PIPER ALPHA

The Incident that changed the whole industry

 Piper Alphawas aNorth Sea oil platform operated by Occidental
petroleumwhich began production in 1976 as an oil platform which later was
converted to gas production.

An explosion and the resulting fires destroyed the entire platform on 6 th of July
1988, killing 167 workers.

The total insured loss of the platform was approximately 1.7 billion.

At the time, the platform accounted for approximately 10% ofNorth Sea gas
production, and was the worst offshore oil disaster in terms of lives lost and
industry impact the UK had ever seen.
 At the time of the disaster 226 people were on the platform;

165 died

61 survived

Two men from the Standby VesselSandhavenwere also killed trying to rescue
the trapped survivors.

This incident had a catastrophic affect on the surrounding environment and

wildlife due to the huge amount of gas, oil and other chemicals that escaped
into sea and atmosphere.
 Piper Alphawas situated on the Piper oilfield, approximately 120 miles
northeast ofAberdeenin 144 meters of water, and composed of four modules
separated by firewalls.

The platform was constructed byMcDermott EngineeringatArdersierand UIE

atCherbourg in 1975.

For safety reasons the modules were designed so that the most dangerous
operations were distant from the personnel areas.

The conversion from oil production to gas production broke this concept, with
the result that sensitive areas were brought together; for example, the gas
compression next to the control room, which later played a key role in the
accident.
THE INCIDENT
 Each of the basic events that occurred was influenced by a number of
decisions and actions. Some of these decisions are clear errors; others that
may have been acceptable at the time when they were made but proved
catastrophic in conjunction with other events later on.

The accident started with a process disruption, followed by a flange leak that
caused a large vapour release of 15-30 tonnes of gas every second that
ignited immediately causing several explosions with flames shooting over
90m in the air

Due to the conversion of the rig from oil to gas production, the firewalls were
designed to resist fire rather than withstand explosions.
 As a result the first explosion broke the firewall and dislodged panels severed
a petroleum line causing pool fires throughout the rig. The fires would have
burnt out were it not being fed with oil from both Tartan and the Claymore
platforms, the resulting back pressure forcing fresh fuel out of ruptured
pipework on Piper, directly into the heart of the fire.

The Claymore platform continued pumping until the second explosion

because the manager had no permission from the Occidental control center to
shut down.

Also, the connecting pipeline to Tartan continued to pump, as its manager had
been directed by his superior.
 The fire later impinged on a gas riser from another platform, which fuelled an
extremely intense fire under the deck of Piper Alpha.

The edited layout of the rig allowed the fire to spread quickly from production
modules B and C to critical areas, and to destroy the control room and the
radio room in the early stages of the accident with smoke beginning to
penetrate the personnel block.

Electric power generation, public address, general alarm, emergency shut-

down, and fire detection and protection systems also failed shortly after the
first explosions.
 The superintendent of the platform (Offshore Installation Manager or OIM)
panicked, was ineffective almost from the beginning, and died during the
accident.

The evacuation was not ordered, and even if it had been ordered, could not
have been fully carried out given the location of the living quarters, the layout
of the topside, and the ineffectiveness of the safety equipment present on the
rig.
 Many evacuation routes were blocked and the life boats, all in the same
location, were inaccessible.

The fire fighting equipment on board could not be operated because the
diesel pumps, which had been put on manual mode, were inaccessible and
seem to have been damaged from the beginning of the incident.

Fire boats such as Sandhaven and Tharos were at quickly on scene, but
waited for orders from OIM to fight the fire.

Piper Alpha was eventually lost in a sequence of structural failures with the
generation and utilities Module, which included the fireproofed
accommodation block, slipped into the sea along with the largest part of the
platform. Over and above the tragic loss of life, the financial damage was in
excess of 1.7 billion.
FACTORS THAT CONTRIBUTED TO THE
SEVERITY OF THE INCIDENT:
 The breakdown of the chain of command and lack of any communication to
the platform's crew

The presence of fire walls and the lack of blast walls - the fire walls predated
the installation of the gas conversion equipment and were not upgraded to
blast walls after the conversion

The continued pumping of gas and oil by the Tartan and Claymore platforms,
which was not shut down due to a perceived lack of authority, even though
personnel could see the Piper burning.
 In conclusion, the main reason for the events that occurred were accelerated
in the initial stages by a series of crucial human errors at critical points, and
those in positions of authority were unprepared for the scale of the
emergency.
THE AFTERMATH
 Significant improvements have been made in the UK for the offshore industry
since the Piper Alpha incident.

This included improvements in both the hardware and in the safety and
regulations of the industry.

As details of the causes of the piper alpha disaster emerged, every offshore
Operator carried out immediate wide-ranging assessments of their
installations and management systems.
 Some of the changes included were;
1. Improvements to the "permit to work" management systems
2. Relocation of some of pipeline emergency shutdown valves
3. Installation of sub sea pipeline isolation systems
4. Modification of smoke hazards
5. Improvements to the evacuation and escape systems

The industry in the UK invested approximately 1 billion on these safety

measures before Lord Cullen's Public Inquiry into the disaster reported.
 Lord Cullen led the official Public Inquiry into the disaster in two parts.

The first was to investigate the causes of the disaster.

The second was to make recommendations for changes to the safety regimes
already in place.

The inquiry began in November 1988, with Lord Cullens report being
published in November 1990.

Lord Cullen made 106 recommendations within his report, all of which were
accepted by industry, many being a direct result of industry evidence.

Responsibilities for implementing them were spread across the industry.

 The Offshore Safety Case Regulations are now underpinned by more detailed
regulations to prevent further accidents from occurring.
Some of those regulations include:
The Offshore Installation and Pipeline Works (Management and
Administration) Regulations 1995 - these set out requirements for the
safe management of offshore installations such as the appointment of
offshore installation managers (OIMs) and the use of permit-to-work systems
The Offshore Installations (Prevention of Fire and Explosion, and
Emergency Response) Regulations 1995 (PFEER) - these provide for the
protection of offshore workers from fire and explosion, and for securing
effective emergency response
The Offshore Installations and Wells (Design and Construction, etc)
Regulations 1996 - these are aimed at ensuring the integrity of installations,
the safety of offshore and onshore wells, and the safety of the workplace
environment offshore.
IN CONCLUSION
 Many of the events that led to the Piper Alpha accident were a direct result of
the structure and the procedures of Occidental Petroleum, some of which are
common to large segments of the oil and gas industry and to other industries
as well.
At the heart of the problem was a philosophy of production first and
continues additions to the system had been made without sufficient feedback
and understanding of their effects on the safety of operations. Because of the
method of assessment of the internal financial results of the different oil
companies, it is the production part of the corporation that often finds itself
under pressures.
Measures that are then taken to save money in the short term have led to
understaffed facilities and less experienced, overworked operators. Because
they must attend to immediate problems, these operators are often unable to
focus specifically on accident prevention, which does not seem to have been
at the forefront of the corporations concerns in any case.
 At the time of the Piper Alpha accident, the lack of coordination of dispersed
regulatory authorities and the interests of the British government in an
accelerated oil production contributed to the neglect of the safety features
and procedures on board the platforms. The maintenance error that
eventually led to the initial leak was the result of inexperience, poor
maintenance procedures, and deficient learning mechanisms
Memorial to the disaster in
Hazlehead Park, Aberdeen
THANK YOU