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By:

JUDGE MARIA FILOMENA D. SINGH


Presiding Judge, Branch 85, RTC Quezon City
Faculty, Ateneo de Manila School of Law
Faculty, Philippine Judicial Academy

Cayetano v. Monsod (201 SCRA 210 [1991])


What constitutes practice of law?
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and
the application of legal principles and technique to
serve the interest of another with his consent. It is not
limited to appearing in court, or advising and assisting
in the conduct of litigation, but embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to
actions and special proceedings, conveyancing, the
preparation of legal instruments of all kinds, and the
giving of all legal advice to clients. It embraces all
advice to clients and all actions taken for them in
matters connected with the law. An attorney engages
in the practice of law by maintaining an office where he
is held out to be an attorney, counseling clients in legal
matters, negotiating with opposing counsel about
pending litigation, and fixing and collecting fees for
services rendered by his associate. (Blacks Law
Dictionary, 3rd ed.)

Practice of law means any activity, in or out of


court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
To engage in the practice of law is to perform
those acts which are characteristics of the
profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device
or service requires the use in any degree of legal
knowledge or skill. (111 ALR 23)
Atty. Monsods past work experiences as a lawyereconomist,
a
lawyer-manager,
a
lawyerentrepreneur of industry, a lawyer-negotiator of
contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich
and the poor verily more than satisfy the
constitutional requirement that he has been
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten

Khan, Jr. v. Simbillo (409 SCRA 299


[2003])
The practice of law is not a business. It is a
profession in which duty to public to service,
not money, is the primary consideration.
Lawyering is not primarily meant to be a
money-making venture, and law advocacy is
not a capital that necessarily yields profits.
The gaining of a livelihood should be a
secondary consideration. The duty to public
service and to the administration of justice
should be the primary consideration of
lawyers, who must subordinate their personal
interests or what they owe to themselves.

The following elements distinguish the legal


profession from a business:
1.
A duty of public service, of which the
emolument is a by-product, and in which one may
attain the highest eminence without making much
money;
2. A relation as an officer of the court to the
administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity and reliability;
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree (of)
fiduciary;
4.
A relation to colleagues at the bar
characterized
by
candor,
fairness
and
unwillingness to resort to current business
methods of advertising and encroachment on their

Annulment
of
Marriage
Specialist
5324333/5212667
The solicitation of legal business is not altogether
proscribed. However, for solicitation to be proper,
it must be compatible with the dignity of the legal
profession. If it were made in a modest and
decorous manner, it would bring no injury to the
lawyer and to the bar. Thus the use of simple
signs stating the names of the lawyers, the office
and residence address and fields of practice, as
well as advertisement in legal periodicals bearing
the same brief data, are permissible. Even the use
of calling cards is now acceptable. Publication in
reputable law lists, in a manner consistent with
the standards of conduct imposed by the canon, of
brief biographical and informative data is likewise
allowable.

Director of Religious Affairs v. Bayot (74 Phil.


579 [1944])
Marriage license promptly secured thru our
assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity
avoided if desired, and marriage arranged to
wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free
for the poor. Everything confidential.
It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise
his talents or skill as a merchant advertises his
wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The
lawyer degrades himself and his profession who
stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism
by advertising his services or offering them to the
public. As a member of the bar, he defiles the
temple of justice with mercenary activities as the
money-changers of old defiled the temple of
Jehovah.

Bernardo v. Mejia, 531 SCRA 639 [2007])


The practice of law is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Adherence to the rigid standards of
mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree
of morality, and faithful compliance with the rules
of the legal profession are the continuing
requirements for enjoying the privilege to practice
law.
Disbarred lawyer petitions the Supreme Court for
re-admission to the practice of law. The applicant
must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral
character, a fit and proper person to practice law.
The Court will take into consideration the
applicants character and standing prior to the
disbarment, the nature and character of the
charges for which he was disbarred, his conduct
subsequent to the disbarment, and the time that
has elapsed between the disbarment and the

Arce v. PNB (62 Phil. 569 [1935])


Attorneys fees for guardianship case: client
offered P200, trial court awarded P400, lawyer
appealed and asked for P5,000.
The SC
awarded P1,000.
The law is a profession, not a business.
Lawyers are officers of the courts. At the
same time professional men are entitled to
have and recover from their clients a
reasonable compensation for their services
rendered with a view to the importance of the
subject matter of the controversy, the extent
of services rendered, and the professional
standing of the lawyer.

Courts have

other hand, the standing of the members of


the bar is not enhanced by quibbling relative
to just fees, equivalent to the bargaining had
between a prospective purchaser and a
merchant in the markets before a sale is
made.

Ledesma v. Climaco (57 SCRA 473 [1974])


Motion to withdraw as counsel de oficio for
accused on ground of appointment as Election
Registrar denied.
Membership in the bar carries with it a
responsibility to live up to its exacting standard.
The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft.
Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in
the performance of one of the basic purposes of
the State, the administration of justice. To avoid
any frustration thereof, especially in the case of an
indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to
act as counsel de oficio. The fact that his services
are rendered without remuneration should not
occasion a diminution in his zeal.
The
admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the
ranks of legal practitioners that there are times,
and this is one of them, when duty to court and to
client takes precedence over the promptings of

People v. Daban (43 SCRA 185 [1972])


Counsel de oficio failed to file an appellants brief
despite 17 extensions, excusing the omission on
the ground of the escape of the prisoner-client.
As such counsel de oficio, he has a high duty to
the accused as one employed and paid by
defendant himself. Because, as in the case of the
latter, he must exercise his best efforts and
professional ability in behalf of the person
assigned to his care. His is to render effective
assistance. The accused defendant expects of him
due
diligence,
not
mere
perfunctory
representation. We do not accept the paradox
that responsibility is less where the defended
party is poor. For indeed a lawyer who is a
vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to
have a bigger dose of social conscience and little

In re: Cunanan (94 Phil. 534 [1954])


It is indispensable to the administration of justice
and to interpretation of the laws that there be
members of the bar of sufficient ability, adequate
learning, and sound moral character. This arises
from the need of enlightened assistance to the
honest, and restraining authority over the knavish,
litigant. It is highly important also that the public
be protected from incompetent and vicious
practitioners, whose opportunity for doing mischief
is wide. Membership in the bar is a privilege
burdened with conditions. One is admitted to the
bar for something more than private gain. He
becomes an officer of the court, and, like the court
itself, an instrument or agency to advance the
ends of justice. His cooperation with the court is
due whenever justice would be imperiled if
cooperation was withheld. Without such attorneys
at law, the judicial department of government
would be hampered in the performance of its

Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava, 105


Phil. 75 [1959])
Patent Office Director imposed an examination to
qualify for practice as a patent attorney before the
Patent Office.
The Supreme Court has the exclusive and
constitutional power with respect to admission to the
practice of law in the Philippines and any member of
the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law
anywhere and before any entity, whether judicial or
quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines.
Naturally, the question arises as to whether or not
appearance before the Patent Office and the
preparation and prosecution of patent applications
constitutes or is included in the practice of law. In
our opinion, the practice of law includes such
appearance
before
the
Patent
Office,
the
representation of applicants, oppositors, and other
persons, and the prosecution of their applications for

The practice of law is not limited to the


conduct of cases or litigation in court; it
embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges
and courts, and in addition, conveying. In
general, all advice to clients, and all action
taken for them in matters connected with the
law where the work done involves the
determination by the trained legal mind of the
legal effect of facts and circumstances. (5 Am
Jur p. 262, 263).

In re: Sycip, et al. (92 SCRA 1 [1979])


Petition to continue using in the firm name names
of partners who have passed away.
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal
entity. It is a mere relationship or association for a
particular purpose. It is not a partnership formed
for the purpose of carrying on trade or business or
of holding property. The right to practice law is
not a natural or constitutional right but is in the
nature of a privilege or franchise. It is limited to
persons of good moral character with special
qualifications duly ascertained and certified. The
right does not only presuppose in its possessor
integrity, legal standing and attainment, but also
the exercise of a special privilege highly personal
and partaking of the nature of a public trust.

Cui v. Cui (11 SCRA 755 [1964])


A deed favored as administrator one who
possessed a titulo de abogado in a contest
between a law graduate and a lawyer previously
disbarred but already reinstated.
The term titulo de abogado means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of
Laws but membership in the Bar after due
admission thereto, qualifying one for the practice
of law. Abogado is lawyer or attorney-at-law.
This term has a fixed and general signification,
and has reference to that class of persons who are
by license officers of the courts, empowered to
appear, prosecute and defend, and upon whom
peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are
devolved by law as a consequence.

In re: Del Rosario (52 Phil. 399 [1928])


Applicant failed the bar thrice, but moved to have
results of second try reviewed and it was granted.
Case for falsification of public documents (application)
filed but applicant acquitted on reasonable doubt
although his co-accused pleaded guilty.
The acquittal of Felipe del Rosario upon the criminal
charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The Court is
now acting in an entirely different capacity from that
which courts assume in trying criminal cases. ... While
to admit Felipe del Rosario again to the bar
examination would be tantamount to a declaration of
professional purity which we are totally unable to
pronounce. The practice of law is not an absolute right.
To be granted everyone who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of
sound discretion. The standards of the legal profession
are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one
to escape the penalties of the criminal law.

In re: Cunanan (94 Phil. 534 [1954])


RA 973 The Bar Flunkers Act of 1953 versus Rule 127, Section 14 of
the Rules of Court (now Rule 138, Section 14)

In the judicial system from which ours has been evolved,


the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law in the practice of the profession and their
supervision have been indisputably a judicial function and
responsibility. Even considering the power granted to
Congress by our Constitution to repeal, alter and supplement
the rules promulgated by this Court regarding the admission
to the practice of law, to our judgment, the proposition that
the admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of
attorneys at law is a legislative function, properly belonging
to Congress is unacceptable. The function requires: (1)
previously established rules and principles; (2) concrete
facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate
individuals; and (3) decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles; in effect, a judicial
function of the highest degree.
And it becomes more
undisputably judicial, and not legislative, if previous judicial
resolutions on the petitions of these same individuals are
attempted to be revoked or modified.

What the law attempts to amend and correct are


not the rules promulgated, but the will or
judgment of the Court, by means of simply taking
its place. In other words, the power exercised was
not to repeal, alter or supplement the rules, which
continue in force. What was done was to stop or
suspend them. And this power is not included in
what the Constitution has granted to Congress,
because it falls within the power to apply the
rules. This power corresponds to the judiciary, to
which such duty has been confided.

In re: Lanuevo (66 SCRA 245 [1975])


The Bar Confidant schemed to have the bar examination of
an applicant reviewed and re-graded, resulting in a passing
grade.
The Office of the Bar Confidant has absolutely nothing to do
in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after
their notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners.
After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades
of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter
compute the general average. The Bar Confidant has no
business evaluating the answers of the examinees and
cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal
made by the Examiner concerned. He is not the over-all
Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the
Examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by
the examinee and the same should be addressed to the
Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant
who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and
thereby compromises his position as well as the image of the
Court.

In re: Almacen (31 SCRA 562 [1970])


In a Petition to Surrender Lawyers Certificate to protest
against the great injustice committed against his client by
the Supreme Court, the lawyer describes the court as
peopled by men who are calloused to our pleas for justice,
who ignore without reasons their own applicable decisions
and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with
impunity.
By constitutional mandate, ours is the solemn duty,
amongst others, to determine the rules for admission to the
practice of law.
Inherent in this prerogative is the
corresponding authority to discipline and exclude from the
practice of law those who have proved themselves unworthy
of continued membership in the Bar.
The power to
discipline attorneys, who are officers of the court, is an
inherent and incidental power in courts of record, and one
which is essential to an orderly discharge of judicial
functions This, because the admission of a lawyer to the
practice of law is a representation to all that he is worthy of
their confidence and respect. Indeed, in this jurisdiction,
that power to remove or suspend has risen above being a
mere inherent or incidental power. It has been elevated to
an express mandate by the Rules of Court.

Disciplinary proceedings like the present one are


sui generis.
Neither purely civil nor purely
criminal, this proceeding is not and does not
involve a trial of an action or a suit, but is rather
an investigation by the Court into the conduct of
its officers.
Not being intended to inflict
punishment, it is no sense a criminal prosecution.
Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor a
prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the
Court motu propio. Public interest is its primary
objective and the real question for determination
is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the
exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court
merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account
for his actuations as an officer of the court with
the end in view of preserving the purity of the
legal profession and the proper and honest

In re: Guarina ( 24 Phil. 37 [1913])

Applicant seeks admission to the Bar without taking the


examination under Act 1597, having been appointed as
Provincial Fiscal of Batanes.
Section 9 of the Act of Congress placed it beyond the
power of the local Legislature to deprive this court of
the jurisdiction or power theretofore granted to it Act
No. 190, in force at the time when the Act of Congress
was enacted, conferred upon this Court the power and
jurisdiction to deny admission to candidates for the bar
unless, in addition to certain other prescribed
conditions, they satisfy the court that they possess the
necessary learning in the law, by passing an
examination prescribed by general rule. It seems clear,
therefore, that the Commission had no authority to
deprive this court of its power to deny admission to any
candidate who fails to satisfy it that he possesses the
necessary qualifications for admission to the bar.
Applicant was not and never had been a practicing
attorney in this or any other jurisdiction prior to the
date of his appointment as provincial fiscal and he was
deficient in the required qualifications at the time when

In re: Edillon (84 SCRA 554 [1978])


Attorneys refusal to pay membership dues in the IBP
prompted the latter to petition that he be dropped from the
Roll of Attorneys.
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend
to the Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent members
name from the Roll of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24,
Article III of the IBP By-Laws, whereas the authority of the
Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of
the Court Rule. looking solely to the language of the
provision in the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the
power to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice
and procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law, it at once becomes indubitable that this
constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with
plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when respondent
Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his practice of law
and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the
body politic to require him to conform to such regulations as
might be established by the proper authorities for the
common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of
his liberties.

To compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBP is not


violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any
group of which he is not already a member. He
became a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar
examinations. Bar integration does not compel the
lawyer to associate with anyone. He is free to attend
or not attend the meetings of his IBP Chapter, or vote
or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The
only compulsion to which he is subjected is the
payment of annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order
to further the States legitimate interest in elevating
the quality of professional legal services, may require
that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion
be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the
regulatory program the lawyers. The practice of
law is not a property right but a mere privilege and as
such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the
Court to exact compliance with the lawyers public

In re: Parazo (82 Phil. 230 [1948])


Reporters refusal to reveal source of news report regarding
claimed bar examination leak favoring one school.
Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution of the Philippines
authorizes this Court to promulgate rules concerning the
admission to the practice of law, and pursuant to that
authority, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court was promulgated,
under which rule, this Court conducts the Bar Examinations
yearly, appoints a Committee of Bar Examiners to be
presided by one of the Justices, to serve for one year, acts
on the report of the committee and, finally, admits to the Bar
and to the practice of law, the candidates and examinees
who have passed the examinations. Any charge or
insinuation of anomaly in the conduct of the Bar
Examinations, of necessity is imbued with wide and general
interest and national importance. We have the inherent
power of courts in general specially of the Supreme court as
representative of the Judicial Department, to adopt proper
and adequate measures to preserve their integrity, and
render possible and facilitate the exercise of their
functions. .. The revelation demanded of the respondent of
the identity of his informants is essential and necessary to
the investigation of the charge contained in the publication
already mentioned.

In re: Garcia (112 Phil. 884 [1961])


A Filipino who had been admitted into law practice
in Spain after legal studies there, applied for
admission to law practice in the Philippines under
the Treaty on Academic Degrees and the Exercise
of Professions between Spain and our country,
without taking the bar examination.
The privileges provided in the Treaty are made
expressly subject to the laws and regulations of
the contracting State in whose territory it is
desired to exercise the legal profession; and
Section 1 of Rule 127 in connection with Sections
2, 9, and 16 thereof, which have the force of law,
require that before anyone can practice the legal
profession in the Philippines, he must pass the
required bar examinations. The Executive
Department may not encroach upon the
constitutional prerogative of the Supreme Court to
promulgate rules for admission to the practice of
law in the Philippines.

US v. Ney and Bosque (No. 3593, March 23, 1907)


A Spanish citizen, who was disqualified from practicing law in the
Philippines, formed an office with a practicing attorney (Law Office
-- Ney and Bosque) for the general practice of law in all the courts
of the Islands.
A mandate of the court, while in force, must be obeyed. The
irregular signature to papers, though affixed by his associate, had
his authorization and constitutes a substantial attempt to engage in
practice.
Moreover the firm circular in setting
forth the
establishment of an office for the general practice of law in all the
courts of the Islands, amounted to an assertion of his right and
purpose, not effectively qualified by the addition that he would
devote himself to consultation and office work relating to Spanish
law. The conduct of defendant Bosque amounts to disobedience
of an order made in a proceeding to which he was a party. In the
offense of Bosque in holding himself out as a general practitioner
Ney participated and for the improper signature of the pleadings he

Robinson v. Villafuerte (18 Phil. 171 [1911])


Law clerk allowed by trial judge to ask questions of
witnesses in the presence of the real counsel of
the party.
It is unquestionable that the intervention of the
said law clerk and employee of the plaintiffs
attorneys in this suit was improperly admitted; it
was not authorized by any law, for the reason that
the said Lacalle did not have the capacity and
qualifications of a lawyer admitted to practice his
profession before the courts of these Islands and,
therefore, on objection being made to his presence
at the hearing, the judge should have excluded
Lacalle and not permitted him to address
questions to the plaintiffs witnesses.

Omico Mining v. Vallejos (63 SCRA 285


[1975]
Judge entered into a contract of personal and
professional services with private individuals to
head defendants legal department for a fixed
yearly salary.
The challenged judgment seeks to enforce a
contract which is patently void because it is
contrary to law and public policy. The contract of
professional services entered into between private
respondent and the petitioners, while the former
was still a judge of the Court of First Instance,
constituted private practice of law in contravention
of Section 35 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of
Court. The aforecited rule was promulgated by
this Court pursuant to its constitutional power to
regulate the practice of law. It is based on sound
reasons of public policy, for there is no question
that the rights, duties, privileges and functions of

This inhibitory rule makes it obligatory upon


the judicial officers concerned to give their full
time and attention to their judicial duties,
prevent them from extending special favors to
their own private interests and assure the
public of their impartiality in the performance
of their functions.
These objectives are
dictated by a sense of moral decency and the
desire to promote the public interest. Private
respondent should have known or ought to
know that when he was elevated to the bench
of the CFI as a judge thereof, his right to
practice law as an attorney was suspended
and continued to be suspended as long as he
occupied the judicial position.

