AODV and DSR Routing Protocols Under Wormhole Attack Environment

PRESENTED BY

Om Prakash Verma Roll. No. 1600669

UNDER THE GUIDENCE OF

Asst. lect. Miss Anupama Tiwari

Department of Computer Science Engineering Graphic Era Institute of Technology Dehradun
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OUTLINE
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Introduction MANET MANET Routing Protocols AODV and DSR Routing Protocols DSR vs.AODV Attacks on AODA and DSR Wormhole Attack Conclusion References

Introduction
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MANET is a wireless network communication nodes.

consisting of a collection of

Several technical challenges regarding deployment of a MANET such as network scalability , communication stability, energy consumption, security and quality of services. Detailed discusses on AODV. Attack on AODV and DSR . Wormhole attack on AODA & DSR and also avoiding technique wormhole attack.

MANET
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A system of mobile nodes connected with each other via wireless medium without infrastructure support The mobile nodes can move while communicating No fixed base stations Nodes in a MANET operate both as hosts as well as routers to forward packets.

y y y

Fig. 1.An example of MANET

Classification of Ad-Hoc Networks

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On the basis of the number of hopes:

o Single hop ad-hoc networks o Multihop ad-hoc networks

Fig. 2.1 Single hop ad-hoc network

Fig. 2.2 Multihop ad-hoc network

Design Issues and Constraints

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Infrastructure less Dynamically changing network topologies Variation in link and node capabilities Energy constrained operation Network security Network scalability Quality of services

MANET ROUTING PROTOCOLS

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To discover correct and efficient route establishment between a pair of nodes

MANET routing protocols are classified as:

o Proactive routing protocols (Table driven) o Reactive routing protocols (On demand protocols) o Hybrid protocols

Dynamic Source Routing (DSR)

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Based on the concept of source routing Every generated data packet carries the rout information in its packet header. When node S wants to send a packet to node D, but does not know a route to D, node S initiates a route discovery. Source node S floods Route Request (RREQ) Each node appends own identifier when forwarding RREQ Destination node D reply via reverse path through which RREQ packet was transmitted.

Dynamic Source Routing Contd

Fig. 3. Route discovery in DSR

Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector OnRouting (AODV)

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AODV is Reactive routing protocol . The AODV protocol is an on-demand routing protocol, which initiates a route discovery process only when desired by an originating node. AODV attempts to improve on DSR by maintaining routing tables at the nodes. Data packets do not have to contain routes. On-demand routing protocols have two processes- Route Discovery. - Route Maintenance.

Route Discovery Massage

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The basic message set consists of:RREQ Route request RREP Route reply RERR Route error HELLO For link status monitoring

Route Maintenance
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Route maintenance by following routing table items . Destination IP Destination Sequence Number Hop Count to Destination (cost per hope = 1) Next Hop Lifetime Last Hop Count Routing Flags Interface (i.e. eth0, eth1) List of Precursors

y y y y y y y y y

Message Routing
SOURCE A RREP DESTNATION RREP B RREQ D RREP F E

Fig-4 . Route discovery in AODV

WIRELESS LINK REPLAY MASG.

RREQ- ROUTE REQEST MASSAGE RREP- ROUTE REQEST REPLAY MASSAGE

DSR vs. AODV

First, by feature of source routing, DSR has access to a significantly greater amount of routing information than AODV. Second, DSR uses routing cache aggressively, and maintains multiple routes per destination. AODV uses one route per destination. Third The current specification of DSR does not contain any explicit mechanism to expire musty routes in the cache, or prefer fresher routes when faced with multiple choices. Fourth, DSR does not rely on any timer-based activities, but AODV does.

Attacks on AOVD &DSR

Wormhole attack Two attackers, connected by a high-speed off-channel link. Sinkhole attack Hello flood attack. Black hole attacks A malicious node sends a false RREP packet to a source node that initiated the route discovery. Misbehavior Atomic Misuses of RREQ Messages Atomic Misuses of RREP Messages Atomic Misuses of RERR Messages Atomic Misuses of RREP-ACK Messages

o o o o

Wormhole Attack
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Two attackers, connected by a high-speed off-channel link Attacking nodes tunnel packets received in one place of the network to a distant location The tunnel can be established in many different ways, such as through an out-of-band hidden channel (e.g., a wired link), packet encapsulation, or high powered transmission. Attacker can tunnel a request packet RREQ directly to the destination node without increasing the hop-count value

RREQ THROUGH WORMHOLE

RREQ

A S O U R C E

-------------------------------------------------------------RREP THROUGH WORMHOLE

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RREP

B REQR
X,Y MAILCIOUS NODE. RREQ MASSAGE. RREQ THROUGH WORM HOLE .

