Crim Law Lecture Oct 2018 - Modified

Updates in Criminal Law
Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

Department of Justice - Visayas
16 October 2018
CRIMINAL LAW
Survey of Selected Cases
• People v. Balute, G.R. No. 189272, 21 January 2015
• Accused Balute was charged with robbery with homicide when he,
together with Blaster, robbed Manaois’ cellphone while the latter
was on board his owner-type jeepney and shot him at the left side
of his torso. Manaois subsequently died in the hospital.
• A special complex crime of robbery with homicide takes place
when a homicide is committed either by reason, or on the
occasion, of the robbery. To sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, the prosecution must prove the following elements: (1)
the taking of personal property belonging to another; (2) with
intent to gain; (3) with the use of violence or intimidation against a
person; and (4) on the occasion or by reason of the robbery, the
crime of homicide, as used in its generic sense, was committed.
Robbery with homicide

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016
• People v. Orosco, G.R. No. 209227, 25 March 2015
• Accused Orosco and a certain “John Doe” were having an
argument with Yap, the store owner. When Yap opened the
door of her store, John Doe placed his left arm around Yap’s
neck and covered her mouth with his right hand. Orosco, on
the other hand, went behind her and restrained her hands.
John Doe then stabbed Yap on the chest and Orosco then
took a stash of bills under a religious icon or “santo” inside
Yap’s store. Yap was rushed to the hospital, but was
declared dead on arrival.
• When a homicide takes place by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery, all those who took part shall be
guilty of the special complex crime of robbery with
homicide whether they actually participated in the killing,
unless there is proof that there was an endeavor to prevent
the killing.

• People v. Orosco, G.R. No. 209227, 25 March 2015
• Here, the Court found that Orosco acted in conspiracy
with John Doe in perpertrating the crime against Yap.
In fact, Orosco played a crucial role in the killing of the
victim to facilitate the robbery. He was behind the
victim holding her hands while John Doe grabbed her
at the neck. His act contributed in rendering the victim
without any means of defending herself when John
Doe stabbed her frontally in the chest. Having acted in
conspiracy with his co-accused, appellant Orosco is
equally liable for the killing of Yap.

• Celedonio v. People, G.R. No. 209137, 1 July 2015
• Celedonio was, in fact, caught in exclusive possession of some of
the stolen items when the police officers flagged down his
motorcycle during their follow-up operation. He failed to give a
reasonable explanation as to his possession of said items.
• Section 3(j), Rule 131 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that a
person found in possession of a thing taken in the doing of a
recent wrongful act is the taker and the doer of the whole act;
otherwise, that thing which a person possesses, or exercises acts of
ownership over, is owned by him. Celedonio never claimed
ownership of the subject items. When the alleged stolen items
were found in his motorcycle compartment which he had control
over, the disputable presumption of being the taker of the stolen
items arose. He could have overcome the presumption, but he
failed to give a justifiable and logical explanation. Thus, the only
plausible scenario that could be inferred therefrom was that he
took the items.
Robbery
• People vs. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016
• If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the
crime committed is either consummated physical injuries, if the offender
had no intention to kill the victim, or frustrated or attempted homicide or
frustrated murder or attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the
victim.
• Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of:

• motive;
• the nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime;
• the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the victim;
• the manner the crime was committed; and
• words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted by him on
the victim
Attempted Murder
• People vs. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124 April 5, 2016
• In this case, the intent to kill on the part of appellant as shown by the use
of firearms, the words uttered during, as well as the manner of, the
commission of the crime.
• As established by the Court:

• As Norberto Divina and his family was about to go to sleep, the
“sako” wall of their house was suddenly ripped.
• One of the armed attackers said: “Magdasal ka na at katapusan mo
na ngayon!”
• To which Norberto replied: “Maawa kayo sa amin, matanda na ako
at marami akong anak. Anong kasalanan ko sa inyo?”
Attempted Murder
• Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-
41, 21 January 2015
• Sometime in November and December 2013, the Ombudsman
served on Sen. Estrada two (2) criminal complaints for
plunder, among others. Eighteen (18) of Sen. Estrada’s co-
respondents in the two complaints filed their counter-
affidavits between 9 December 2013 and 14 March 2014. On 20
March 2014, Sen. Estrada filed his “Request to be Furnished
with Copies of Counter-Affidavits of the Other Respondents,
Affidavits of New Witnesses and Other Filings” (the
“Request”). Sen. Estrada’s Request was made "[p]ursuant to
the right of a respondent ‘to examine the evidence submitted
by the complainant which he may not have been furnished’
(Section 3[b], Rule 112 of the Rules of Court) and to ‘have
access to the evidence on record’ (Section 4[c], Rule II of the
Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman).“
Probable cause
• Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21 January
2015, con’t.
• Both the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and the Rules of Procedure of
the Office of the Ombudsman require the investigating officer to furnish the
respondent with copies of the affidavits of the complainant and affidavits of
his supporting witnesses. Neither of these Rules require the investigating
officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of his co-
respondents. The right of the respondent is only “to examine the evidence
submitted by the complainant,” as expressly stated in Section 3(b), Rule 112 of
the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 3, Rule 112 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly provides that the respondent shall
only have the right to submit a counter-affidavit, to examine all other
evidence submitted by the complainant and, where the fiscal sets a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, to be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or
cross-examine.” Moreover, Section 4 (a, b and c) of Rule II of the
Ombudsman’s Rule of Procedure, read together, only require the
investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of the affidavits of
the complainant and his supporting witnesses. There is no law or rule
requiring the investigating officer to furnish the respondent with copies of
the affidavits of his co-respondents.
Probable cause
• Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21
January 2015, con’t.
• A person under preliminary investigation is not yet an accused
person, and hence he cannot demand the full exercise of the rights
of an accused person. The rights of a respondent in a preliminary
investigation are merely statutory rights, not constitutional due
process rights. An investigation to determine probable cause for
the filing of an information does not initiate a criminal action so as
to trigger into operation Section 14(2), Article III of the
Constitution. It is the filing of a complaint or information in court
that initiates a criminal action.
• The constitutional right of an accused to confront the witnesses
against him does not apply in preliminary investigations, nor will
the absence of a preliminary investigation be an infringement of
his right to confront the witnesses against him. A preliminary
investigation may be done away with entirely without infringing
the constitutional right of an accused under the due process clause
to a fair trial.
Probable cause
• Estrada v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 212140-41, 21
• A preliminary investigation is defined as an inquiry or
proceeding for the purpose of determining whether there is
sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime
cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and
that the respondent is probably guilty thereof, and should be
held for trial. The quantum of evidence now required in
preliminary investigation is such evidence sufficient to "engender
a well-founded belief" as to the fact of the commission of a crime
and the respondent's probable guilt thereof.
• Thus, probable cause for the filing of an information can be
established with hearsay evidence, as long as there is substantial
basis for crediting the hearsay. Hearsay evidence is admissible in
determining probable cause in a preliminary investigation
because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.
Probable cause
• Benito v. People, GR. No. 204644, 11 February 2015
• Conspiracy must be proven with evidence that
can convince a trial court of its existence beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence, when the co-accused
stated in open court that her fellow co-accused
had no participation in the crime of estafa, such
statement was an admission against her interest.
The statement negated the alleged “common
design or purpose”of conspiracy between her and
Benito. It also means that she admitted that her
companion’s acts can never be attributed to her.
Conspiracy
• People, v. Dimacuha, Jr. GR. No. G.R. No. 191060, 2 February
2015
• There is conspiracy "when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to
commit it. It arises on the very instant the plotters agree, expressly
or impliedly, to commit the felony and forthwith decide to pursue
it."
• Here, the members of the group positioned themselves according
to their plan and waited for Agon to leave. Later on, Caballero
signaled Vitan and the other alleged gunman, accused Theo
(Theo), that the target had left the arena and that his vehicle was
already approaching their position. When Agon’s vehicle came,
Vitan and Theo fired at him. Vitan, Caballero, Alvarez, who acted
as one of the back-ups, and the rest of the group then fled the
scene of the crime. Clearly, there was unity of action and purpose
among the members of the group in killing the victim.
Conspiracy
• Zapanta v. People, G.R. Nos. 192698-99, 22 April
2015
• Accused Raymundo Zapanta was the vault/records keeper
of the Registry of Deeds, Davao City. He was charged with
(a) violation of Section 3(e), R.A. No. 3019; and (b) infidelity
in the custody of documents under Article 226 of the RPC,
in conspiracy with the Registrar of Deeds, Atty. Gadia, for
allegedly causing the wrongful issuance of TCT No. T-
285369 and deleting the encumbrance annotated in TCT No.
T-256662, to the damage and prejudice of the owner of the
latter title.
• Whether accused Zapanta was in conspiracy with Atty.
Gadia for the crimes charged.
Conspiracy
• Zapanta v. People, G.R. Nos. 192698-99, 22 April 2015, con’t.
• No. In order to hold an accused guilty as a co-principal by reason
of conspiracy, he must be shown to have performed an overt act in
pursuance or furtherance of the complicity. Conspiracy can be
inferred from, and established by, the acts of the accused
themselves when said acts point to a joint purpose and design,
concerted action and community of interests. What is
determinative is proof establishing that the accused were
animated by one and the same purpose. There must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of
the common design and purpose. Conspiracy must, like the crime
itself, be proven beyond reasonable doubt for it is a facile device
by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the penal
fold. Suppositions based on mere presumptions and not on solid
facts do not constitute proof beyond reasonable doubt.
Conspiracy
• Zapanta v. People, G.R. Nos. 192698-99, 22 April 2015, con’t.
• In the case at bench, the Supreme Court found that the
prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Zapanta
conspired with Atty. Gadia in committing the crimes charged. No
testimonial or documentary evidence was presented to
substantiate Zapanta's direct or indirect participation in the
anomalous registration of TCT No. T-285369, and in the
concealment/disappearance of the original copy of TCT No. T-
256662.
• Not a scintilla of proof was adduced to show with absolute
certainty that Zapanta was the one who actually withdrew the
original copy of TCT No. T-256662 from the vault of the RD.
• Accordingly, Zapanta was acquitted of the crimes charged.
Conspiracy
• People v. Villariez, G.R. No. 211160, 2 September
2015.
• Villariez insists that since the prosecution failed to amend
the Information charging that he committed the crime
alone, and not in conspiracy with his brothers, then the
prosecution violated his constitutional right to due process
for not informing him of the true nature, cause and
circumstance of the commission of the crime for which he
was tried and convicted.
• In the present case, the Information charged Villariez,
together with his brothers, of inflicting upon Enrique a fatal
gunshot wound in the body causing the latter's
instantaneous death.
Conspiracy
• People v. Villariez, G.R. No. 211160, 2 September
2015, con’t.
• The commission of the specific acts charged against
Villariez constitutes the offense charged in the Information.
The prosecution's failure to establish conspiracy due to the
death of a co-conspirator and the dismissal of the case
against another co-conspirator does not defeat the
conviction of the accused for the offense charged and
proven during the trial.
Conspiracy
• Inocencio v. People, G.R. 205760, 9 November 2015
• Francisco Inocencio was convicted of two (2) counts of theft.
In his defense, Inocencio claims that there is no allegation of
conspiracy between him and Clemente. Thus, he cannot be
convicted of criminal acts committed by Clemente.
• Ideally, Clemente and Inocencio should have been indicted

together. However, the non-inclusion of Clemente does not
invalidate the Information filed against Inocencio especially
since conspiracy is not charged as a crime, but is merely
alleged to show how criminal liability was incurred.
Conspiracy
• Inocencio v. People, G.R. 205760, 9 November 2015, con’t.
• The agreement to commit the crime, the unity of purpose or
the community of design among the accused must be
conveyed such as either by the use of the term "conspire" or
its derivatives and synonyms or by allegations of basic facts
constituting the conspiracy. Conspiracy must be alleged, not
just inferred, in the information on which basis an accused
can aptly enter his plea, a matter that is not to be confused
with or likened to the adequacy of evidence that may be
required to prove it. In establishing conspiracy when
properly alleged, the evidence to support it need not
necessarily be shown by direct proof but may be inferred
from shown acts and conduct of the accused.
Conspiracy
• People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta, G.R. No. 202124,
April 5, 2016
• Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

