An introduction Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 2 Content History Purpose Hazards Deviations Parameters Guidewords Consequences Safeguards Application HAZOP in Dow HAZOP Process Nodes Starting the Study
Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 3 Origins of HAZOP Concept dreamed up by Bert Lawley at I.C.I. in the late 1960s Result of a desire to have structured check on P. & I.D.s Spread through I.C.I. in early 1970s Endorsed by the Health and Safety Directorate of the U.K. government Dow started to use in mid 1970s NL, Belgian and U.K. government adopted HAZOP Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 4 HAZOP in the 1980s U.K. HSE and the Dutch Arbeidsinspectie began to mandate HAZOP as part of Safety Report for Seveso Directive I.C.I. by this time were doing HAZOP on everything Dow incorporated in its Risk Management process based on its own criteria (focusing on highest risk) Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 5 Purpose of HAZOP
To identify credible causes, consequences and safeguards before INCIDENTS occur To define recommendations to minimize the HAZARD by eliminating or controlling the cause or providing lines of defence Provide compatible information for subsequent Process Safety efforts (i.e. LOPA scenarios) Comply with regulatory Process Safety requirements Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 6 Scope of HAZOP Review is limited to the piping, instrumentation and equipment shown on the P&IDs (do not re-design) Review is limited to deviations from normal operations Impact of process unit on the utility systems or other process units will be noted as requiring further study Primary intent is to identify hazards and define action items for additional safeguards if appropriate Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 7 HAZARDS Fire and Explosion Reactive Chemicals Incidents Toxic Exposure Corrosion Radiation Vibration Mechanical Hazards Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 8 Deviations Hazards are caused by DEVIATIONS from the DESIGN INTENTION HAZOP is a method for generating these DEVIATIONS using GUIDE WORDS Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 9 Study is based on PARAMETERS Flow Temperature Pressure Level Composition Agitation Anything it is important to control Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 10 In combination with GUIDE WORDS No Less More Reverse Instead of or Other than (e.g. something else or wrong composition) Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 11 Combinations of parameters and guide words are DEVIATIONS No flow Less flow More flow Reverse flow Flow of something not planned More temperature Less temperature And so on... Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 12 Deviations are logical combinations like... More temperature Less pressure Ignore illogical combinations like. X Reverse temperature Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 13 Determining the causes for a deviation Consider only the causes that originate within the node (consequences may be outside of the node) Deviations could be caused by: Equipment or process control failure Human error Loss of utilities External events such as fire Long term processes, e.g. erosion, corrosion, coking If process instrumentation crosses a node boundary, control malfunction is considered a cause in both nodes Deviations that require the simultaneous occurrence of two or more unrelated causes are not considered Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 14 Consequences Describe all consequences, even those that propagate outside the node. Consequences may include: Personnel injury Environmental damage Equipment damage Property loss Extended downtime Operability/Quality problems Consequences are described assuming there are no safeguards Describe consequences as a chronological sequence of events Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 15 Safeguards Safeguards may include: Equipment design Instrumentation (control, alarm and shutdown) Pressure relief devices Administrative procedures Only list those instrument systems that have at least an alarm as a safeguard Control instrumentation must automatically correct or mitigate a process deviation Operator training and administrative procedures should be listed provided they are part of ODMS Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 16 what can HAZOP be applied to? Continuous processes Batch procsses Operating procedures (similar concept to Job Safety Analysis) Maintenance procedures Any operation where the Design Intention is defined and deviations are possible Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 17 Recommendations Recommendations are made to: Eliminate a cause Prevent or mitigate the consequence Reduce the likelyhood that the hazard will occur Examples of recommendations include: Equipment/instrumentation changes/additions Further study needed Inspection and maintenance Training Administrative systems to manage hazards Verification of design assumptions
Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 18 Risk Review in DOW today (Process Risk Management Standard 2001) Level 1 Risk Review: (Process Hazard Analysis (RC-PHA, Fire and Explosion Index, Chemical Exposure Index, LOPA target factors) Level 2: LOPA, Cause Consequence Pairs, Occupied Building Overpressure analysis Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 19 Risk review in DOW today LEVEL 1 Fire and Explosion Index < 128 Chemical Exposure Index < 200 CEI Hazard Distance (3) outside of the fence
Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 20 What makes HAZOP mandatory? TECHNOLOGY IS NEW TO DOW New processes New chemistry New Unit Operations These are the ONLY criteria for Mandatory HAZOP Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 21 HAZOP method Generic for Chemical Industry Dow guideline setting down our special needs (\\USN17\ehsaps) Based on P.& I.D. or flowsheet study with Operating Instructions/Design Intention Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 22 Normal scope of a Dow HAZOP Based on the operating unit(s) generating the highest risk Basic Criteria described All steps from start up, through normal running to shut down Application to Most Effective Technology (M.E.T.) Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 23 HAZOP Process Team maximum 6 persons from (example): run plant engineer programmer process control process chemist shift operations team member study leader/facilitator Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 24 Nodes P&IDs for the process are broken into manageable sections called nodes Nodes generally consists of unit operations and associated piping and connect to upstream and downstream units Nodes are defined by the HAZOP team and can be redefined as needed A Global issues node can be included to capture hazardous events that can impact the entire process unit. For example: Loss of containment Sampling Utility failure
Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 25 Typical nodes E 201 R 201 P 201 NODE 1 NODE 2 Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 26 Nodes There is no right way to define nodes Usually start with a small node As experience builds, move to a larger node Follow the leaders intuition If the team gets bored, the node is probably too small If the team gets confused, the node is probably too big Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 27 Starting the study: The most knowledgeable person describes the INTENTION of the node Composition (which chemicals are in the equipment) Flow, temperature, pressure, phase, quantity, agitation etc . Anything important to the process Leader records for study team reference Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 28 Start with Deviation No Flow Team gives all the causes for no flow in the lines and equipment inside the node Leader prompts their thinking Team can add but not delete These causes are recorded in software package The library in the software can be consulted for possible additional causes When the ideas dry up move on to CONSEQUENCES Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 29 Team decision on ACTION column Team may decide if any new action is needed Can record any protective devices or alarms which become active e.g. PSVs Can refer decision outside the team Can refer serious consequences for consequence analysis MUST NOT REDESIGN THE PLANT in the Hazop study session!! Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 30 After no flow Repeat exercise for less flow (ususally similar to no flow Repeat exercise for more flow Repeat exercise for reverse flow Repeat exercise for composition (other than expected material composition) UNTIL FLOW is completely studied Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 31 After flow List causes for more temperature proceed to consequences for more temperature repeat all steps as for flow when temperature is studied, go to pressure after pressure, consider other parameters, e.g. agitation (use design intention as a guide) Jan. 2012 Process Safety Training Fluor 32 When parameters are all done for node 1 Repeat whole process for node 2 And all the other nodes defined in the study scope List actions and responsibility for follow up