Noriega v. Sison (125 SCRA 293 [1983])


Lawyer-SEC Hearing Officer appeared in a JDRC case for
a close friend and with the written permit of the SEC
Commissioner.
The purpose of disbarment, therefore, is not meant as
a punishment depriving him of a source of livelihood
but is rather intended to protect the administration of
justice by requiring that those who exercise this
function should be competent, honorable and reliable
in order that the courts and clients may rightly repose
confidence in them. In disbarment proceedings, the
burden of proof rests upon the complainant and for the
court to exercise its disciplinary powers, the case
against the respondent must be established by clear,
convincing,
and
satisfactory
proof.

clear,
preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of the administrative penalty. An attorney
enjoys the legal presumption that he is innocent of the
charges preferred against him until the contrary is
proved; and as an officer of the court, that he
performed his duty in accordance with his oath.

Diao v. Martinez (7 SCRA 475 [1963])


Charge of false representation against a lawyer for
stating in his bar application that had completed
the requisite academic qualifications but he
actually obtained an AA diploma 6 months after
beginning his law studies.
Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations,
he was allowed to take it, luckily passed it, and
was thereafter admitted to the Bar.
Such
admission having been obtained under false
pretenses must be and is hereby revoked. The
fact that he hurdled the Bar examination is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the
only qualification to become an attorney-at-law;
taking the prescribed courses of legal study in the
regular manner is equally essential.

Quingwa v. Puno (19 SCRA 439 [1967])


Charge of gross immorality and misconduct
against a lawyer who induced the complainant to
have sexual relations upon a promise of marriage
but reneged on the promise even after he made
her pregnant.
One of the requirements for all applicants for
admission to the Bar is that the applicant must
produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character.
If that
qualification is a condition precedent to a license
or privilege to enter upon the practice of law, it is
essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege. The statutory
enumeration of the grounds for disbarment or
suspension is not to be taken as a limitation on the
general power of courts to suspend or disbar a
lawyer. The inherent power of the court over its
officers can not be restricted. An attorney will be
removed not only for malpractice and dishonesty
in his profession but also for gross misconduct

Macarrubo v. Macarrubo (424 SCRA 42 [2004])


Complaint for disbarment on claimed deception leading
complainant to marriage without knowledge of respondents
prior existing marriage. Then the lawyer-respondent married
a 3rd time and left the complainant and their children without
support.
The rule that a lawyer may be disciplined or suspended for
nay misconduct, whether in his professional or private
capacity, which shows him to be wanting in moral character,
in honesty, in probity and good demeanor, thus rendering
him unworthy to continue as an officer of the court bears
reiterating. Respondent is indeed guilty of gross misconduct
in his private affairs which warrant disciplinary action He
and complainant started living as husband and wife in
December 1991 when his first marriage was still subsisting
as it was only on August 21, 1998 that such first marriage
was annulled, rendering him liable for concubinage. Such
conduct is inconsistent with the good moral character that is
required for the continued right to practice law as a member
of the Philippine bar. It imports moral turpitude and is a
public assault upon the basic social institution of marriage.
As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of
good moral character but must also be perceived to be of
good moral character and must lead a life in accordance

De Jesus-Paras v. Vailoces (111 Phil. 569 [1961])


Lawyer-Notary Public convicted of falsification of public
document for acknowledging a last will and testament
which was proven to be a forgery.
A member of the bar may be removed or suspended
from his office as attorney if it appears that he has
been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Moral turpitude includes any act deemed contrary to
justice, honesty or good morals. Among the examples
given of crimes of this nature are the crimes of
seduction and concubinage.
The crime of which
respondent was convicted is falisfication of public
document, which is indeed of this nature, for the act is
clearly contrary to justice, honesty and good morals.
Embezzlement, forgery, robbery, swindling are crimes
which denote moral turpitude and as a general rule, all
crimes of which fraud is an element are looked on as
involving moral turpitude.

Garcia v. De Vera (418 SCRA 27 [2003])


Petition to disqualify respondent from IBP
elections on ground of moral turpitude based
on a previous contempt citation.
The Court defines moral turpitude as an act
of baseness, vileness or depravity in the
private and social duties which a man owes his
fellow men, or to society in general, contrary
to the accepted and customary rule of right
and duty between man and man, or conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good
morals.

Calub v. Suller (323 SCRA 556 [2000])


Lawyer raped his neighbors wife.
A lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct, whether in his professional or
private capacity, which shows him to be
wanting in moral character, honesty, probity
and good demeanor or unworthy to continue
as an officer of the court. The rape of his
neighbors wife constituted serious moral
depravity even if his guilt was not proved
beyond reasonable doubt in the criminal
prosecution for rape. He is not worthy to
remain a member of the bar. The privilege to
practice law is bestowed upon individuals who
are competent intellectually, academically
and, equally important, morally.

People v. Lee (382 SCRA 596 [2002])


Character is defined to be the possession by a
person of certain qualities of mind and morals,
distinguishing him from others. It is the opinion
generally entertained of a person derived from the
common report of the people who are acquainted
with him; his reputation. Good moral character
includes all elements essential to make up such a
character; among these are common honesty and
veracity, especially in al professional intercourse;
a character that measures up as good among
people of the community in which the person lives,
or that is up to the standard of the average citizen;
that status which attaches to a man of good
behavior and upright conduct.

Guevarra v. Eala (AC No. 7136, August 1, 2007)


Whether a lawyers sexual congress with a woman not
his wife or without the benefit of marriage should be
characterized as grossly immoral conduct depends on
the surrounding circumstances.
The case at bar
involves a relationship between a married lawyer and a
married woman who is not his wife. It is immaterial
whether the affair was carried out discreetly. While
it has been held in disbarment cases that the mere fact
of sexual relations between two unmarried adults is not
sufficient to warrant administrative sanction for such
illicit behavior, it is not so with respect to betrayals of
the marital vow of fidelity. Even if not all forms of
extra-marital relations are punishable under penal law,
sexual relations outside marriage is considered
disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate
disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital
vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our
laws. That the marriage between complainant and
Irene was subsequently declared void ab initio is
immaterial. The acts complained of took place before
the marriage was declared null and void.

Soriano v. Dizon, A.C. No. 6792 [January 25, 2006]


A lawyer gave chase to a taxi and as a resultof an altercation
he fell down on the ground, went to hiscar took his gun and
shot the taxi driver several times.
The Supreme Court found the lawyer guilt of violating Canon
1 for his illegal possession of an unlicensed firearm and his
refusal to satisfy the civil liabilities imposed on him by the
trial court which had convicted him for frustrated homicide.
For having violated a law and disobeying a final court
judgment, he was also found to have violated his lawyers
oath.
Moral turpitude was defined as everything which is done
contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of
baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good
morals.

Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude


depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is
not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by
every known and intentional violation of statute, but
whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude
may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all
the surrounding circumstances. We stress that
membership in the legal profession is a privilege
demanding a high degree of good moral character, not
only as a condition precedent to admission, but also as
a continuing requirement for the practice of law. Sadly,
herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting
standards expected of, and brazen dishonesty of
respondent clearly show his unworthiness to continue
as a member of the bar.
In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated
homicide, the attending circumstances not the mere
fact of their conviction would demonstrate their
fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present
case, the appalling vindictiveness, treachery, and
brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his
unworthiness to continue as a member of the Bar.

Gonzales v. Alcaraz, A.C. No. 5321 [2006]


Whether in their professional or in their private
capacity, lawyers may be disbarred or suspended for
misconduct. The penalty is a consequence of acts
showing their unworthiness as officers of the courts; as
well as their lack of moral character, honesty, probity,
and good demeanor (Calub vs. Suller, 380 Phil. 532
[January 28, 2000]; Saburnido vs. Madrono, 418 Phil
241 [September 26, 2001]; Lao vs. Medel, 453 Phil 115
[July 1, 2003]).
When the misconduct committed
outside of their professional dealings is so gross as to
show them to be morally unfit for the office and the
privileges conferred upon them by their license and the
law, they may be suspended or disbarred (Soriano vs.
Dizon, A.C. No. 6792 [January 25, 2006]; Quingwa vs.
Puno, 125 Phil. 831 [February 28, 1967]).

A lawyers brash transgression of any,


especially a penal, law is repulsive and
reprehensible and cannot be countenanced.
The vengeful and violent behavior exhibited
by respondent in what should have been a
simple traffic alteration reveals his conceit and
delusions of self-importance. By firing his gun
openly in a congested highway and exposing
complainant and the general public to danger,
he showed his utter lack of a sense of
responsibility, as well as of respect for law and
order.

Co v. Bernardino, A.C. No. 3919, 285 SCRA 102


[1998]

In finding the lawyer administratively liable,


the Court held that he is guilty of gross
Violation 1.01 through the procurement of
personal loans through insinuations of his
power as an influence peddler in the Bureau of
Customs, the issuance of a series of bad
checks and taking undue advantage of his
position in the aforesaid government office
which the High Court characterized as a
propinquity for employing deceit and
misrepresentation.
The
lawyer
was
suspended for one year

As a general rule, a court will not assume


jurisdiction to discipline one of its officers for
misconduct alleged to have been committed in his
private capacity. But this is a general rule with
many exceptions xxx
xxx. The nature of the
office, the trust relation which exists between
attorney, and the statutory rules prescribing the
qualifications of attorneys, uniformly require that
an attorney shall be a person of good moral
character.
If that qualification is a condition
precedent to a license or privilege to enter upon
the practice of law, it would seem to be equally
essential during the continuance of the practice
and the exercise of the privilege. So it is held that
an attorney will be removed not only for
malpractice an dishonesty in his profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his
professional duties, which shows him to be unfit
for the office and unworthy of the privileges which
his license and the law confer upon him.

Bon v. Ziga and Arcangel, A.C. No. 5436, 429


SCRA 177 [2001]
Notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary
act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such
that only those who are qualified or authorized may act
as notaries public. Notarization converts as private
document into a public document thus making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof
of its authenticity. A notarial document is by law
entitled to full faith and credit upon its face. Courts,
administrative agencies and the public at large must be
able to rely upon the acknowledgement executed by a
notary public and appended to a private instrument.
For this reason, notaries public must observe with
utmost care the basic requirements in the performance
of their duties. Otherwise, the confidence of the public
in the integrity of this form of conveyance would be
undermined (id. At 184-185, citing Rosales vs. Ramos,
A.C. No. 5645, 383 SCRA [July 2, 2001]).

Gonzales v. Ramos, A.C. No. 6649 [2005]


The Court found that by notarizing the
questioned deed, he engaged in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct (and
that) he also committed falsehood and misled
or allowed the Court to be misled by any
artifice in violation of Rules 1.01 and 10.01 of
the Code. He was thus suspended for one
year from the practice of law and his notarial
commission was revoked and he was
disqualified from renewing the same for 2
years.

Soriano v. Basco, A.C. No. 6648 [2005]


A Notary Public who failed to provide the
Office of the Clerk of Court with the
required
copies
of
documents
he
notarized and to retain his own file
copies thereof was found guilty of
violating the Notarial Law and his
commission was suspended for one year.
He was, however, not found guilty of
having committed a violation of Rule 1.01
of the Code, although there was a finding
of a legal transgression. Hence, there
was no suspension aspect to the penalty.

Tan Tek Beng v. David (126 SCRA 389 [1983])


A lawyer executed an agreement with a nonlawyer to share attorneys fees from our clients
50-50, and not to deal directly with said clients
without the consent of the non-lawyer partner.
The agreement is void because it was
tantamount to malpractice which is the practice
of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain,
either personally or through paid agents or
brokers. The lawyer may not seek or obtain
employment by himself or through others for to do
so
would
be
unprofessional.
The
commercialization of law practice is condemned.

People v. Rosqueta, et al. (55 SCRA 486 [1974])


Disciplinary action against lawyer who failed to file an appeal
brief for accused after suspension from the practice for that
reason. Instead, moved to withdraw appeal with consent of
the accused.
Respondent should be aware that even in those cases
where counsel de parte is unable to secure from the
appellants or from their near relatives the amount necessary
to pursue the appeal, that does not necessarily conclude his
connection with the case. It has been a commendable
practice of some members of the bar under such
circumstances to be designated as counsel de oficio. That
way the interest of justice is best served. Appellants will
then continue to receive the benefits of advocacy from one
who is familiar with the facts of the case. What is more
there is no undue delay in the administration of justice.
Respondents conduct yields a different impression. What
has earned a reproof is his irresponsibility. He should be
aware that in the pursuance of the duty owed to the court as
well as to client, he cannot be too casual and unconcerned
about the filing of pleadings. It is not enough that he
prepares them; he must see to it that they are duly mailed.
Such inattention as shown in this case is inexcusable.

San Jose Homeowners Assn., Inc. v. Romanillos,


A.C. No. 5580 [2005]
A lawyer, who was a former Judge, used the title
Judge in his office letterhead, correspondence, and in
billboards erected in a subdivision where a dispute was
ongoing wherein he represented one party. Such use
was deceiving and a clear attempt to mislead the
public into believing that the order was issued in his
capacity as a judge when he was dishonorably stripped
of the privilege.
The use of titles such as Justice is reserved to
incumbent and retired members of the Supreme Court,
the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan and may
not be used by any other official of the Republic ,
including those given the rank of Justice (JBC No. 001
[July 20, 1989]). By analogy the title Judge should be
reserved only to judges, incumbent an retired, and not
those who were dishonorably discharged from the
service. (T)he right to retain and use said title applies
only to the aforementioned members of the bench and
no other, and certainly not to those who were removed
or dismissed from the judiciary, such as respondent.

Considering that, of all classes and


professions, lawyers are most sacredly
bound to uphold the law, it is imperative
that they live by the law. Accordingly,
lawyers who violate their oath and
engage in deceitful conduct have no
place in the legal profession.

Ulep v. Legal Clinic (223 SCRA 378 [1993])


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and lawyers which are strictly non-diagnostic and
non-advisory Respondent corporation gives out
legal information to laymen and lawyers. The
services being offered by private respondent
which constitute practice of law cannot be
performed by para-legals. Only a person duly
admitted as a member of the Bar and who is in
good and regular standing is entitled to practice
law. In the Philippines we still have a restricted
concept and limited acceptance of what may be
considered as para-legal service. In the absence
of constitutional or statutory authority, a person

The standards of the legal profession


condemn the lawyers advertisement of his
talents. A lawyer cannot, without violating the
ethics of his profession, advertise his talents or
skills as in a manner similar to a merchant
advertising his goods.
The proscription
against advertising of legal services or
solicitation of legal business rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law
is a profession.

Abad v. Bleza (145 SCRA 1 [1986])


Judge charged with ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of discretion and misconduct.
To hold a judge administratively accountable for
every erroneous ruling or decision he renders,
assuming that he has erred, would be nothing
short of harassment and would make the position
unbearable As a matter of public policy, in the
absence of fraud, dishonesty or corruption, the
acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not
subject to disciplinary action, even though such
acts are erroneous. However, while judges should
not be disciplined for inefficiency on account
merely of occasional mistakes or errors of
judgment, yet it is highly imperative that they
should be conversant with basic legal principles.
They are called upon to exhibit more than just a
cursory acquaintance with statutes and to keep
themselves abreast of the latest laws, rulings and
jurisprudence affecting their jurisdiction.

De Roy v. Court of Appeals (157 SCRA 757


[1988])
Petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Court
of Appeals on the last day of the 15-day period to
appeal. The CA denial was based on the rule laid down
in the Habaluyas Enterprises case decided on August 5,
1985, which was reiterated in a line of cases thereafter.
Petitioners motion for extension of time was filed on
september 9, 1987, more than a year after the
expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986.
Hence, it is no longer within the coverage of the grace
period.
Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of
the decision of the CA on August 25, 1987, petitioners
cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel
regarding said rule for their failure to file a motion for
reconsideration within the reglementary period. It is
the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law

Vitriolo, et al. v. Dasig, A.C. No. 4984, 448 Phil


199 [2003]
The Officer-in-Charge of the Legal Affairs Service of the
Commission on Higher Education (CHED) was sought
to be disbarred for repeated acts of solicitation or
extortion of money from persons who had pending
applications for correction of their names in her office,
the amounts ranging from P5,000.00 to P20,000.00.
She was also reported to have failed to pay her just
debts as evidenced by the issuance of dishonored
checks.
In finding respondents misconduct as a lawyer of the
CHED
is of such character as to affect her
qualifications as a member of the Bar, the Supreme
Court upheld its power to discipline a lawyer who holds
a government office by clarifying that Generally
speaking, a lawyer who holds a government office may
not be disciplined (by this Court) as a member of the
Bar for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official (Gonzales-Austria( vs. Abaya, A.M.
No. R-705-RTJ, 176 SCRA 634, 649 [August 23, 1989]).
However, if said misconduct as a government official

Respondents conduct in office falls short of the


integrity and good moral character required from
all lawyers, especially from one occupying a high
public office. For a lawyer in public office is
expected not only to refrain from any act or
omission which might tend to lessen the trust and
confidence of the citizenry in government, she
must also uphold the dignity of the legal
profession at all times and observe a high
standard of honesty and fair dealing. Otherwise
said, a lawyer in government service is a keeper of
the public faith and is burdened with high degree
of social responsibility, perhaps higher than her
brethren in private practice (id, at 209).

Penticostes v. Ibanez (304 SCRA 281 [1999])


A Public Prosecutor received P1,804.00 from a
respondent in a preliminary investigation assigned to
him who was charged with non-remittance of SSS
payments. The amount represented the respondents
arrears. The Prosecutor never remitted it to the SSS.
The duties of a provincial prosecutor do not include
receiving money from persons with official transactions
with his office While Pascual may not strictly be
considered a client of respondent, the rules relating to
a lawyers handling of funds of a client is applicable.
The failure of respondent to immediately remit the
amount to the SSS gives rise to the presumption that
he has misappropriated it for his own use. This is a
gross violation of general morality as well as
professional ethics; it impairs public confidence in the
legal profession and deserves punishment A lawyer
does not shed his professional obligations upon
assuming public office. In fact, his public office should
make him more sensitive to his professional obligations
because a lawyers disreputable conduct is more likely
to be magnified in the publics eye. Want of moral
integrity is to be more severely condemned in a lawyer

Pimentel, Jr. v. Llorente (339 SCRA 154 [2000])


Complaint for disbarment against the Election OfficerLawyer and City Prosecutor who acted as Chair and
Vice-Chair of the Board of Canvassers in the 1995
elections.
Despite the fact that these discrepancies were
apparent on the face of these documents and that the
variation involves substantial number of votes,
respondents nevertheless certified the statements of
votes as true and correct.
Their acts constitute
misconduct
A lawyer who holds a government
position may not be disciplined as a member of the bar
for misconduct in the discharge of his duties as a
government official. However, if the misconduct also
constitutes a violation of the CPR or the lawyers oath
or is of such character as to affect his qualifications as
a lawyer or shows moral delinquency on his part, such
individual may be disciplined as a member of the bar
for such misconduct.

