Professional Documents
Culture Documents
2
Objectives
• Investigate the extent to which renewable
distributed electricity generation can help
address transmission constraints
• Determine performance characteristics for
generation, transmission and renewable
technology
• Identify locations within system where
sufficient renewable generation can
effectively address transmission problems
3
Objectives
• We want to determine the impact of large-
scale distributed projects on grid security.
• We need to:
– Identify weak transmission elements and
define metrics that assess system security.
– Find locations where new generation would
enhance the security of the grid.
– Combine maps of beneficial locations with
maps of energy resources.
4
Methodology
• Simulation
– Power Flow
– Contingency Analysis
• Security Metrics
• Results
– Weak Elements
– Security Indices
– Visualization
5
Power flow Simulation
• Identify weak elements in the system by
simulating impacts from lost transmission
or capacity (NERC N-1 contingency)
• More importantly, can identify locations in
system where new generation can provide
grid reliability benefits.
6
Normal Operation Example
1
00M
W 1
10MW
40M
var
System does not 3
3MW A
3
2MW
8
0M
3
0M
W
v
ar
T
hre
e
have normal O
1
n
.0
e
5pu
MVA
0
.99
30p
u A
5
8MW
operation thermal 6
7MW
5
7MW
82% F
our
MVA
violations
2
1MW
A 1
.00p
u
4
0MW A
1
1MW
2
0Mv
ar
MVA 1
50M
W
MVA
A 2
3MW
6
7MW 2
1MW MVA A
1
1MW MVA
T
w o
1
.04p
u A
2
3M W
Fiv
e
2
3MW 6
6MW MVA 6
5MW
1
.01p
u
5
0MW 4
2MW
A A 1
30MW
40M
var
MVA 87%
2
00MW MVA
0M
var 2
3MW
2
9MW A 2
8MW 4
3MW
Se
ven
S
ix MVA
2
9MW 2
8MW 1
.04p
u
1
.04p
u A
MVA 2
00MW
2
80M
W
1
87M
W 0M
var
7
Contingency Example
1
00M
W 1
10MW Suppose there is a fault
40M
var
5
5MW
A
5
3MW
and this line is 8300M
M
v
W
ar
83%
Then this line gets One
MVA
T
hree
disconnected
1
.05pu 0
.96
75pu
overloaded 0M W
A
0M
W
F
our
(is a weak element) MVA
4
5MW
A 5
6MW 1
.00p
u
A
M
VA
A
4
5MW 5
8MW MVA
system 2
5MW
95%
T
w o MVA
1
.04p
u A
4
3M W
Fiv
e
3
0MW 5
2MW MVA 5
1MW
1
.01p
u
5
0MW 3
6MW
A A 1
30MW
40M
var
83%
Planning Solutions: 2
00MW
MVA
MVA
0M
var 3
0MW
New line to bus 3 2
5MW A 2
4MW 3
7MW
S
eve
n
OR S
ix
2
5MW
MVA
2
4MW 1
.04p
u
1
.04p
u
New generation
A
MVA 2
00MW
2
80M
W
at bus 3 1
88M
W 0M
var
8
Contingency Analysis
• Security is determined by the ability of the
system to withstand equipment failure.
• Weak elements are those that present
overloads in the contingency conditions
(congestion).
• Standard approach is to perform a single
(N-1) contingency analysis simulation.
• A ranking method will be demonstrated to
prioritize transmission planning.
9
Results Organized by
Lines, then Contingencies
Then multiply
by limit to get
the Aggregate
MW
Contingency
Overload
(AMWCO)
10
Weak Element Visualization
100 MW 110 MW
40 Mvar
80 MW
33 MW A
32 MW 30 Mvar
Three
One MVA
1.05 pu 0.9930 pu A
57 MW 58 MW
82% Four
67 MW 21 MW
MVA
A
1.00 pu
40 MW A
11 MW
20 Mvar
MVA
MVA
150 MW
A 23 MW
67 MW 21 MW MVA
A
Two 11 MW MVA
1.04 pu A
23 MW
Five
23 MW 66 MW MVA 65 MW
1.01 pu
50 MW 42 MW
A A 130 MW
40 Mvar
MVA 87%
200 MW
0 Mvar 23 MW
29 MW 28 MW 43 MW
MVA
AMWCO
A
Seven
28
Six
21
MVA
29 MW 28 MW 1.04 pu
1.04 pu A
MVA 200 MW
14
280 MW
187 MW 0 Mvar
7
0
11
Determination of Good Locations
Sink
New Source
12
Determination of Good Locations
• Generation could be located to produce
counter-flows that mitigate weak element
contingency overloads.