agreement regarding the commission of a crime and decide to
commit it.
• Proof of a prior meeting between the perpetrators to discuss the
commission of the crime is not necessary as long as their concerted
acts reveal a common design and unity of purpose. In such case,
the act of one is the act of all
• Here, the three men undoubtedly acted in concert as they went to
the house of Norberto together, each with his own firearm. It is,
therefore, no longer necessary to identify and prove that it is the
bullet particularly fired from appellant's firearm that killed the
children.
Conspiracy
• People v. Bosito, G.R. No. No. 209346, 12 January 2015
• Self-defense, to be successfully invoked, must be proven by clear and
convincing evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on
the part of the person invoking it. Bosito failed to present adequate
evidence to prove otherwise. Thus, his claim of self-defense cannot stand.
Aside from Bosito’s self-serving testimony, the defense did not present any
witness to corroborate his testimony that Bonaobra pulled a knife and tried
to stab him. Likewise, Bosito failed to present the knife which he said he
grabbed during the tussle and kept in his possession. Further, the records
show that after Bonaobra received the first blow to his head, which proved
to be the most fatal, Bosito still continued to thrust his bolo to the victim
three more times. Even Analisa, Bosito’s sister, who gave her testimony for
the defense, confirmed that Bosito hacked Bonaobra four times. Clearly, the
means utilized was not reasonable under the circumstances.
Justifying circumstance:
Self-defense
• People v. Casas, G.R. No. 212565, 25 February 2015
• The accused failed to prove any unlawful aggression on the part of
either Joel or Eligio, which is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense to obtain. As case law puts it, there can
be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression
against the person who resorted to self-defense. As shown by the
records, it was Casas who was actually the aggressor, as he was the
one who wielded a knife, brought it to bear on Eligio, then on Joel as
he lay prostrate, and again on Eligio as he was fleeing. Being the
party initiating the attack, and overbearing with a deadly weapon,
Casas cannot successfully claim that there was unlawful aggression.
Verily, for unlawful aggression to be appreciated, there must be an
actual, sudden and unexpected attack or imminent danger thereof,
not merely a threatening or intimidating attitude, as against the one
claiming self-defense. Evidently, the contrary happened in this case.
Justifying circumstance:
Self-defense
• Fantastico et al. v. People, G.R. No. 190912, 12
January 2015
• Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva were convicted of
attempted murder. They claim that the prosecution was not
able to prove the presence of treachery or any other
qualifying circumstance.
• Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a
notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength
notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or
taken advantage of by him in the commission of the crime.
Aggravating circumstance:
Abuse of superior strength
• Fantastico et al. v. People, G.R. No. 190912, 12
• The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim does
not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of
superior strength, there being no proof of the relative strength of
the aggressors and the victim. The evidence must establish that the
assailants purposely sought the advantage, or that they had the
deliberate intent to use this advantage. To take advantage of
superior strength means to purposely use excessive force out of
proportion to the means of defense available to the person
attacked. The appreciation of this aggravating circumstance
depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties.
Aggravating circumstance:
Abuse of superior strength
• People vs. Llobera, G.R. No. 203066, 5 August 2015
• Rodelio Llobera was found guilty of murder. He now claims that
the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstance of
treachery considering the prosecution’s failure to establish that he
contemplated on the means or method to ensure the victim’s
killing without affording the latter a chance to defend himself.
• The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim [with]
no chance to resist or escape.
• The mere suddenness of the attack does not amount to treachery.
The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and
without warning and is done in a swift and unexpected way,
affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim with no
chance to resist or escape. Thus, even frontal attack can be
treacherous when it is sudden and unexpected, and the victim is
unarmed.
Aggravating
circumstance: Treachery
• People v. Zabala and Albius; G.R. No. 203087 November 23, 2015
• Joseph was walking home unsuspecting of the imminent danger
to his life. Appellants came from behind and in a sudden and
unexpected manner assaulted Joseph who was not able to defend
himself from such attack. In fact, he was continuously mauled
until he fell to the ground unconscious and then appellant
Edgardo smashed his head with a stone. Even if the attack is
frontal but is sudden and unexpected, giving no opportunity for
the victim to repel it or defend himself, there would be treachery.
Aggravating
• People v. Edaño; G.R. No. 206970, 29 July 2015
• Antonio Edaño was found guilty of murder. He now claims that
the RTC erred in appreciating the qualifying circumstances in
this case.
• Even though the lower courts found that abuse of superior
strength attended the commission of the crime, it was not
appreciated as a qualifying or aggravating circumstance because
it cannot serve to qualify or aggravate the felony at issue since it
is jurisprudentially settled that when the circumstance of abuse
of superior strength concurs with treachery, the former is
absorbed by the latter.
Aggravating
• People of the Philippines vs. Ireneo Jugueta,
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016
• The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected

attack on an unsuspecting victim without the slightest
provocation on his part. Minor children, who by reason of
their tender years, cannot be expected to put up a defense.
When an adult person illegally attacks a child, treachery
exists.
Aggravating
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016
• Dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law

accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or
do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere."
• Dwelling aggravates a felony where the crime is committed in the
dwelling of the offended party provided that the latter has not given
provocation therefor.
• The testimony of Norberto established the fact that the group of appellant
violated the victims' home by destroying the same and attacking his
entire family therein, without provocation on the part of the latter.
Aggravating
circumstance: Dwelling
• People v. Matibag; G.R. No. 206381, 25 March 2015
• The prosecution was able to prove that Matibag, who was armed
with a gun, confronted Duhan, and without any provocation,
punched and shot him on the chest. Therefore, when Matibag
killed Duhan with his firearm, the use thereof was unauthorized
under the purview of RA 8294 and is equally appreciated as a
special aggravating circumstance.
• The special aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed
firearm, which was duly alleged in the Information, should be
appreciated in the imposition of penalty. P.D. 1866, as amended
by R.A. 8294, treats the unauthorized use of a licensed firearm in
the commission of the crimes of homicide or murder as a special
aggravating circumstance.
Special Aggravating
circumstance
People v. Gaborne G.R. No. 210710, July 27, 2016
• In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No. 10591, to
Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide and illegal
possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of firearm is
merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the crime of murder. It is
clear from the foregoing that where murder results from the use of an unlicensed
firearm, the crime is not qualified illegal possession but, murder.·
• In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a

separate crime but shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance.
Thus, where murder was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms
is no longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance. The intent of Congress is to treat the offense of illegal possession
of firearm and the commission of homicide or murder with the use of unlicensed
firearm as a single offense
Special Aggravating
circumstance
• David vs. People, G.R. No. 208320, 19 August 2015
• Accused falsified several BOC Form No. 38-A, a commercial
document, in order to facilitate and insure the commission of
estafa. BOC Form No. 38-A is a commercial document used by
authorized collecting banks, such as Land Bank, as official
receipt for the payment of additional or deficiency customs
taxes and duties. The falsification of the BOC forms, which are
commercial documents, was a necessary means to commit
estafa.
• The phrase "necessary means" in Article 48 does not mean
indispensable; otherwise, the offense as a "necessary means" to
commit another would be an indispensable element of the
latter and would be an ingredient thereof. For instance, the
crime of simple estafa is ordinarily committed in the manner
defined under the RPC; but if the accused resorts to
falsification merely to facilitate and insure the commission of
estafa, then he is guilty of the complex crime of estafa through
falsification.
Complex crimes
• People v. Valdez, G.R. Nos. 216007-09, 8 December 2015
• For purposes of bail proceedings, it would be premature to
rule that the supposed crime committed is a complex crime
since it is only when the trial has terminated that falsification
could be appreciated as a means of committing malversation.
Further, it is possible that only the elements of one of the
constituent offenses, i.e., either malversation or falsification, or
worse, none of them, would be proven after full-blown trial
• It would be the height of absurdity to deny Valdez the right to
bail and grant her the same only after trial if it turns out that
there is no complex crime committed. Likewise, it is unjust for
us to give a stamp of approval in depriving the accused
person's constitutional right to bail for allegedly committing a
complex crime that is not even considered as inherently
grievous, odious and hateful. To note, Article 48 of the RPC on
complex crimes does not change the nature of the constituent
offenses; it only requires the imposition of the maximum
period of the penalty prescribed by law.
Complex crimes
G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016
• There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a

compound crime, or when a single act constitutes two or more grave
or less grave felonies while the other is known as a complex crime
proper, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the
other. The classic example of the first kind is when a single bullet
results in the death of two or more persons.
• A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a

number killed. Deeply rooted is the doctrine that when various
victims expire from separate shot, such acts constitute separate and
distinct crimes.
When not a Complex crime

G.R. No. 202124, April 5, 2016
• Here, the facts surrounding the shooting incident clearly show that
appellant and the two others, in firing successive and indiscriminate
shots at the family of Norberto from their respective firearms,
intended to kill not only Norberto, but his entire family.
• They are committing not only one crime. What appellant and his
cohorts committed cannot be classified as a complex crime
because "each act by each gunman pulling the trigger of their
respective firearms, aiming each particular moment at different
persons constitute distinct and individual acts which cannot give rise
to a complex crime."
When not a Complex crime

• People v. Licayan, G.R. No. 203961, 29 July 2015
• For Kidnapping for Ransom, the Court set the minimum
indemnity and damages where facts warranted the
imposition of the death penalty if not for prohibition
thereof by Republic Act No. 9346, to wit: (1) P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; (2) P100,000.00 as moral damages which
the victim is assumed to have suffered and thus needs no
proof; and (3) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages to set an
example for the public good. Licayan, Lara and Delos
Reyes are jointly and severally liable for these amounts
awarded in favor of each of the victims. These amounts
shall accrue interest at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per
annum from the date of the finality of the Court's
Resolution until fully paid.
Civil penalties
CRIMINAL LAW II AND SPLS
Survey of Selected Cases
• Mesina v. People, G.R. No. 162489, 17 June 2015
• Petitioner was a public officer, holding the position of Local

Treasurer Officer I of Caloocan City. He collected taxes and
fees, which are public funds for which he was accountable.
• As to the fourth element, petitioner failed to rebut the
presumption that he had misappropriated the patubig
collection to his personal use. Conformably with Article 217,
the failure of the petitioner to have the patubig collection duly
forthcoming upon demand by the duly authorized officer was
prima facie evidence that he had put such missing fund to
personal use.
Malversation of public funds

• Mesina v. People, G.R. No. 162489, 17 June 2015,
con’t.
• Malversation is committed either intentionally or by
negligence. The dolo or the culpa is only a modality in the
perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs
from the mode proved, the same offense of malversation is
still committed; hence, a conviction is proper. All that is
necessary for a conviction is sufficient proof that the accused
accountable officer had received public funds or property, and
did not have them in his possession when demand therefor
was made without any satisfactory explanation of his failure
to have them upon demand. For this purpose, direct evidence
of the personal misappropriation by the accused is
unnecessary as long as he cannot satisfactorily explain the
inability to produce or any shortage in his accounts.

• Panganiban v. People G.R. No. 211543, 9 December
2015
• Accused Mayor Panganiban of Sta. Cruz, Laguna procured a
cash advance of P500,000 to defray expenses for a projected
travel.
• The trip did not push through and thereafter accused failed
to liquidate the amount.
• Through salary deductions and deductions from his terminal
pay, the amount was eventually liquidated.

2015, con’t.
• To have custody or control of the funds or property by reason of the
duties of his office, a public officer must be a cashier, treasurer,
collector, property officer or any other officer or employee who is
tasked with the taking of money or property from the public which
they are duty-bound to keep temporarily until such money or
property are properly deposited in official depository banks or
similar entities; or until they shall have endorsed such money or
property to other accountable officers or concerned offices. Petitioner
was not shown to have been such public officer, even temporarily, in
addition to his main duties as mayor. Needless to say, he was not
accountable for any public funds or property simply because it never
became his duty to collect money or property from the public.
Therefore, petitioner could not have appropriated, taken,
misappropriated or consented, or, through abandonment or
negligence, permitted another person to take them.

2015, con’t.
• Even granting that it was malversation which petitioner was
alleged to have committed, it has been ruled that good faith is
a valid defense in a prosecution for malversation of public
funds as it would negate criminal intent on the part of the
accused. Petitioner's full liquidation of his cash advance by
means of an arrangement allowed by the COA ultimately
translated into the good faith he interposed as a defense.
• The felony of malversation of public funds being one which
involves breach of the public trust that is uniformly punished,
whether committed through dolo or culpa, defenses relative
thereto are to be rightfully accorded strict and close scrutiny.