Suarez v. Platon (69 Phil. 556 [1940])


The prosecuting officer is the representative not
of an ordinary party to a controversy, but of a
sovereignty whose obligation to govern impartially
is as compelling as its obligation to govern at all;
and whose interest, therefore, in a criminal
prosecution is not that it shall win a case, but that
justice shall be done. As such, he is in a peculiar
and very definite sense the servant of the law, the
twofold aim of which is that guilt shall not escape
or innocence suffer.
He may prosecute with
earnestness and vigor indeed, he should do so.
But while he may strike hard blows, he is not at
liberty to strike foul ones. It is as much his duty to
refrain from improper methods calculated to
produce a wrongful conviction as it is to use every
legitimate means to bring about a just one.

Far Eastern Shipping v. CA (297 SCRA 30 [1998])


It took 8 months of extensions (210 days) for the OSG
to file a required comment. In the other case, it took 6
extensions totaling 180 days before the OSG filed its
comment.
The undeniably dilatory disinclination of the OSG to
seasonably
file
required
pleadings
constitutes
deplorable disservice to the tax-paying public and can
only be categorized as censurable inefficiency on the
part of the government law office.
This is most
certainly professionally unbecoming of the OSG The
OSG is reminded that just like other members of the
Bar, the canons under the CPR apply with equal force
on lawyers in government service in the discharge of
their official tasks. These ethical duties are rendered
even more exacting on them because, as government
counsel, they have the added duty to abide by the
policy of the State to promote a high standard of ethics
in public service.

Igoy v. Soriano (367 SCRA 70 [2001])


A litigant before the Court of Appeals was introduced to
a certain Justice of the Supreme Court who asked for
sums of money to help secure a favorable decision on
his case.
Respondents offer to resign was obviously an attempt
to evade whatever penalty may be imposed upon him.
However, the mere expedient of resigning from the
service will not extricate him from the consequences of
his acts The conduct or behavior of all officials and
employees of an agency involved in the administration
of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior
clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden
of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be
characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum in order to earn and maintain the respect of
the public for the judiciary Considering that
respondent is a senior lawyer (28 years in service) of
this Court.

Tatad v. Sandiganbayan (159 SCRA 70 [1988])


Undue delay in preliminary investigation prompted by
political motivations.
That political motivations played a vital role in activating
and propelling the prosecutorial process is shown by: First,
the complaint came to life only after petitioner had a falling
out with President Marcos.
Secondly, departing from
established procedures prescribed by law for preliminary
investigation, which requires the submission of affidavits and
counter-affidavits by the complainant and the respondent
and their witnesses, the Tanodbayan referred the complaint
to the Presidential Security Command for fact-finding
investigation and report Prosecutors should not allow and
should avoid giving the impression that their noble office is
being used or prostituted, wittingly or unwittingly, for
political ends or other purposes alien to or subversive of the
basic and fundamental objective of serving the interest of
justice evenhandedly, without fear or favor to any and all
litigants alike, whether rich or poor, weak or strong,
powerless or mighty.
Only by strict adherence to the
established procedure may the publics perception of the
impartiality of the prosecutor be enhanced. The inordinate
delay is violative of the petitioners constitutional rights. A
delay of close to 3 years cannot be deemed reasonable or
justifiable an undue delay in the conduct of a preliminary

Tan, Jr. v. Gallardo (73 SCRA 306 [1976])


Private prosecutors contend they are entitled to appear
and take part in the criminal proceedings and adopt a
position contrary to the OSG.
Since a criminal offense is an outrage to the
sovereignty of the State, it is but natural that the
representative s of the State should direct and control
the prosecution The role of the private prosecutors is
to represent the offended party with respect to the civil
action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from
the offenseAlthough the private prosecutors may be
permitted to intervene, they are not in control of the
case, and their interests are subordinate to those of the
People of the Philippines represented by the fiscal. The
right which procedural law reserves to the injured party
is that of intervening in the prosecution for the sole
purpose of enforcing the civil liability for the criminal
action and not demanding punishment for the accused.
Where from the nature of the offense, or where the law
defining and punishing the offense charged does not
provide for an indemnity, the offended party may not
intervene in the prosecution of the offense.

Nadayag v. Grageda, A.C. No. 3232, 237 SCRA 202 [1994]

A Notary Public, when asked to notarize a Deed of Sale a


Retro was shown the Original Certificate of Title covering the
property subject of the deed and gave an opinion to the
vendee a retro that it was clear and free from any
encumbrances. He then translated the contents to the
Visayan dialect and explained it to the vendee before it was
signed in his presence. The OCT was thereafter confiscated
by the Register of Deeds.
Treated as counsel for the vendee, he had the legal duty to
advise him properly of the irregularities and the dangers of
holding the Original Certificate of Title which should have
been in the custody of the Register of Deeds. Respondent
had acted recklessly at the least, in his advice of the vendee.
He rendered an opinion which was irresponsible that his
client relied upon which recklessness is censurable. The
Court held that by such omission, the lawyer failed to
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession in
Violation of Canon 7 because (n)othing should be done by
any member of the legal fraternity which might tend to
lessen in any degree the confidence of the public in the
fidelity, honesty, and integrity of the profession (citing

Respondent should have been conscientious in


seeing to it that justice permeated every aspect
of a transaction for which his services had been
engaged, in conformity with the avowed duties
of a worthy member of the Bar. He should have
fully explained the legal intricacies and
consequences of the subject transaction as
would aid the parties in making an informed
decision.
Such responsibility was plainly
incumbent upon him, and failing therein, he
must now face the commensurate consequences
of his professional indiscretion.

Saburnido vs. Madrono, A.C No. 4497, 366 SCRA 1 [2001]

In a prior administrative case, respondent was dismissed as


a judge for pointing a high-powered firearm at one of the
complainants, who was unarmed at the time, during a
heated altercation.
In 2 other administrative cases, the respondent was
subsequently convicted for misconduct as a judge, which
resulted in the forfeiture of all his retirement benefits from
the judiciary. Complainants-spouses were the complainants
also in one of these cases.
Thereafter, respondent filed 3 administrative cases against
the complainants, and one criminal case. Complainants
alleged that these cases were filed by respondent against
them in retaliation for his dismissal from the judiciary and
forfeiture of his benefits.
Respondents act of filing multiple complaints against
herein complainants reflects on his fitness to be a member
of the legal profession. His act evinces vindictiveness, a
decidedly undesirably trait whether in a lawyer or another
individual xxx xxx xxx. We see in respondents tenacity in
pursuing several cases against complainants not the
persistence of one who has been revenge. He was thus
found guilty of gross misconduct land violation of Canon 7
and Rule 7.03 of the Code, and imposed the penalty of
suspension for one year.

Gacias v. Balauitan, A.C. No. 7280 [2006])


A lawyer sold a portion of his 1,242 square
meter parcel of land to complainant and
received
total
payments
amounting
to
P300,000.00 out of the P3220,000.00 purchase
price
agreed
upon.
When complainant learned that the lawyervendor mortgaged the entire property including
the portion sold to her, she asked the lawyervendor for the copy of the title, and when the
latter refused her request, she did not complete
the payment of the balance and instead
demanded a refund of her payments, to no avail.
In the meantime, the bank to which the

The Court held that the lawyers refusal to comply


with his just obligation for no justifiable reason,
compounded by his act of mortgaging the property
after he had received substantial payment from
the complainant, was bordering on the fraudulent
and surely dishonest. He has thus shown a want
of professional honesty. Such misdeed reflects on
the moral stuff which he is made of. His fitness to
continue in the advocacy of law and manage the
legal affairs of others are thus put in the same was
concluded
without
the
respondent
taking
advantage of his legal profession is really of little
moment. For a lawyer may be suspended or
disbarred for any misconduct, even it if pertains to
his private activities, as long as it shows him
wanting in honesty, probity or good demeanor.

Marcayda v. Naz (171 SCRA 466 [1983])


A
notarized
agreement
whereby
respondent
acknowledged paternity of a child and undertook to pay
support paved the way for the withdrawal of the
complaint and allowed respondent to take his oath.
But respondent failed to comply with the undertaking
to give support. Complaint was revived this time for
disbarment.
Naz is not guilty of gross immorality. He should not be
disbarred because he had admitted the paternity of Rey
in a public document and agreed to support him. This
circumstance rendered his immorality not so gross and
scandalous (but) Nazs stand of not giving any value
to
that
public
document
shows
a
certain
unscrupulousness unbecoming a member of a noble
profession. His attitude is highly censurable. He wants
to make a mockery of the proceedings before this Court
by making it appear that he lied brazenly about the
filiation of Rey Marcayda just to facilitate his admission
to the bar. In his oath, he swore to do no falsehood.

Soberano v. Villanueva (6 SCRA 891 [1962])


Complainant claims respondent induced her to
take part in a fake wedding to facilitate their
cohabitation as husband and wife, and she bore 2
children out of such cohabitation but respondent
left them. In a letter presented as evidence,
complainant
reminded
respondent
of
his
unfulfilled promise to marry her 3 years after the
supposed ceremony.
Other letters referred to
trysts in hotels, delayed monthly periods, and the
possibility of being pregnant.
Intimacy between a man and a woman who are
not married, especially in the light of the
circumstances, is neither so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act nor so unprincipled as to
warrant disbarment or disciplinary action against
the man as a member of the Bar.

In re: Argosino (246 SCRA 14 [1995])


Petition to be admitted to the Bar by an applicant who
has been convicted for the death of a hazing victim.
He passed the bar examination but was not allowed to
take his oath.
Argosinos participation in the deplorable hazing
activities certainly fell far short of the required standard
of good moral character. The deliberate (rather than
merely accidental or inadvertent) infliction of severe
physical injuries which proximately led to the death of
the unfortunate victim certainly indicated serious
character flaws on the part of those who inflicted such
injuries. Argosino and his co-accused had failed to
discharge their moral duty to protect the life and wellbeing of a neophyte who had, by seeking admission to
the fraternity involved, reposed trust and confidence in
all of them that, at the very least, he would not be
beaten and kicked to death like a stray dog. Thus,
participation in the prolonged and mindless physical
beatings inflicted upon the victim constituted evident
rejection of that moral duty an was totally irresponsible
behavior, which makes impossible a finding that the
participant was then possessed of good moral

People v. Sesbreno, (130 SCRA 465


[1984])
In reply filed in a civil case, a lawyer branded
his adverse counsel as an irresponsible
person, cannot be trusted, like Judas, a
liar, and an irresponsible childish prankster.
On the basis of these utterances, an
Information for libel was filed against the
lawyer.
The accused-lawyer sought to quash the
Information on ground that said utterances are
absolutely privileged in nature.

The doctrine of the privileged communication that


utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings,
including all kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions,
belong to the calls of communications that are absolutely
privileged has been expressed in a long line of cases
(citations
omitted).
The
doctrine
of
privileged
communication rests upon public policy, which looks to the
free and unfettered administration of justice, though as an
incidental result it may, in some instances, afford an
immunity to the evil-disposed an malignant slander (People
vs. Castelo, 4 SCRA 947) xxx
xxx
xxx
(t)he purpose
being that members of the legislature, judges of courts,
jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely
and exercise their respective functions without incurring the
risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for recovery of
damages (Deles vs. Aragona, Jr., 27 SCRA 633). Lawyers,
most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of
pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they
uphold, and for the felicity of their clients, they may be
pardoned some infelicities of language (id).

The privilege, however, musts be extended


only if the statement is relevant, pertinent, or
material to the cause in hand or subject of
inquiry (Tolentino vs. Baylosis, 1 SCRA 396;
People vs. Alvarez, 14 SCRA 901; People vs.
Aquino, 18 SCRA 555) and courts are inclined
to be liberal in favor of extending the privilege
(People vs. Alvarez, id; Malit vs. People, 1114
SCRA 348).

In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession,


a lawyers language should likewise be dignified
(In re: Climaco, 55 SCRA 107, 121). Choice of
language is a very important requirement in the
preparation of pleadings. Appropriately, in the
assertion of their clients right, lawyers, even
those gifted with a superior intellect, are enjoined
to rein up their tempers.
Greater care and
circumspection must be exercised in the
preparation of their pleadings and to refrain from
using abrasive and offensive language (Yangson
vs. Saladanan, 68 SCRA 42). A becoming modesty
is a desirable trait also of practicing attorneys.

Tolentino vs. Baylosis, (1 SCRA 396 [1961])


In a Reply to Answer on Counterclaim filed in a civil case for
damages, a lawyer made the following statements against
adverse counsel: for the death of the said five plaintiffs xxx
xxx
xxx
the cause of their death may be due to the will of
God, or due to the heavy expenses which they may have
suffered from their leader and counsel; when Atty. Tolentino
made this allegation, he must be certainly not of his usual mind,
otherwise with his old age and long practice of law, he would
have not dared to make such fictitious and malicious claim;
Before the public, Atty. Tolentino cannot be judged as a
prominent attorney or a bright attorney for his several failures in
the bar and his several losses of his cases are not in hi sfavor;
Atty. Tolentino was badly humiliated because of his lack of
knowledge of law and unpreparedness; It is therefore the
contention of the defendant that the caliber and standing of
Atty. Miguel Tolentino is not the type of attorney who can
demand a professional service of ten thousand pesos, and in the
honest belief of defendant, Atty. Tolentino is a counsel for just
five hundred pesos in the event that plaintiff wins this case.

Applying a test of relevancy and pertinence that


counsel, parties, or witnesses are exempted from
liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial
proceedings, provided that the statements are
connected with, or relevant, pertinent or material
to the cause in hand or subject of inquiry (citing
53 C.J.S. 170-171; Tupas vs. Parreno, G.R. No. L12545 [April 30, 1959]), the Court found that as
the propriety of award of claim for attorneys fees
was a legitimate issue before the court, Atty.
Tolentino himself laid open his own standing as a
lawyer as material and relevant. The statements
relating to this issue were thus held privileged.

But as for the statement regarding plaintiffs


deaths being caused perhaps by counsel, and the
averment that Atty. Tolentino was not of his usual
mind otherwise he would not have made such
fictitious and malicious claim, the Court found
these irrelevant and impertinent. However, as
these were uttered in retaliation for Atty.
Tolentinos own prior libelous remarks against
adverse counsel, and since Atty. Tolentino did not
come to court with clean hands, to penalize him
for likewise indulging in offensive personalities in
the course of judicial proceedings constituting
highly unprofessional conduct according to the
High Court, which merits disciplinary action, the
Court ruled to uphold the dismissal by the trial
court of Atty. Tolentinos complaint for damages.

Torres v. Javier, A.C. No. 5910 [2005]


In finding the utterances to be beyond the privilege granted
to relevant and material judicial statements, the Supreme
Court held that the statements what kind of lawyer is Atty.
Torres?, he lies through his teeth, if he has any common
sense at all he should shut up, and Atty. Torres forgets the
sad chapter of his life as a practitioner when he lost out to
Prof. Javier in the petitoin for audit which he filed to gain
pogi points, the undersigned thinks that even a dim-witted
first-year law student would not oblige with such a very
serious charge, and respondent Torres is a member of the
Philippine Bar. But what law books is he reading?, were
irrelevant and immaterial to the petition for audit case and
the labor case. Respondent lawyer was found guilty of
violating Canon 8 and Rule 8.01, in particular for the use of
offensive and improper language in his pleadings and was
suspended for one month from practice.

The fact that counsel was defending his wife from what
he perceived were unwarranted attacks, did not
convince the High Court to exonerate him. They held:
Clients, not lawyers, are the litigants, so whatever
may be the ill-feelings existing between clients should
not be allowed to influence counsel in their conduct
toward each other or toward suitors in the case (citing
People vs. Sesbreno, 130 SCRA 465, 470 [1984]]). The
Court reminded counsel that Canon 8 and Rule 8.01
instruct that respondents arguments in his pleadings
should be gracious to both the court and opposing
counsel and be of such words as may be properly
addressed by one gentleman to another (HueysuwanFlorido vs. Florido, 420 SCRA 132, 137 [22004]). The
language does not run short of expressions which are
emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory,
illuminating but not offensive. (Rheem of the
Philippines vs. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441, 445 [1967]) (id.).

In an answer to a complaint for damages, respondent


lawyer made the following statements against the
plaintiff: for the plaintiff to do such acts with a twisted
color is indicative of a twisted mind; It is only a dirtyminded mind of plaintiff that can concoct an equally
dirty thinking, for plaintiff to say otherwise is again a
delimitation of a limited mind; the accusations in
par. 10 and 11of the complaint as purely false, a devise
of wickedness a earmarks of plaintiffs traits; to think
and allude the way plaintiff did is again characteristic
of plaintiffs wicked, twisted and ignominious
mentality; he cannot be a dignified pater familias as
plaintiff claim he is because he had been hailed to the
police station, the fiscals office and the courts many
times for crimes which do not bespeak of a dignified
person, much less a dignified parter familias which is
indeed a big joke; instead of capitalizing on it for
vindictiveness and in procuring money from his
neighbors under a disguise of a court action since such
results are voluntary in the course of human relations.

