered to be a systematic way to: identify and evaluate the effects of each potential component failure mode; classify failure severity; determine what could eliminate or reduce the chance of failure; document the system (or sub-system) under analysis.

FMEDA
The following assumptions are usually made during the FMEDA Constant Failure Rates (wear out mechanisms not included) Propagation of failures is not relevant Repair Time = 8 hours Stress levels according IEC 60654-1, Class C (sheltered location), with temperature limits within the manufacturers rating and an average temperature over a long period of time of 40C

FMEDA

1oo1 Architecture

PFDavg (T1) = dd * RT + du * T1/2

because RT (avg. repair time) is << T1

PFDavg = du * T1/2
du = du (sensor) + du(isolator) + du(controller) + du(final element) SIL level is the lowest in the loop.

1oo2 Architecture

PFDavg = duc * (T1/2) + ddc * RT+(ddn* RT)2 + (ddn* RT * dun* T1)2/2 + (dun* T1)2 /3 PFDavg = (dun* T1)2/2 + (dun* T1)2 /3

2oo3 Architecture

PFDavg = duc * (T1/2) + 3[ddc * RT+(ddn* RT)2 + (ddn* RT * dun* T1)2/2 + (dun* T1)2 /3]

SIL3 using SIL2 subsystem

SIL3 Control Loop or Safety Function using SIL2 SubSystems in 1oo2 Architecture

Safety Manual
A Safety Manual is a document provided to users of a product that specifies their responsabilities for installation and operation in order to maintain the design safety level. The following information shall be available for each safetyrelated sub-system ..

Safety Manual Requirements

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. Functional specification and safety function Estimated rate of failure in any mode which would cause both undetected and detected safety function dangerous failures Environment and lifetime limits for the sub-system Periodic Proof Tests and/or maintainance requirements T proof test time interval Information necessary for PFDavg, MTTR, MTBF, SFF, du, total Hardware fault tolerance and failure categories Highest SIL that can be claimed (not required for proven in use sub-systems) Documentary evidence for sub-systems validation (EXIDA) Proof Test Procedures to reveal dangerous faults which are undetected by diagnostic tests.

Using the Safety Manual

Standard references
Remembering that: SIL (Safety Integrity Level) RRF (Risk Reduction Factor) PFD avg (Average Probability of Failure on Demand)

SIL Table for operative modes high and low demand

Using the Safety Manual

Standard references
Remembring definitions given for type A and B components, sub-systems, and related SFF values

Using the Safety Manual

Loop PFDavg calculation

1oo1 typical control loop

PFDavg(sys) = PFDavg(tx) + PFDavg(i) + PFDavg(c) + PFDavg(fe)

Using the Safety Manual

Loop PFDavg calculation

For calculating the entire loops reliability (Loop PFDavg), PFDavg values for each sub-systems must first be found and be given a proportional value (weight) compared to the total 100%. This duty is usually assigned to personnel in charge of plants safety, process and maintainance.

Using the Safety Manual

Loop PFDavg calculation

Equation for 1oo1 loop

Where: RT = repair time in hours (conventionally 8 hours) T1 = T proof test, time between circuit functional tests (1-5-10 years)

dd = failure rate for detected dangerous failures du = failure rate for undetected dangerous failures

Using the Safety Manual

Loop PFDavg calculation

If T1 = 1 year then

but being dd * 8 far smaller than du * 4380

Using the Safety Manual

Example 1
PFDavg = du * T1/2 For D1014 du is equal to 34 FIT (see manual) Therefore PFDavg = 34 * 10-9 * 4380 = = 0,000148920 = 148920 FIT

Using the Safety Manual

Example 2
Weights of each sub-system in the loop must be verified in relation with expected SIL level PFDavg and data from the devices safety manual. For example, supposing SIL 2 level to be achieved by the loop on the right in a low demand mode: PFDavg(sys) is between 10-3 and 10-2 per year Weight of D1014 Isolator is 10% Therefore PFDavg(i) should be between 10-4 and 10-3 per year.

Using the Safety Manual

Example 2

Given the table above (in the safety manual) conclusions are:
1. Being D1014 a type A component with SFF = 90%, it can be used both in SIL 2 and SIL 3 applications. 2. PFDavg with T proof = 1yr allows SIL3 applications 3. PFDavg with T proof = 5yr allows SIL2 applications 4. PFDavg with T proof = 10yr allows SIL1 applications

Using the Safety Manual

1oo2 architecture

What happens if the total PFDavg does not reach the wanted SIL 2 level, or the end user requires to reach a higher SIL 3 level? The solution is to use a 1oo2 architecture which offers very low PFDavg, thus increasing fail-safe failure probabilites.

Using the Safety Manual

1oo2 architecture
For D1014S (1oo1): PFDavg = du* T1/2 PFDavg = 148920 FIT For D1014D (1oo2): PFDavg = (dun* T1)2/2 + (dun* T1)2 /3 PFDavg = 75 FIT In this case a 1oo2 architecture gives a 2000 times smaller PFDavg for the sub-system

Using the Safety Manual

Final considerations
Always check that the Safety Manual contains information necessary for the calculation of SFF and PFDavg values. Between alternative suppliers, choose the one that offers: highest SIL level, highest SFF value, longest T[proof] time interval for the same SIL level, lowest value of PFDavg for the same T[proof]. When in presence of units with more than one channel and only one power supply circuit, the safety function allows the use of only one channel. Using both of the channels is allowed only when supply is given by two independent power circuits (like D1014D). Check that the Safety Manual provides all proof tests procedures to detect dangerous undetected faults.

Credits and Contacts

G.M. International s.r.l Via San Fiorano, 70 20058 Villasanta (Milan) ITALY www.gmintsrl.com info@gmintsrl.com

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Document last revised 20 May 2005