• Ricalde v. People, G.R. No. 211002, 21 January 2015
• Accused Ricalde was charged with rape under the second
paragraph of Section 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, for
allegedly inserting his penis into the anal orifice of a ten-year
old boy, against the latter’s will and consent.
• The Court sustained the trial court’s findings that XXX
sufficiently proved that accused committed an act of sexual
assault by inserting his penis into XXX’s anal orifice. There
was no showing of ill motive on the part of XXX to falsely
accuse Ricalde.
• Rape under the second paragraph of Article 266-A is also
known as “instrument or object rape,” “gender-free rape,” or
“homosexual rape.” The gravamen of rape through sexual
assault is “the insertion of the penis into another person’s
mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
another person’s genital or anal orifice.”
Rape
• People v. Joson, G.R. No. 206393, 21 January 2015
• The failure of the victim to shout for help or resist the
sexual advances of the rapist is not tantamount to
consent. Physical resistance need not be established in
rape when threats and intimidation are employed and
the victim submits herself to her attackers of because of
fear. Besides, physical resistance is not the sole test to
determine whether a woman voluntarily succumbed to
the lust of an accused. Rape victims show no uniform
reaction. Some may offer strong resistance while others
may be too intimidated to offer any resistance at all.
After all, resistance is not an element of rape.
Rape
• People v. Espejon, G.R. No. 199445, 4 February 2015
• The mere fact that AAA did not tell her parents about what
happened to her immediately after the first incident on 10
August 2003 does not discredit her accusations of rape and
sexual molestation against Espejon. Delay or vacillation in
making a criminal accusation does not necessarily impair the
credibility of witnesses if such delay is satisfactorily
explained. In this connection, fear of reprisal, social
humiliation, familial considerations, and economic reasons
have all been considered by this Court as sufficient
explanations for such delay.
Rape
• People v. Santos, G.R. No. 205308, 11 February 2015
• The RTC and the CA convicted the accused of 1 count of rape
and 15 counts of acts of lasciviousness. The accused
interposed a defense of denial and alibi. The Supreme Court
ruled denial and alibi, which are self-serving, negative
evidence and easily fabricated, especially when
uncorroborated, cannot be accorded greater evidentiary
weight than the positive testimony of a credible witness.
Appellant’s denial and uncorroborated defense of alibi
cannot prevail over the credible and positive testimony of
AAA that appellant raped her and committed acts of
lasciviousness against her. As found by the trial court and the
appellate court, AAA categorically identified appellant as the
person who repeatedly molested her. AAA’s testimony was
replete with delicate details which she could not have
concocted herself. She was consistent in her testimony and
never wavered even during cross-examination.
Rape
• People v. Nical, G.R. No. 210430, 18 February
2015
• Alminario insisted that he could not be convicted
of rape because the medical examination results
showed that AAA suffered no lacerations or
contusions. It is settled that the absence of physical
injuries or fresh lacerations does not negate rape,
and although medical results may not indicate
physical abuse or hymenal lacerations, rape can
still be established since medical findings or proof
of injuries are not among the essential elements in
the prosecution for rape.
Rape
• People v. Gallano, G.R. No. 184762, 25 February 2015
• Gallano was guilty only of simple rape, not of qualified rape. In
order that the accused is convicted of qualified rape under
Article 266-B (1) of the RPC, two requisites must be met, namely:
(1) the victim must be less than 18 years old; and (2) the offender
must either be related to the victim by consanguinity of by
affinity within the third civil degree, or is the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim. These two requisites must be
both alleged and proved with absolute certainty. Otherwise, the
accused could only be held guilty of simple rape. The qualifying
circumstances of relationship and minority remain to be relevant
in the crime of rape despite the abolition of the death penalty
under R.A. No. 9346. The accused's civil liability depends on the
mode of rape he committed.
Rape
• People v. CA, G.R. No. 183652, 25 February 2015
• In reviewing rape cases, the lone testimony of the victim is,
and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of
conviction if found to be credible. Also, it has been
established that when a woman declares that she has been
raped, she says in effect all that is necessary to mean that she
has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of
credibility, the accused can be convicted on that basis
alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole
evidence that can usually be offered to establish the guilt of
the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself.
Rape
• People v. Nuyok, G.R. No. 195424, 15 June 2015
• Despite the lack of testimony on how the accused had carnal
knowledge of his victim, his guilt was nonetheless shown beyond
reasonable doubt. A conviction for rape may rest on direct as well as
circumstantial evidence. Thus, an accused like him can be declared
guilty of rape even if the sole witness against him was the victim
who had been rendered unconscious at the time of the
consummation of carnal knowledge provided sufficient
circumstantial evidence existed showing that the victim was
violated, and that it was the accused and no other who had
committed the violation. To disallow such showing is to obstruct
the successful prosecution of a rapist who renders his victim
unconscious before the consummation.
Rape
• People v. Regaspi, G.R. No. 198309, 7 September
2015
• Rape cases are not always committed in seclusion. It is settled that
lust is no respecter of time or place, and rape defies constraints of
time and space
• The lack of resistance on the part of complainant is not inconsistent
with a claim of rape. Lack of resistance does not automatically mean
that the complainant consented to the sexual act, especially when
the accused had intimidated said person into submission. Here, the
victim was not only intimidated but likewise rendered unconscious.
True, there was no test conducted to determine that the victim was
indeed drugged, but this is of little relevance as the same is not an
indispensable element in a prosecution for rape. It is sufficient that
the prosecution was able to prove that the victim had been sedated
by the accused at the time the latter had carnal knowledge of her.
Rape
• People v. Arceo, G.R. No. 208842, 10 November 2015
• Accused-appellant contends that the element of intimidation is
lacking in this case to prove his guilt to the crime of rape. Accused-
appellant asserts that based on MMM's testimony, he did not
employ intimidation as to have cowed her into submission. His
alleged acts of covering MMM's mouth and straddling her with his
legs were performed only after MMM woke up and were never used
to compel MMM into having sexual intercourse with him. Accused-
appellant also assails the lack of medical basis to prove that there
was sexual contact between him and MMM. In this case, the fact of
forceful sexual intercourse is even bolstered and confirmed by the
physical examination on the private part of MMM which revealed
that she sustained abrasions on the left upper and middle quadrant
of her labia minora. When a victim's testimony of her violation is
corroborated by physical finding of penetration, there is sufficient
foundation for concluding that there was carnal knowledge.
Rape
• People v. Garrido, G.R. No. 191258 , 8 July 2015
• Jurisprudence lays down the following guidelines in
evaluating the testimony of the victim. First, while an
accusation for rape can be made with facility, it is difficult to
prove but more difficult for the person accused, though
innocent, to disprove; Second, in view of the intrinsic nature
of the crime of rape where only two persons are usually
involved, the testimony of the complainant must be
scrutinized with extreme caution; and lastly, the evidence for
the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits and
cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence of the defense.
Rape
• People v. Nerio, Jr., G.R. No. 200940, 22 July 2015
• It is true that in rape cases, the testimony of the victim is essential.
However, when the victim is a small child or, as in this case,
someone who acts like one, and thus cannot effectively testify as to
the details of the offense, and there are no other eyewitnesses, resort
to circumstantial evidence becomes inevitable. Circumstantial
evidence, sometimes referred to as indirect or presumptive
evidence, indirectly proves a fact in issue through an inference
which the fact-finder draws from the evidence established. It is not
a weaker form of evidence vis-a-vis direct evidence. Resort to it is
imperative when the lack of direct testimony would result in setting
an outlaw free. The Court reiterates that direct evidence of the
commission of a crime is not the only basis on which a court may
draw its finding of guilt. In fact, circumstantial evidence, when
demonstrated with clarity and forcefulness, may even be the sole
basis of a criminal conviction. It cannot be overturned by bare
denials or hackneyed alibis.
Rape
• PEOPLE v. JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G. RACHO
G.R. No. 225642-43 January 17, 2018
• More often than not, where the alleged victim survives to tell
her story of sexual· depredation, rape cases are solely decided
based on the credibility of the testimony of the private
complainant.
• In doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young

Filipina of decent repute would publicly admit that she has
been sexually abused, unless that is the truth, for it is her
natural instinct to protect her honor. However, this
misconception, particularly in this day and age, not only puts
the accused at an unfair disadvantage, but creates a travesty of
justice.
• This opinion borders on the fallacy of non sequitor.
Rape
• PEOPLE v. JUVY D. AMARELA AND JUNARD G.
RACHO G.R. No. 225642-43 January 17, 2018
• And while the factual setting back then would have been
appropriate to say it is natural for a woman to be reluctant in
disclosing a sexual assault; today, we simply cannot be stuck to
the Maria Clara stereotype of a demure and reserved Filipino
woman.
• We, should stay away from such mindset and accept the
realities of a woman's dynamic role in society today; she who
has over the years transformed into a strong and confidently
intelligent and beautiful person, willing to fight for her rights.
Rape
• In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private

complainant of rape without gender bias or cultural
misconception. It is important to weed out these
unnecessary notions because an accused may be
convicted solely on the testimony of the victim, provided
of course, that the testimony is credible, natural,
convincing, and consistent with human nature and the
normal course of things
Rape
• In this case, the accused were acquitted on ground of
reasonable doubt
• In the victim’s cross examination, the place where she was
allegedly raped was inconsistent with her affidavit
• At the time she was allegedly raped, She admitted that it was dark
and that she could not see the face of Amarela
• According to her testimony, the stage where she was pulled was 2
feet high. It’s physically impossible for the act to be performed on
a resisting person
• Considering the medical findings, court held that there is no
difference in the lacerations in the hymen for consensual and non-
consensual sex. The Court cannot completely rule out the
probability that AAA voluntarily had sex that night.
Rape
• Benabaye v. People, G.R. No. 203466, 25 February 2015
• It bears to stress that a sum of money received by an employee on
behalf of an employer is considered to be only in the material
possession of the employee. The material possession of an
employee is adjunct, by reason of his employment, to a recognition
of the juridical possession of the employer.
• Records show that Benabaye was merely a collector of loan
payments from Siam Bank's clients. At the end of every banking
day, she was required to remit all cash payments received together
with the corresponding cash transfer slips to her supervisor,
Tupag. As such, the money merely passes into her hands and she
takes custody thereof only for the duration of the banking day.
Hence, as an employee of Siam Bank, specifically, its temporary
cash custodian whose tasks are akin to a bank teller, she had no
juridical possession over the missing funds but only their physical
or material possession.
Estafa
• Benabaye v. People, G.R. No. 203466, 25 February
2015, con’t.
• There is an essential distinction between the possession of a
receiving teller of funds received from third persons paid to the
bank, and an agent who receives the proceeds of sales of
merchandise delivered to him in agency by his principal. In the
former case, payment by third persons to the teller is payment to
the bank itself; the teller is a mere custodian or keeper of the funds
received, and has no independent right or title to retain or possess
the same as against the bank. An agent, on the other hand, can
even assert, as against his own principal, an independent,
autonomous, right to retain the money or goods received in
consequence of the agency.
• Accordingly, the Supreme Court dismissed the estafa charge
against Benabaye, without prejudice, however, to the filing of the
appropriate criminal charge against her as may be warranted
under the circumstances.
Estafa
• People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. 203466, 25 February 2015
• All the elements of estafa were present in this case. The first
element was admitted by Villanueva, who confirmed that she
had issued the checks to Madarang in exchange for the jewelry
she had purchased. There is no question that Madarang
accepted the checks upon the assurance of Villanueva that they
would be funded upon presentment. It is clear that Madarang
would not have parted with and entrusted the pieces of
valuable jewelry to Villanueva whom she barely knew unless
Villanueva gave such assurance to her. The second element was
likewise established because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment due to insufficiency of funds or because the
account was already closed. The third element was also proved
by the showing that Madarang suffered prejudice by her failure
to collect from Villanueva the balance of Php995,000.00.
Estafa
• People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 208686, 1 July 2015
• It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be

convicted separately for illegal recruitment under RA 8042
(or the Labor Code), and estafa under Article 315(2)(a) of
the RPC.
• The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded

another by abuse of confidence or by means of deceit; and
(2) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or
prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation.
Estafa
• People v. Tolentino, G.R. No. 208686, 1 July 2015, con’t.
• In this case, the prosecution proved beyond reasonable doubt that
appellant deceived private complainants into believing that she
had the authority and capability to send them to Korea for
employment, despite her not being licensed by the POEA to
recruit workers for overseas employment. She even showed them
pictures of past applicants whom she allegedly sent abroad for
work. She also assured them that she would be able to secure their
visas and employment contracts once they pay the placement fee.
Because of the assurances given by appellant, private
complainants paid appellant a portion of the agreed placement
fee, for which appellant issued petty cash vouchers with her
signature, evidencing her receipt of the payments. Clearly, these
acts of appellant constitute estafa punishable under Article 315
(2)(a) of the RPC.
Estafa
• Gloria S. Dy v. People, G.R. No. 189081, 10 August 2016
• When the element of misappropriation or conversion is

missing, there can be no estafa. In such case, applying the
foregoing discussions on civil liability ex delicto, there can be
no civil liability as there is no act or omission from which any
civil liability may be sourced. However, when an accused is
acquitted because a reasonable doubt exists as to the existence
of misappropriation or conversion, then civil liability may still
be awarded. This means that, while there is evidence to prove
fraud, such evidence does not suffice to convince the court to
the point of moral certainty that the act of fraud amounts to
estafa. As the act was nevertheless proven, albeit without
sufficient proof justifying the imposition of any criminal
penalty, civil liability exists.
Estafa
• Gloria S. Dy v. People, G.R. No. 189081, 10 August 2016
• Civil liability arising from the contract is not civil liability ex
delicto, which arises from the same act or omission constituting
the crime. When the court finds that the source of obligation is
in fact, a contract, as in a contract of loan, it takes a position
completely inconsistent with the presence of estafa. In estafa, a
person parts with his money because of abuse of confidence or
deceit. In a contract, a person willingly binds himself or herself
to give something or to render some service. In estafa, the
accused's failure to account for the property received amounts
to criminal fraud. In a contract, a party's failure to comply with
his obligation is only a contractual breach. Thus, any finding
that the source of obligation is a contract negates estafa.
Estafa
Navarra v. People, G.R. No. 203750, 6 June 2016
• When a corporate officer issues a worthless check in the
corporate name, he may be held personally liable for violating
a penal statute. The statute imposes criminal penalties on
anyone who draws or issues a check on any bank with
knowledge that the funds are not sufficient in such bank to
meet the check upon presentment. Moreover, the corporate
officer cannot shield himself from liability on the ground that
it was a corporate act and not his personal act. The general rule
is that a corporate officer who issues a bouncing corporate
check can be held civilly liable when he is convicted.
Bouncing Checks Law