Gutierrez v. Abila, et al., (111 SCRA 658 [1982])


The trial court dismissed the complaint on the ground that
the statements are absolutely privileged. Applying the rule
on relevancy, the Supreme Court reversed the trial curts
finding of materiality, it was held that far from being
isolated statements, these slanderous matters pervade the
entire dimensions of the defendants answer, with almost
every paragraph thereof scathing with spiteful imputations
against the plaintiff. These imputations constitute a grave
reflection upon the mental and moral character and
reputation of the plaintiff, and they certainly achieve no
purpose except to gratify the defendants rancor and ill-wid.
The aforementioned personal opinions of the defendants,
expressed in vituperative and intemperate language, are
palpably devoid of any relation whatever to the subject of
inquiry and have no place in a pleading. xxx xxx xxx The
defendants answer in Civil Case No. C-6607 is quite
complete and sufficient without the derogatory statements
in question and their inclusion therein was clearly made
solely for the purpose of giving vent to their ill-feelings
against the plaintiff for the purpose to which the mantle of

Yulo v. Yang Chiao Seng (106 Phil. 110


[1959])
A lawyer took advantage of adverse counsels
absence to secure court permission to present
evidence ex parte and thereafter judgment
despite agreement between the parties to ask
for a postponement in view of a possible
settlement.
In setting aside the judgment and granting a
new trial, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial
courts reconsideration and stated that As the
parties had agreed to postpone the trial
because of a possible amicable settlement,
the plaintiff could not take advantage of
defendants absence at the time of the fixed

Macias v. Malig (157 SCRA 762 [1988])


Charge and counter-charge between two lawyers, the first as
original counsel and the second as the counsel who substituted the
first upon motion of the client-litigant.
The Court is not prepared to pass sub silentio the misconduct of
which complainant and respondent are guilty one vis--vis the
other. Each party here has shown himself to be too ready to
believe the other guilty of serious misconduct in the practice of the
profession to which they both belong while vehemently asserting
his own good faith. Each party here was too anxious and willing to
make serious accusations against the other which the exertion of
reasonable diligence along with simple courtesy would have shown
to be unwarranted by the facts and the records. Each attorney here
was too prone to use intemperate and offensive language in
describing the professional behavior of the other. Macias insisted
that respondent Malig extorted P10,000 from him. The dictionary
meaning of to extort is to obtain from an unwilling or reluctant
person by physical force, intimidation or the abuse of legal or
official authority. Clearly extortion is an unethical act and well be
criminal.
Harassment and intimidation are other similarly
unethical and offensive acts that complainant Macias so freely
ascribed to respondent Malig. Corruption with which complainant
Macias accused both respondent Malig and the deceased Judge
Tiangco is an even more deplorable term. Upon the other hand,
respondent Malig was not to be outdone and referred to
complainant Macias as a denizen of a jungle who preys upon
his brother lawyer and his own clients and likened him to a

Complainant Macias and respondent Malig are not,


however, in pari delicto.
For purposes of determining
appropriate penalties in respect of complainant Macias, the
Court takes judicial notice of the fact that this is not the first
time that complainant Macias has been found guilty of using
improper and unethical language. In GR No. L-34395, this
Court held certain statements made by complainant Macias
in pleadings filed before this Court as intemperate, tactless
and offensive and as constituting contempt of court in
facie curiae for which complainant Macias was severely
reprimanded and warned that for a repetition of the
offense, a more drastic penalty would be imposed. This
Court would also take judicial notice of the fact that
complainant Macias has more than once in the past been
rebuked by this Court in relation to his conduct vis--vis
clients and former clients. We hold that both complainant
Macias and respondent Malig are both guilty of conduct
unbecoming a lawyer and an officer of the court. Lawyers
must at all times treat each other, and as well their clients,
former clients and the rest of the community, with that
personal dignity, courtesy and civility rightly demanded of
members of the ancient and learned profession of the law.

In re: Soriano (33 SCRA 801 [1970])


Entry as counsel done 1 year and 8 months after
the decision became final.
The entry of appearance of a counsel in a case
which has long been sealed and terminated by a
final judgment, besides being an unmitigated
absurdity in itself and an unwarranted annoyance
to the court which pronounced the judgment, is a
sore deviation from normal judicial processes. It
detracts heavily from the faith which should be
accorded final judgments of courts of justice,
generating as it does in the minds of the litigants,
as well as of the public, an illusory belief that
something more can be done toward overturning a
final judicial mandate.
We find Atty. Soriano
grossly remiss and inexcusably precipitate in
putting an officious finger into the vortex of the
case. He was wanting in the reasonable care
which every member of the Bar must need

Camacho v. Pangulayan (328 SCRA 631 [2000])


Charge of misconduct against lawyers for defendant
school for allegedly procuring and effecting on separate
occasions, without knowledge of the counsel,
compromise agreements with four of his clients in the
civil case which resulted in the waiver of all kinds of
claims against defendant school, and to terminate all
proceedings.
When the individual letters of apology and readmission agreements were formalized, complainant
was by then already the retained counsel for plaintiff
students in the civil case. Respondent lawyers had full
knowledge of this fact.
Although aware that the
students were represented by counsel, respondent
attorney proceeded, nonetheless, to negotiate with
them and their parents without at the very least
communicating the matter to their lawyer, herein
complainant, who was counsel of record. This failure of
respondent, whether by design or because of oversight,
is an inexcusable violation of the canons of professional
ethics and in utter disregard of a duty owing to a
colleague.
Respondent fell short of the demands

Osop v. Fontanilla (365 SCRA 398 [2001])


Lawyer convinced complainant in a civil case to
write a letter of reconsideration to the Chancellor
of the defendant-university on representation he
will try to help, despite contrary advice of
complainants counsel. After manifesting that the
university was not amenable to settlement, the
lawyer moved to dismiss the case on ground of
forum shopping based on the letter seeking
reconsideration.
Misconduct is improper or wrong conduct. It is
the transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of
duty, willful in character and implies wrongful
intent and not mere error in judgment.

The act of Atty. Fontanilla in rushing to court and filing the


Manifestation the minute he got the Indorsement brings out
in the open his not being totally bent on the idea of
negotiation even if he was the one who broached the idea
and his desire to have the case dismissed at the expense of
Mr. Osop. Furthermore, since it is the University President
who would decide on complainants letter, it would have
been prudent of Atty. Fontanilla to preserve the status quo
and wait for the resolution on the said letter. It is deplorable
that the letter written by Mr. Osop in good faith and upon the
solicitation of respondent was used against him as
ammunition to have his case dismissed. And that this
unconscionable act was done by a member of the Philippine
Bar. Atty. Fontanillas employment of the said letter against
the interest of Mr. Osop, after he had actively solicited the
same, was not proper and revealed his lack of candor and
absence of good faith in his dealings with Mr. Osop.
Moreover, Atty. Fontanilla conveniently omitted to state in
his motion to dismiss that the letter of reconsideration was
written at his solicitation to facilitate a possible settlement.
The said omission is not only unfair to Mr. Osop but had a
tendency to mislead the court as to the true circumstances
material to resolving the incident.

Eco v. Rodriguez (107 Phil. 612])


Filing of notice of appeal and appeal bond was
made out of time. In motion for relief, excusable
negligence alleged was counsels clerk erroneous
computation of the period to appeal.
What was delegated by petitioners counsel to his
clerk was the computation itself of the period
within which the appropriate pleading may be
filed. This act is hardly prudent or wise. As the
lower court aptly held: the duty to compute the
period to appeal is a duty that devolves upon the
attorney which he can not and should not delegate
unto an employee because it concerns a question
of study of the law and its application, and this
Court considers this to be a delicate matter that
should not be delegated. The negligence here
cannot be considered excusable.

US v. Go-Leng (21 SCRA 426 [1912])


Lawyers services engaged to suppress, reduce and
refund toll rates. Lawyer was able to obtain these
resulting
to
economic
benefit
to
respondent
corporation. Reasonable compensation for the services
sued for: claim of P20,000, trial court award of P10,000,
CA award of P3,500.
Although the professional services rendered by the
petitioner are purely administrative and did not require
a high degree of professional skill and experience, the
fact remains that these services were rendered and
were productive of substantial beneficial results to his
clients. It is clear that for these services the petitioner
is entitled to compensation, and the only question is
the reasonable amount to which he is entitled ... The
importance, merits and value of professional services
of a lawyer are measured not alone by his work taken
separately, but by his work taken as a whole an
attorney is entitled to have and receive the just and
reasonable compensation for services performed at the
special instance and request of client. That as long as
the plaintiff was honestly and in good faith trying to

People v. De Luna (102 Phil. 968])


Applicants for admission to the Bar using the Bar Flunkers
Act of 1953 who were denied permission to take the oath,
filed a manifestation with the Supreme Court as attorneys
stating that they have taken the oath before a notary public
and ending thus: This manifestation is made for all legal
effects as they will practice law in all the Courts of the
Philippines.
Appellees knew that they did not pass the bar examination.
Although they likewise sought admission to the Bar under
the provisions of RA 972 known as the Bar Flunkers Act of
1953, they were subsequently notified of the resolution of
this Court denying said petition. In as much as the oath as
lawyer is a pre-requisite to the practice of law and may be
taken only before the Supreme Court, by those authorized by
the latter to engage in such practice, the resolution denying
the petition of appellees herein, implied, necessarily, a
denial of the right to take said oath, as well as a prohibition
of or injunction against the taking thereof. When this
notwithstanding appellees took the oath before a notary
public, and formally advised this Court not only of such fact
but also that they will practice in all the courts of the
Philippines, they accordingly disobeyed the order implied
and resisted the injunction implicit in said resolution.

By their aforementioned acts, appellees herein


expressed clearly their intent to and did in fact
challenge and defy the authority of this Court to
pass upon and settle, in a final and conclusive
manner, the issue whether or not they should be
admitted to the bar, as well as embarrass, hinder
and obstruct the administration of justice and
impair the respect due to the courts of justice in
general and the Supreme Court, in particular.
Thus, they performed acts constituting an
improper conduct tending, directly or indirectly, to
impede, obstruct, or degrade the administration of
justice.

By taking the oath of office as


attorneys-at-law and notifying the Supreme Court
that they had done so and would practice law in all
courts of the Philippines, the appellee shad for, all
intents and purposes, held out to the public as
such attorneys-at-law.

Amalgamated Laborers Assn. v. CIR (22 SCRA


1266 [1968])
Controversy over attorneys fees for legal services
in labor case based on alleged oral agreement that
the union president would share in the attorneys
fees.
Canon 34 of Legal Ethics condemns this
arrangement in terms clear and explicit. It says:
No division of fees for legal services is proper,
except with another lawyer, based upon a division
of service or responsibility. The union president is
not the attorney for the laborers. He may seek
compensation only as such president.
An
agreement whereby a union president is allowed
to share in attorneys fees is immoral. Such a
contract we emphatically reject. It cannot be

CANON 10
A LAWYER OWES
CANDOR,
FAIRNESS
AND
GOOD FAITH TO
THE COURT

Edison Cheng vs. Atty. Agravante (A.C. No.


6183 [March 23, 2004])
In his Memorandum on Appeal filed with the
National Labor Relations Commission, a lawyer
certified to a false date of receipt of the Decision
sought to be appealed to make it appear it was
seasonably filed. The Supreme Court found the
lawyer guilty of violating Canon 10 and Rule 10.01
of the Code, for having committed a falsehood and
misleading the NLRC by his artifice, likewise Canon
18 and Rule 18.03, for having been negligent in the
handling of his clients case. In suspending the
lawyer for one year and imposing a fine of
P10,000.00, the court stated: It cannot be stressed
enough how important it is for a lawyer as an
officer of the court to observe honesty at all times,
especially before the courts.

Heirs of the Late Herman Rey Romero vs.


Atty. Venancio Reyes, Jr. (461 SCRA 1 [June
23, 2005])
Respondent-lawyer represented defendants in a
civil case where the parties entered into a
Compromise Agreement by way of settlement.
The trial judge rendered judgment based on this
agreement. As there were 3 groups of litigants,
the signing was done in 3 stages, the last
signatories being respondent-lawyer and his
clients. A fire gutted the courthouse and the
records of the case were burned. The court
granted a motion for reconstitution but the copy
of the agreement presented did not bear the
signatures of respondent-lawyer and his clients.

After a lapse of 2 years, since defendants still


had not fully complied with their obligations
under the compromise, a motion for execution
was filed with the court. Respondent-lawyer
moved to dismiss the motion for being
premature arguing that his clients period to
comply has not yet expired. Much later, lawyerrespondent raised the issue that one of his
clients had not signed the agreement and that
she had no authority to sign for co-defendant
corporation. As a result, the trial judge denied
the motion for execution and declared the
Compromise Agreement unenforceable and
without legal effect.

The Supreme Court found that through his acts and


representations, respondent-lawyer impressed upon
the parties and the trial judge that his clients were
bound to the Compromise Agreement.
Then
suddenly and conveniently, he repudiated it by
falsely alleging that one of his clients had never
signed it. Obviously, he was anticipating a dead end
in shielding them from the courts Order of
execution. Suspiciously, he raised the issue only
after they had no other recourse but to comply with
their obligation under the Agreement.
His
subterfuge was undoubtedly a ruse to mislead the
court because, as later proven, the Compromise
Agreement had in fact been duly signed by the said
client.

Thus, he was found guilty of deception, dishonesty


and doublespeak, which the Court lumped with
other forms of moral flaw, in violation of Rule
10.01 and Rule 10.03, which require of lawyers
complete and absolute honesty when they appear
and plead before the courts. Any act that obstructs
or impedes the administration of justice constitutes
misconduct and justified disciplinary action against
lawyers. Respondent-lawyer was penalized with
suspension from the practice of law for one year
and reminded that True, lawyers are obliged to
present every available remedy or defense to
support the cause of their clients. However, their
fidelity to their causes must always be made within
the parameters of law and ethics, never at the
expense of truth and justice.

Encinas v. National Bookstore (464 SCRA 572 [2005])

Counsel made to show cause why he should not be cited in


contempt for his participation in the submission of a fake judicial
decision to the SC.
Direct contempt, or contempt facie curiae, is misbehavior
committed in the presence of or so near a court or judge so as to
obstruct or interrupt the proceedings before the same, including
disrespect toward the court, and can be punished summarily
without hearing. It is conduct directed against or assailing the
authority and dignity of the court or a judge, or in the doing of a
forbidden act. It is insulting to assert a claim before this Supreme
Court based on an obvious and incompetent forgery and conceived
by one with so primitive a sense of what normative standards
would pass judicial muster.
We cannot accept counsels
declarations of good faith and honest mistake since, as a member
of the Bar and an officer of the court, he is presumed to know
better. He is required to thoroughly prepare himself on the law and
facts of his case and the evidence he will adduce. The minimum he
could have done was to verify with the appropriate authorities the
documents upon which his clients based their claims, and not have
relied on his clients assertions. Counsels actuations may even
constitute a violation of the lawyers oath. As an officer of the
court, he is reminded of his basic duties to observe and maintain
the respect due to the courts of justice and judicial officers, to do
no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in court, nor mislead
or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice, and to assist in the
speedy and efficient administration of justice.

Castaneda v. Ago (65 SCRA 505 [1975])


Despite the pendency in the trial court of the
complaint for the annulment of the sheriffs sale,
elementary justice demands that the petitioners, long
denied the fruits of their victory in the replevin suit,
must now enjoy them for, the respondents Agos,
abetted by their lawyer, have misused legal remedies
and prostituted the judicial process to thwart the
satisfaction of the judgment, to the extended prejudice
of the petitioners. Respondents with the assistance of
counsel, maneuvered for 14 years to doggedly resist
execution of the judgment thru manifold tactics in and
from one court to another (5 times in the SC).
Forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn public servant
and his exalted position as an officer of the court,
counsel has allowed himself to become an instigator of
controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a
mediator for concord and a conciliator for compromise,
a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of litigation
instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and

A counsels assertiveness in espousing with


candor and honesty his clients cause must be
encouraged and is to be commended; what we do
not and cannot countenance is a lawyers
insistence despite the patent futility of his clients
position, as in the case at bar. It is the duty of a
counsel to advise his client, ordinarily a layman to
the intricacies and vagaries of the law, on the
merit or lack of merit of his case. If he finds that
his clients cause is defenseless, then it is his
bounden duty to advise the latter to acquiesce and
submit, rather than traverse the incontrovertible.
A lawyer must resist the whims and caprices of his
client, and temper his clients propensity to
litigate. A lawyers oath to uphold the cause of
justice is superior to his duty to his client; its
primacy is indisputable.

Request for Consolidation (364 SCRA 189


[2001])
First complaint for declaration of nullity of title
with damages RTC Cabanatuan City.
Second
complaint for annulment of contract with damages
RTC Mindoro, both filed by same plaintiff against
same defendant. Cabanatuan court dismissed the
complaint for forum shopping and for failure to
submit a certificate of NFS. Third complaint with
RTC Cabanatuan City also for declaration of nullity
of title with damages with identical allegations as
the dismissed case but with proper CNFS, also by
same plaintiff against same defendant.
All 3
complaints were filed by the same lawyer. The 3rd
complaint was dismissed with prejudice.

If the civil cases were to be tried separately then conflicting


decisions can arise Such conflicting results can be
disruptive of the orderly administration of justice. . . It is
true that if the complaint is dismissed based on the failure to
submit the proper certification of NFS, then the dismissal is
without prejudice. However, if the dismissal is based on the
clear existence of forum shopping, then such dismissal is
with prejudice. The resolution of RTC Cabanatuan shows that
the dismissal was based on clear existence of forum
shopping Merely enumerating and admitting the existence
of related cases in the certification of NFS cannot exculpate
a complainant who is obviously deliberately seeking a more
friendly forum for his case. Atty. Martinez conspired with his
client in filing 3 complaints involving the same parties,
issues, and subject matter. Instead of aiding in the orderly
administration of justice, the complaints filed in different for
a only caused confusion among the trial courts .

Melo v. CA (318 SCRA 94 [1999])


The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits
involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.
It exists where the
elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final
judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in
another. .. The requirement to file a certificate of NFS is
mandatory. Failure to comply with this requirement cannot
be excused by the fact that plaintiff is not guilty of forum
shopping Compliance with the certification against forum
shopping is separate from and independent of the avoidance
of forum shopping itself. Thus, there is a difference in the
treatment in terms of imposable sanctions between failure to
comply with the certification requirement and violation of
the prohibition against forum shopping.
The former is
merely a cause for the dismissal, without prejudice, of the
complaint or initiatory pleading, while the latter is a ground
for summary dismissal thereof and constitutes direct
contempt.
Nor can subsequent compliance with the
requirement excuse a partys failure to comply in the first
instanceCompliance with the certification requirement on
NFS should not be made subject to a partys afterthought,
lest the policy of the law be undermined.