• The new injection of power requires
decreasing generation somewhere else.
– A good assumption is that generation will be
decreased across the system or each control
area using participation factors.
13
TLR for Normal Operation
• Need to know how the new generation at a
certain bus will impact the flows in a
transmission element.
→ Transmission Loading Relief (TLR)
ΔMWFlow BRANCH jk
TLR BUS i ,BRANCH jk =
ΔMWInjection BUS i
→ Since a TLR is calculated for every bus, the
TLR can be used to rank locations that
would be beneficial for security.
14
Specify the sink
of the transfer
Sensitivities are
calculated for each bus
15
TLR for Contingencies
• Need to consider contingencies
• Contingency Transmission Loading Relief
(TLR) Sensitivity is the change in the flow
of a line due to an injection at a bus
assuming a contingency condition.
16
Determination of Good Locations
• Equivalent TLR (ETLR):
ETLR BUS i = � �
jk �Overloaded Contingencies that
TLR BUS i ,BRANCH jk ,CONT c
= �
v �Contingent
TLR BUS i ,CONTVIOL v
Violations
17
Determination of Good Locations
• Weighted TLR (WTLR) using post-
contingency TLRs: CODir � CONTVIOL v �
N CONTVIOL � �
WTLR BUS i = � �
SysAMWCO v �Contingent
�
�
�
TLR BUS i ,CONTVIOL v
�
�
Violations
�
�MWCO CONTVIOL v �
18
Weighted TLR (WTLR)
• Complexity: A TLR is computed for each bus, to
mitigate a weak element, under a contingency.
• We want a single “weighted” TLR for each bus.
Contingencies
WTLR
Weak Elements
Buses
Buses
19
Calculating WTLRs
• The contingency information (severity and
number) of a weak element can be captured by
calculating the Aggregate MW Contingency
Overload (AMWCO).
• This effectively converts the cube to a table.
Contingencies
Weak Elements
Weak Elements
Buses
Buses
20
Calculating WTLRs
• Need to mitigate the weakest elements first
• Weight the TLR by the weakness of each
element, which is given by the AMWCO.
Buses Buses
21
Meaning of the WTLR
• A WTLR of 0.5 at a bus means that 1MW of new
generation injected at the specific bus is likely to
reduce 0.5 MW of overload in transmission
elements during contingencies.
• Thus, if we inject new generation at high impact
buses, re-dispatch the system, and rerun the
contingencies, the overloads will decrease.
• Note that the units of the WTLR are:
[MW Contingency Overload]
[MW Installed]
22
Large Case Example
• Project for the California Energy
Commission (CEC).
– Needed to simulate N-1 contingencies (about
6,000 for California)
– Simulation developed for 2003, 2005, 2007
and 2017 summer peak cases.
– In 2003, there were 170 violating
contingencies, 255 contingency violations, and
146 weak elements.
23
Process Overview
Test Power
Identify Evaluate
Injections
Weak Locations
at Select
Elements (WTLR)
Locations
GIS Overlay
D EL N O RTE
SISKIYO U
MO D O C
H UM BO LD T
SH ASTA
LASSEN
TRIM ITY
TE
H A MA
PL
U M AS
GLEN N
BUTTE
M EN D O CH IN O
SIERRA
LAKE
CO LUSA YUBA
N EVAD A
SUTTER
Power
PLACER
YO N O
SO N O M A
N APA
EL D O RAD O
SACRAM EN TO
AL
P IN E
SO LAN O
AM AD O R
M ARIN
CALAVE R
AS
SAN JO AQ UIN
C O NT R
A C O STA
TO ULUM N E
ALAM E D A
MO N O
STAN I S
L A
US
SAN M ATEO
PWR 1
PWR 1
PWR 1
Flow Cases
M ARIPO SA
SAN TA CRUZ
SAN TA CLARA
M ERCED
M AD ERA
IN YO
FRESN O
M O N TERREY TULARE
KIN GS
KERN
SAN TA BARBARA
L O S AN GELES
O RAN GE
RIVERSID E
SAN D IEGO
I MP
E RIAL
24
Result: Weak Element
Distribution
400
250
200
150
100
50
# Weak Elements
0
0 20 40 60 80 100 120 140 160 180 200 220 240
25
Identification of Weak Elements
2007 2017
The spatial
distribution of
weak elements
seems to
follow an
identifiable
pattern.