(B.P. 22)
• Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, 15 July 2015
• Petitioner Santiago married Santos during the subsistence
of the latter’s marriage with Galang. Santiago and Santos
were then charged with bigamy. Petitioner argues that for
there to be a conviction for bigamy, the second marriage
should be proven valid by the prosecution; but in this case,
she argued that her marriage with Santos was void due to
the lack of a marriage license.
• Whether Santiago may be exculpated from liability
considering that her marriage with Santos was void for lack
of a marriage license.
Bigamy
• Santiago v. People, G.R. No. 200233, 15 July 2015,
con’t.
• No. While jurisprudence requires that for the accused to be
convicted of bigamy, the second or subsequent marriage must
have all the essential requisites for validity, the facts of this case
beg to differ. It appears that petitioner and Santos perpetrated a
false Certificate of Marriage by misrepresenting that they were
exempted from the license requirement based on their fabricated
claim that they had already cohabited as husband and wife for at
least five years prior their marriage. In violation of our law against
illegal marriages, petitioner married Santos while knowing fully
well that they had not yet complied with the five-year cohabitation
requirement under Article 34 of the Family Code. Consequently, it
will be the height of absurdity to allow petitioner to use her illegal
act to escape criminal conviction.
Bigamy
• People v. Sumili, G.R. No. 212160, 4 February 2015
• When there was delay in the turn-over of the corpus delicti to the
PNP Crime Laboratory as it was alleged that the date the illegal
sachet was seized falls on a Friday and therefore the PNP Crime
Laboratory was closed but it appears that said date falls on a
Wednesday, not on a Friday, conviction must be immediately set
aside. It must be emphasized that in criminal prosecutions
involving illegal drugs, the presentation of the drugs which
constitute the corpus delicti of the crime calls for the necessity of
proving with moral certainty that they are the same seized
items.
Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.

No. 9165)
• People v. Dacuma, G.R. No. 205889, 4 February 2015
• In the prosecution of illegal sale, what is essential is to prove that
the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled with the
presentation in court of evidence of the corpus delicti. The
consummation of sale is perfected the moment the buyer
receives the drug from the seller. In this case, the prosecution
failed to prove that the four sachets which tested positive
for shabu and eventually presented in court were the same ones
confiscated by the police officers due to its non-marking at the
place where the buy-bust operation was committed at the police
station. This non-marking violated the measures defined under
Section 21(1) of Republic Act No. 9165 and Section 21(a) of the
IRR of R.A. No. 9165 which are also known as the Rule on Chain
of Custody.
Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

9165)
• People v. Dasigan, G.R. No. 206229, 4 February 2015
• Accused handed the illegal drugs she was selling the buyer-
poseur. When the latter received the drugs, he did not give the
marked money to the accused but immediately arrested her
instead. SC ruled that although accused-appellant was shown
the consideration before she handed over the subject shabu to
the poseur-buyer, such is not sufficient to consummate the
sale. Looking at a thing does not transfer possession of it to the
beholder.
• The exoneration of an accused from the charge of illegal sale of
dangerous or prohibited drugs, does not spell freedom from
all criminal liability as she may still be convicted for illegal
possession of dangerous or prohibited drugs. It is settled that
possession is necessarily included in the sale of dangerous or
prohibited drugs.

9165)
• People v. Reyes, G.R. No. 194606, 18 February 2015
• The delivery of the illicit drug to the poseur-buyer and the
receipt by the seller of the marked money successfully
consummate the buy-bust transaction. In this case, SPO1 Acosta
positively identified Santos as the person he transacted with and
who handed to him the two sachets of shabu presented in court,
however, the prosecution was unable to discharge its burden of
establishing the element of consideration or payment for the
sachets of shabu. The charge against him was not confined to the
sale of shabu. To deliver a dangerous drug is an act that is also
punishable under the same Section 5, Article II of R.A. 9165.
During the buy bust operation, SPO1 Acosta asked Santos for
the shabu and Santos responded by taking out from his pocket
the shabu and handing over its possession to SPO1 Acosta
without receiving any payment thereto.

9165)
• People v. Basilio, G.R. No. G.R. No. 185774, 23 February 2015
• A buy-bust operation was conducted by the police to apprehend
Larry Basilio. Basilio was successfully apprehended by the
police after he sold shabu to a police acting as poseur-buyer. The
RTC and CA convicted the accused. Basilio questions the chain
of custody of the drug. Marking the subject item at the police
station did not dent the prosecution's case. While R.A. No. 9165
provides for the immediate marking of the seized item, it does
not specify a time frame when and where said marking should
be done.

9165)
• People v. Lara III, G.R. No. 198796, 16 September 2015
• Non-compliance with the procedure outlined in Section 21,
Article II of the IRR of R.A. No. 9165 shall not render void and
invalid such seizure as long as the arresting officers successfully
preserved the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated
items. Here, while it is true that the police officers failed to make
an inventory and take photographs, the prosecution was able to
prove, however, that the sachet of shabu confiscated during the
buy-bust operation was the same item presented and identified
before the court. They were able to maintain the integrity of the
seized drug and establish that the links in the chain of custody
were not compromised.

9165)
• People v. Punzalan; G.R. No. 199087, 11 November 2015
• The accused-appellants alleged that the chain of custody of the
drugs was broken because Atty. Gaspe of the PDEA Office who
made the report, did not sign the receipt/inventory of the
property seized. SC ruled against the accused saying that the
chain of custody in this case was duly established from the time
the sealed plastic sachets were seized and marked by the police
to its turnover to Atty. Gaspe.
• Failure to strictly comply with the prescribed procedures in the
inventory of seized drugs does not render an arrest of the
accused illegal or the items seized/confiscated from him
inadmissible. What is of utmost importance is the preservation
of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items, as
the same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt or
innocence of the accused.

9165)
• People v. Kamad Akmad, G.R. No. 195194, 25 November 2015
• In the prosecution of a case of illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the
absence of marked money does not create a hiatus in the evidence
for the prosecution as long as the sale of dangerous drug is
adequately proven and the drug subject of the transaction is
presented before the court. Neither law nor jurisprudence requires
the presentation of any money used in the buy-bust operation. What
is material is the proof that the transaction or sale took place,
coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as
evidence.
• Moreover, Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 punishes not only
the sale but also the mere act of delivery of prohibited drugs after
the offer to buy by the entrapping officer has been accepted by the
seller. In the distribution of prohibited drugs, the payment of any
consideration is immaterial. The mere act of distributing the
prohibited drugs to others is in itself a punishable offense.

9165)
• People v. Juliet Pancho, G.R. No. 206910, 14 October
2015
• "[C]onstructive possession exists when the drug is under
the dominion and control of the accused or when he has
the right to exercise dominion and control over the place
where it is found." Accused-appellant is not authorized by
law to possess the shabu. Mere possession of a regulated
drug per se constitutes prima facie evidence of knowledge
or animus possidendi sufficient to convict an accused absent
a satisfactory explanation of such possession - the onus
probandi is shifted to the accused, to explain the absence of
knowledge or animus possidendi. Accused-appellant's bare
denials will not suffice to overcome the· presumption of
knowledge.

9165)
• People v. Kusain Amin, G.R. No. 215942, 18
January 2017
• If the poseur-buyer and the confidential informant
were one and the same. The confidential
informant/poseur-buyer is the only person who
directly witnessed the transaction. The members of
the buy bust team who are positioned at a distance
from the poseur-buyer and the accused could not
have witnessed the sale of illegal drugs.

No. 9165)
• People v. Maritess Cayas, G.R. No. 206888, 4 July 2016
The exception found in the IRR of R.A. 9165 applies only (a)
where the prosecution recognized the procedural lapses, and
thereafter explained the cited justifiable grounds, and (b) when
the prosecution established that the integrity and evidentiary
value of the evidence seized had been preserved. The prosecution,
thus, loses the benefit of invoking the presumption of regularity
and bears the burden of proving – with moral certainty – that the
illegal drug presented in court is the same drug that was
confiscated from the accused during his arrest.

No. 9165)
• PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM G.R. No. 231989
September 4, 2018
• Police officers conducted a buy-bust operation at the
house of accused Romy Lim. The alleged shabu sachets
were seized from the accused and an inventory was
immediately made by the officers at Lim’s house
• However, the Inventory Report does not contain the
signatures of elected officials, or a representative of the
DOJ, or the media. It was also not signed by the accused.

No. 9165)
• PEOPLE V. ROMY LIM G.R. No. 231989, September 4, 2018
• For drug cases, the Court laid out a mandatory policy:
1. In the sworn statements/affidavits, the apprehending/seizing officers must state
their compliance with the requirements of Section 21 (1) of R.A. No. 9165, as
amended, and its IRR.
2. In case of non-observance of the provision, the apprehending/seizing officers
must state the justification or explanation therefor as well as the steps they have
taken in order to preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized/
confiscated items
3. If there is no justification or explanation expressly declared in the sworn
statements or affidavits, the investigating fiscal must not immediately file the
case before the court. Instead, he or she must refer the case for further
preliminary investigation in order to determine the (non) existence of probable
cause
4. If the investigating fiscal filed the case despite such absence, the court may
exercise its discretion to either refuse to issue a commitment order (or warrant
of arrest) or dismiss the case outright for lack of probable cause in accordance
with Section 5,40 Rule 112, Rules of Court.
Dangerous Drugs Act

• Mustapha Dimakuta v. People, G.R. No.
206513, 20 October 2015
• Dimakuta was charged with and convicted of violation of
Section 5 Paragraph (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610. The
OSG opined that Dimakuta should have been convicted
only of acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 of the Revised
Penal Code in view of the prosecution’s failure to establish
that lascivious acts were attended by force or coercion
because the victim was asleep at the time the alleged acts
were committed.
Special Protection of Children Against

Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act
[R.A. No. 7610]
• Mustapha Dimakuta v. People, G.R. No. 206513, 20 October
2015, con’t.
• Other acts of lasciviousness under Art. 339 of the RPC, where
the victim is a virgin and consents to the lascivious acts
through abuse of confidence or when the victim is single or a
widow of good reputation and consents to the lascivious acts
through deceit, or;
• Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness

is not covered by lascivious conduct as defined in R.A. No.
7610. In case the acts of lasciviousness is covered by lascivious
conduct under R.A. No. 7610 and it is done through coercion or
influence, which establishes absence or lack of consent, then
Art. 336 of the RPC is no longer applicable.

[R.A. No. 7610]
• Mustapha Dimakuta v. People, G.R. No. 206513, 20
October 2015, con’t.
• Section 5(b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, where there was no
consent on the part of the victim to the lascivious conduct,
which was done through the employment of coercion or
influence. The offender may likewise be liable for sexual
abuse under R.A. No. 7610 if the victim is at least eighteen
(18) years and she is unable to fully take care of herself or
protect herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.

[R.A. No. 7610]
• Mustapha Dimakuta v. People, G.R. No. 206513, 20
October 2015, con’t.
• Notably, a child is considered as sexually abused under
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 when he or she is subjected to
lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any
adult. Intimidation need not necessarily be irresistible. It is
sufficient that some compulsion equivalent to intimidation
annuls or subdues the free exercise of the will of the offended
party. The law does not require physical violence on the
person of the victim; moral coercion or ascendancy is
sufficient.

[R.A. No. 7610]
• Van Clifford Torres Salera v. People, G.R. No. 206627, 18
January 2017
• The act of whipping a child three (3) times in the neck with a
wet t-shirt constitutes child abuse. The Supreme Court ruled
that accused’s intent to abuse is evident from the fact that he
hit the child’s neck. Common sense and human experience
would suggest that hitting a sensitive body part, such as the
neck, with a wet t-shirt would cause an extreme amount of
pain, especially so if it was done several times. There is also
reason to believe that petitioner used excessive force.
Otherwise, the child would not have fallen down the stairs at
the third strike. He would likewise not have sustained a
contusion.