BA Savings Bank v. Sia (336 SCRA 484


[2000])
The certificate of non-forum shopping
required by SC Circular 28-91 may be signed,
for and on behalf of
corporation, by a
specifically authorized lawyer who has
personal knowledge of the facts required to be
disclosed in such document. Unlike natural
persons, corporations may perform physical
actions only through properly delegated
individuals, namely, its officers and/or
agents counsel of the corporation was in the
best position to verify the truthfulness and the
correctness of the allegations in the complaint
and to know and to certify if an action had
already been filed and pending with the
courts.

Maricalum Mining Corporation v. NLRC (298


SCRA 378 [1998])
The certificate of NFS as provided by this Court
Circular 04-94 is mandatory and should
accompany pleadings filed before the NLRC. Court
Circular No. 04-94 is clear and needs no further
interpretation: the following requirements, in
addition to those in pertinent provisions of the
Rules of Court and other existing circulars, shall be
strictly complied with in the filing of complaints,
petitions, applications or other initiatory pleadings
in all courts and agencies other than the Supreme
Court and the Court of Appeals The NLRC is a
quasi-judicial agency, hence, initiatory pleadings
filed before it should be accompanied by a
certification of NFS.

Banogan v. Zerna (154 SCRA 593 [1987])


Original decision in cadastral case rendered in
1926. A motion to amend the decision was filed
31 years later in 1957 followed by an amended
petition for review of the judgment. In 1971, 14
years after, a motion to dismiss the petition was
filed and it was granted on ground of laches.
Litigation must end and terminate sometime and
somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and
efficient administration of justice that, once a
judgment has become final, the winning party be
not, through a mere subterfuge, deprived of the
fruits of the verdict. Courts must therefore guard
against any scheme calculated to bring about that
result. Constituted as they are to put an end to
controversies, courts should frown upon any
attempt to prolong them.

One reason why there is a degree of public


distrust for lawyers is the way some of them
misinterpret the law to the point of distortion in a
cunning effort to achieve their purposes. By doing
so, they frustrate the ends of justice and at the
same time lessen popular faith in the legal
profession as the sworn upholders of the law.
While this is not to say that every wrong
interpretation of the law is to be condemned, as
indeed most of them are only honest errors, this
Court must express its disapproval of the adroit
and intentional misleading designed precisely to
circumvent or violate it As officers of the court,
lawyers have the responsibility to assist in the
proper administration of justice.
They do not
discharge this duty by filing pointless petitions
that only add to the workload of the judiciary,
especially this Court, which is burdened enough as
it is. They do not advance the cause of law or
their clients by commencing litigations that for
sheer lack of merit do not deserve the attention of

Pajares v. Abad Santos (30 SCRA 748 [1969])


The appeal is frivolous and a plain trick to delay payment
and prolong litigation unnecessarily. Such attitude deserves
condemnation, wasting as it does, the time that the courts
could well devote to meritorious cases. Here, this simple
collection case has needlessly clogged the court dockets for
over 7 years. Had appellant been but prudently advised by
her counsel to confess judgment and ask from her creditor
the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has
incurred by way of filing fees in the CFI, premiums for her
appeal bond, appellate court docket fees, printing of her
appellants brief, and attorneys fees would have been much
more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appellee. Yet,
here she still remains saddled with the same debt, burdened
by accumulated interests, after having spent uselessly much
more than the amount in litigation in this worthless case.
The cooperation of litigants and their attorneys is needed so
that needless clogging of court dockets with unmeritorious
cases may be avoided.
The signature of an attorney
constitutes a certificate by him that he has read the pleading
and that to the best of his knowledge, information and belief,
there is good ground to support it; and that it is not
interposed for delay.

Lim Tanhu v. Ramolete (66 SCRA 425 [1975])


The procedural maneuver resorted to by private
respondent in securing the decision in her favor
was ill-conceived. It was characterized by that
which every principle of law and equity disdains
taking unfair advantage of the rules of procedure
in order to unduly deprive the other party of full
opportunity to defend his cause. The idea of
dropping the non-defaulted defendants with the
end in view of completely incapacitating their codefendants from making any defense, without
considering that all of them are indispensable
parties to a common cause of action to which they
have countered with a common defense, readily
connotes an intent to secure a one-sided decision,
even improperly.

Manila
Pest
Control,
Inc.
v.
Workmens
Compensation Commission (25 SCRA 700 [1968])
It is one thing to exert to the utmost ones ability to
protect the interest of ones client. It is quite another
thing, and this is to put it at its mildest, to take
advantage of any unforeseen turn of events, if not to
create one, to delay if not to defeat the recovery of
what is justly due and demandable, especially so, when
as in this case, the obligee is a necessitous and
poverty-stricken man suffering from a dreaded disease,
that unfortunately afflicts so many of our countrymen
and even more unfortunately requires an outlay far
beyond the means of our poverty-stricken masses. The
ancient and learned profession of the law stresses
fairness and honor that must ever be kept in mind by
everyone who is enrolled in its ranks and who expects
to remain a member in good standing. This Tribunal is
rightfully entrusted with the serious responsibility of
seeing to it that no deviation from such a norm should
be countenanced. If what occurred here would not be
characterized for the shocking thing it was, then it
could be said that the law is less than fair and far from

Samar Mining Co. v. Arnado (24 SCRA 402


[1968])
The illness on which Abuyens claim is based took
place in 1956. Yet through the present case,
petitioner has succeeded in prolonging the
litigation for the compensation involved for 12
years. What is more, petitioners contention was
based upon a theory that had been rejected by
this Court as early as August 1961. Then again
the compensability of Abuyens disability has
never been questioned by petitioner herein.
Hence, it is manifest that the purpose of this case
has been merely to delay, a policy often resorted
to as a means of draining the resources of the
poorer party, in this case a TB patient, and of
compelling it to submit out of sheer exhaustion.
Thus, the conduct of petitioners counsel is hardly
compatible with the duty of the Bar to assist in the

Cruz v. Salva (105 Phil. 1151 [1959])


CFI found accused guilty of murder and sentenced
them to death.
Motion for new trial by one
accused granted but he was still found guilty.
While appeals were pending, President Magsaysay
ordered a reinvestigation and the PC obtained a
confession from different persons as the supposed
real killers.
Based on this, several accused
wrote respondent Fiscal to reinvestigate. A motion
for new trial was also filed with the SC where the
appeals were pending.
Respondent Fiscal
reinvestigated through a committee he created
and chaired. Petitioner was subpoenaed to appear
before the committee because he was implicated
as the mastermind in the killing based on the new
evidence. He sought to prohibit and stop the
reinvestigation.

Ordinarily, when a criminal case in which a fiscal intervened


though nominally is tried and decided and it is appealed to a higher
court such as this Tribunal, the functions and actuations of said
fiscal have terminated; usually, the appeal is handled for the
government by the OSG. Consequently, there would be no reason
or occasion for said fiscal to conduct a reinvestigation to determine
criminal responsibility for the crime involved in the appeal.
However, respondent has established a justification for his
reinvestigation the duty and role of a prosecuting attorney is not
only to prosecute and secure the conviction of the guilty but also to
protect the innocent. We come to the manner in which said
investigation was conducted by respondent. He could well have
conducted the investigation in his office, quietly, unobtrusively and
without much fanfare, much less publicity with the permission of,
if not the encouragement by the respondent, news photographers
and newsmen had a field day. Not only this but in the course of the
investigation, on two occasions, respondent, addressing the
newspapermen said, gentlemen of the press, if you want to ask
questions I am willing to let you do so and the questions asked will
be reproduced as my own; Why respondent was willing to
abdicate and renounce his right and prerogative to make and
address the questions to the witnesses under investigation in favor
of the members of the press is difficult for us to understand, unless
he wanted to curry favor with the press and publicize his
investigation as much as possible.

It seemed as though the criminal responsibility for


the killing of Manuel Monroy which has already
been tried and finally determined by the lower
court and which was under appeal and advisement
by this Tribunal, was being retried and
redetermined in the press, and all with the
apparent placet and complaisance of respondent.
His actuations in this regard went well beyond
the bounds of prudence, discretion and good taste.
It is bad enough to have such undue publicity
when a criminal case is being investigated by the
authorities even when it is being tried in court; but
when said publicity and sensationalism is allowed,
even encouraged, when the case is on appeal and
is pending consideration by this Tribunal, the
whole thing becomes inexcusable, even abhorrent,
and this Court, in the interest of justice, is
constrained and called upon to put an end to it
and a deterrent against its repetition by meting an
appropriate disciplinary measure, even a penalty
to the one liable.

Ochida v. Cabarroguis (71 SCRA 40 [1976])


Counsel in an oral arguments on a motion,
characterized defendant in the case as a fugitive from
justice because there are 5 warrants of arrest pending
against her.
Defendant filed a complaint for
disbarment against counsel.
A lawyer should treat the opposite party or suitor with
fairness and due consideration and should avoid
offensive personalities and improper speech against an
opposing litigant. Respondent lawyer used abrasive
language in branding defendant as a fugitive from
justice, an expression which, according to MerriamWebsters dictionary, refers to one who having
committed or being accused of a crime in one
jurisdiction is absent for any reason from that
jurisdiction; specifically, one who flees to avoid
punishment. A lawyer with a keen sense of decorum
and propriety would have avoided such intemperate
language. [on the other hand] respondents infelicitous
utterance does not constitute gross misconduct.

PNB v. Uy Teng Piao (57 Phil. 337 [1932])


One of the attorneys for the bank testified, in an
action to revive a judgment against defendant,
that the latter had waived the right to redeem.
Although the law does not forbid an attorney to
be a witness and at the same time an attorney in a
cause, the courts prefer that counsel should not
testify as a witness unless it is necessary, and that
they
should
withdraw
from
the
active
management of the case. When a lawyer is a
witness for his client, except as to merely formal
matters such as the attestation or custody of an
instrument and the like, he should leave the trial
of the case to another counsel. Except when
essential to the ends of justice, a lawyer should
avoid testifying in court in behalf of his client.

Oparel v. Abaria (40 SCRA 128 [1971])


Charge against respondent lawyer who was retained by
complainant to recover damages from his employer for
injuries suffered.
Settlement was reached: complainant
received P500, P55 of which was deducted as attorneys fees
of respondent. It was discovered that respondent actually
received P5,000. Counsel explained that of the P5,000,
P3,500 was spent for the complainants hospital expenses
and another P1,000 was given to complainants family
during his confinement.
Complainant later executed a
desistance acknowledging a misunderstanding.
It is not amiss to impress on members of the Bar that the
utmost care be taken to minimize occasions for any
misunderstanding between them and their clients. The
relationship being one of confidence, there is ever present
the need for the latter being adequately and fully informed
of the mode and manner in which their interest is defended.
They should not be left in the dark. They are entitled to the
fullest disclosure of why certain steps are taken and why
certain matters are either included or excluded from the
documents they are made to sign. It is only thus their faith
in counsel may remain unimpaired.

Where the client happens to be poor and


unlettered, seeking to enforce what he considers
his just demands against an employer, it is even
more imperative that matters be explained to him
with all precision and clarity. More than that, no
effort should be spared for him to get fully what he
is entitled to under the law. The same zeal should
characterize a lawyers efforts as when he is
defending the rights of property More
specifically, in a case like the present, he should
not invite loss of trust by inadvertence or even by
a failure to use the simplest and most
understandable language
in communicating
matters. For he may lend himself to the suspicion
that he is lacking in candor and may be taking
undue advantage of his client for his own profit
and advantage in any dealing with the adverse

Lim Siok Huey v. Lapiz 103 Phil. 930 [1958])


Plaintiffs who are the widow and children of the
deceased Chua Pua Lun are all citizens and
residents
of
Communist
China
and
notwithstanding the fact that they have been
informed of the death of the deceased, they have
not sent any communication to anyone in the
Philippines giving authority to take whatever
action may be proper to obtain an indemnity for
his death other than two letters which do not
contain any intimation nor authorization for the
filing of the present action While a lawyer is
presumed to be properly authorized to represent
any cause in which he appears he may however
be required by the court on motion of either party
to produce his authority under which he appears
When in the course of the trial it developed that
he never had any communication with any of the
heirs and much less received any authority from
them either to prosecute this case or to act as
such guardian in behalf of the minors, the trial

Santos v. NLRC (254 SCRA 673 [1996])


The fact that Atty. Perez has been able to timely ask
for a deferment of the initial hearing on 14 November
1986, coupled with his subsequent active participation
in the proceedings, should disprove the supposed want
of service of legal process. .. Appearance by a legal
advocate is such voluntary submission to a courts
jurisdiction.
It may be made not only by actual
physical appearance but likewise by the submission of
pleadings in compliance with the order of the court or
tribunal. To say that petitioner did not authorize Atty.
Perez to represent him in the case is to unduly tax
credulity. The Court likewise considers it unlikely that
Atty. Perez would have been so irresponsible as to
represent petitioner if he were not, in fact, authorized.
Atty. Perez is an officer of the court and he must be
presumed to have acted with due propriety.
The
employment of a counsel or the authority to employ an
attorney need not be proved in writing; such fact could
be inferred from circumstantial evidence. Petitioner
was not just an ordinary official of the MMDC; he was
the President of the company.

People v. Solis (128 SCRA 217 [1984])


The appellants contend that they were deprived of
due process for failure of the trial court to afford them
the right to be defended by a lawyer of their own
choice. This contention is devoid of factual basis.
Appellants were arraigned on April 11, 1969, but actual
trial did not start until February 5, 1970, or ten months
later. This was due to frequent postponements caused
by their failure to secure the services of a lawyer of
their own choice. Their alleged counsel de parte never
appeared in court. If they were indeed sincere in their
desire to secure the services of a lawyer of their own
choice, that period of ten months was more than
sufficient for them to do so.
Besides, during the
proceedings a quo appellants never informed the trial
court of their desire to be defended by a lawyer of their
own choice; neither did they protest the appointment
or the actuations of their counsel de oficio. It has been
held that where a counsel has been assigned to a
person on trial and such counsel has acted without
objection from the accused, the latters conviction
cannot be set aside on the sole ground that said

People v. Daeng, et al. (49 SCRA 221 [1973])


In every case, the defendants either pleaded
guilty on initial arraignment or later changed their
plea from not guilty to guilty. The appointment
of atty. Galvan as counsel de oficio in all 3 cases
might just have been a coincidence since there is
no evidence before us that would show that he
applied for and has been granted such
appointment. We would, nevertheless, caution all
courts against the frequent appointment of the
same attorney as counsel de oficio for 2 basic
reasons: first, it is unfair to the attorney
concerned, considering the burden of his regular
practice that he should be saddled with too many
de oficio cases; and second, the compensation
provided for by the Rules of Court might be
considered by some lawyers as a regular source of
income, something which the Rule does not
envision. In every case, the accused stands to
suffer because the overburdened counsel would
have too little time to spare for his de oficio cases,

Gonzales v. Chavez (205 SCRA 816 [1992])


Whether the SolGen neglected his public duty by
withdrawing as counsel for the RP and the PCGG in cases he
had filed in court, and whether the PCGG acted without or in
excess of jurisdiction in hiring private lawyers (40) as a result
of the OSGs withdrawal.
All these legal provisions ineluctably lead to no other
conclusion but that under the law of its creation and the
complementary rules, the law office of the PCGG, as it is for
the rest of the government, is the OSG. Although the PCGG
is empowered to file and prosecute all cases investigated by
it, it does not thereby oust the OSG from its lawful mandate
to represent the Government and its agencies in any
litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the
services of a lawyer. Moreover, such express grant of power
to PCGG does not imply that it may abdicate such power and
turn over the prosecution of the cases to private lawyers
whom it may decide to employ The SolGen should not
decline to appear in court to represent a government agency
without just and valid reason, especially the PCGG which is
under the Office of the President, he being a part of the
Executive Department The Court is not compelling him to
act in a particular way. Rather, the Court is directing him to
prevent a failure of justice resulting from his abandonment in
midstream of the cause of the PCGG and the Republic and

Republic v. CA (200 SCRA 226 [1991])


The OGCC is the principal law office of all governmentowned and controlled corporations.
The Sugar Regulatory Administration need not bee
represented by the OSG. It may appear on its own
behalf through its legal personnel or representative.
Since the SRA is neither a government-owned or
controlled corporation nor a subsidiary thereof, OGCC
does not have the authority to represent it when
confronted with a situation where one government
office takes an adverse position against another
government agency, the SolGen should not refrain from
performing his duty as a lawyer of the government. It
is incumbent upon him to present to the court what he
considers should legally uphold the best interest of the
government although it may run counter to a clients
position. In such an instance, the government office
adversely affected by the position taken by the SolGen,
if it still believes in the merit of its case, may appear in
its own behalf through its legal personnel or

San Jose Homeowners Association, Inc. vs.


Atty. Roberto Romanillos (A.C. No. 5580
[June 15, 2005])
A
lawyer
represented
the
Homeowners
Association before the Human Settlements
Regulation Commission in a case against the
subdivision developer for violation of P.D. No. 957,
the
Subdivision
and
Condominium
Buyers
Protection Act.
The HOA alleged that the
subdivision plan submitted to the Bureau of Lands
designated a certain lot as a school site but it was
sold by the developer to the Spouses Durano.
While still counsel for the HOA, the lawyer
represented the Sps. Montealegre in requesting
the HOAs conformity to construct a school
building at the questioned lot, which the
Montealegres were buying from the Sps. Durano.

the lawyer applied for a clearance from the


Housing and Land Use Regulatory board in
behalf of the Sps. Montealegre. The HOA then
terminated the lawyers service as counsel.
Thereafter, the lawyer acted as counsel also for
the
party-successor
of
the
subdivision
developer in a civil case filed by the HOA
against the developer.
A disbarment case was thus filed by the HOA
against the lawyer for representing conflicting
interests. In the initial report of the IBP Board
of Governors, the complaint was recommended
for dismissal with a strict admonition, based on
a plea of good faith by lawyer and as it was his
first offense. Notwithstanding this, however,
the
lawyer
continued
representing
the
successor-in-interest of the developer in the
case filed by the HOA. A second disbarment
case was filed against him by the HOA.

The Supreme Court found the lawyer guilty


of representing conflicting interests. As
long as the lawyer represents inconsistent
interests of two or more opposing clients,
he is guilty of violating his oath. Rule
15.03 of the code of Professional
Responsibility specifically mandated that a
lawyer shall not represent conflicting
interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure.
Coupled with the lawyers prior infractions,
the supreme penalty of disbarment was
imposed upon him.

Ilusorio-Bildner vs. Atty. Luis Lokin, Jr. (A.C.