26
Good Locations
DE
LNOR
TE
S
ISK
IYOU
MODOC
HU
M B
OLDT
S
HAS
TA
L
ASSE
N
TR
IMIT
Y
B
UTT
E
P
LUMA
S
LA
KE Y
UBA
C
OLU
SA
NEV
ADA
S
UTT
ER
PL
ACE
R
NA
PA
ELDOR
ADO
SA
CRA
M E
NTO
A
LPI
NE
S
OLA
N O
A
M A
DOR
MA
RIN
overloads.
C
ALA
VER
AS
S
ANJ
OAQUIN
C
ONT
RAC
O S
TA
T
O U
LUMNE
A
LAME
DA
MONO
ST
ANIS
LAU
S
S
ANMA
TEO
PWR1
MA
RIP
O S
A
S
ANT
ACR
UZ
SA
N T
ACL
ARA
ME
RCE
D
M
ADE
RA
INY
O
F
RESNO
MONT
ERR
EY TU
LAR
E
SA
NLUISOBI
S P
O
overloads. S
ANT
ABA
RBA
RA
K
ERN
LOSA
N G
ELE
S
R
IVE
RSIDE
system security. S
ANDIE
GO
IMPE
RIA
L
27
Local WTLR Visualization
EBM UD GRY
D O M TAR
FIBRJCT1
EST PRTL
UCB JCT1
WN D M STR
LKWD BART
FIBREBRD FIBRJCT2
LK_REACT FIBRBJCT
FLO WIN D 2
UCB SUB LAKEWD -C
STATIN D M O RAGA
O AKLN D 23 RO SSM O O R
STATIN L
CONTRA COSTA
CLARM N T D UBLIN
O AK C115 M O RSTA21
STATIN X
RO SSTAP2
MO RSTA31 M RAGA 3M
M O RSTA41
EM BRCD RD
M O RAGA
EM BRCD RE M RAGA 1M
ALAM ED CT
M ARITIM E
CARTWRT
N _LVM O RE
JEN N Y
D ELTAPM P
SL BART SN LN D RO TASSAJAR
H J H EIN Z
STATIN J JV EN TER
D M TAR_SL
ED ESTAP1
ED ES
ED S GRN T
LEPRIN O
TRACY JC
TRAM AX11
TCY M P2
O WN BRKWY
O WEN STAP
TRACY
TRACY
LLN L
UAL CO GN
UAL TAP
D ALY CTY TES JCT LLN LAB TCH RT_T2
TCH RT_T1
TCH RTJCT
CV BART
D LY CTYP
SFIA
GRAN T
CASTRO VL
SFIA-M A
SERRM N TE TESLA JB
LS PSTAS
O WEN STP1
TESLA E
EASTSH RE
SAN PIT11
O I GLASS
TESLA
M ILLBRAE TESLA
SAN M ATEO
AEC_TP2
ALAMEDA
AEC_JCT
SAN M ATEO
SAN M AR12
TESLA JA TH . E. D V.