• People v. Noel Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, 8 August 2017
• Difference between acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the

RPC and lascivious conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.
• Based on the language of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the

offense designated as “Acts of Lasciviousness” under Article 336
of the RPC in relation to Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 should be
used when the victim is under 12 years of age at the time the
offense was committed. This finds support in the first proviso in
Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, which requires that “when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators shall be
prosecuted under Article 35, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336
of Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be.” Thus, pursuant to this
proviso, it has been held that before an accused can be convicted
of child abuse through lascivious conduct on a minor below 12
years of age, the requisites for of lasciviousness under Article 336
of the RPC must be met in addition to the requisites for sexual
abuse under Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610.

• People v. Noel Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, 8 August 2017
(cont).
• Conversely, when the victim, at the time the offense was
committed, is aged twelve (12) years or over but under eighteen
(18), or is eighteen (18) or older but unable to fully take care of
herself/himself or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition, the nomenclature of the offense
should be Lascivious Conduct under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, since the law no longer refers to Article 336 of the RPC,
and the perpetrator is prosecuted solely under R.A. No. 7610.

• People v. Noel Caoili, G.R. No. 196342, 8 August 2017 (cont).
• Guidelines in designating or charging the proper offense in case
lascivious conduct is committed under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610,
and in determining the imposable penalty:
• The age of the victim is into consideration in designating or charging
the offense, and in determining the imposable penalty.
• If the victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the nomenclature of the
crime should be “Acts of Lasciviousness under Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610.”
Pursuant to the second proviso in Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
• If the victim is exactly twelve (12) years of age, or more than twelve
(12) but below eighteen (18) years of age, or is eighteen (18) years old
or older but is unable to fully take care of herself/himself or protect
herself/himself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation or
discrimination because of a physical or mental disability or condition,
the crime should be designated as "Lascivious Conduct under Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610," and the imposable penalty is reclusion
temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua.

• Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, 18 April 2017
• Before an accused can be held criminally liable for lascivious conduct
under Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the requisites of Acts of
Lasciviousness as penalized under Art. 336 of the RPC must be met in
addition to the requisites of sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of R.A. No.
7610, to wit:
• The accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct.
• The said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse.
• That child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age.
• Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or

connected with child prostitution wherein the child is abused primarily
for profit. On the other hand, paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct committed on a child subjected to other sexual
abuse. It covers not only a situation where a child is abused for profit but
also one in which a child, through coercion, intimidation or influence,
engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct. Hence, the law
punishes not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse
against children.

• Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, 18 April 2017
(cont).
• The original wording of Section 5 of R.A. No. 7610 was
expanded so as to cover abuses that are not characterized by
gain, monetary or otherwise. In the case at bar, the abuse
suffered by AAA squarely falls under the expanded scope as
there was no allegation of consideration or profit in
exchange for sexual favor. As stated in the Information,
Quimvel committed lascivious conduct through the use of
force and intimidation.

• Quimvel v. People, G.R. No. 214497, 18 April 2017 (cont)
• The Senate deliberations made clear, that other forms of sexual
abuse, not just prostitution, are within the extended coverage
of R.A. No. 7610. Both offenses must then be dealt with under
the same parameters, in spite of the differences in their
elements. Thus, the participation of a third person is not
necessary to commit the crime of prostitution, in the same
manner that the participation of a third person is not an
element in charging one for other sexual abuse.
• It is immaterial whether or not the accused himself employed
the coercion or influence to subdue the will of the child for the
latter to submit to his sexual advances for him to be convicted
under paragraph (b). Sec. 5 of R.A. No. 7610 even provides
that the offense can be committed by "any adult, syndicate or
group," without qualification. The clear language of the
special law, therefore, does not preclude the prosecution of
lascivious conduct performed by the same person who subdued
the child through coercion or influence.

• RICHARD ESCALANTE v. People G.R. No. 218970, June
28, 2017
• AAA was called by Escalante and was pulled into a comfort

room at a school. Once inside, Escalante pulled down AAA's
shorts and sucked the latter's penis for about ten (10) minutes.
Shortly thereafter, he forcibly inserted AAA's penis into his
anus.
• Escalante was found guilty of violating sec. 10 (a) of R.A. No.
7610 other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or Exploitation and
Other Conditions Prejudicial to the Child's Development
R.A. No. 7610

• RICHARD ESCALANTE v. People G.R. No. 218970,
June 28, 2017
• Held: Accused violated sec. 5(b), Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse not sec. 10(a)
• The elements of 5(b) are:
1. the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct;
2. the said act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution
or subjected to other sexual abuse; and
3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of age. It
further ruled
• All elements were established in this case
R.A. No. 7610

Sec. 5 (b) Sec. 10(a)
Penalty: Penalty:
reclusion temporal in its medium (a) Any person who shall commit any
period to reclusion perpetua shall be other acts of child abuse, cruelty or
imposed upon exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child's
(b) Those who commit the act of development including those covered
sexual intercourse or lascivious by Article 59 of Presidential Decree
conduct with a child exploited in No. 603, as amended, but not covered
prostitution or subjected to other by the Revised Penal Code, as
sexual abuse amended, shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its minimum
period
R.A. No. 7610

• Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, 18
August 2015
• Senator Enrile was accused of and charged with the
crime of plunder, punishable by life imprisonment
under Section 2, R.A. No. 7080. He filed a “Motion to
Fix Bail” with the Sandiganbayan, arguing that (a) the
prosecution had not yet established that the evidence
of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged
with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be
reclusion temporal not reclusion perpetua ; and (c) he was
not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition
must further be seriously considered.
Plunder (R.A. No. 7080)

• Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015, con’t.
• The Supreme Court granted Senator Enrile’s motion on the following
grounds:
• The principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the
accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. Senator Enrile’s
social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to
the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his
flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely. His personal
disposition from the onset of his indictment for plunder, formal or
otherwise, has demonstrated his utter respect for the legal processes of
this country. We also do not ignore that at an earlier time many years ago
when he had been charged with rebellion with murder and multiple
frustrated murder, he already evinced a similar personal disposition of
respect for the legal processes, and was granted bail during the pendency
of his trial because he was not seen as a flight risk.
• With his solid reputation in both his public and his private lives, his
long years of public service, and history’s judgment of him being at
stake, he should be granted bail.

• Enrile v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 213847, 18 August 2015, con’t.
• The currently fragile state of Senator Enrile’s health presents another
compelling justification for his admission to bail.
• Bail for the provisional liberty of the accused, regardless of the crime
charged, should be allowed independently of the merits of the charge,
provided his continued incarceration is clearly shown to be injurious
to his health or to endanger his life. Indeed, denying him bail despite
imperiling his health and life would not serve the true objective of
preventive incarceration during the trial.
• It is relevant to observe that granting provisional liberty to Senator
Enrile will then enable him to have his medical condition be properly
addressed and better attended to by competent physicians in the
hospitals of his choice. This will not only aid in his adequate preparation
of his defense but, more importantly, will guarantee his appearance in
court for the trial.

Macapagal-Arroyo v. People /Aguas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
220598/G.R. No. 220953, 19 July 2016
• As regards the allegation of conspiracy

The prosecution failed to properly allege conspiracy in the information. The
allegation of the wheel conspiracy or express conspiracy in the information
is appropriate because the main plunderer would then be identified in either
manner. Considering that 10 persons have been accused of amassing,
accumulating and/or acquiring ill-gotten wealth aggregating
P365,997,915.00, it would be improbable that the crime charged was plunder
if none of them was alleged to be the main plunderer. As such, each of the 10
accused would account for the aliquot amount of only P36,599,791.50, or
exactly 1/10 of the alleged aggregate ill-gotten wealth, which is far below the
threshold value of ill-gotten wealth required for plunder.

220598/G.R. No. 220953, 19 July 2016
• Overt acts of plunder

GMA’s approval of Uriarte’s requests for additional CIFs did not make her
part of any design to raid the public treasury as the means to amass,
accumulate and acquire ill-gotten wealth. GMA’s handwritten unqualified
“OK” as an overt act of plunder was absolutely unwarranted considering
that such act was a common legal and valid practice of signifying approval
of a fund release by the President.
Uriarte’s requests for additional funds were compliant with applicable laws
such as Letter of Instruction No. 1282 considering that these stated: (a) the
full details of the specific purposes for which the funds would be spent; (b)
the explanations of the circumstances giving rise to the necessity of the
expenditure; and (c) the particular aims to be accomplished.

220598/G.R. No. 220953, 19 July 2016
• Overt acts of plunder, cont.
Aguas’ certifications and signatures on the disbursement vouchers were

insufficient bases to conclude that he was into any conspiracy to commit
plunder or any other crime. Without GMA's participation, he could not
release any money because there was then no budget available for the
additional CIFs. Whatever irregularities he might have committed did not
amount to plunder, or to any implied conspiracy to commit plunder.

Macapagal-Arroyo v. People /Aguas v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 220598/G.R.
No. 220953, 19 July 2016
• The public officer should have used the property taken
• The common thread that binds all the four terms together is that the public
officer used the property taken. Considering that raids on the public treasury is
in the company of the four other terms that require the use of the property
taken, the phrase “raids on the public treasury” similarly requires such use of
the property taken. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan gravely erred in finding
that the mere accumulation and gathering constituted the forbidden act
of raids on the public treasury. Pursuant to the maxim of noscitur a sociis, raids
on the public treasury requires the raider to use the property taken impliedly
for his personal benefit. Moreover, based on the legislative proceedings for the
passage of R.A. No. 7080, a conviction for plunder requires the prosecution to
prove that there was personal benefit on the part of the main plunderer or his
co-conspirators by virtue of their plunder.

• Sec. 3 Prohibition on Hazing
• All forms of hazing shall be prohibited:
• in fraternities, sororities and organizations in schools, including
citizens’ military training and citizens’ army training
• All other fraternities, sororities and organizations that are not
school-based, such as community based and other similar
organizations
• In no case shall hazing be made a requirement for employment in
any business or corporation
• Exception:
• AFP and PNP physical, mental and psychological testing as
approved by the Secretary of National Defense
Anti-Hazing Act of 2018

R.A. No. 11053
Penalty
Reclusion Perpetua and Those who actually planned and participated where
Fine of P3,000,000 death, rape, sodomy or mutilation results from the
hazing
Reclusion Perpetua and • All who actually planned and participated
Fine of P2,000,000 • All officers actually present during the hazing
• The adviser, former officers actually present
• Members present who are intoxicated or under
influence of alcohol or illegal drugs
Reclusion Temporal • All persons present in the conduct of the hazing
maximum and fine of
P1,000,000

Penalties sec. 14
Reclusion Temporal and Fine of Former Officers, Members who will
P1,000,000 hamper, conceal or obstruct any
investigation
Prision Correccional Minimum Any person who will shall intimidate,
threaten, force, vex another person for
the purpose of recruitment in an
organization, fraternity, sorority
Fine of P1,000,000 The School, if the hazing was
approved
Administrative Liability School authorities, local government
officials, if there was consent, or when
the hazing was allowed

Penalties sec. 14
CYBERCRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 2012
(R.A. NO. 10175)
• Promulgated on 12 September 2012
• The first law in the Philippines which specifically
criminalizes acts committed through the use of a
computer
• The SC issued a 120-day temporary restraining order
(TRO) against the law’s implementation on 9 October
2012
• On 5 February 2013, the SC extended the TRO "until
further orders from the court”
• The SC upheld the constitutionality of most of the law’s
provisions in Disini, et al. vs. Secretary of Justice (G.R. No.
203335, 11 February 2014)
Background
• Disini v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 203335, 18
February 2014
• The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10175.
Among the issues raised was whether the penal code
provisions on libel as well as Section 4(c)(4) of R.A. No. 10175
or cyberlibel are valid.
• Libel is not a constitutionally protected speech and that the
government has an obligation to protect private individuals
from defamation. Indeed, cyberlibel is actually not a new crime
since Article 353, in relation to Article 355 of the penal code,
already punishes it. In effect, Section 4(c)(4) above merely
affirms that online defamation constitutes "similar means" for
committing libel.
Libel and Cyberlibel

• Disini v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 203335, 18 February 2014,
con’t.
• In the dipositive portion, the Supreme Court ruled that Section 4(c)(4) that
penalizes online libel as valid and constitutional with respect to the original
author of the post; but void and unconstitutional with respect to others who
simply receive the post and react to it. In short, while the author of a libelous
tweet or Facebook post may be held liable under Section 4(c)(4), those who
“like,” “comment,” or “share” the supposed libelous online post cannot be
held liable under Section 5 for “aiding and abetting” the author of the libelous
post for the following ratiocinations:
a. A person who comments on a supposed libelous post only expresses
agreement with the statement of the poster. He still is not its author.
b. It is not clear if aiding or abetting libel in the physical world is a crime.
c. Except for the original author of the assailed statement, the rest (those
who pressed “like,” “comment” and “share”) are essentially knee-jerk
sentiments of readers who may think little or haphazardly of their
response to the original posting.