No. 6554 [December 14, 2005])
The law firm of respondent-lawyer represented the
late Potenciano Ilusorio in a civil case filed against
him by the Republic of the Philippines over
shareholdings
in
the
Philippine
Overseas
Telecommunications Corporation (POTC) and the
Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation
(PHILCOMSAT). Respondent-lawyer with 2 other
lawyers from his law firm, actively handled the
case for Ilusorio, and assisted the latter in
executing a Compromise Agreement with the
Republic
which
was
approved
by
the
Sandiganbayan.

At
a
special
stockholders
meeting
of
PHILCOMSAT, a new set of directors and officers
were elected which Ilusorio questioned before
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
In this case, respondent-lawyer appeared on
behalf of Manuel Nieto, et al., the newly elected
directors and officers.
Respondent-lawyers defense that the Ilusorio
case before the Sandiganbayan was a personal
account of just one attorney of the firm was
found contrary to the evidence submitted by
respondent
himself,
specifically
letters
regarding negotiations for the compromise
bearing his name and signature on behalf of the
law firm.

Respondent was personally barred by the rules of


ethics from representing an interest contrary to
that earlier espoused by his firm. xxx xxx xxx
An information obtained from a client by a
member or assistant of a law firm is information
imparted to the firm. This is not a mere fiction
or an arbitrary rule; for such member or
assistant, as in our case, not only acts in the
name and interest of the firm, but his
information, by the nature of his connection with
the firm, is available to his associates or
employers.
For such misconduct in violation of Rule 15.03, the
lawyer was suspended from the practice of law
for 3 months.

Gonzales vs. Atty. Gabucana, Jr. (479 SCRA 320


[January 23, 2006])
In a civil case for sum of money, the plaintiff was
represented by a law firm, of which respondent-lawyer
was an associate/partner. Plaintiff was able to secure a
favorable judgment. The Sheriff of the court failed to fully
implement the writ of execution in the case prompting the
plaintiff to sue him administratively. The Sheriff and his
wife went to the plaintiffs house to harass her into
executing an affidavit of desistance in the administrative
case. Plaintiff thus filed criminal cases against the Sheriff
and his wife. Notwithstanding pendency of the civil case,
where the judgment still had to be fully executed,
respondent-lawyer assumed the representation of the
Sheriff and the latters wife in the cases filed against them
by the plaintiff in the civil case. The plaintiff thus sued
respondent-lawyer for disbarment for violating the lawyerclient relationship.

It is well-settled that a lawyer is barred from


representing conflicting interests except by
written consent of all concerned given after a
full disclosure of facts.
Such prohibition is
founded on principles of public policy and good
taste as the nature of the lawyer-client relation
is one of trust and confidence of the highest
degree,. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the clients confidence, but also to
avoid the appearance of treachery and doubledealing for only then can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their
lawyers, which is of paramount importance in
the administration of justice. xxx xxx xxx The
repersentation of opposing clients in said cases,
through unrelated, constitutes conflict of
interests or, at the very least, invites suspicion
of double-dealing, which this Court cannot
allow.

However,
although
so
found
to
have
transgressed the proscription against conflict
of interests, the Court appreciated as
mitigating circumstances the fact that
respondent-lawyer represented the Sheriff and
his wife pro-bono, and that it was his firm, not
him personally, which handed the civil case
for the plaintiff. In all the pleadings for the
cases filed against the Sheriff and his wife,
respondent-lawyer signed alone, without any
mentioned of the law firm. Instead of the
penalty of suspension, the Court only imposed
a fine of P2,000.00 against respondent-lawyer.

One of tests of inconsistency of interests is whether


the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the
full discharge of the lawyers duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of
unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the performance
of that duty.
The proscription against representation of conflicting
interests applies to a situation where the opposing
parties are present clients in the same action or in
an unrelated action. It is of no moment that the
lawyer would not be called upon to contend for one
client that which the lawyer has to oppose for the
other client, or that there would be no occasion to
use the confidential information acquired from one
to the disadvantage of the other as the two actions
are wholly unrelated.

It is enough that the opposing parties in one


case, one of whom would lose the suit, re
present clients and the nature or conditions of
the lawyers respective retainers with each of
them would affect the performance of the
duty of undivided fidelity to both clients.
The representation of opposing clients in
said cases, though unrelated, constitutes
conflict of interests or, at the very least,
invites suspicion of double-dealing which this
Court cannot allow.

Rolion vs. Naraval (452 SCRA 675 [2005])


Lawyers owe fidelity to their clients. The latters money
or other property coming into the formers possession
should be deemed to be held in trust and should not under
any circumstance be commingled with the lawyers own;
much less, used by them. Failure to observe these ethical
principles constitutes professional misconduct and
justified the imposition of disciplinary sanctions.
Ordinarily, lawyers are not obliged to act either as
advisers or as advocates of any person who may wish to
become their client. They may decline employment and
refuse to accept representation, if they are not in a
position to carry it out effectively or competently. But
once they agree to handle a case, attorneys are required
by the Canons of Professional Responsibility to undertake
the task with zeal, care and utmost devotion.

Acceptance of money from a client establishes an


attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the
duty of fidelity to the clients cause. Every case
accepted by a lawyer deserves full attention,
diligence, skill and competence, regardless of
importance.
Hence, practicing lawyers may accept only as
many cases as they can efficiently handle.
Otherwise, their clients would be prejudiced.
Once lawyers agree to handle a case, they should
undertake the task with dedication and care. If
they do any less, then they fail their lawyers
oath.

The circumstances of this case indubitably show that


after receiving the amount of P8,000 as filing and partial
service fee, respondent failed to render any legal service
in relation to the case of complainant. His continuous
inaction despite repeated follow-ups from her reveals his
cavalier attitude and appalling indifference toward his
clients cause, in brazen disregard of his duties as a
lawyer. Not only that. Despite her repeated demands,
he also unjustifiably failed to return to her the files of the
case that had been entrusted to him. To top it all, he
kept the money she had likewise entrusted to him.
Furthermore, after going through her papers, respondent
should have given her a candid, honest opinion on the
merits and the status of the case. Apparently, the civil
suit between Rosita Julaton and complainant had been
decided against the latter. In fact, the judgment had
long become final and executory. But he withheld such
vital information from complainant.
Instead, he
demanded P8,000 as filing and service fee and thereby
gave her hope that her case would be acted upon.

Rule 15.05 of the Code of Professional Responsibility


requires the lawyers give their candid and best
opinion to their clients on the merit or lack of merit
of the case, neither overstating nor understating
their evaluation thereof. Knowing whether a case
would have some prospect of success is not only a
function, but also an obligation on the part of
lawyers. If they find that their clients cause is
defenseless, then it is their bounded duty to advise
the latter to acquiesce and submit, rather than to
traverse the incontrovertible.
The failure of
respondent to fulfill this basic undertaking
constitutes a violation of his duty to observe
candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and
transactions with his clients.

Likewise, as earlier pointed out, respondent


persistently refused to return the money of
complainant
despite
her
repeated
demands.
His conduct was clearly
indicative of lack of integrity and moral
soundness; he was clinging to something
that did not belong to him, and that he
absolutely had no right to keep or use.
Lawyers are deemed to hold in trust their
clients money and property that may
come into their possession.

Velasquez vs. Barrera, ( 29 SCRA 312 [1969])


While it is true that the civil case for ejectment was
filed against Pedro Velasquez, who is complainants
brother, it was the complainant himself who hired
the services of the respondent to institute the
appeal paying him P100.00 for his attorneys fees
and P120.00 for appeal bond and other expenses.
Complainant himself was an interested party in the
outcome of the case since he was a part owner of
the personal properties to be confiscated by the
sheriff. It appears that the respondent failed to pay
the appeal bond out of the amount of P100.00 he
received from the complainant.

Complainant had to execute a chattel mortgage on his


properties in favor of Alberto Ymson and Nicolas Ymson.
The execution of the chattel mortgage was upon the advice
of the respondent. Respondent was already giving legal
advice not only to the parties to the civil case, namely,
Pedro Velasquez and Jose Pangan, but also the complainant
himself, who was to be adversely affected in the outcome of
the case.
Respondent neglected and failed to exert all his efforts to
protect the interest of his client. He even induced the
complainant to sign an alleged chattel mortgage and later
turned against him representing this time Nicolas and
Alberto Ymson as mortgagees. He even instituted a criminal
case of estafa against the complainant. He also represented
Ymson brothers in the third and fourth party complaints.

As admitted by the respondent himself, the civil case


for ejectment against complainants brother was a
hopeless case since they admitted that they failed to
pay the annual rentals.
That being the case,
respondent should have advised complainant and his
brother not to institute the appeal.
Even though upon the evidence fore us, the
respondent did not represent complainants brother
and the latters co-defendant in the Court of First
Instance of the city of Baguio, it would have been more
in accordance with the demands of the ethics of the
legal profession that he should have refrained from
representing the Ymsons in the latters fourth party
complaint; in the foreclosure of the chattel mortgage
mentioned heretofore, and in the prosecution of the
Criminal Case No. 2003 against herein complainant.
His intervention in the ejectment case in the municipal
court on behalf of Pedro B. Velasquez apparently left
the complainant with the impression that he had
continued to represent said party in the court of first
instance, thus concluding that his actuations in said
case on appeal and in the criminal case already
mentioned were in violation of his oath of office.

Bautista vs. Barrios, (9 SCRA 695 [1963])

Rufina Bautista complains that Atty.


Barrios committed malpractice in that
having drafted a deed of partition at
her request, and as her attorney, he
afterwards, in suit to enforce it, refused
to appear for her, and what is worse,
he appeared instead as counsel for the
other party to the deed of partition and
opposed her rights thereunder.

Upon refusal of Rovero to comply with the


terms of the deed, Rufina went to ask
Barrios to enforce ithe admits Rufina went
to see himby filing a complaint against
Rovero, strongly corroborates
Rufinas
testimony that she had actually engaged his
services to draft the partition. Indeed, when
she asked him to file the complaint, and he
refused, he did not tell her that he had been
engaged by Rovero to draft the partition. He
merely told her she had no case, and that he
was reluctant to take up a lost cause.

Even supposing that he was employed by both


Rovero and the Baustista brothers to draft the
partition, it is doubtful whether he could appear for
one as against the other in a subsequent litigation.
At most, if he could appear for one client, it should
be for him who seeks to enforce the partition as
drafter. Yet he appeared for Rovero who sought to
avoid compliance with it, asserting that it did not
contain all the terms of the agreement, that it was
subject to certain modifications, etc. Moreover, in
his defense of Rovero, he raised issued which
obviously violated Rufinas confidence because he
allegedin behalf of Roverothat the undisclosed
modifications were known to Rufina at the time of
the execution of the partition. The inconsistent
positions taken by the respondent coupled with
some flimsy arguments he had advanced, do not
favorably impress this Court with his alleged good
faith in the matter.

Tiania vs. Ocampo, (200 SCRA 472 [1991])


Baylock sued Tiania for ejectment. Ocampo
appeared for Tiania and also for Blaylock.
Ocampo prepared the answer in the said
ejectment case, which Tiania signed. Then
Ocampo made Tiania sign a Compromise
Agreement which the latter signed without
reading.
Two years from the submission of the
Compromise Agreement, Tiania was shocked
when she received an order to vacate the
property in question. To hold off her ejectment
for another tow years, Ocampo advised Tiania
to pay him a certain amount for the sheriff.

The Angel spouses, sold their house in favor of Blaylock.


Ocampo acted as their counsel and prepared the Deed
of Sale.
With the money paid by Blaylock, the Angel spouses
bought another parcel of land. Again, Ocampo prepared
the Deed of Sale. In addition, Ocampo made the Angel
spouses sign two (2) more documents which,
accordingly, were made parts of the sale transaction.
Those two (2) documents later turned out to be a Real
Estate Mortgage of the same property purchased from
Laurea Dalanan and a Promissory Note, both in favor of
Blaylock.
The Angel spouses never realized the nature of the said
documents until they received a complaint naming
thme as defendants in a collection suit filed by Ocampo
on behalf of the plaintiff, Commercial Corporation of
Olongapo, a firm headed by Blaylock.

We prohibit the representation of conflicting


interests not only because the relation of
attorney and client is one of trust and
confidence of the highest degree, but also
because of the principles of public policy and
good taste. An attorney has the duty to deserve
the fullest confidence of his client and represent
him with undivided loyalty. Once this confidence
is abused, the entire profession suffers.
The test of the conflict of interest in disciplinary
cases against a lawyer is whether or not the
acceptance of a new relation will prevent an
attorney from the full discharge of his duty of
undivided fidelity and loyalty to his client or
invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance thereof.

Indeed, the aforementioned acts of the


respondent in representing Blaylock, and at
the same time advising Tiania, the opposing
party, as in the first administrative case, and
once again representing Blaylock and her
interest while handling the legal documents of
another opposing party as in the second case,
whether the said actions were related or
totally
unrelated,
constitute
serious
misconduct.
They are improper to the
respondents office as attorney.

Natan vs. Capule, (91 Phil. 640 [1952])


Failed

to appear, without any justifiable


reason, in the hearing of a case for which he
had received his fees in full;

Accepted professional employment in the very

case in which his former client is the adverse


party, and utilizing against the latter papers,
knowledge, and information obtained the
course of his previous employment;

Falsely accusing tenants of his former client

and causing their detention, in order to compel


them to enter into a compromise by giving him
(respondent) one-half of their rice harvests.

We are convinced that the respondent had utilized


the papers and the knowledge and information that
he had received from his former client Simplicio
Natan, in relation to the Hacienda Minit, against
Natan and for the benefit of his new client Patero.
It is evident from the foregoing that respondent,
because of his previous relationship with the
complainant herein, was disqualified to accept the
case of Olimpio Patero, who claimed ownership of
Hacienda Minit. The immediate objective of Patero
was to wrest possession of the Hacienda Minit from
respondents
former
client,
Natan,
which
possession it was the latters duty to protect and
support.

The fact that respondent herein retired from the


forcible entry case on November 21, 1949, prior
to retaining the case of Olimpio Patero, did not
relieve him from his obligation of fidelity and
loyalty to his former client. The inconsistency
between his position as attorney for Olimpio
Patero and that as attorney for complainant was
so apparent that it could not have escaped
respondents attention.
Respondent may not
excuse his conduct behind the shield of the
presumption of good faith, because the
inconsistency was clear. But what makes the
violation of his obligation of fidelity more
improper is the fact that in forwarding Pateros
interest, he did actually utilize the papers,
knowledge, and information which he had
received in the course of his employment as
lawyer for complainant herein.

An attorney is forbidden to do either of two things after


severing his relationship with a former client. He may not do
anything which will injuriously affect his former client in any
matter in which he formerly represented him, nor may he at
any time use against his former client knowledge or
information acquired by virtue of the previous relationship.
(Wutchumn Water Co. vs. Bailey)
But if the conduct of the respondent in accepting Pateros
case and in using papers and documents to the prejudice of
his former client is inexcusable, in prosecuting the tenants of
his former client for estafa without reasonable grounds,
causing their imprisonment in order to compel them to
deliver portion of their palay harvests to his second client, his
conduct was reprehensible, constituting not merely unethical
practice but a clear and direct violation of oath as lawyer.
His conduct evinces a character wanting in truthfulness, and
devoid of that sense of fairness and justice so essential to the
profession that he has embraced.

Nakpil vs. Valdes, (286 SCRA 758 [1998])


Respondent became the business consultant, lawyer and
accountant of the Nakpils.
Nakpil became interested in purchasing a summer residence
in Moran Street, Baguio City. He requested respondent to
purchase the Moran property for him. They agreed that
respondent would keep the property in trust for the Nakpils
until the latter could but it back.
It was the Nakpils who occupied the Moran summer house.
When Jose Nakpil died on July 8, 1973, respondent acted as
the legal counsel and accountant of his widow, complainant.
Respondent excluded the Moran property from the inventory
of Joses estate.
On February 13, 1978, respondent
transferred his title to the Moran property to his company,
the Caval Realty Corporation.

There was a conflict of interest when his law firm


represented the estate in the intestate proceedings
while his accounting firm served as an accountant of
the estate and prepared the claims of creditors Angel
Nakpil and ENORN, Inc. against the estate.
As a rule, a lawyer is not barred from dealing with his
client but the business transaction must be
characterized with utmost honesty and good faith. The
measure of good faith which an attorney is required to
exercise in his dealings with client is a much higher
standard than is required in business dealings where
the parties tread at arms length.
Business
transactions between an attorney and his client are
disfavored and discouraged by the policy of the law.
Hence, courts carefully watch these transactions to
assure that no advantage is taken by a lawyer over his
client. This rule is founded on public policy for, by
virtue of his office, an attorney is in an easy position to
take advantage of the credulity and ignorance of his
client.
Thus, no presumption of innocence or
improbability of wrongdoing is considered in an
attorneys favor.

It is well-established that respondent offered to the


complainant the services of his law and accounting
firms by reason of their close relationship dating as
far back as the 50s. She reposed her complete trust
in respondent who was the lawyer, accountant and
business consultant of her late husband. Respondent
and the late Nakpil agreed that the former would
purchase the Moran property and keep it in trust for
the latter. In violation of the trust agreement,
respondent claimed absolute ownership over the
property and refused to sell the property to
complainant after the death of Jose Nakpil. To place
the property beyond the reach of complainant and
the intestate court, respondent later transferred it to
his corporation.

Respondents bad faith in transferring the property to his


family corporation is well discussed in this Courts
Decision.
Respondents misuse of his legal expertise to deprive his
client of the Moran property is clearly unethical.
To make matters worse, respondent, through his
accounting firm, charged the two loans of P65,000.00
and P75,000.00 as liability of the estate, after said loans
were obtained by respondent for the purchase and
renovation of the property which he claimed for himself.
The interests of the estate and that of it creditors are
adverse to each other. Respondents accounting firm
prepared the list of assets and liabilities of the estate
and, at the same time, computed the claims of two
creditors of the estate. There is clearly a conflict between
the interest of the estate which stands as the debtor, and
that of the two claimants who are creditors of the estate.
In fact, at one instance, respondents law firm questioned
the claims of creditor Angel Nakpil against the estate.