E RREQ

D E S T I D N A T I O N

RREP THROUGH WORMHOLE. WHORMHOLE TUNNEL LINK .

Fig. 5.Wormhole Tunneling .

Wormhole Attack Classification

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Open Wormhole attack:In this type of wormhole, the attackers include themselves in the RREQ packet header following the route discovery procedure. Other nodes are aware that the malicious nodes lie on the path but they would think that the malicious nodes are direct neighbours. Closed Wormhole Attack: The attackers do not modify the content of the packet, even the packet in a route discovery packet. Instead, they simply tunnel the packet form one side of wormhole to another side and it rebroadcasts the packet. Half open wormhole attack: One side of wormhole does not modify the packet and only another side modifies the packet.

Solutions
All nodes in the MANET can obtain authenticated symmetric key of every other node. The receiver can authenticate information like time and location from the received packet. y Time of Flight is a technique used for prevention of wormhole attacks. y Directional Antennas are a good solution for wormhole detection for networks relying on directional antennas. If the directions of both pair match, then and then the relation is set . y Other types of techniques like LiteWorp, Localization and Network Visualization are also very useful in detecting wormhole attacks in wireless networks
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Average end-to-end delay end-toy

Variation with number of nodes:

o Average end-to-end delay is very small. o Because wormhole attack provides a fast and longer range directional link for all the traffics from source to destination.

Variation with tunnel length :

o Average end-to-end delay is very small and further decreases on increasing the tunnel length. o On increasing tunnel length attackers become nearer to the source and destination and performance of both protocols improves as compared to shorter tunnel length.

Frames dropped & Average throughput

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Variation with number of nodes:

o frames dropped by wormhole attackers increases in case of both routing protocols.

Variation with tunnel length:

o On varying tunnel length frames dropped by wormhole attackers increases in case of both routing protocols.

Variation with number of nodes:

o On increasing number of nodes throughput decreases in case of both routing protocols.

Variation with tunnel length:

o On increasing tunnel length throughput decreases in case of both routing protocols

CONCLUSION
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source routing, DSR has access to a significantly greater amount of routing information than AODV From the all analyses it can be said that for small number of nodes performance of AODV is better. As no. of nodes increases, for AODV protocol, routing overhead in the network increases in large amount. Hence performance for AODV decreases with large network. The effect of wormhole attack is more for DSR than AODV protocol.

References
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Djamel Djenouri and Lyes Khelladi, A Survey of Security Issues In Mobile Ad Hoc And Sensor Networks,IEEE COMMUNICATIONS surveys and tutorials, Volume 7, no. 4, Fourth Quarter 2005. Hoang Lan Nguyen, Uyen Trang Nguyen, A study of different types of attacks on multicast in mobile ad hoc networks in: Proceedings of IEEE ,Ad Hoc Networks 6, pp. 3246 ,August 2006. G. K. Singh, H. S. Bindra and A. L. Sangal, Performance Analysis of DSR, AODV Routing Protocols based on Wormhole Attack in Mobile Ad-hoc Network, International Journal of Computer Applications,Volume 26, no.5, pp. 38-41, July 2011. V. Sharma and A. Baghel, Analysis of AODV and DSR in Presence of Wormhole Attack in Mobile Ad-hoc Network, International Journal of Engineering Science and Technology, vol. 2, no.11, pp. 6657-6662, April 2010. Y.C. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Ariadne: A secure on demand routing protocol for ad hoc networks, in: Proceedings of ACM MobiCom 2002, Atlanta, Georgia, September 2002.

References Contd
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K. P. Manikandan, R. Satyaprasad, K. Rajasekhararao, A Survey on Attacks and Defense Metrics of Routing Mechanism in Mobile Ad hoc Networks, (IJACSA) International Journal of Advanced Computer Science and Applications, vol. 2, no.3, pp. 7-12, March 2011. R. H. Jhaveri, A. D. Patel, J. D. Parmar, B. I. Shah, MANET Routing Protocols and Wormhole Attack against AODV (IJCSNS) International Journal of Computer Science and Network Security,Vol. 10, no. 4,April 2010. C.E. Perkins, E.M. Royer, S.R. Das, Ad hoc on demand distance vector (AODV) routing, in: Proceedings of IEEE WMCSA99, New Orleans, LA, February 1999. Y.C. Hu, A. Perrig, D.B. Johnson, Rushing attacks and defense in wireless ad hoc network routing protocols, in: Proceedings of ACM WiSe 2003, San Diego, CA, September 2003. D. Johnson, D. Maltz, Dynamic Source Routing in Ad Hoc Wireless Networks, Mobile Computing, Kluwer Academic Publishers., Norwell, MA, 1996, pp. 153181.