• Disini v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 203335, 18 February
2014, con’t.
• The terms “aiding or abetting” constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves
through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages. Its
vagueness raises apprehension on the part of internet users
because of its obvious chilling effect on the freedom of
expression, especially since the crime of aiding or abetting
ensnares all the actors in the cyberspace front in a fuzzy way.
• Libel in the cyberspace can of course stain a person’s image with
just one click of the mouse. Scurrilous statements can spread and
travel fast across the globe like bad news. Moreover, cyberlibel
often goes hand in hand with cyberbullying that oppresses the
victim, his relatives, and friends, evoking from mild to
disastrous reactions. Still, a governmental purpose, which seeks
to regulate the use of this cyberspace communication technology
to protect a person’s reputation and peace of mind, cannot adopt
means that will unnecessarily and broadly sweep, invading the
area of protected freedoms.

February 2014, con’t.
• Libel under the RPC
Art. 353. Definition of libel.—A libel is public and

malicious imputation of a crime, or of a vice or defect,
real or imaginary, or any act, omission, condition, status,
or circumstance tending to cause the dishonor, discredit,
or contempt of a natural or juridical person, or to
blacken the memory of one who is dead.
Comparative analysis: Libel under the

Revised Penal Code and libel under R.A.
No. 10175
2014, con’t.
• Libel under R.A. No. 10175
Sec. 4. Cybercrime offenses.— XXX

… …
(c) Content-related Offenses:
… …
(4) Libel.—The unlawful or prohibited acts of libel as defined in
Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, committed
through a computer system or any other similar means which
may be devised in the future.

No. 10175
February 2014, con’t.
• The SC declared as unconstitutional Section 5, which
punishes aiding or abetting and attempt to commit libel on
the cyberspace:
“SEC. 5. Other Offenses. — The following acts shall also constitute an

offense:
(a) Aiding or Abetting in the Commission of Cybercrime. – Any
person who willfully abets or aids in the commission of any of the
offenses enumerated in this Act shall be held liable.
(b) Attempt in the Commission of Cybercrime. — Any person who
willfully attempts to commit any of the offenses enumerated in this
Act shall be held liable.”

No. 10175
2014, con’t.
• The terms "aiding or abetting" constitute broad sweep that
generates chilling effect on those who express themselves
through cyberspace posts, comments, and other messages.
Hence, Section 5 of the cybercrime law that punishes "aiding or
abetting" libel on the cyberspace is a nullity.
• The cyberspace is an incomparable, pervasive medium of
communication. It is inevitable that any government threat of
punishment regarding certain uses of the medium creates a
chilling effect on the constitutionally-protected freedom of
expression of the great masses that use it. In this case, the
particularly complex web of interaction on social media
websites would give law enforcers such latitude that they
could arbitrarily or selectively enforce the law.

No. 10175
• Disini v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No.
203335, 18 February 2014, con’t.
• Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel is valid
and constitutional with respect to the original
author of the post; but void and unconstitutional
with respect to others who simply receive the
post and react to it.

No. 10175
• Jurisdiction over libel cases under the Revised Penal Code
• If the offended party were a private individual, the criminal
and civil action for damages shall be filed simultaneously or
separately with:
• The Regional Trial Court (RTC) of the province or city
where the libelous article is printed and first published;
or
• Where any of the offended parties actually resides at the
time of the commission of the offense

No. 10175
• Jurisdiction over libel cases under the RPC
• If the offended party were a public officer, the action
shall be filed in:
• The RTC of the province or city where he held office
at the time of the commission of the offense; or
• Where the libelous article is printed and first
published.

No. 10175
• Jurisdiction over libel cases under the RPC
• In case one of the parties is a private individual,
the action shall be filed in:
• The RTC of the province or city where he
actually resides at the time of the commission of
the offense; or
• Where the libelous matter is printed and first
published.

No. 10175
• Jurisdiction over cases involving violations of R.A. No.
10175
• The RTC shall have jurisdiction over any violation of the
provisions of the Act including any violation committed by a
Filipino national, regardless of the place of commission.
• Jurisdiction shall lie if :
• Any of the elements was committed within the Philippines;
or
• Committed with the use of any computer system wholly or
partly situated in the country; or
• When by such commission any damage is caused to a
natural or juridical person who, at the time the offense was
committed, was in the Philippines.

No. 10175
• Bonifacio v. RTC of Makati, G.R. No. 184800, 5
May 2010
• The Yuchengco family filed a complaint for libel under
Article 355 in relation to Article 353 of the RPC against
officers of Parents Enabling Parents Coalition, Inc. (PEPCI)
for derogatory articles published in the websites which
PEPCI was maintaining.
• The complaint was filed in Makati on the basis that the
articles were first accessed by complainants in Makati.
Petitioners moved to quash the Information because it failed
to allege that the libelous articles were printed and first
published in Makati and the prosecution erroneously laid the
venue of the case in the place where the offended party
accessed the internet-published article.
• The Supreme Court ordered the quashal of the Information.
Venue for instituting criminal

actions for “Internet libel”
May 2010
• If the venue for the criminal action for libel is based on the
circumstances as to where the libel was printed and first
published, the information must allege with particularity
where the defamatory article was printed
and first published. It must be evidenced or supported by,
for instance, the address of their editorial or business offices
in the case of newspapers, magazines or serial publications.
• Note: The Bonifacio ruling was promulgated when there was
still no “internet libel” in the Philippines. By reason of the
passage of Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, internet libel
is now penalized.

May 2010, con’t.
• The same measure cannot be reasonably expected
when it pertains to defamatory material appearing on
a website on the Internet as there would be no way of
determining the situs of its printing and first
publication.
• To equate the first access to the defamatory article on
the website with “printing and first publication”
would spawn the very ills that the amendment to
Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code sought to
discourage and prevent.

COMPREHENSIVE FIREARMS AND
AMMUNITION REGULATION ACT
(R.A. NO. 10591)
• On 29 May 2013, R.A. No. 10591 was approved into law. The
law recognizes the right of its qualified citizens to self-
defense through the use of firearms and regulates the
ownership, possession, carrying, manufacture, dealing in and
importation of firearms, ammunition, or parts thereof.
• The law did not entirely repeal P.D. No. 1866, as amended by
R.A. No. 8294. Only Sections 1, 2, 5, and 7 of PD 1866 and
Section 6 of RA 8294 were repealed.
• Hence, the provisions of these laws concerning explosives
were retained and, as such, the unlawful manufacture, sale,
acquisition, disposition or possession of explosives such as
hand grenade, rifle grenade, and other explosives, continues
to be punishable under the old law.
Background
• Unlawful acquisition or possession of firearms
and ammunitions (Sec. 28)
• The penalties for various offenses under Section 28 are
dependent on the type of firearm, ammunition, or part
of firearm unlawfully acquired or possessed by the
offender.
1. Small arms Prision mayor in its 6. Major part of Prision mayor in its
medium period. Class—B light maximum period.
2. Class—A light Prision mayor in its weapon
weapon maximum period. 7. Ammunition of Prision mayor in its
3. Class—B light Reclusion perpetua. small arm minimum period.
weapon 8. Ammunition of Prision mayor in its
4. Major part of small Prision mayor in its Class—A light medium period.
arm minimum period. weapon
5. Major part of Prision mayor in its 9. Ammunition of Prision mayor in its
Class—A light medium period. Class—B light maximum period.
weapon weapon
Punishable acts
• Use of loose firearm in the commission of a crime
(Sec. 29)
• Loose firearm: An unregistered firearm, an
obliterated or altered firearm, firearm which has
been lost or stolen, illegally manufactured
firearms, registered firearms in the possession of
an individual other than the licensee and those
with revoked licenses in accordance with the
rules and regulations (Sec. 3 [v])
Punishable acts
• If the use of a loose firearm is inherent in the commission of a
crime punishable under the RPC or other special laws, the use of
loose firearm is an aggravating circumstance.
• If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized
by the law with a maximum penalty which is lower than that
prescribed in the section for illegal possession of firearm, the
penalty for illegal possession of firearm shall be imposed in lieu of
the penalty for the crime charged.
• If the crime committed with the use of a loose firearm is penalized
by the law with a maximum penalty which is equal to that
imposed under the section for illegal possession of firearms, the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed in
addition to the penalty for the crime punishable under the RPC or
other special laws of which he/she is found guilty.
Punishable acts
• If the violation of this law is in furtherance of, or incident to,
or in connection with the crime of rebellion or insurrection,
or attempted coup d’ etat, the violation shall be absorbed as
an element of the crime of rebellion or insurrection, or
attempted coup d’ etat.
• If the crime is committed by the person without using the
loose firearm, the violation of this law shall be considered
as a distinct and separate offense.
Punishable acts
• Wilfully or knowingly allowing any of the firearms owned
by a company or entity to be used by any person or persons
found guilty of using a loose firearm or allowing any of
them to use unregistered firearm or firearms without any
legal authority to be carried outside of their residence in the
course of their employment (Sec. 30)
• The person liable is the owner, president, manager,
director or other responsible officer of any public or
private firm, company, corporation or entity
• Absence of permit to carry outside of residence (Sec. 31)
Punishable acts
• Unlawful manufacture, importation, sale or disposition of firearms or
ammunition or parts thereof, machinery, tool or instrument used or
intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, ammunition or
parts thereof (Sec. 32)
• The possession of any machinery, tool or instrument used directly in
the manufacture of firearms, ammunition, or major parts thereof by
any person whose business, employment or activity does not lawfully
deal with the possession of such article, shall be prima facie evidence
that such article is intended to be used in the unlawful or illegal
manufacture of firearms, ammunition or parts thereof.
• The laborer, worker or employee of a licensed firearms dealer who
shall unlawfully take, sell or otherwise dispose of parts of firearms or
ammunition which the company manufactures and sells, and other
materials used by the company in the manufacture or sale of firearms
or ammunition shall be criminally liable.
Punishable acts
• The buyer or possessor of such stolen part or
material, who is aware that such part or material
was stolen, shall suffer the same penalty as the
laborer, worker or employee.
• If the violation or offense is committed by a
corporation, partnership, association or other
juridical entity, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the directors, officers, employees or other
officials or persons therein who knowingly and
willingly participated in the unlawful act.
Punishable acts
• Arms smuggling (Sec. 33)
• Refers to the import, export, acquisition, sale, delivery, movement or
transfer of firearms, their parts and components and ammunition,
from or across the territory of one country to that of another country
which has not been authorized in accordance with domestic law in
either or both country/countries
• Tampering, obliteration or alteration of firearms identification, without
authority (Sec. 34)
• Use of an imitation firearm in the commission of a crime (Sec. 35)
• An imitation firearm used in the commission of a crime shall be
considered a real firearm.
• Planting of evidence (Sec. 38)
• Failure to notify lost or stolen firearm or light weapon (Sec. 40)
• This is punishable by fine only.
• Illegal transfer / registration of firearms (Sec. 41)
Punishable acts
• To qualify and acquire a license to own and possess a firearm
or firearms and ammunition, the applicant:
• Must be a Filipino citizen;
• Must be at least 21 years old;
• Must have gainful work, occupation or business or has filed
an Income Tax Return (ITR) for the preceding year as proof
of income, profession, business or occupation; and
• Shall submit certain certifications issued by the appropriate
authorities.
Standards and requisites for issuance

of and obtaining a license to own
firearms
• A permit to carry firearms outside of residence shall be issued by the Chief of the
PNP or his duly authorized representative to any qualified person whose life is
under actual threat or his life is in imminent danger due to the nature of his/her
profession, occupation or business.
• The following professionals are considered to be in imminent danger due to the
nature of their profession, occupation or business:
• Members of the Philippine Bar;
• Certified Public Accountants;
• Accredited Media Practitioners;
• Cashiers, Bank Tellers;
• Priests, Ministers, Rabbi, Imams;
• Physicians and Nurses;
• Engineers; and
• Businessmen, who by the nature of their business or undertaking, are exposed
to high risk of being targets of criminal elements.
Carrying of firearms outside of