Respondent is a CPA-lawyer who is actively practicing both


professions. He is the senior partner of his law and
accounting firms which carry his name. In the case at bar,
complainant is not charging respondent with breach of
ethics for being the common accountant of the estate and
the two creditors. He is charged for allowing his accounting
firm to represent two creditors of the estate and, at the
same time, allowing his law firm to represent the estate in
the proceedings where these claims were presented. The
act is a breach of professional ethics and undesirable as it
placed respondents and his law firms loyalty under a cloud
of doubt. Even granting that respondents misconduct
refers to his accountancy practice, it would not prevent this
Court from disciplining him as a member of the Bar. The
rule is settled that a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred
for ANY misconduct, even if it pertains to his private
activities, as long as it shows him to be wanting in moral
character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.

Nombrado vs. Hernandez, (26 SCRA 13 [1968])

Malpractice on two counts:


(1) appeared as counsel for Crispin Nazareno in a
civil case for forcible entry against Arsenio Pansaon,
his former client, being the offended party and
complainant, in a criminal case for serious physical
injuries wherein Eufemio Velasco (Nazareno), a son
of Crispin, was the accused;
(2) appeared as counsel for the accused and also for
the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 329 of
the Justice of the Peace Court (now municipal court)
of Baganga, Davao (now Davao Oriental).

Even if respondent did not use against his client


any information or evidence acquired by him as
counsel it cannot be denied that he did become
privy to information regarding the ownership of the
parcel of land which was later litigated in the
forcible entry case, for it was the dispute over the
land that triggered the mauling incident which gave
rise to the criminal action for physical injuries.
Communications between attorney and client are,
in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of dealings
between an attorney and client, inquiry of the
nature suggested would lead to the revelation, in
advance of the trial, of other matters that might
only further prejudice the complainant's cause.

Whatever may be said as to whether or not


respondent utilized against his former client
information given to him in a professional capacity,
the mere fact of their previous relationship should
have precluded him from appearing as counsel for
the other side in the forcible entry case
An attorney owes loyalty to his client not only in
the case in which he has represented him but also
after the relation of attorney and client has
terminated and it is not good practice to permit
him afterwards to defend in another case other
person against his former client under the pretext
that the case is distinct from, and independent of
the former case.

Gesuden vs. Ferrer, (128 SCRA 357 [1984])


When respondent was hired to prepare the documents
for the partition of the property, he became, for all
intents and purposes, the lawyer of all the heirs. In this
situation, he was in a position to know the relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well-known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of the
preparation of the documents, an attorney acquires data
and/or information that might prejudice one or all of the
heirs.
In later becoming a counsel for one of the heirs in a case
file against the other heirs, and in disputing the division
or partition which he himself devised in the extra-judicial
partition, respondent Edwin Z. Ferrer failed to adhere to
proper professional standards and to comply with the
duties imposed upon him as a lawyer. Thus, even
without impugning respondents good faith, his taking
up to the cause of one of the heirs in a case filed against
the other heirs, should not be sanctioned. It had the
tendency to bring the profession, of which he is a
distinguished member, into public disrepute and
suspicion and undermine the integrity of justice.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the


respondent did advise against the filing of the
complaint, the proper thing for him to do was
not to involve himself in it. As to his withdrawal
therefrom, the order of the court allowing him to
do so shows that he withdrew after he had
presented the principal evidence for the plaintiff.
We hold that the respondent violated his duty as
a lawyer when he appeared as counsel for one of
the heirs in her suit against the other heirs over
a matter which the respondent had handled for
all of them.

Periquet vs. National Labor Relations Commission,


(186 SCRA 724 [1990])
The petitioner was dismissed as toll collector by the
Construction
Development
Corporation
of
the
Philippines, private respondent herein, for willful breach
of trust and unauthorized possession of accountable toll
tickets allegedly found in her purse during a surprise
inspection. Claiming she had been "framed," she filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal and was sustained by the
labor arbiter, who ordered her reinstatement within ten
days "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges
and with fun back wages to be computed from the date
of her actual dismissal up to date of her actual
reinstatement.
The NLRC sustained the appeal.

She entered into a compromise agreement with


CDCP where she waived her right to
reinstatement and received from the CDCP the
sum of P14,000.00 representing her back wages
from the date of her dismissal to the date of
agreement.
She applied for re-employment
with the CDCP and was won on March 16, 1987.
Petitioner accepted this additional amount and
signed another Quitclaim and Release.
On March 11, 1989, she filed the motion for
execution.

As officers of the court, counsel are under


obligation to advise their clients against
making untenable and inconsistent claims like
the ones raised in this petition that have only
needlessly taken up the valuable time of this
Court, the Solicitor General, the Government
Corporate Counsel, and the respondents.
Lawyers are not merely hired employees who
must unquestioningly do the bidding of the
client, however unreasonable this may be
when tested by their own expert appreciation
of the pertinent facts and the applicable law
and jurisprudence. Counsel must counsel.

Choa vs. Chiongson, 253 SCRA 371 [1996])


Atty. Raymundo A. Quiroz, counsel for the complainant, must
have been aware of the utter lack of merit of the charges
against the respondent. As a Member of the Philippine Bar he
is bound: (1) by his oath, not to, wittingly or willingly,
promote or sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit nor
give aid nor consent to the same; (2) by Section 20(c)i Rule
138 of the Rules of Court, to counsel or maintain such action
or proceedings only as appear to him to be just; and (3) to
uphold the Code of Professional Responsibility. It was
incumbent upon him to give a candid and honest opinion on
the merits and probable results of the complainant's case
(Rule 15.05, Canon 15, Code of Professional responsibility)
with the end in view of promoting respect for the law and
legal processes (Canon 1, Id.). He should, therefore, be
required to show cause why no disciplinary action should be
taken against him for his apparent failure to observe the
foregoing duties and responsibilities.

In the case of People of the Philippines vs.


Cainglet (16 SCRA 748) the Court held that
"every interest of public policy demands that
perjury be not shielded by artificial refinements
and narrow technicalities. For perjury strikes at
the very administration of the laws (Jay vs.
State, [1916] 15 Ala. App. 255, 43 So. 137). It is
the policy of the law that judicial proceedings
and judgment shall be fair and free from fraud,
and that litigants and parties be encouraged to
tell the truth and that they be punished if they
do not (People vs. Niles, 300 Ill., 458, 133 N.E.
252, 37 A.R.L. 1284, 1289)".

Pasay Law and Consience Union, Inc. vs. Paz, (95 SCRA
24 [1980])
On the charge of representing clients with conflicting interests,
the evidence has duly established that the respondent, David
D.C. Paz , as PARGOS Legal Officer and Legal Prosecutor and
head of the Charlie Division, took part in the investigation of
the anti-graft case against ex-Mayor Cuneta by administering
oaths to witnesses and gathering evidence. He acquired
knowledge of the facts and circumstances surrounding the antigraft case. The respondent obtained confidential information
and learned of the evidence of the PARGO against ex- Mayor
Cuneta. There was undoubtedly a relationship of attorney and
client between the respondent David D.C. Paz and the PARGO.
It is also a fact that at the early stages of the preliminary
investigation conducted by the City Fiscal of Pasay of the antigraft case against ex-Mayor Pablo Cuneta, the respondent
appeared as counsel for said Cuneta. This is the same anti-graft
case investigated by the PARGO when the respondent was
head of the "Charlie Division" thereof. That the respondent later
withdrew his appearances as counsel of Cuneta is of no
moment. He had already violated the Canons of Legal Ethics
and Sec. 20(e) of Rule 138, Revised Rules of Court

The respondent has displayed a lack of concern


for his duties as a lawyer and an officer of the
court.
Communications between attorney and client are,
in a great number of litigations, a complicated
affair, consisting of entangled relevant and
irrelevant, secret and well known facts. In the
complexity of what is said in the course of
dealings between an attorney and client, inquiry
of the nature suggested would lead to the
revelation, in advance of the trial of other matters
that
might
only
further
prejudice
the
complainant's cause

Whatever may be said as to whether or not respondent


utilized against his former client information given to him
in a professional capacity, the mere fact of their previous
relationship should have precluded him from appearing as
counsel for the other side in the forcible entry case. In the
same cast of Hilado vs. David, supra, this Tribunal further
said:
Hence the necessity of setting down the existence of the
bare relationship of attorney and client as the yardstick for
testing incompatibility of interest. This stern rule is
designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner
from fraudulent conduct, but as wok to protect the honest
lawyer from unfounded suspicion of unprofessional
practice. ... It is founded on principles of public policy of
good taste. As has been said in another case, the n 43 not
necessarily one of the rights of the parties, but as to
whether attorney has adhered to proper professional
standard. With these thoughts in mind, it behooves
attorneys, like 's Ceasar's wife, not only to keep inviolate
the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance
of treachery and double dealing. Only thus can litigants be
encouraged to entrust their secrets to their attorneys
which is of paramount importance in the administration of
justice.

People vs. Babiera, (52 Phil. 94 [1928])


In regard to the first assignment of error, the fact that
the prosecuting attorney filed an information against
Clemente Babiera, Justo Babiera and Dominga Bores,
for the murder of Severino Haro, and then another
information for frustrated homicide and less serious
physical injuries against Severino Haro, Margarito
Mediavilla and Fermin Proces, because Severino Haro
had fired three shots at Clemente Babiera with his
revolver, because Margarito Mediavilla has wounded
the latter at the base of the little finger of his right
hand, does not disqualify said fiscal from sustaining
said accusations, because the accused in the one are
the offended parties in the other and vice versa, nor
does it violate professional ethics which forbids an
attorney to represent conflicting interests, since in both
cases the prosecuting attorney represents the public,
or the people of the Philippine Islands, who is the
primary offended party in every crime, as being a
violation of its sovereign will manifested in the law.

Mortera, et al. vs. Atty. Pagatpatan, (A.C. No. 4562


[June 15, 2005])

How far may a lawyer go to ensure that he gets


paid?
Plaintiffs in a civil action for rescission of contracts
won a judgment in the amount of P155,000.00. Their
lawyer, through a secret agreement with one of the
defendants, accepted P150,000.00 as partial
payment of the judgment sum, even issuing a receipt
for the amount. He deposited the money in his
personal bank account without the knowledge of
plaintiffs. Despite the orders of the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals for the lawyer to
return the money to plaintiffs, he refused to do so.
He insists that plaintiffs owe him for services already
rendered.

In deciding to suspend the lawyer for 2 years, the


Court took into account the following factors: (a)
He has been a practicing lawyer since 1974 and
runs his own small firm.
He nevertheless
continues to deny liability for concealing and
withholding his clients money. This attitude was
found to be inexcusable; (b) He had other
means for recovering his failure to implead an
indispensable party. By reason of his own neglect
or omission, he chose a shortcut which was
against both law and procedure. The High Court
concluded: Clearly, the respondents actuations
were thoroughly tainted with bad faith, deceit and
utter contempt of his sworn duty as a lawyer.
Thus a heavier penalty than a mere one year
suspension is definitely called for.

Aldovino vs. Pajalte (423 SCRA 135 [Feb.


17, 2004])
Respondent-lawyer faced similar disbarment
charge for having withheld his clients money
in violation of Canon 16. the Supreme Court
suspended him for one year for keeping the
P250,000.00 rightfully belonging to his client.
Obviously his failure to return the money to
complainants upon demand gave rise to the
presumption that he misappropriated it in
violation of the trust reposed on him. His act
of holding on to their money without their
acquiescence is conduct indicative of lack of
integrity and propriety. He was clinging to
something not his and to which he had no
right.

De Guzman Buado and Lising vs. Layag (A.C.


No. 5182 [August 12, 2004])
Where respondent-lawyer received 3 checks from the
Sheriff, only one of which was his, the other 2 being
payable to the plaintiffs whom he represented in
the case. He did not inform his clients of the check
payments and he had somebody encash all the
checks on the strength of a Special Power of
Attorney purportedly executed by the deceased
plaintiff. Even after his clients learned of the check
payments 2 years later, and demanded delivery of
the proceeds thereof from the lawyer, he refused to
comply. The Court En Banc chose to impose the
heavier
penalty
of
indefinite
suspension
considering the lawyers years of experience, his
ignorance of the law, specifically Civil Code, and his
violation of 3 Canons.

CORPUS vs. CA (98 SCRA 424 [1980])


There was no contract for contingent fee between
Corpus and respondent David. Contingent fees depend
on an express contract therefor. Thus, an attorney is
not entitled to a percentage of the amount recovered
but his client in the absence of an express contract to
that effect.
While there was no express contract between the
parties for the payment of attorneys fees, the fact
remains that respondent David rendered legal services
to petitioner Corpus and therefore as aforestated, is
entitled to compensation under the innominate contract
of facio ut des. And such being the case, respondent
David is entitled to a reasonable compensation.

Where one has rendered services to


another, and these services are accepted
by the latter, in the absence of proof that
the service was rendered gratuitously, it is
but just that he should pay a reasonable
remuneration therefor because 'it is a wellknown principle of law, that no one should
be permitted to enrich himself to the
damage of another (emphasis supplied).

In determining a reasonable fee to be paid to

respondent David as compensation for his


services, on a quantum meruit basis, it is proper
to consider all the facts and circumstances
obtaining in this case particularly the following:
a) The extent of the services rendered by
respondent David should be considered together
with the extent of the services of petitioners
other counsel, Atty. Rosauro Alvarez.
b) The benefits secured for petitioner Corpus
may also be considered in ascertaining what
should be the compensation of respondent David.

Beltran vs. Fernandez, (70 Phil. 248 [1940])


Charging respondent with having purchased a property of

his client involved in a pending litigation in which he


appeared as counsel.

conflicting claims to lot C, a series of suits, civil and

criminal, in all these suits, respondent Inocentes Fernandez


appeared as counsel for the opponents of the complainant.

while criminal case No. 6585 aforementioned was pending

appeal, respondent purchased from his client, Natividad


Ypan, lot C in question.

Respondent has accordingly violated article 1459 of the

Civil Code, in breach of professional conduct.

Suspended for six months.

For failure to appear in two consecutive


hearings and to submit a position paper in the
Hanopol case which resulted in complainant
LFCs default and judgment against it by the
Labor Arbiter, the respondent is faulted for
negligence.

The setting aside of the adverse Decision of


the Labor Arbiter cannot obliterate the effects
of respondents negligence.
Indeed, had
respondent attended the two scheduled
hearings and filed the required position paper,
then at least, there would have been no delay
in the resolution of the case, which , perhaps,
would have been in favor of complainant. The
delay, by itself, was prejudicial to complainant
because it deprived successor-counsel Atty.
Loy of time which he should be devoting to
other cases of complainant. In fact he had to
prepare complainants position paper which
respondent should have done earlier.

From the foregoing, it is manifest that the


respondent is indeed guilty of negligence, a
clear violation of the Code of Professional
Responsibility
further found that the respondent assisted
Roberto San Juan in the preparation of the
counter affidavit, submitted in defense of the
latter in the accusation of estafa filed against
San Juan by LFC. As a matter of fact, the
respondent signed the jurat of the San Juan
counter-affidavit he (respondent) helped
prepare. It is also a fact that the respondent
investigated this same charge of estafa while
he was still the lawyer of the complainant and

We are convinced that the respondent had


betrayed the confidences of the complainant,
his former client.
xxx
An attorney owes loyalty to his client
not only in the case
in which he has
represented him but also after the relation of
attorney and client has terminated, and it is
not a good practice to permit him afterwards
to defend in another case other persons
against his former client under the pretext that
the case is distinct from and independent of
the former case.

B.R. SEBASTIAN ENTERPRISES, INC. vs. COURT OF


APPEALS, 206 SCRA 28 [1992]
On 19 February 1974, petitioner, thru its then counsel
of record, received notice to file Appellant's Brief within
45 days. It had, therefore, until 5 April 1974 within
which to comply.
Counsel for petitioner failed to file the Brief; thus, on 9

July 1974, respondent Court issued a Resolution


requiring said counsel to show cause why the appeal
should not be dismissed
was received by counsel for petitioner on 17 July 1974.
failed to comply, appeal dismissed

The trial court issued a writ of execution


Motion to Reinstate Appeal with Prayer for Issuance of

a Writ of Preliminary Injunction


In the instant case, no fraud is involved; what obtains
is simple negligence on the part of petitioner's counsel,
which is neither excusable nor unavoidable. Petitioner
thus failed to demonstrate sufficient cause to warrant
a favorable action on its plea.
Petitioner's counsel was the law firm of BAIZAS,
ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES and not merely Atty. Crispin
Baizas. Hence, the death of the latter did not
extinguish the lawyer-client relationship between said
firm and petitioner.

The death of Attorney Baizas was not a valid excuse on the

part of his associates for not attending to Alvendia's appeal,


supposing arguendo that his office was solely entrusted with
the task of representing Alvendia in the Court of Appeals.
Attorney Espiritu (not Attorney Baizas) was the one actually
collaborating with Viola in handling Alvendia's case. He did
not file a formal appearance in the Court of Appeals.

There was inexcusable negligence on the part of petitioner's

counsel in failing to file the Appellant's Brief.

petitioner's counsel, the BAIZAS ALBERTO & ASSOCIATES law

firm, received the notice to file Brief on 19 February 1974. It


failed to do so within the 45 days granted to it. Said law firm
also received a copy of the respondent Court's Resolution of
9 July 1974 requiring it to show cause why the appeal should
not be dismissed for failure to file the Brief within the
reglementary period. Petitioner chose not to comply with it,

Then, on 28 September 1974, the BAIZAS LAW OFFICE moved

for reconsideration of the said Resolution

Nothing more was heard from petitioner until after a year

when, on 6 November 1975, it filed the instant petition in


reaction to the issuance of a writ of execution by the trial court
following receipt of the records for the respondent Court.

The "confusion" in the office of the law firm following the death

of Atty. Crispin Baizas is not a valid justification for its failure to


file the Brief. With Baizas' death, the responsibility of Atty.
Alberto and his Associates to the petitioner as counsel
remained until withdrawal by the former of their appearance in
the manner provided by the Rules of Court. This is so because
it was the law firm which handled the case for petitioner before
both the trial and appellate courts. That Atty. Espiritu, an
associate who was designated to handle the case, later left the
office after the death of Atty. Baizas is of no moment since
others in the firm could have replaced him.. Upon receipt of the
notice to file Brief, the law firm should have re-assigned the
case to another associate or, it could have withdrawn as
counsel in the manner provided by the Rules of Court so that
the petitioner could contract the services of a new lawyer.

that negligence of counsel binds the client.


petitioner itself was guilty of negligence when it failed

to make inquiries from counsel regarding its case.


