Professional Documents
Culture Documents
(A):
Why might a manager withhold bad news?
Accou
nting
Unsure
Infor stand
if the
mati ards
manag
on is (or
er has
prop GAAP)
the
rieta qualit
inform
ry y is
ation
not
high
N New Inf
e s or
w will m
(B):
Contracts
are based
Releasing
in share
the
price and
informati
releasing
on may
the news
trigger
will
entry of
increase
competito
firms
rs
contracti
Conclusion:
ng costs
While disclosure
principle
Firm Not
has the in
will
potential firms
to motivate
Q13-4
(A):
In theory, what are the advantages of Employee
Stock Options (ESOs) as a compensation
device?
Alignment with Shareholder Interests
No Cash Outlay
No Effect on Net Income
Longer-Run Decision Horizon
Low Downside Risk
(A):
Alignmen No Cash
t with Outlay
Sharehold
er
Interests
Value Firms
of ESO not
depend require
ent on d to
share pay
price cash
as
(A):
No Longer Low
Effec Run Dow
t on Decision nsid
Net Horizon e
Inco Risk
me
B EMH- L
e Stron o
f g w
o would e
r mean s
e that t
2 inves v
0 tors al
(B):
In practice, during the period leading up to the
2007-2008 market meltdowns, what were the
claimed negative effects of the ESOs on
financial institution managers incentives and
actions?
Shortened Managers Decision Horizon
Opportunistic Manager Behaviour
Pressure to Meet Earnings Forecast
Excessive Risk Taking
(B):
Shortened Managers
Decision Horizon
Actions taken to
increase share price
in the SR to
maximise personal
gains
Opportunistic
Pump Behaviour
Manager and Dump -
Increase share
value
Spring before-
Loading
exercising options,
Pressuring
then sell the shares
compensation
before share
committees price
to grant
fell back, ESOs
unscheduled to
maximise
shortly before GNcash
(B):
Pressure to Meet
Earnings Forecast
Value of ESO is
dependent on share
price, which can be
greatly affected if
investors
Excessive Riskearnings
Taking
expectations are not
met
ESOs have low
downside
Managers riskmightand
resortupside
high to rewards
extreme
measures to
Managers inflate
stand to
reported
lose littleearnings
from any
risk-taking
behaviour that is
(C):
Decision usefulness
Relevance
Improved
relevance
Higher ESO
expenses is
an indicator
of lower
dividend
Reliability
Reduced
reliability
Fair value
model
(E):
Reduction of
information
asymmetry
Current standard
(2004) requires fair
value of ESO to be
stated in the Notes
to FS.
Evaluation for both
Information
Asymmetry
Reduction and
(E):
Economic
consequences
Costly to the firms
and managers
(Interest Group
Theory)
Greater
probability of
violating Debt
Covenants
Affects
Managers
Future Bonuses,
(E):
Political aspect
No agreement on
the proposed
standard for
expensing ESO
There are equally
powerful
proponents and
opponents of the
new standard
Result of the
Q13-8
Case Study:
Requirement for listed foreign companies in USA
to reconcile their FS from IASB to US GAAP
standards cancelled in 2007.
SEC is considering to allow US companies to
choose between US GAAP and IASB GAAP to
prepare their FS.
This results in competition between IASB and
FASB
Possibility of race to the top instead of race
(A):
What is meant by a race to the top in this
context?
It refers to each Standard Setting Body raising the
quality of its accounting standards, with the
expectation that firms will choose higher quality
standards for preparing financial statements
(B):
Assuming that Standard Setting Bodies wish to
maximise the number of firms using their
standards, why might a race to the top, rather
than a race to the bottom, result?
Higher quality information means lower estimation risk
for investors, hence it lowers cost of capital
Signalling effect. Firms that are committed to high
quality reporting will urge Standard Setters to raise
standards quality.
Higher quality reporting improves manager's
(C):
Given the SECs dropping of its reconciliation
requirement, what difficulties are created for
investors who wish to use financial statements
for investment decisions?