residence or place of business
• Only small arms may be registered by licensed citizens or
licensed juridical entities for ownership, possession and
concealed carry.
• A light weapon shall be lawfully acquired or possessed
exclusively by the AFP, the PNP and other law enforcement
agencies authorized by the President in the performance of their
duties.
• Provided: That private individuals who already have licenses
to possess Class-A light weapons shall not be deprived of the
privilege to continue possessing the same and renewing the
licenses therefor, for the sole reason that these firearms are
Class “A” light weapons, and shall be required to comply with
other applicable provisions of this law.
Registration of firearms
• Upon the death or legal disability of the holder of a firearm
license, it shall be the duty of his next of kin, nearest relative,
legal representative, or other person who shall knowingly
come into possession of such firearm or ammunition, to
deliver the same to the FEO of the PNP or Police Regional
Office.
• The failure to deliver the firearm or ammunition within six
months after the death or legal disability of the licensee shall
render the possessor liable for illegal possession of the
firearm.
Death or disability of
licensee
• It refers to any:
• Firearm which was manufactured at least seventy-five (75)
years prior to the current date but not including replicas;
• Firearm which is certified by the National Museum of the
Philippines to be curio or relic of museum interest; and
• Any other firearm which derives a substantial part of its
monetary value from the fact that it is novel, rare, bizarre
or because of its association with some historical figure,
period or event.
• Any person who possesses an antique firearm shall register
the same and secure a collector’s license from the FEO of the
PNP. Proper storage of antique firearm shall be strictly
imposed. Non-compliance with this provision shall be
considered as illegal possession of the firearm.
Antique firearm
• During the pendency of any case filed in violation of this law,
seized firearm, ammunition, or parts thereof shall remain in
the custody of the court.
• No bond shall be admitted for the release of the firearm,
ammunition or parts thereof, machinery, tool or instrument.
Custodia legis
• The imposition of penalty for any violation of this
law shall carry with it the accessory penalty of
confiscation and forfeiture of the firearm,
ammunition, or parts thereof in favor of the
government.
Confiscation and
forfeiture
P.D. 1866, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. 8294 REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591
(Old Firearms Law) (New Firearms Law / Comprehensive
Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act)
When another crime is also committed
The unlawful manufacture, sale, If the use of a loose firearm is inherent in
acquisition, disposition or possession of the commission of a crime punishable under
firearms or ammunition is punishable the RPC or other special laws – the use of
provided no other crime was committed loose firearm is an aggravating
(Sec.1 of P.D. 1866, as amended by R.A. circumstance. Hence, the penalty for the use
8294). What is punished is the other crime. of a loose firearm is not imposed (Sec. 29).
However, if the crime is committed by the
person without using the loose firearm, the
violation of this law shall be considered as a
distinct and separate offense (Sec. 29).
Old and new fire arms

laws, distinguished
P.D. 1866, AS AMENDED BY R.A. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591
NO. 8294 (New Firearms Law / Comprehensive
(Old Firearms Law) Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act)
When considered as an aggravating circumstance
If homicide or murder is If the use of a loose firearm is
committed with the use of inherent in the commission of a
unlicensed firearm – the use of crime punishable under the RPC or
unlicensed firearm is an aggravating other special laws – the use of loose
circumstance. firearm is an aggravating
circumstance (Sec. 29).

laws, distinguished
P.D. 1866, AS AMENDED BY R.A. NO. REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10591
8294 (New Firearms Law / Comprehensive
(Old Firearms Law) Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act)
When absorbed as an element of another crime
If the manufacture, sale, acquisition, If the use of a loose firearm is in
disposition or possession of firearms or furtherance of, or incident to, or in
explosives is in furtherance of or incident connection with the crime of (RIA):
to, or in connection with the crime of 1. Rebellion,
(RISA): 2. Insurrection, or
1. Rebellion, 3. Attempted coup d’ etat,
2. Insurrection, the violation shall be absorbed as an
3. Sedition, or element of the crime of rebellion or
4. Attempted coup d'etat, insurrection, or attempted coup d’ etat (Sec.
the violation is absorbed as an element of 29).
rebellion, or insurrection, sedition, or
attempted coup d'etat.

laws, distinguished
• People v. Luisito Gaborne, G.R. No. 210710, 27 July 2016
• Under R.A. No. 10591, use of loose firearm in the commission of a crime,
like murder, shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance.
• In view of the amendments introduced by R.A. No. 8294 and R.A. No.
10591 to Presidential Decree No. 1866, separate prosecutions for homicide
and illegal possession are no longer in order. Instead, illegal possession of
firearm is merely to be taken as an aggravating circumstance in the crime
of murder. Where murder results from the use of an unlicensed firearm,
the crime is not qualified illegal possession, but murder. In such a case,
the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a separate crime but
shall be appreciated as a mere aggravating circumstance. Thus, where
murder was committed, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms is no
longer imposable since it becomes merely a special aggravating
circumstance.

• Jacaban v. People, G.R. No. 184355, 23 March 2015
• Arnulfo Jacaban was charged with illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions under PD No. 1866, as amended by RA 8294. In his
defense, Jacaban claims that the house where the firearm was found
was not owned by him.
• The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal

possession of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the existence of subject
firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the
same does not have the corresponding license for it. The unvarying
rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunition. What the law requires is merely
possession, which includes not only actual physical possession, but
also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s
control and management.
Illegal Possession
• Jacaban v. People, G.R. No. 184355, 23 March 2015
• Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession

without the requisite authority or license, coupled with animus
possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused, conviction for
violation of the said law must follow. Animus possidendi is a state of
mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on
attendant events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or
contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances.
• Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the
items were recovered, the ownership of the house is not an essential
element of the crime under PD 1866 as amended. While petitioner may
not be the owner, he indeed had control of the house under the
circumstances.
Illegal Possession
AMENDMENTS TO JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE ACT OF 2006
(R.A. NO. 10630, AMENDING R.A. NO. 9344)
• Prior to the amendment, youth offenders who are awaiting
court disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or
jurisdiction are placed in a “Youth Detention Center.”
• The new law, RA 10630, renames the temporary housing
program, “Bahay Pag-asa” and mandates the creation of a
multidisciplinary team for the protection of children composed
of a social worker, psychologist or mental health professional,
medical doctor, educational/guidance counselor, and barangay
council representative.
Creation of Bahay-Pag-
asa
Section 4 of R.A. No. 9344 is amended as follows:
“SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – The following terms as used in this
Act shall be defined as follows:
“x x x
“(s) ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ – refers to a 24-hour child-caring institution
established, funded and managed by local government units
(LGUs) and licensed and/or accredited nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) providing short-term residential care for
children in conflict with the law who are above fifteen (15) but
below eighteen (18) years of age who are awaiting court
disposition of their cases or transfer to other agencies or
jurisdiction.
asa
“Part of the features of a ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ is an intensive
juvenile intervention and support center. This will cater to
children in conflict with the law in accordance with
Sections 20, 20-A and 20-B hereof.
“A multi-disciplinary team composed of a social worker, a

psychologist/mental health professional, a medical doctor,
an educational/guidance counselor and a Barangay Council
for the Protection of Children (BCPC) member shall
operate the ‘Bahay Pag-asa.’ The team will work on the
individualized intervention plan with the child and the
child’s family.”
asa
• Section 20-A of R.A. No. 9344, as amended, provides:
• “SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by Children Who Are
Exempt From Criminal Responsibility. – A child who is above
twelve (12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who
commits parricide, murder, infanticide, kidnapping and
serious illegal detention where the victim is killed or raped,
robbery, with homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, or
carnapping where the driver or occupant is killed or raped or
offenses under Republic Act No. 9165 (Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002) punishable by more than twelve
(12) years of imprisonment, shall be deemed a neglected child
under Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall be
mandatorily placed in a special facility within the youth care
faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ called the Intensive Juvenile
Intervention and Support Center (IJISC).
… …”
Serious crimes committed by children

who are exempt from criminal
responsibility
Thus:
• A child who is above 12 years of age up to 15 years of age
and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where the
victim is killed or raped, robbery, with homicide or rape,
destructive arson, rape, or carnapping where the driver
or occupant is killed or raped or offenses under R.A. No.
9165, punishable by more than twelve (12) years of
imprisonment, shall be deemed a neglected child and
shall be mandatorily placed in a special facility within
the youth care faculty or “Bahay Pag-asa.”

responsibility
• This is a new provision. Prior to the amendment, if the
child taken into custody is 15 years old or below, he shall
be immediately released to the custody of his parents or
guardian, regardless of the crime committed. He will not
be considered a neglected child under P.D. No. 603. It is
only when the said child is found by the Local Social
Welfare and Development Office to be abandoned,
neglected or abused, or that the parents will not comply
with the prevention program, that proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be filed by the DSWD
(Section 20 of R.A. No. 9344, as amended).

responsibility
Section 20-B is a new provision added to R.A. No. 9344, as amended:
• “SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child who is above twelve (12) years
of age up to fifteen (15) years of age and who commits an offense for the
second time or oftener: Provided, That the child was previously subjected to
a community-based intervention program, shall be deemed a neglected
child under Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended, and shall undergo an
intensive intervention program supervised by the local social welfare and
development officer: Provided, further, That, if the best interest of the child
requires that he/she be placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’,
the child’s parents or guardians shall execute a written authorization for
the voluntary commitment of the child: Provided, finally, That if the child
has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to execute the written
authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper petition for
involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the DSWD or the
LSWDO pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended.”
Repetition of offenses
• A child who is above 12 years of age up to 15 years of age and who
commits an offense for the second time or oftener shall be deemed a
neglected child and shall undergo an intensive intervention program
supervised by the local social welfare and development officer, provided
that:
• The child was previously subjected to a community-based intervention
program;
• If the best interest of the child requires that he/she be placed in a youth
care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall
execute a written authorization for the voluntary commitment of the
child; and
• If the child has no parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to
execute the written authorization for voluntary commitment, the proper
petition for involuntary commitment shall be immediately filed by the
DSWD or the LSWDO pursuant to P.D. No. 603, as amended (Sec. 20-B
of R.A. No. 9344, as amended).
Repetition of offenses
• The law would impose the maximum penalty for those who
exploit children such as syndicates, for the commission of
criminal offenses (Sec. 20-C of R.A. No. 9344, as amended).
• “SEC. 20-C. Exploitation of Children for Commission of Crimes. –
Any person who, in the commission of a crime, makes use,
takes advantage of, or profits from the use of children,
including any person who abuses his/her authority over the
child or who, with abuse of confidence, takes advantage of the
vulnerabilities of the child and shall induce, threaten or
instigate the commission of the crime, shall be imposed the
penalty prescribed by law for the crime committed in its
maximum period.”
Exploitation of children
for commission of crimes
• Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning juvenile status offenses
such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental disobedience,
anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety such as, but not limited to,
disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment, drunkenness, public
intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering,
public urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No
penalty shall be imposed on children for said violations, and they shall instead
be brought to their residence or to any barangay official at the barangay hall to
be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate intervention programs
shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded as a
‘child at risk’ and not as a ‘child in conflict with the law’. The ordinance shall
also provide for intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in
group activities for children, and for the parents, attendance in parenting
education seminars.” (Section 57-A of R.A. No. 9344, as amended)
Violations of local
ordinances
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10951
AN ACT ADJUSTING THE AMOUNT OR THE VALUE OF PROPERTY AND DAMAGE ON WHICH A
PENALTY IS BASED AND THE FINES IMPOSED UNDER THE REVISED PENAL CODE AMENDING
FOR THE PURPOSE ACT NO. 3815, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS “THE REVISED PENAL CODE,” AS
AMENDED
• Light felonies as defined under Article 9 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) are:
(a) infractions of law or the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor;
or (b) fine not exceeding Forty thousand pesos (₱40,000) or both is provided.
• Schedule of penalties under Article 26 of the RPC was revised as follows:
Penalty Under old RPC Under R.A. No. 10951
Afflictive If it exceeds If it exceeds

Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00
Correctional Php200.00 to Php40,000.00 to

Php6,000.00 Php1,200,000.00
Light Less than Php200.00 Less than Php40,000.00
Pertinent amendments to the

Revised Penal Code
• PENALTIES FOR ROBBERY UNDER ARTICLES
299 AND 302 OF THE RPC
Article Felony Under old RPC Under R.A. No. 10951
299 Robbery in an Any armed person Any armed person who

inhabited house who shall commit shall commit robbery in an
or public robbery in an inhabited house or public
building or inhabited house or building or edifice devoted
edifice devoted public building or to religious worship, shall
to worship. edifice devoted to be punished by reclusion
religious worship, temporal, if the value of the
shall be punished by property taken shall exceed
reclusion temporal, if Php50,000.00 x x x
the value of the
property taken shall
exceed Php250.00 x x
x

299 Robbery in an When the offenders do When the offenders do

inhabited house not carry arms, and the not carry arms, and the
or public value of the property value of the property
building or taken exceeds Php250.00, taken exceeds
edifice devoted the penalty next lower in Php50,000.00, the
to worship. degree shall be imposed. penalty next lower in
degree shall be imposed.
The same rule shall be The same rule shall be

applied when the applied when the
offenders are armed, but offenders are armed, but
the value of the property the value of the property
taken does not exceed taken does not exceed
Php250.00. Php50,000.00.
When said offenders do When said offenders do
not carry arms and the not carry arms and the
value of the property value of the property
taken does not exceed taken does not exceed
Php250.00, they shall Php50,000.00, they shall
suffer the penalty suffer the penalty
prescribed in the two prescribed in the two (2)
next preceding next preceding
paragraphs, in its paragraphs, in its
minimum period. minimum period.