Petitioner failed to act with prudence and diligence,
thus, its plea that they were not accorded the right to
procedural due process cannot elicit either approval or
sympathy.

TUASON vs. COURT OF APPEALS, 256 SCRA 158 [1996]


On May 8, 1990, two days before the scheduled hearing , a

counsel for petitioner moved for a postponement on the


ground that the principal counsel was out of the country
and due to return on the first week of June. The court
granted the motion and reset the hearing to June 8, 1990.

On June 8, 1990, petitioner failed to appear. On oral motion

of private respondent, the court declared petitioner to


have waived his right to present evidence and deemed the
case submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented.

Counsel for petitioner received a copy of this decision on

August 24, 1990. No appeal was taken from the decision.

On October 17, 1990, petitioner, through new counsel, filed

with the trial court a petition for relief from judgment of the
June 29, 1990 decision.

The trial court denied the petition on August 8, 1991.


The records, however, show that the former counsel of

petitioner did not inform the trial court of this confinement.


And when the court rendered its decision, the same counsel
was out of the country for which reason the decision became
final and executory as no appeal was taken therefrom.

The failure of petitioner's counsel to notify him on time of

the adverse judgment to enable him to appeal therefrom is


negligence which is not excusable. Notice sent to counsel of
record is binding upon the client and the neglect or failure of
counsel to inform him of an adverse judgment resulting in
the loss of his right to appeal is not a ground for setting
aside a judgment valid and regular on its face.

Similarly inexcusable was the failure of his former counsel to

inform the trial court of petitioner's confinement and medical


treatment as the reason for his non-appearance at the
scheduled hearings. Petitioner has not given any reason why his
former counsel, intentionally or unintentionally, did not inform
the court of this fact. This led the trial court to order the case
deemed submitted for decision on the basis of the evidence
presented by the private respondent alone. To compound the
negligence of petitioner's counsel, the order of the trial court
was never assailed via a motion for reconsideration.

Clearly, petitioner cannot now claim that he was deprived of

due process. He may have lost his right to present evidence but
he was not denied his day in court. As the record show,
petitioner, through counsel, actively participated in the
proceedings below. He filed his answer to the petition, crossexamined private respondent's witnesses and even submitted
his opposition to private respondent's motion for dissolution of
the conjugal partnership of gains.

Indeed, relief will not be granted to a party who seeks

avoidance from the effects of the judgment when the loss of the
remedy at law was due to his own negligence; otherwise the
petition for relief can be used to revive the right to appeal which
had been lost thru inexcusable negligence.

BERGONIA vs. MERRERA, AC 5204 [2003]


A motion for extension to file an appellants

brief carries with it the presumption that the


applicant-lawyer will file the pleading within
the period granted. Failure to so file the brief
without any reasonable excuse is a violation of
the Canons of Professional Responsibility. For
such
violation,
a
lawyer
may
be
administratively sanctioned, especially if it
results in damage to the client.

From time to time, a request for extension becomes

necessary when an advocate needs more time to study the


clients position. Generally, such request is addressed to
the sound discretion of the court. Lawyers who, for one
reason or another, decide to dispense with the filing of the
required pleading, should promptly manifest this intent to
the court. It is necessary for them to do so in order to
prevent delay in the disposition of the case. Those who file
motions for extension in bad faith misuse the legal
process, obstruct justice, and thus become liable to
disciplinary action

A lawyer who requests an extension must do so in good

faith and with a genuine intent to file the required pleading


within the extended period. In granting the request, the
court acts on the presumption that the applicant has a
justifiable reason for failing to comply with the period
allowed. Without this implied trust, the motion for
extension will be deemed to be a mere ruse to delay or
thwart the appealed decision. The motion will thus be
regarded as a means of preventing the judgment from
attaining finality and execution and of enabling the movant
to trifle with procedure and mock the administration of
justice.

VILLAFLORES vs. LIMOS (AC 7504)[2007])


Respondents

conduct in failing to file the


appellants brief for complainant before the Court
of Appeals falls below the standards exacted upon
lawyers on dedication and commitment to their
clients cause.

The relation of attorney and client begins from the

time an attorney is retained.To establish the


professional relation, it is sufficient that the advice
and assistance of an attorney are sought and
received in any manner pertinent to his profession

It must be noted that as early as 8 September 2004, respondent

already agreed to take on complainants case, receiving from


the latter partial payment of her acceptance fee and the entire
records of complainants case. The very next day, 9 September
2004, complainant paid the balance of respondents acceptance
fee. Respondent admitted her receipt of P20,000.00 as
acceptance fee for the legal services she is to render to
complainant and P2,000.00 for the miscellaneous expenses she
is to incur in handling the case, and the subsequent execution
of the employment contract between her and complainant.
Hence, it can be said that as early as 8 September 2004,
respondents rendition of legal services to complainant had
commenced, and from then on, she should start protecting the
complainants interests.

No lawyer is obliged to advocate for every person who may wish

to become his client, but once he agrees to take up the cause of


a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must be
mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. Among the
fundamental rules of ethics is the principle that an attorney who
undertakes an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
termination, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.

lawyer should serve his client in a


conscientious, diligent and efficient manner; and
he should provide a quality of service at least
equal to that which lawyers generally would
expect of a competent lawyer in a like situation.
By agreeing to be his clients counsel, he
represents that he will exercise ordinary
diligence or that reasonable degree of care and
skill having reference to the character of the
business he undertakes to do, to protect the
clients interests and take all steps or do all acts
necessary therefor, and his client may
reasonably expect him to discharge his
obligations diligently.

Respondent has obviously failed to measure up

to the foregoing standards.

BAUTISTA vs. REBUENO, 81 SCRA 535 [1978]


This

mandamus proceeding seeks to compel


respondent Judge Alfredo S. Rebueno to continue trying
a civil case assigned to his sala.

[respondent Judge] is a townmate and distant relative

of plaintiff

The

Court knows from reliable sources that the


defendant has been doubting the actuations of this
Court as biased on the belief that the Presiding Judge is
related to the plaintiff.

the Court also knows that the plaintiff is doubting his

actuations because of the defendant's


utterances that he will surely win this case.

alleged

either way he acts in this case, whether in favor or

against the plaintiff or vice-versa, his actuation will


always be tainted and beset with doubt and misgivings
mandamus does not lie. What was done by respondent

Judge is five from the taint of any infirmity.


Respondent Judge, inhibiting himself lived up to the

Ideal of a judiciary striving ever to preserve public faith


in its fairness and objectivity.
second only to the duty of rendering a just decision, is

the duty of doing it in a manner that win not arouse


any suspicion as to its fairness and the integrity of the
Judge.

The lack of awareness on the part of counsel of

controlling doctrines is thus evident. There is reference


to decisions of this Tribunal none of which is applicable
and one of which, Joaquin v. Baretto was promulgated
way back in 1913, almost 65 years ago. the law, it is
not to be forgotten, is a progressive science. There is
then less than full compliance with the demands of
professional competence, if a member of a bar does
not keep himself abreast of the trend of authoritative
pronouncements. There is need in this particular case,
it would seem, to impress on counsel of record

the complexities of modern society and the changing

values regarding matters of "delicadeza which


nowadays seemingly place more reliance on the
personal sense of justice and obvious integrity of a
judge as reflected in the tenor and substance of his
decision than on possible circumstances that could
breed suspicion as to his motivations, make it a vain
luxury to insist on any kind of meticulous insulation
against such possible suspicion.

Villaluz, Jr. vs. Armenta, 285 SCRA 1 [1998]


an action for the vindication of their easement of right of

way over property belonging to the spouses, Deogracias


Villaluz and Belma M. Villaluz.

No appeal was ever taken or attempted to be taken from

the decision which, in consequence, became final and


executory.

On January 5, 1995 an administrative complaint, drawn up

by Atty. Pio L. Villaluz, was filed in behalf of his above


named clients against Judge Wenifredo Armenta,

Atty. Villaluz also filed with the Provincial Prosecution Office

at Daet, Camarines Norte a criminal complaint, in behalf of


his clients, accusing Judge Armenta of a "violation of Article
204 of the Revised Penal Code," based on substantially the
same grounds as his administrative complaint.

that

the remedy was lost to them by the


unexplained and unjustified failure of their counsel,
Atty. Pio L. Villaluz, to take an appeal from the Trial
Court's judgment within the time and in the
manner prescribed by law; and that . . the
administrative complaint in this case is being used
as a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal

Atty. Villaluz failed to comply with the Resolution

despite his receipt of notice thereof on October 2,


1995, by registered mail.

Villaluz eventually submitted his Compliance under

date of March 30, 1996 some six months late.

He ignored this Court's first directive (Resolution of

September 6, 1995) for him to show cause why he should


not be disciplinarily dealt with (for filing a supposedly
unmeritorious complaint against a Judge), obeying it only
when admonished to comply therewith some five or six
months later, when the normal reaction of the innocent
lawyer that he portrays himself to be would have been a
quick exposition of the facts e.g., his services had
been suddenly and unjustifiably terminated, etc. The
same curious dilatoriness is observed in Atty. Villaluz's
compliance with the Resolutions of July 1, 1996 and
September 23, 1996: all of five (5) months expired before
he responded thereto, by filing his "Comment with Prayer
to Dismiss" dated February 17, 1997.

In sum, the Court finds that the administrative complaint

against Judge Armenta was instituted by Atty. Villaluz as


a substitute for the lost remedy of appeal. The Court
considers Atty. Villaluz's avowed explanation for failing to
appeal unworthy of belief.

A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter

entrusted to him and his negligence in


connection therewith shall render him liable."
Respondent lawyer in this proceeding merits
no less.

The Code of Professional Responsibility


mandates that a lawyer shall serve his client
with competence and diligence. He shall not
handle any legal matter without adequate
preparation.
Nor shall he neglect a legal
matter entrusted to him; his negligence in
connection therewith shall render him liable.

Respondent is bound by the representations


he made in his Memorandum in Support of the
Petition for Probation, i.e., that a timely
petition for probation was not filed due to the
fact that he was out of town and that
complainants were laboring under the
misapprehension that the civil liability must be
paid in full before probation could be availed
of. Either of his two explanations is enough
ground to tender him liable for negligence
under the Code of Professional Conduct.

The lawyer should serve his client in a


conscientious, diligent and efficient manner and
he should provide a quality of services at least
equal to that which lawyers generally would
expect of a competent lawyer in the like
situation. Bu agreeing to be his clients counsel,
he represents that he will exercise ordinary
diligence or that reasonable degree of care and
skill having reference to the character of the
business he undertakes to do, to protect the
clients interests and take all steps or do all acts
necessary therefor, and his client may
reasonably expect him to discharge his
obligations diligently. Respondent has failed to
measure up to his oath.

A lawyer shall serve his client with


competence and diligence and never neglect a
legal matter entrusted to him and his
negligence in connection therewith shall
render him liable. Indeed, it is his sworn duty
not to delay no man for money or malice; and
to conduct himself in a proper manner not only
to his client, but also to the court, the legal
profession and society at large.

When respondent accepted the amount of


P17,000.00 from complainant, it was understood
that he agreed to take up the latters case and
that an attorney-client relationship between
them was established. From then on, it was
expected of him to serve his client, herein
complainant, with competence and attend to his
cause with fidelity, care and devotion.
The act of receiving money as acceptance fee
for legal services in handling complainants case
and subsequently failing to render such services
is a clear violation of Canon 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility which provides that a
lawyer shall serve his client with competence
and diligence.

A member of the legal profession owes his


client entire devotion to his genuine interest,
warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of
his rights. An attorney is expected to exert his
best efforts and ability to preserve his clients
cause, for the unwavering loyalty displayed to
his client likewise serves the ends of justice.
Verily, the entrusted privilege to practice law
carries with it the corresponding duties, not
only to the client, but also to the court, to the
bar and to the public.

Significantly, respondent also violated his oath


as a lawyer, which declares in part, that he will
not delay any man for money or malice and
will conduct himself as a lawyer according to
the best of his knowledge and discretion, with
all good fidelity as well to the courts as to his
client.

Under Canon 19 of the Code of Professional


Responsibility, a lawyer is required to
represent his client within the bounds of the
law. The Code enjoins a lawyer to employ
only fair and honest means to attain the lawful
objectives of his client.
(Rule 19.01) and
warns him not to allow his client to dictate the
procedure in handling the case (Rule 19.03).
In short, a lawyer is not a gun for hire.

Advocacy within the bounds of the law,


permits the attorney to use any arguable
construction of the law or rules which is
favorable to his client. But the lawyer is not
allowed to knowingly advance a claim or
defense that is unwarranted under existing
law. He cannot prosecute patently frivolous
and meritless appeals or institute clearly
groundless actions (Annotated Code of
Professional Responsibility 310 [1979]).
Professional rules impose limits on a lawyers
zeal and hedge it with necessary restrictions
and qualifications (Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics 579-582 [1986]).

It is unethical for a lawyer to abuse or


wrongfully use the judicial process, like the
filing of dilatory motions, repetitious litigation
and frivolous appeals for the sole purpose of
frustrating and delaying the execution of a
judgment.
Respondent filed a total of six appeals,
complaints or petitions to frustrate the
execution of the MTC judgment in Civil Case
No. 844.

By having willfully and knowingly abused his


rights of recourse in his efforts to get a
favorable judgment, which efforts were all
rebuffed, respondent violated the duty of a
member of the Bar to institute actions only
which are just and put up such defenses as he
perceives to be truly contestable under the
laws .

In filing a number of pleadings, actions and


petitions, respondent has made a mockery of
the judicial processes and disregarded canons
of
professional
ethics
in
intentionally
frustrating the rights of a litigant in whose
favor a judgment in the case was rendered,
thus, abused procedural rules to defeat ends
of substantial justice.

Samala v. Valencia (AC No. 5439 [2007])


Respondent lawyer represented contending parties on
2 occasions, despite warning. He was also charged for
initiating numerous cases in exchange for rentals on
the apartment he was occupying.
Counsel entered into a retainer agreement with the
complainant, his client who owned the premises. As
payment for his legal services, he was allowed to
occupy the property for free and utilize the same as his
office pursuant to the retainer agreement.
The act of respondent-lawyer of filing the afore-cited
cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand,
and his own interest, on the other, cannot be made the
basis of an administrative charge unless it can be
clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse
judicial processes to commit injustice. The filing of an
administrative case against respondent for protecting
the interest of his client and his own right would be
putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is
obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his
client.

Uy v. Gonzales (AC 5280 [2004])


Complainant engaged services of counsel to
prepare a petition for issuance of new
certificate of title. He confided circumstances
surrounding loss of the title and they
discussed fees. Counsel demanded a higher
fee subsequently.
Instead of filing
the
petition, counsel filed a complaint against his
client for falsification of public documents
based on the information he confided
regarding the lost title.
With the execution of the letter-complaint,
respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and
grossly disregarded his duty to preserve the
secrets
of
his
client.
Respondent
unceremoniously turned against him just

A scrutiny of the records reveals that the relationship


between complainant and respondent stemmed from a
personal transaction or dealings between them rather
than the practice of law by respondent. Respondent
dealt with complainant only because he redeemed a
property which complainant had earlier purchased from
his son.
It is not refuted that respondent paid
complainant P340,000 and gave him ample time to
produce its title and execute the Deed of Redemption.
However, despite the period given him, complainant
failed to fulfill his end of the bargain because of the
alleged loss of the title which he had admitted to
respondent as having prematurely transferred to his
children, thus prompting respondent to offer assistance
so as to secure the issuance of a new title in lieu of the
lost one Whatever facts alleged by respondent
against complainant were not obtained by respondent
in his professional capacity but as a redemptioner of a
property and therefore when he filed the complaint for
estafa, respondent was not violating Canon 21. To hold
otherwise would be precluding a lawyer from instituting
a case against anyone to protect his personal or
proprietary interests.

CANON 22- A LAWYER


SHALL WITHDRAW HIS
SERVICES ONLY FOR
GOOD
CAUSE
AND
UPON
NOTICE
APPROPRIATE IN THE
CIRCUMSTANCES.

Ferrer vs. Atty. Tebelin (461 SCRA 207


[June 27, 2005])

Complainant approached respondent-lawyer


for legal services in connection with his
claim for damages arising from a vehicular
accident. Agreeing to render services for
complainant, respondent-lawyer charged
and received P5,000.00 from complainant
as acceptance fee. Complainant accused
respondent-lawyer of thereafter abandoning
his case and hiding from him when he
sought him out after. He then sent letters
to respondent-lawyer but he did not receive
any reply.

In his answer, respondent-lawyer alleged he did


render services for complainant by making
demands on the company responsible for the
damages claimed. He also undertook to return
the sum of P5,000.00, as well as the pertinent
documents, to complainant.
In imposing the penalty of suspension of 2
months on the lawyer, the Supreme Court
faulted respondent for welching on his
manifestation-undertaking
to
return
the
P5,000.00, not to mention the documents
hearing on the case, to complainant or his heirs.
Such is reflective of his reckless disregard of
the duty imposed on him by Rule 22.02 of the
code of Professional Responsibility.

Orcino v. Gaspar (AC 3773 [1997])


The rule in this jurisdiction is that a client has the
absolute right to terminate the attorney-client relation
at any time with or without cause. The right of an
attorney to withdraw or terminate the relation other
than for sufficient cause is, however, considerably
restricted. Among the fundamental rules of ethics is
the principle that an attorney who undertakes to
conduct an action impliedly stipulates to carry it to its
conclusion. He is not at liberty to abandon it without
reasonable cause. A lawyers right to withdraw from a
case before its final adjudication arises only from the
clients written consent or from a good cause
complainant did not give her written consent to
respondents withdrawal.
The court thus ordered
respondent to secure his consent.
Respondent
allegedly informed the court that complainant had
become hostile and refused to sign his motion. He,
however, did not file an application with the court for it
to determine whether he should be allowed to

A lawyer may withdraw his services from his


client only in the following instances: (a) when a
client insists upon an unjust or immoral conduct of
his case; (b) when the client insists that the lawyer
pursue conduct violative of the CPR; (c ) when the
client has two or more retained lawyers and the
lawyers could not get along to the detriment of the
case; (d) when the mental or physical condition of
the lawyer makes him incapable of handling the
case effectively; (e) when the client deliberately
fails to pay the attorneys fees agreed upon; (f)
when the lawyer is elected or appointed to public
office; (g) other similar cases. The instant case
does not fall under any of these grounds
Respondent expressly bound himself to bring the
criminal case to its termination. He was in fact
paid in full for his services.

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