BURLN GM E JV BART
M ARTIN C
M ARTIN C
EST GRN D
SMATEO 3M
BAYSH O R2
BAY M D WS
AD CC
BAYSH O R1 JARVIS
BELM O N T
LARKIN D
LARKIN F
LARKIN E FREMN T
D UM BARTN
H N TRS PT
BAIR
CRTEZ
M O CCASIN
N UM I JCT
N UM I TAP
RAVEN SWD
H ILM AR
N EWARK F
M ISSO N
PO TRERO
SH RED JCT O AKD LTID
N EWARK E
RAVEN SWD
N EWARK D
N EWN EW11
TUO LUM N
PIN EER
N WRK 2 M
JEFFERSN
KIFER
LS N WK12 N O RTH ERN
SH RED D ER AGN EW J
N UM M I
CLY LN G2
N EWARK D LS N WK11
SCO TT
N WK D IST LS N WK13
AGN EW
N EWARK E
LO N ESTAR
S. L.A. C.
AM ES BS2
AM ES J1A N O RTECH
AM ES D ST ZN KER J1
SLACTAP1 FM C JCT
D IXO N LD
M ILPITAS
M O FT. FLD
PLO ALTO M FT. FD J
WTLR
LCKH D J2
LCKH D J1
M T VIEW
SAN MATEO
M ABURY J
WH ISM AN
M O N TAGUE
LO CKH D 2
M ABURY
TRIM BLE
LO CKH D 1 LAWREN CE
AM D JCT
WAUKESH A
SJ B E SN ELP11
A. M . D
APP M AT w aksha j
PH LPS_JT
LS ESTRS
PH ILLIPS SJ B F
ELPT_SJ1
EL ELP11
LS ESTRS
STELLIN G
ELPT_SJ2 SN JSE A
BRITTN
M O N TAVIS EL PATIO
WO LFE
M CKEE
IBM -BALY
IBM -CTLE
STO N E
SWIFT
ED N VL J3 ED N VL J1
M ARKH AM M ARKH M J2
STO N E J
SARATO GA
IBM -H R J
ED EN VALE
BAILY J2 MARKH M J
BAILY J1
PIERCY
VASO N A
BAILY J3
GILRO Y
EVRM TC21
M TCALF D
EVRGRN 2
CAL M EC M TCALF E
H ICKS
M TCEVR11
M ETCALF
CYTE PM P
M ETCALF
CM P EVRS
M ETLS 11
M ETLS 12
M ETLS 13
28
Eastern Interconnection
WTLR
1.50
0.75
0.00
–0.75
–1.50
29
Towards a Locational Value
• Determination of locations where new
generation would enhance security needs to
be combined with availability and
economics of energy resources.
• Valuation requires monetizing the security
benefits.
30
Towards a Locational Value
• GIS spatial analysis techniques are needed
to determine feasible generation
alternatives for each location in a large-
scale system.
ci � �= cost of least-cost alternative gij
� �
$
MW
32
Security-Penetration Curves
• Once a set of proposed sites is defined, the
effect of simultaneous distributed injections
with different levels of penetration can be
simulated using security-penetration
curves.
• The effectiveness of the solution is affected
for large injections due to:
– Local transfer capability of the grid
– Reversed flows
33
Security-Penetration Curves
SysAMWCO in 2005
12,000
10,000
8,000 69
500
6,000 115
230
4,000
2,000
0
0 650 1300 2000 New Generation
34
Policy Analysis
• A fundamental goal of integrated electricity
systems is to ensure dependable supply to
customers.
• This goal cannot be achieved if the system
consistently exhibits overloaded elements and
congestion.
• System AMWCO can be utilized to:
– Evaluate system security for different seasons/years
– Design policy goals regarding security
• Can use security-penetration curves
35
Policy Analysis
AMWCO
2007 2005 2003
14000
Indicates the effect of new generation
Approx. -3.5 MWCO/MW Installed
NewGen
12000 Indicates how much generation
AMWCO
is needed to maintain the
current
10000
level of reliability.
Approx. 500MW every two years
(at strategic locations)
8000
6000
4000
2000
0
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
New Generation
36
Policy Analysis
AMWCO
2007 2005 2003
AMWCO
14000 2007 2005 2003
14000
8000 8000
7300
6000
6000
4000
4000
2000
Generation needed in the next two
2000 years (2005) to solve the problems
by 02017. Approx. 950MW
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
0 New Generation
0 250 500 750 1000 1250 1500 1750 2000
New Generation
37
Integrated Model
Transmission Energy
Policy Policy
38