302 Robbery in an Any robbery committed Any robbery committed in an

uninhabited place in an uninhabited place uninhabited place or in a
or in a private or in a building other building other than those
building. than those mentioned in mentioned in the first
the first paragraph of paragraph of Article 299, if the
Article 299, if the value of value of the property taken
the property taken exceeds Php50,000.00 shall be
exceeds 250 pesos, shall punished by prisión
be punished by prision correccional in its medium and
correccional if any of the maximum periods x x x
following circumstances
is present x x x
When the value of the When the value of the property

property takes does not taken does not exceed
exceed Php250.00, the Php50,000.00, the penalty next
penalty next lower in lower in degree shall be
degree shall be imposed. imposed.

• PENALTIES FOR THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 309
OF THE RPC
Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under

Old RPC R.A. No. 10951
Prision mayor in its More than Php12,000.00 but More than Php1,200,000.00
minimum and medium does not exceed but does not exceed
periods Php22,000.00 Php2,200,000.00
If the value of the thing If the value of the thing

stolen exceeds Php22,000.00 stolen exceeds
amount the penalty shall be Php2,200,000.00, the
the maximum period of penalty shall be the
prision mayor, and one maximum period of prision
year for each additional mayor, and one (1) year for
Php10,000.00, but the total each additional
of the penalty which may Php1,000,000.00, but the
be imposed shall not total of the penalty which
exceed 20 years. may be imposed shall not
exceed 20 years

Penalty Value of Property under Value of Property under
Prision correccional in its More than Php6,000.00 but More than Php600,000.00
medium and maximum does not exceed but does not exceed
periods Php12,000.00. Php1,200,00.00
Prision correccional in its More than Php200.00 but More than Php20,000.00 but
minimum and medium does not exceed does not exceed
periods Php6,000.00. Php600,000.00
Arresto mayor in its Over Php50.00 but does not over Php5,000.00 but does
medium period to prision exceed Php200.00. not exceed Php20,000.00
correccional in its
minimum period
Arresto mayor to its full Over Php5.00 but does not Over Php500.00 but does
extent exceed Php50.00 not exceed Php5,000.00
Arresto mayor in its Does not exceed Php5.00 Does not exceed Php500.00
minimum and medium
periods
PENALTIES FOR THEFT UNDER ARTICLE 309 OF THE

RPC
Penalty Value of Property under Old Value of Property under R.A.
RPC No. 10951
Arresto menor or a fine not If the theft is committed under

exceeding 200 pesos the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value
of the thing stolen does not
exceed Php5.00. If such value
exceeds said amount, the
provision of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.
Arresto menor or a fine not If the theft is committed under

exceeding Php20,000.00 the circumstances enumerated in
paragraph 3 of the next
preceding article and the value
of the thing stolen does not
exceed Php500.00. If such value
exceeds said amount, the
provisions of any of the five
preceding subdivisions shall be
made applicable.

RPC
Penalty Value of Property under Old Value of Property under R.A.
RPC No. 10951
Arresto menor in its When the value of the thing

minimum period or a fine stolen is not over Php5.00,
not exceeding Php50.00 and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of
hunger, poverty, or the
difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.
Arresto menor in its When the value of the thing

minimum period or a fine of stolen is not over Php500.00,
not exceeding Php5,000.00 and the offender shall have
acted under the impulse of
hunger, poverty, or the
difficulty of earning a
livelihood for the support of
himself or his family.

RPC
• PENALTIES FOR MALVERSATION UNDER
ARTICLE 217 OF THE RPC
Penalty Value of Property under Old RPC Value of Property under R.A. No.
10951
Prisión correccional in its medium does not exceed Php200.00 does not exceed Php40,000.00
and maximum periods
Prisión mayor in its minimum and more than Php200.00 but does not more than Php40,000.00 but does not
medium periods exceed Php6,000.00. exceed Php1,200,000.00
Prision mayor in its maximum more than Php6,000.00 but is less than more than Php1,200,000.00 but does not
period to reclusion temporal in its Php12,000.00 exceed Php2,400,000.00
minimum period

Penalty Value of Property under Old Value of Property under R.A. No.
RPC 10951
Reclusion temporal in its more than Php12,000.00 but is more than Php2,400,000.00 but
medium and maximum less than Php20,000.00 does not exceed Php4,400,000.00
periods
Reclusion temporal in its more than Php4,400,000.00 but

maximum period does not exceed Eight million
Php8,800,000.00.
Reclusion perpetua exceeds Php20,000.00 exceeds Php8,800,000.00
PENALTIES FOR MALVERSATION UNDER ARTICLE 217

OF THE RPC
• PENALTIES FOR ESTAFA UNDER ARTICLE 315
OF THE RPC
Penalty Amount of the Fraud Amount of the Fraud
under Old RPC under R.A. No. 10951
Prision correccional in its Over Php12,000.00 but over Php2,400,000.00 but

maximum period to does not exceed does not exceed Four
prision mayor in its Php22,000.00 million Php4,400,000.00
minimum period
If such amount exceeds If such amount exceeds

Php22,000.00, the penalty Php4,400,000.00, the
provided in this penalty provided in this
paragraph shall be paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum imposed in its maximum
period, adding one year period, adding one year
for each additional 10,000 for each additional
pesos; but the total Php2,000,000.00; but the
penalty which may be total penalty which may be
imposed shall not exceed imposed shall not exceed
20 years. 20 years.

Penalty Amount of the Fraud under Amount of the Fraud under
Prision correccional in its Over Php6,000.00 but does Over Php1,200,000.00 but
minimum and medium not exceed Php12,000.00 does not exceed
periods Php2,400,000.00
Arresto mayor in its Over Php200.00 but does not Over Php40,000.00 but does
maximum period to prision exceed Php6,000.00 not exceed Php1,200,000.00
correccional in its
minimum period
Arresto mayor in its Does not exceed Php200.00 Does not exceed
maximum period Php40,000.00
PENALTIES FOR ESTAFA UNDER

ARTICLE 315 OF THE RPC
The penalties and/or fines for the following crimes have been amended by R.A. No.
10951:
• Treason (Art. 114);

• Conspiracy and proposal to commit treason (Art. 115);
• Search warrants maliciously obtained and abuse in the service of those legally
obtained (Art. 129);
• Conspiracy and proposal to commit coup d’etat, rebellion or insurrection (Art. 136);
• Sedition (Art. 140);
• Conspiracy to commit sedition (Art. 141);
• Inciting to sedition (Art. 142)
• Acts tending to prevent the meeting of Congress and similar bodies (Art. 143);
• Disturbance of proceedings (Art. 144);
• Illegal associations (Art. 147);
Felonies with revised penalties under

R.A. No. 10951
• Direct assaults (Art. 148);
• Indirect assaults (Art. 149);
• Disobedience to summons issued by Congress, its committees or subcommittees, by
the Constitutional Commissions, its committees, subcommittees or divisions (Art.
150);
• Resistance and disobedience to a person in authority or the agents of such person
(Art. 151);
• Tumults and other disturbances of public order; tumultuous disturbance or
interruption liable to cause disturbance (Art. 153);
• Unlawful use of means of publication and unlawful detainer (Art 154);
• Alarms and scandals (Art. 155);
• Making and importing and uttering false coins (Art. 163);
• Mutilation of coins; importation and utterance of mutilated coins (art. 164);
• Forging treasury or bank notes or other documents payable to bearer; importing and
uttering such false or forged notes and documents (Art. 166);
• Counterfeiting, importing and uttering instruments not payable to bearer (Art. 167);
• Falsification of legislative documents (Art. 170);
• Falsification by public officer or employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister (Art.171);
• Falsification by private individual and use of falsified documents (Art. 172);
Felonies with revised penalties

under R.A. No. 10951
• False medical certificates, false certificates of merits or service, etc. (Art. 174);
• Manufacturing and possession of instruments or implements for falsification (Art. 176);
• Using fictitious name and concealing true name (Art. 178);
• False testimony against a defendant (Art. 180);
• False testimony favorable to the defendant (Art. 181);
• False testimony in civil cases (Art. 182);
• Importation and disposition of falsely marked articles or merchandise made of gold,
silver, or other precious metals or their alloys (Art. 187);
• Immoral doctrines, obscene publications and exhibitions and indecent shows (Art. 201);
• Prostitutes (Art. 202);
• Betrayal of trust by an attorney or solicitor (Art. 209);
• Frauds against the public treasury (Art. 213);
• Prohibited transactions (Art. 215);
• Possession of prohibited interest by a public officer (Art. 216);
• Malversation of public funds or property (Art. 217);
• Failure of accountable officer to render accounts (Art. 218);
• Failure of a responsible public officer to render accounts before leaving the country (Art.
219);

• Failure to make delivery of public funds or property (Art. 221);
• Removal, concealment, or destruction of documents (Art. 226);
• Officer breaking seal (Art. 227);
• Opening of closed documents (Art. 228);
• Revelation of secrets by an officer (Art. 229);
• Public officer revealing secrets of private individuals (Art. 230);
• Open disobedience (Art. 231);
• Refusal of assistance (Art. 233);
• Refusal to discharge elective office (Art. 234);
• Maltreatment of prisoners (Art. 235);
• Anticipation of duties of a public office (Art. 236);
• Prolonging performance of duties and powers (Art. 237);
• Usurpation of legislative powers (Art. 239);
• Disobeying request for disqualification (Art. 242);
• Orders or requests by executive officers to any judicial authority (Art. 243);
• Unlawful appointments (Art. 244);

• Abortion practiced by a physician (Art. 259);
• Less serious physical injuries (Art. 265);
• Slight physical injuries and maltreatment (Art. 266);
• Slight illegal detention (Art. 268);
• Unlawful arrest (Art. 269);
• Inducing a minor to abandon his home (Art. 271);
• Abandoning a minor (Art. 276);
• Abandonment of minor by person entrusted with his custody: indifference of
parents (Art. 277);
• Exploitation of minors (Art. 278);
• Qualified trespass to dwelling (Art. 280);
• Other forms of trespass (Art. 281);
• Grave threats (Art. 282);
• Other light threats (Art. 285);
• Grave coercions (Art. 286);
• Light coercions (Art. 287);
• Other similar coercions (Art. 288);
• Formation, maintenance and prohibition of combination of capital or labor through
violence or threats (Art. 289);

• Discovering secrets through seizure of correspondence (Art. 290);
• Revealing secrets with abuse of office (Art. 291);
• Revelation of industrial secrets (Art. 292);
• Robbery in an inhabited house or public building or edifice
devoted to worship (Art. 299);
• Robbery in an uninhabited place or in a private building (Art.
302);
• Theft (Art. 309);
• Theft of the property of the National Library and National
Museum (Art. 311);
• Occupation of real property or usurpation of real rights in
property (Art. 312);
• Altering boundaries or landmarks (Art. 313);
• Swindling (Art. 315);
• Other deceits (Art. 318);

• Special cases of malicious mischief (Art. 328);
• Other mischiefs (Art. 329);
• Destroying or damaging statues (Art. 331);
• Simulation of births, substitution of one child for another and
concealment or abandonment of a legitimate child (Art. 347);
• Libel by means of writing or similar means (Art. 355);
• Threatening to public and offer to prevent such publication for
a compensation (Art. 356);
• Prohibited publication of acts referred to in the course of
official proceedings (Art. 357);
• Slander (Art. 358);
• Slander by deed (Art. 359);
• Intriguing against honor (Art. 364); and
• Imprudence and negligence (Art. 365).

Thank you!

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Updates in Criminal Law

Atty. Ramon S. Esguerra

Robbery with homicide

Robbery with homicide

Robbery with homicide

• Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of:

• As established by the Court:

• Ideally, Clemente and Inocencio should have been indicted

• Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an

• The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected

• Dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the law

• In such a case, the use of the unlicensed firearm is not considered as a

• There are two kinds of complex crime. The first is known as a

• A different rule governs where separate and distinct acts result in a

When not a Complex crime

When not a Complex crime

• Petitioner was a public officer, holding the position of Local

Malversation of public funds

Malversation of public funds

Malversation of public funds

Malversation of public funds

Malversation of public funds

• In doing so, we have hinged on the impression that no young

• In this way, we can evaluate the testimony of a private

• It is settled that a person, for the same acts, may be

• The elements of estafa are: (1) the accused defrauded

• When the element of misappropriation or conversion is

Bouncing Checks Law

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A. No.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.

Dangerous Drugs Act (R.A.

Dangerous Drugs Act

Special Protection of Children Against

• Acts of lasciviousness under Art. 336 if the act of lasciviousness

Special Protection of Children Against

Special Protection of Children Against

Special Protection of Children Against

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016

• Difference between acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the

• Based on the language of Section 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016

• Correlatively, Sec. 5(a) of R.A. No. 7610 punishes acts pertaining to or

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016

Esguerra, Updates in Criminal Law 2016

• AAA was called by Escalante and was pulled into a comfort

R.A. No. 7610

R.A. No. 7610

R.A. No. 7610

Plunder (R.A. No. 7080)

Plunder (R.A. No. 7080)

Plunder (R.A. No. 7080)

• As regards the allegation of conspiracy